

# SITUATION IN BOSNIA

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Situation in Bosnia, S. Hrg. 104-587... **INGS**

BEFORE THE

## COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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JUNE 7, 8, 14, 15; SEPTEMBER 29; OCTOBER 17; NOVEMBER 28;  
DECEMBER 6, 1995

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Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



LEGISLATIVE

NOV 27 1996



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## SITUATION IN BOSNIA

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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 7, 1995

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 p.m., in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Thurmond, Warner, Cohen, McCain, Lott, Coats, Smith, Kempthorne, Hutchison, Inhofe, Nunn, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Glenn, Byrd, Robb, Lieberman, and Bryan.

Committee staff members present: Richard L. Reynard, staff director; George W. Lauffer, deputy staff director; Melinda M. Koutsoumpas, chief clerk; Ann M. Mittermeyer, assistant counsel; and Christine K. Cimko, press secretary.

Professional staff members present: Charles S. Abell, Romie L. Brownlee, Thomas G. Moore, Cord A. Sterling, and Eric H. Thømmes.

Minority staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, minority staff director; Richard D. DeBobs, counsel; and Richard E. Combs, Jr., professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Pamela L. Farrell, Shelley G. Lauffer, Jason Rossbach, Deasy Wagner, and Alec Bierbauer.

Committee members' assistants present: Judith A. Ansley, assistant to Senator Warner; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Ann E. Sauer and Walter Lohman, assistants to Senator McCain; Samuel D. Adcock, assistant to Senator Lott; Richard F. Schwab and David J. Gribbin, assistant to Senator Coats; Thomas L. Lankford, assistant to Senator Smith; Glen E. Tait, assistant to Senator Kempthorne; Patricia L. Stolnacker, assistant to Senator Santorum; Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; David A. Lewis, assistant to Senator Levin; Steven A. Wolfe, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Patricia J. Buckheit, assistant to Senator Glenn; C. Richard D'Amato Lisa W. Tuite, assistants to Senator Byrd; William Owens, assistant to Senator Robb; John F. Lilley, assistant to Senator Lieberman; and Randall A. Schieber, assistant to Senator Bryan.

### OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND, CHAIRMAN

Chairman THURMOND. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets today to consider recent developments in Bosnia and to receive testimony on the changes in U.S. policy to-

ward the escalating conflict. I am pleased to welcome Secretary of Defense Perry and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili. As always, we are honored to have you gentlemen appear before the committee.

You both are bearing a heavy burden as the crisis deepens. The issues we are considering are matters of life and death, and have serious implications for the welfare of the United States and our allies. But the burden is not yours alone. Congress also plays a role in deciding on the response to a crisis that might involve American forces. It is vital for all of us to understand the choices before us, and, if possible, to reach agreement about how to proceed.

I remain deeply concerned about the path the administration appears to be taking in Bosnia. I have consistently said that U.S. military intervention is to be avoided. There could be no Western-imposed military solution to this conflict between ancient enemies with deep historical, cultural, and religious hatreds.

Mr. Secretary, you and other officials from the Defense Department have briefed us several times on Operations Plan 4104, NATO's plan to withdraw U.N. forces from Bosnia, if it becomes necessary. I believe most members of Congress support this plan. If implemented, we understand it would be a NATO operation, with no dual-key command arrangement, and with sufficient force to deter or defeat any attempt to interfere. It would be limited in scope to getting all U.N. troops out of Bosnia.

However, last week in Colorado, President Clinton seemed to propose an additional NATO mission to assist in the reconfiguring and consolidation of UNPROFOR. That is a major shift from a withdrawal operation. In a subsequent statement, the President appears to have backed away from the suggestion made in Colorado, but now the U.S. is poised to assist the French and British and deploy a rapid reaction force in Bosnia that would reinforce UNPROFOR, and so confusion remains.

I believe the administration is stumbling towards greater involvement in Bosnia without a coherent policy or clear strategy. If confusion exists among the Nation's top leaders, it will inevitably result in confusion at the operational level and cause unnecessary loss of life, as the shooting down of our F-16 pilot last week attests. I agree that we have an obligation to our allies, and have said so on many occasions. President Clinton remarked last week that we cannot leave our allies in the lurch. This is true. However, that does not mean the United States must join them in the lurch. The best way to meet our obligations to our allies is to cover the withdrawal of the U.N. troops from Bosnia. But if our allies persist in a course of action that is doomed to fail, we should consider ourselves free of any obligation to join them.

If Congress agreed to support a U.S. and NATO mission to help UNPROFOR consolidate its posture, that would perpetuate the U.N.'s presence in Bosnia. It would also force U.S. and NATO forces to operate under the U.N., which is a root problem in the current approach. The administration's policy is clearly committed to keeping UNPROFOR in Bosnia. The administration seems to think that if UNPROFOR withdraws, that the responsibility for whatever happens next will fall on the United States. I do not agree. The world community has tried, but failed, to keep a non-

existent peace through the U.N. But that is not the fault of the United States.

If the administration fears a military or humanitarian catastrophe after the U.N.'s departure, then the administration ought to insist on ending the arms embargo. Let the Bosnians acquire the means to defend themselves, get supplies into their isolated enclaves, and perhaps even create a balance of power that will lead to a negotiated settlement. The administration's current problems flow from an underlying policy that subordinates America's actions and interests to the U.N. military operations in Bosnia based on this flawed policy are bound to be flawed as a result. Despite the best of intentions, the U.N. mission in Bosnia has failed, failed to meet its own mandates, and failed to protect its own troops. Increasing the U.N. presence in Bosnia will only complicate matters further and prolong the agony.

Furthermore, it is a serious mistake to subordinate NATO to the U.N. in any way, out of a misguided desire to salvage the U.N.'s lost credibility. That will only result in harm to NATO's credibility. Moreover, if the American people see their loved ones getting drawn into combat in Bosnia by our allies, but for no clear American interests, the resulting backlash will cause greater harm to the alliance than America's reluctance to intervene.

The Bosnian crisis confronts us with critical choices, and perhaps none of them are good. But we must choose the options that will best serve America's national interests, and not impose unnecessary risk to U.S. personnel.

I look forward to hearing from Dr. Perry and General Shalikashvili. I hope you will reassure the committee and the American people that we are not being dragged into Bosnia in the wrong way and for the wrong reasons. Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili, I know your time with us is limited because you have to testify in the House early this afternoon. For this reason, I am requesting that members make very brief opening statements. At this time I will now recognize the distinguished ranking member, Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for arranging this very timely hearing to ensure that the committee is kept up to date on the evolving and developing situation in Bosnia, as well as the operational planning and actions that are being prepared for continued presence or withdrawal of the United Nations Protection Force from Bosnia, should that prove necessary. I welcome both Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili this morning.

I am particularly interested, and I know all of our committee and our colleagues in the Senate and the American people are interested, in the role the United States would play either if the U.N. forces and NATO forces stay in Bosnia or if they are withdrawn at some point in the weeks and months ahead. So we welcome both of our witnesses this morning. Their testimony, coming a few days after their attendance at the meeting of defense ministers and military chiefs of NATO and the European Union Countries, is very timely.

Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, in his report to the U.N. Security Council on May 30, laid out in some detail the difficult situa-

tion confronting the United Nations Protection Force, or UNPROFOR, in Bosnia. The basic difficulty lies primarily in what this committee was told in testimony almost 3 years ago by Gen. Lewis McKinsey of the Canadian Army, who was the first UNPROFOR commander in Bosnia, who told us at that time, "you have a peacekeeping force for the first time in history that does not have a peace to keep."

That is the fundamental problem we have had there for the last several years. We have a humanitarian mission in there that is really caught in the middle of a conflict, an armed conflict, and the two roles have been incompatible, and they are also incompatible, having, in effect, hostages there while you are trying to carry out some leverage with possible military strikes. So it is a very difficult situation, and in this situation the U.N. forces are more often viewed by some of the antagonists as hostages and targets, rather than peacekeepers and humanitarian mission personnel.

Based upon the Majority Leader Senator Dole's floor statement yesterday, Mr. Chairman, the Senate will soon be considering legislation or a Sense of the Senate Resolution, depending on the exact proposal, relating to the future role of the U.S. forces in and around Bosnia and related issues.

Mr. Chairman, I agree with much of what you said, but I do think we have to put it into context that the U.N. is not everybody but the United States. Both in the Bush administration and in the Clinton administration, to the best of my knowledge, every single action taken by the Security Council regarding Bosnia was with our vote and our approval. So what has happened now we bear some responsibility for, and I think that is important to keep in mind as our allies find themselves in a very difficult situation. This is not just a situation of Bosnia. We have had British and French and other allies fighting with us in virtually every conflict we have had since World War II, and when they make mistakes, when they are in difficulties, I do not think it is time for us to say simply that it is your problem.

We are an alliance. We are in a NATO alliance. We have been in it a long time. It is the most successful alliance in history, and as we consider things like unilateral lifting of the arms embargo or not coming to the assistance of our allies if they are in dire emergency, I think we have to put it in a much broader context, both in regard to the history of the alliance and also in regard to what we will be asking our allies to do in the future. I think that is very important for us to keep in mind.

There is a lot at stake here beyond the tragedy in Bosnia. We have, of course, the immediate problem of the hostages. We have the immediate challenge of whether we commit U.S. ground forces; in my view, that ought to be only in emergency situations. We have the question of what our allies are going to do, whether the buildup they are now preparing is really to be deeply involved in Bosnia or whether it is a preparation for possible emergency withdrawal. And we have the overall question, I think, of where we virtually leave important interests that are not vital and may move into an area where we have vital interests, and that is the question of the spreading of that conflict. If that conflict spreads, we could move far beyond humanitarian and important concerns into what I call

vital concerns. So whatever happens here, we need to keep those things in mind, that this conflict could spread, and that if it does spread, the United States would, I think, have much more substantial interests involved than purely humanitarian.

And finally, we have the viability of NATO and the viability of the United Nations at stake. So there is a lot at stake here today as we hear from our witnesses, and I look forward, as well as my other colleagues, to their testimony this morning and to the question and answer session.

Chairman THURMOND. And for members who wish to make opening statements, it would be appreciated if you could confine it to 2 minutes, and then continue during the question and answer period. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The time has come for Congress to be a full and equal partner in sharing the burdens of this problem in Bosnia. And I have to tell you, Mr. Secretary and Mr. Chairman, you have individually tried to do your consultations here, and I appreciate that, but it is absolutely tragic that this confusion has broken out within the administration, spilled out in all the papers this morning. It is harmful to the families of the troops, U.S. troops there in Bosnia now, to those that may be on the way; it is harmful to our relationships with our allies; and, indeed, it tarnishes America's image as the leading nation in this world in the cause of freedom.

So I think the time has come for us to hammer out a policy. As you can see from the views expressed by the two leaders of this committee, there are divisions within the Congress. But the time has come. We have to hammer it out within the Congress, within the administration, get a policy, and stick to it, and vote on it. It is no less imperative that we do that.

All along, I have expressed my views against further involvement, particularly on the ground, in this area. But we have to keep an open mind to hear from you with respect to what will be the policy of the administration and whether or not we will concur with it. Somehow, we have to reach an agreement, vote on it, and stick with it.

Chairman THURMOND. The Senator from Nebraska.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I wish to associate myself generally with the remarks made by all three of the Members of this committee that have preceded me. At the same time, I want to say to the Secretary and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, I have an immense amount of confidence in your abilities. I know you are making very difficult decisions these days.

I am particularly concerned about the United Nations and NATO coming to some kind of an agreement as to who is going to be handling things. Under the new arrangement, as I understand that has been announced, it may well be that our principal allies, such as the British and the French, may be moving in either unilaterally or as a United Nations force not directly reporting to the United Nations. While there is a great deal of confusion in the Congress of the United States and among the American people, all of us are very much concerned about what is going on and what is not going on.

Much of the indecision, much of the uncertainty, is taking place in the highest echelons of our international relations and the international organizations of which we are a very important part. It seems to me that sooner or later we are probably going to have to realize that despite our best efforts and those of our allies, we may be on a failed course, as far as the situation is concerned there, just as we as a Nation had to face it several years ago because of our involvement in Vietnam. I think Vietnam still haunts and confronts all of us as we try to be constructive, as I think this committee will be.

One thing that I hope that you will comment on also today is the latest information, if anything, on the safety, or any information you have on our downed pilot over there and the confusing reports that I keep hearing on television and radio with regard to radio signals that we do not seem to be able to identify completely.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief.

Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili, I think that ambiguity in diplomacy is sometimes desirable. But I think ambiguity in the use of our military forces can usually prove to be disastrous. It confuses our allies, emboldens our enemies, and it costs us the lives of the men and women who serve us in the military.

The purpose of this hearing, as far as I am concerned, is not to find fault with the administration but to clear away the confusion and, hopefully, to find common and solid ground on which all of us can stand. And that is the way I hope that we can proceed as we listen to the presentations by both of you, in terms of exactly how you hope to clarify what our policy is and will remain throughout the duration, as we try to resolve the situation in Bosnia.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There is no easy answer in Bosnia, but I have been convinced for a long time that the least bad answer is to allow Bosnia to defend itself. Since Western Europe is not willing and we are not willing to send in ground forces to defend this government against aggression, the least we should do is allow that government the right that every other government in the world has, which is the right of self-defense, but which the Government of Bosnia cannot implement because of an arms embargo that has been inflicted upon it. So at least let them defend themselves.

But whatever our policy is, we need clarity, and we also need clarity in the execution of a clear policy, and I look forward to our witnesses particularly addressing the question of command and control over whatever French, British and NATO forces are in Bosnia. Apparently now there will be three commands, a NATO command, a U.N. command, and a French and a British command; each, for instance, with authority to ask for air strikes, and each apparently with authority to veto air strikes. So whatever the policy is, and there are other things besides air strikes that are involved, whatever our policy is, the lines of command and control must be clear, and they must be in accordance with clearly established rules that we have adopted in our military.



I also have tremendous confidence in our Secretary and our Chairman, to make sure that those rules are put in place for the protection of our military people.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Chairman, there are no good options in Bosnia today. But there is one inescapable conclusion, and that is that peacekeeping in Bosnia was always doomed to failure for the simple fact that there was no peace to keep. Peacemaking or peace enforcing is what was required, and neither the United States nor our allies nor the United Nations was ever prepared to make that kind of commitment to Bosnia. That is the sad reality of this disaster.

Harsh, cold military facts will resolve this conflict. One side will prevail, and I hope it is the lawful Government of Bosnia. I find it very troubling that we have interfered with these realities to the benefit of the aggressor, by imposing an arms embargo in the foolish hope that we could somehow persuade committed belligerents to peacefully accept what they all view as an unsatisfactory outcome to their struggle. I strongly hope we will correct this grievous error and lift the arms embargo.

I do not know if the Bosnians will prevail, or if the Serbs will overrun government forces before the Bosnians receive enough weapons and training to defend themselves from further conquest. I cannot even say that UNPROFOR's evacuation and the lifting of the embargo will not increase the bloodshed in Bosnia, but again and again Bosnian authorities have claimed their right to defend themselves against aggression. I cannot deny a nation that right. If we are unwilling to commit American forces to defend Bosnians, then we cannot in good conscience impede their ability to defend themselves.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think, even at this time of tragic conflict and suffering in Bosnia, it is important for all of us to understand why these forces are there. Some of the most egregious kinds of conditions have been placed upon fellow citizens that exist in that part of the world, some of the most horrendous kinds of human brutality since the end of World War II. It is against that background that we have found that efforts are being made to one, avoid a massive conflict and two, to avoid a cut-and-run which would leave helpless individuals to the vagaries of the war machines of that part of the region.

What I think all of us are very much interested in, Mr. Chairman, are the new circumstances that we find ourselves in, the new force which has been proposed as a result of the meetings in Europe recently, the new circumstances that may be there with the release of hostages, the new evidence that might be emerging as Serbia is showing some efforts to bring some restraint upon the Bosnian Serbs.

I think the President is correct in acting cautiously and very carefully. I think the obvious object of all of this is to try to take whatever strands are there and to further them into some kind of

negotiated settlement. I think that is what is in the interest of the people, and certainly in the interest of the United States, as well.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Lott.

Senator LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Perry, General Shalikashvili, thank you for being here. We look forward to hearing your comments today. We understand that there are no easy solutions, and that setting a policy and sticking with that policy is very difficult under the circumstances that exist in Bosnia. But what we really need to hear from you today is why we have been doing some of the things we have been doing, including air strikes or the lack thereof, and, more importantly, what our plan is for the future, difficult though that may be to ascertain.

Clarity is something we have to establish in this conflict. We need to work together, the administration, this committee and the Congress, to try and clarify what those plans will be, and we look forward to hearing what your thoughts are on that this morning.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. I will pass. I came to hear the witnesses, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief.

Good morning, General and Mr. Secretary. I think you know that all of us have great respect for both of you, that it is a very difficult situation, and that you are the ones that sit there directly and have to deal with this on a day-to-day basis. I just would like to make a couple of comments.

Obviously, as others have stated, I am troubled by this policy, if it is a policy. I think that is the concern that I have, that there is no clearly defined policy. I oppose, personally, the involvement of U.S. troops in the conflict. I do not think we have any military interests there. I do not think we have any economic interests there. There is not a consensus of support among the American people, and we really have not outlined clearly defined military objectives, which I think should be defined if we are even going to consider sending troops in.

We basically have seen an incremental expansion of our role without this policy, and I think it is a recipe for disaster if we do not turn it around. We should insist, in my opinion, upon the withdrawal of the NATO troops and insist upon a lifting of the embargo on the Bosnian Muslims, and at the same time insist that the peacekeepers who are being held hostages be allowed to come home.

Let me just conclude on this point: From the Bosnian Serbs' point of view you see a NATO aircraft flown by the British or the French, or anyone else in the NATO alliance, at the same time you have peacekeepers from the same alliance. To them, an aggressor is an aggressor, and I think that they are as confused as perhaps the American people are as to just what the policy is, and I think that is causing problems. It may have even contributed to the shooting down of the F-16.

In conclusion, if we lift the embargo we give the Bosnian Muslims the dignity and the capability to defend themselves. They do

not have that now. They can meet destiny on their own terms, from behind their own guns, rather than cowering in the shadows of some safe haven which is not safe. So I would hope that we would look at those things, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Robb.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I join our colleagues in welcoming Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili. The President has pledged to consult closely with Congress on Bosnia.

Chairman THURMOND. Excuse me just a minute. I might announce we are going to keep these hearings going. If any of you have not voted, feel free to do it. So anybody who wants to go and vote now, feel free to leave and vote and come back. Thank you.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The President has pledged to consult closely with Congress on Bosnia, and certainly this hearing is a timely manifestation of that commitment. Let me begin by qualifying what I am going to say.

As the only Member of Congress serving simultaneously on all three of the committees involving national security, Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Intelligence, it might be assumed that I would favor an expanded congressional role in these areas. To the contrary, however, I feel Congress ought to exercise its oversight on matters of national security with great caution and be particularly sensitive to actions that might have the effect of micromanaging foreign policy or usurping the President's constitutional responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief. I have tried to support Presidents of both parties on defense and foreign policy decisions, and I plan to continue. My brief statement this morning is offered solely in the context of consultation, and I hope it will be received in that spirit.

That said, I have long had serious reservations about elements of our Bosnian policy, and I have been alarmed by recent policy statements indicating continued Allied support for what has been implicitly and explicitly described as a policy of maintaining the status quo or muddling through. Instead of repositioning UNPROFOR forces, I believe we should be reconsidering their role in Bosnia. I would respectfully suggest that any thought of pledging U.S. involvement in repositioning activities by UNPROFOR forces would be ill-advised. While UNPROFOR troops certainly deserve credit for supporting humanitarian missions, separating the combatants, and deterring atrocities, I do not see how the international community can afford to keep peacekeepers in a region where there is no peace.

The role of UNPROFOR has evolved from keeping the peace to regulating the war. In my view, such a mission is no longer sustainable, and repositioning UNPROFOR troops out of harm's way simply renders them irrelevant. From safe havens, they cannot support convoys, open blockades, or provide humanitarian assistance to the very areas that are most needed.

Regrettably, the escalating events in the past week underscore the failure to achieve a peaceful settlement in the Balkans. Long-standing and incompatible differences between the people and the forces involved have rendered traditional military conflict resolution methods unworkable. As long as the Bosnian Serbs can capture territory, attack innocent civilians, and take hostages with im-

punity, they have no incentive to come to the bargaining table. This civil war, in my view, must ultimately be resolved by the different groups within the former Yugoslavia.

Recognizing that there are no attractive or easy solutions, I urge the President to chart a new course which minimizes American involvement and gives the Bosnians the ability to achieve peace on their own terms. We cannot and should not dictate to our allies, but there is no question that what we do influences what they do or the commitments that they make, and I think clarification is clearly in order.

Specifically, I believe that we should, one, press our allies for the expeditious withdrawal of UNPROFOR, limiting our role to emergency extraction, if necessary, of the peacekeepers; two, after all NATO and other allied troops have been evacuated, lift the arms embargo, multilaterally if possible, unilaterally if we must, to permit those who have a real stake in the outcome to determine their own future; and three, continue to isolate the Bosnian Serbs politically and economically to keep the pressure on for a peacefully negotiated settlement.

These are not attractive options, but there are no attractive options, and the alternative is to risk having the United States pulled incrementally into a full-scale war in an area where our chances of success would be limited, where the costs in lives and dollars would be far more than we could justify, and where ancient animosities we cannot resolve will still reign.

Where we have made specific commitments, as we have to NATO, and where the President has pledged U.S. support, we must honor those commitments, even if it means taking risks. There are no risk-free scenarios. Failing to fulfill our obligations would compromise our credibility and lessen our ability to achieve our objectives around the world. If the President were to formalize the consultation process by seeking a resolution of support for the limited objective of emergency extraction or near-term withdrawal, I believe it would receive widespread bipartisan support. Any request for broader authority, however, would be met with firm opposition from both sides of the aisle.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from the Secretary of Defense and from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator KEMPTHORNE [presiding]. Senator Robb, thank you very much. In the order, then, I would continue now with a brief statement.

Secretary Perry, General Shalikashvili, I, too, have the utmost confidence in you. With all of the troubling information that we have seen recently, I think the most troubling is the confusing and inconsistent statements by the administration. And I would ask that it be made part of the record that some of these statements have happened this last week. I think that that can erode the confidence of American citizens in our policy, and I certainly would not want to see it erode the confidence of our troops. It also erodes the confidence of our allies.

[The information follows]

## PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR DIRK KEMPTHORNE

Secretary Perry, General Shalikashvili, it is a pleasure to have you here today. Recent events in Bosnia have called into question the wisdom of continuing the United Nations' peacekeeping mission in that troubled country and raised doubts about the clarity of U.S. policy. To begin with, it seems as though our NATO allies and the Clinton Administration are determined to redeploy and reinforce a tragic but lost cause. Additional troops and AC-130 gunships will not alter the fact that the combatants in Bosnia will pay a higher price to achieve their objectives than the rest of the world is willing to pay to stop them. This fact is demonstrated today by the Serbian held UNPROFOR hostages and the daily humiliations inflicted upon the UNPROFOR forces. At some point, leadership requires an admission that a policy has failed and I believe we are now at that point.

I am also troubled by the perception that the Clinton Administration's policy toward Bosnia is inconsistent and adrift. In recent days, the American people have received a confusing series of policy statements and clarifications. For example, at the U.S. Air Force Academy last week, President Clinton stated,

"I believe we should be prepared to assist NATO if it decides to meet a request from the United Nations for help in a withdrawal or a reconfiguration and a strengthening of its forces. So I must carefully review any request for an operation involving a temporary use of our ground forces."

A day after the President's statement, Vice President Gore told radio listeners,

"We are not in any way attempting to create a situation where U.S. ground forces would be involved in Bosnia. That is not our policy. We are not in favor of that. We are not going to let that occur."

At the end of the week, President Clinton tried to clarify the situation,

"I do not favor sending our troops into combat there."

When I consider the administration's policy toward Bosnia, I do not see consistency or clarity of purpose. In an admittedly terrible situation, where there are no good answers, I do not think we have chosen the least bad policy. So I am concerned about where we have been and where we are going. I do not want to see a repeat of the "mission creep" which led to the tragic loss of 18 U.S. Rangers in Somalia. I hope this hearing and dialog will help define a more sensible policy.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. I am also very interested in the rules of engagement that the F-16 pilot was operating under when he was flying in this area. I would be interested, too, in the question of the divided chain of command between the U.N. and NATO and what sort of implications that has, and I know that one of the things that we teach our officers is to never reinforce a failure, and I would hope that that is not the direction that we are going. And I, too, believe that it is high time that we lift this embargo. With that, let me call upon Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili, I welcome you and want to say again how much I appreciate your contributions to the search for a solution to this extraordinarily difficult and complicated situation in Bosnia. It is probably in large part because there are no simple or risk-free solutions that American and European policy has seemed to careen from crisis to crisis in this tragedy, and I believe increasingly to do so without any reasonable chance of success.

Today, the United States is paying \$500 million a year for U.N. peacekeeping in Bosnia, which today, in my opinion, is not fulfilling any of the three elements of the mission, although it has in the past. Those three elements are delivering humanitarian aid, protecting the safe areas, and ultimately contributing to a peace settlement. As events last week demonstrated, the United Nations is not even ultimately able to protect itself. Its personnel, taken hostage, have become an impediment to United Nations or NATO en-

forcement of U.N. Security Council resolutions, just as earlier, sadly, United Nations presence was too often an unintentional cover for Serbian aggression.

Mr. Chairman, I respect and appreciate the contribution that countries have made in contributing troops to the United Nations mission in Bosnia, and I appreciate the sacrifices that are part of that. But with all respect, I agree with my colleagues who have said that it is time to recognize that, however well intentioned, the United Nations in Bosnia has not accomplished its mission, and it is time for that mission to end. Yet by sending a rapid reaction force of approximately 10,000 to Bosnia under national command, the Europeans, understandably upset and angered by the seizing of their personnel as hostages, have nonetheless set themselves on a course that I believe reinforces a futile policy. I look forward to your explanation as to how a 10,000 member force under national command will coordinate operations with or contribute to the already confused dual-key United Nations-NATO operation.

Mr. Chairman, by their actions in the last couple of weeks, the downing of the F-16, the taking of United Nations personnel as hostages, the Serbs have once again shown themselves to be international outlaws and deserving of the investigation occurring in The Hague of potential charges against them as war criminals. So finally, it seems to me that instead of continuing this failed policy of an even-handed approach to the aggressor and the victim in the former Yugoslavia, we and the Europeans should abandon impartiality in this war. We should withdraw the United Nations troops, lift the arms embargo in Bosnia, provide air support for the Bosnians, as the best hope we have of righting the wrongs that have been done and of bringing the Serbs to the table to negotiate a fair peace.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator COHEN [presiding]. The Senator's 2 minutes have expired. Senator HUTCHISON.

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to thank you for coming before us, and also thank you for the calls that have been made to members of the Armed Services Committee about what is going on. I want to say that I think I am probably the Senator who has most recently visited the area. I was fortunate enough last Sunday, the Sunday before last, 10 days ago, to be in Macedonia and Croatia, and I visited with our troops. And, of course, it is always rejuvenating to visit with our American troops, especially in an outpost, and I was able to go to the outpost on the border of Macedonia and Serbia.

In addition, I was able to visit with Mr. Akashi of the United Nations, and I must say that we do clearly have United States troops on the fringes of this effort, and I am worried about the policy direction and what I think is the potential for us to escalate our involvement. I have heard you, Mr. Secretary, say that we are not going to be a combatant in this effort, but if our troops are there on the ground, it really is a distinction with very little difference to say that we are not combatants, if we are in fact there.

I am concerned that the people there do not know what our policy is, and I am very concerned about the seeming efforts to continue to say that the U.N. mission should continue. Like so many

of my colleagues here this morning, I do not blame the U.N. for failing. It is not that they did not try. It is not that we did not try to help them. But the fact of the matter is the U.N. is successful when two warring parties want peace or when there is a peace agreement to enforce. And neither of those conditions are present in the former Yugoslavia, and I think we are going to continue to see bloodshed if we do not say there is no peace to be made at this time.

Let us allow them the opportunity to have a fair fight, which we know they are not having now because of the arms embargo. And then, I think, after that has been allowed to go forward there is a likelihood that there would be two warring factions who would like peace, and then the U.N. can come in and be effective. But I think the dual NATO-U.N. force is certainly a failure. The U.N. just does not have a place at the table right now, and therefore is basically getting in the way. I just hope that we can recognize the difference between a U.S. interest, which we certainly have in that part of the world, and a U.S. security interest, which we do not have, in my opinion, in that part of the world. I think we are trying to force ourselves into a situation where a U.S. security interest does not exist.

So I hope that as we are able to hear from you, and certainly we want to do that, and as we are able to question you, that we will be able to come to some terms that would enable Congress and the administration to say that we would go in a direction that everyone would clearly understand. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER [presiding]. Senator Coats.

Senator COATS. Mr. Chairman, I have expressed my views on the situation in this part of the world many times. I think in fairness to our witnesses, the situation may have changed, at least I would like to hear their perspective in terms of how it has changed and how that may affect our decisions regarding this policy. If I could, I will reserve a little bit of extra time. I know I will have a number of questions, and perhaps I can use part of my opening statement time to ask questions.

Senator EXON. Thank you very much.

Senator WARNER. Secretary Perry, you may now proceed. We will put your statement in its entirety in the record, as we will with General Shalikashvili, and proceed as you wish.

**STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. PERRY, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY GEN. JOHN SHALIKASHVILI, U.S. ARMY, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

Secretary PERRY. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.

We would like to discuss with you today, first of all, the U.S. policy in Bosnia, and particularly relative to the contingencies under which U.S. ground forces might be deployed to Bosnia; second, the decision that was made for the bombing strike a few weeks ago, and the aftermath of that bombing strike; third, the meeting that General Shalikashvili and I attended in Paris on Saturday, which led to a decision of the major nations that have forces on the ground to strengthen UNPROFOR. Related to that, I will describe

a possible U.S. contribution to that strengthened rapid reaction force.

In addition to that, General Shalikashvili will also give you perspective on the bombing, we will describe the search and rescue attempts to find the pilot, and we will give you a brief description of what we call 40104, which is the NATO plan for a withdrawal of the U.N. forces. That would be our plan in the presentation, and if that is satisfactory, we can proceed with that.

Senator WARNER. That is satisfactory, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary PERRY. I would like to, in the first chart, have a brief summary statement of the four points of our U.S. policy in Bosnia. The first bullet is that we will not take sides in this war as combatants. The second is that we will fully engage in diplomatic efforts. Third, we will do what we can to keep the war from spreading. And fourth, we will do what we can to reduce the impact of the violence on civilians. Those are limited, very limited, objectives. Those four policies have been the policies throughout the 2½ years of the Clinton administration. Indeed, most of them go back to the Bush administration. What has changed is not the policy but the strategic implementation as the facts on the ground change. And we will talk about that today.

First of all, let me describe in some more detail this first policy. I want to talk about the first policy, which is not being engaged as a combatant in the war. When we say that, that is not to say that we do not have any point of view about this war. We do. We believe that the Bosnian Serbs are the aggressors and that the Bosnian Government and the people are the victims.

Many people who have that same point of view have argued that we, the American Government, therefore have an obligation to see that justice is done in Bosnia, and that we should put in the necessary combat forces to achieve that justice. That first policy statement says we reject that argument. And the reason we reject it is, first of all, in our professional judgment, that of myself and of our military leaders, the decision to do that would entail the commitment of several hundred thousand American troops on the ground involved in a long war with many thousands of casualties. Second, it is a value judgment, and the value judgment is that as great a tragedy as Bosnia is, it is not sufficiently vital to the U.S. national interest to warrant taking those kind of losses with our troops. And third, there is a political judgment, and that is that there is no support, either in the public or in the Congress, for taking sides in this war as a combatant. So we will not, and there is no wavering on that policy. There has never been any wavering on that policy. There is no intention of taking that step.

Now, having said that, we have three different contingencies by which—well, first of all, as you know, we are using U.S. air power as part of NATO to support the U.N. forces, and I will talk more about that later. But there are also contingencies under which the United States might put ground forces in Bosnia. There has been much confusion in the media reporting on that in the last few weeks in particular, so let me see if I can clarify that issue as well as I can.





- Implementation of a Peace Plan
- Withdrawal of UN Forces
- Emergency Extraction of UN Forces

Secretary PERRY. The next chart lists the contingencies on which U.S. ground troops might go into Bosnia. The first has been a commitment that goes back almost 2 years now that we would participate in a NATO force to implement a peace plan if there were a peace agreement made. I have to agree with Senator McCain's statement. There is not a peace agreement there, and that is indeed a fundamental reason why the operations of the U.N. forces have been so difficult. But if a peace agreement is reached, and if they agreed to send a NATO force in to implement that peace agreement, then we have said we would be a part of that plan.

Second, we have briefed this committee on something called 40104, which is a NATO plan to assist in the withdrawal of the U.N. forces if the U.N. requests it, and if the NATO Council approves that. General Shalikashvili will talk more about that today.

Also, the President has said that we would be prepared to help NATO in an emergency extraction of U.N. forces, and I want to emphasize the word emergency here, and the situation envisioned would be one of the U.N. units, for example in one of the enclaves, if they were attacked and if they were in substantial danger and called for an extraction operation and NATO agreed to do that, then the 4104 plan presented to you would provide the provision for doing that, as well. So those are the three conditions under which we could envision the use of ground forces in Bosnia.

Now, the second part of our policy, which was to work to achieve a negotiated peace settlement, has been described by many critics as a failed policy, for the obvious reason that it has not succeeded in reaching a peace settlement. I would point out to you that there has been some important but partial success in this regard in that an agreement was reached between the Croations and the Muslims last year, and that agreement now has been sustained for more than a year. I would call your attention to the bloodshed and the

fighting that was going on around Mostar, all of which has stopped now as a result of that agreement.

So the stakes are so great to reach this peace negotiation that even though the problem is difficult we have to keep trying, and there has been some modest success in this area. But because we understand it is difficult, and that it may take many months to reach a negotiated peace settlement, we believe our other goals, namely to keep the war from spreading and to limit the violence of the war, are all the more important.

And now I would like to suggest to you that the rather strong views expressed by the members of this committee, that UNPROFOR has been a failure, are not correct. UNPROFOR has had many problems and continues to have problems, but let us assess them on the basis of what their mission is, which is the delivery of humanitarian aid and the reduction of the level of civilian casualties.

First of all, I would comment that relative to the goal of keeping the war from spreading, that has been successful. The war has not spread to Croatia. The war has not spread to Macedonia. If that were to happen, this would be a much more serious conflict, and would indeed start to affect our vital national interests under the possibility of a wider Balkan war. But in terms of the benefits of what the U.N. forces have actually done, the year before they went in, 1992, there were approximately 130,000 civilian casualties in Bosnia. It is easy to forget that when we look at the present problems going on in Bosnia. But I call your attention back to 1992 before UNPROFOR went in. There were, by our best estimate, about 130,000 civilian casualties. The year after they went in, 1993, that number was reduced to about 12,000, and last year, in 1994, the estimate was about 2,500.

Now, we can focus on the 2,500 casualties last year and say UNPROFOR has failed because they did not reduce that to zero, or we could focus on the 130,000 they were having and say they have succeeded because they have dramatically reduced the carnage and the violence in Bosnia.

To the extent they have succeeded, it has been not only because of the effort of the U.N. forces on the ground, but because of the support they have gotten from NATO air power. NATO has performed, first of all, the delivery of humanitarian aid by airlift and air drop, and the United States has assisted and participated in that operation. We provide about half of that airlift and air drop operation. They have provided close air support for the U.N. forces on the ground, and then they have also enforced a provision to prevent the shelling and the bombing of Bosnian cities. And for all of the problems that that air operation has had, it has been remarkably successful in achieving those objectives. Indeed, there has been virtually no bombing of Bosnian cities since the Deny Flight Operation was instituted. General Shalikashvili will talk to you more about that operation.

I want to go now to the last point in my presentation, which was the meeting that we had in Paris last Saturday. This was a meeting of the NATO ministers of defense and chiefs of defense staff to look at ways, to determine ways, in which the U.N. forces on the ground could be strengthened. Out of that meeting came a decision

to create something called a rapid reaction force. This is going to be composed of approximately 10,000 troops. British, French, Dutch, and several other nations have stated they would contribute troops to this. I am going to ask General Shalikashvili to describe to you how that force is going to operate, and how it relates to the U.N. force on the ground. But basically, it is there to provide protection so that the U.N. force can carry out its humanitarian mission.



- **Close Air Support**
- **Strategic Airlift**
- **Certain Weapons/Support Systems**
- **Intelligence Coordination Cell**

Secretary PERRY. We were asked at that meeting what assistance or support the United States could provide for that rapid reaction force, and I have listed on this last chart the four areas where we have proposed to provide support.

The bullet missing from that chart is providing ground troops. We are not going to provide ground troops for the rapid reaction force. We will continue to provide close air support; we will continue to provide strategic lift, if requested; we have offered to consider providing certain weapons or support systems to help that rapid reaction force, and some of them are listed there, those are now being considered by the nations involved and by U.S. military; and finally, we have offered to provide an intelligence coordination cell. I can discuss that with you in more detail, if you like, but this is an intelligence—as the name provides, it is a system which coordinates intelligence, draws in intelligence from many different sources relative to Bosnia, and provides that intelligence to the tactical commanders in the rapid reaction force. This would be based on or modeled on the intelligence coordination cell which we created during Desert Storm and used very, very effectively in that operation.

Now, at this point, I would like to turn over General Shalikashvili to talk to you further about the bombing decision, the

attempts to find the pilot, and further discussions on 40104, and then we will both be available for questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Perry follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY WILLIAM J. PERRY, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

I am pleased to be here to discuss U.S. policy on Bosnia, and to inform you of the results of a meeting that General Shalikashvili and I attended in Paris last Saturday with our counterparts from the NATO and European Union countries that contribute to, and support, the U.N. operations in Bosnia. The outcome of that meeting was agreement on a Rapid Reaction Force that will substantially upgrade the capability of the U.N. peacekeeping force. This is a welcome development, and we have pledged to make available to the new force certain U.S. equipment and capabilities that will enhance its capacity to operate.

Let me begin by outlining the overall U.S. policy on Bosnia. Our policy consists of four elements: First, to not take sides in the war as a combatant. Second, to be fully engaged in the diplomatic effort to reach a negotiated peace settlement, which preserves Bosnia as a state within its internationally recognized borders. Third, to keep the war from spreading. Fourth, to mitigate and reduce the impact of the violence on innocent civilians. And as we pursue this policy, we will do so in a way that contributes to unity with our NATO allies.

Our goal is to protect U.S. interests in the region. It is true that we do not have what I would call "vital" national security interests in Bosnia. That is to say, the survival of the United States is not threatened by actions in Bosnia. But we do have a security interest in preventing the violence from spreading and from stimulating a broader European war. We do have a security interest in limiting the violence and the flow of refugees. And we certainly have a humanitarian interest in mitigating the violence. So in my view, walking away is not an option.

At the same time, we are not going to take sides in the war as a combatant. That is to say we have no point of view about this war. We believe that the aggressors are the Bosnian Serbs, and that the victims are the Bosnian government and their people. Some have argued that America has a moral obligation to see that justice is done by entering the war as a combatant on the Bosnian government side. I respect the moral aspect of this argument, but I do not accept the conclusion, based on three separate judgments:

In my professional judgment, and the professional judgment of our military leaders, that decision would entail the commitment of several hundred thousand troops, a long war, and thousands of casualties. In my value judgment, I do not believe that the Bosnian war poses a threat to U.S. interests grave enough to risk the lives of thousands of our troops. And in my political judgment, there is no support among the public or in the Congress for entering this war as a combatant. So we will not commit ground forces to the conflict in Bosnia.

Our policy on Bosnian has been consistent throughout the 2½ years of the Clinton administration. What has changed is the strategic implementation of the policy as the facts on the ground change. In that light, let me describe how the implementation has evolved in the four prongs of our policy:

First, we reaffirm that we will not commit ground forces to the conflict in Bosnia or join the U.N. peacekeeping force in Bosnia. However, there are three strictly proscribed conditions under which we might use U.S. troops in discrete, temporary conditions—and then, only after consulting with the Congress: First, as part of a NATO force to help implement a peace settlement, if one is reached. Second, as part of a NATO force to help withdraw the U.N. peacekeeping force if it decides that it can no longer perform its mission and requests NATO's help in withdrawing.

This is the essence of NATO's preplanned withdrawal operation known as OPLAN 40104, which General Shalikashvili will describe for you. This plan has not yet received the final and formal endorsement of NATO. Some technical and political details remain to be worked out, but we expect full NATO approval by mid-month. That plan has sufficient flexibility to respond to the remote possibility that the U.N. could ask NATO to help in an emergency extraction of UNPROFOR from Bosnia. We do not expect that to happen, especially in light of the latest steps taken by key allied troop contributors to strengthen UNPROFOR's ability to defend itself.

And third, we would be willing in principle to use U.S. troops to assist in the emergency movement of UNPROFOR units within Bosnia. Specifically, as a last resort, if needed—and whether it would be needed is an open question because our allies in UNPROFOR have formidable capabilities themselves—we should be prepared to assist NATO in an emergency extraction of units whose positions had become untenable, to points of safety in Bosnia. Any such operation would be short-

term and aimed at specific problems and tasks. Once a specific limited operation were completed, our troops would withdraw immediately from Bosnia. But let me be clear on this: the United States will not become UNPROFOR's transportation service. And let me also be clear that we have not been asked to undertake a commitment to assist in emergency relocation. We think that it is unlikely that we will be asked to do so, in part because our willingness to consider such a request has given UNPROFOR a greater sense of confidence.

General Shalikhashvili will discuss the details of 40104 in his testimony.

Under the diplomatic prong of our policy, we will continue to fully engage in the diplomatic effort to reach a negotiated peace settlement. Some have said this is a failed policy, because the war continues. But it is easier to criticize the peace negotiations than to actually achieve a peace settlement in Bosnia. And the peace negotiations have, in fact, yielded some progress—for example, the Croatian-Muslim accord last year, spearheaded by efforts of Secretary Christopher and Ambassador Redman. The stakes are great, so we must keep trying, while at the same time, keeping our expectations in check, and recognizing that real progress may take many months.

That is why it is all the more important to hold steady on the other two prongs of our policy: preventing the spread of the war, and reducing the impact of the violence. Both prongs have been successful. That's self-evident when it comes to preventing the spread of the war because, in fact, the war has not spread. This is a very important success, because if the conflict in Bosnia were to spread into a wider regional war, it could threaten to engulf our NATO allies Greece and Turkey. This would threaten our vital national interests.

But while the war has not spread, we cannot be complacent. Which is why U.S. troops will continue to participate in the U.N. peacekeeping force in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and why our diplomats have worked so hard to keep the U.N. force in Croatia.

We have also been successful in limiting the violence and civilian casualties. The key to this success has been the U.N. peacekeeping operation, supported by NATO. Nineteen nations have provided about 23,000 troops in Bosnia to reduce the level of violence on civilians, and to mitigate the effects of the violence by ensuring the delivery of humanitarian assistance. This is a tremendous outpouring of international support, and a clear demonstration that the world takes the crisis in Bosnia seriously.

The U.N. has been criticized for being ineffective or even counterproductive. Granted, the peacekeepers have had their problems, given the great difficulty of their mission. But in the face of this great difficulty, the peacekeepers have done a tremendous job in minimizing civilian casualties and relieving human misery. In 1992, before they arrived in full force, there were about 130,000 civilian casualties in Bosnia. Last year, there were fewer than 3,000. Three thousand civilian casualties is still a tragedy, but the selflessness and courage of these peacekeepers has made a critical difference. If the U.N. force comes out of Bosnia, we'll turn the clock back to 1992, and we could again see annual casualties in excess of 100,000 civilians.

So, in spite of the criticism of the U.N. force, it has saved tens of thousands of lives. NATO has played a critical role in the success of the peacekeepers' humanitarian mission. Six NATO nations, including the United States, have been participating in operations providing airlift and air drop of food and medicine when U.N. humanitarian convoys cannot get through. NATO also provides, on request from the U.N., close air support to protect the peacekeepers from attack and air interdiction—under operation Deny Flight—to stop the bombing of cities.

We've conducted thousands of sorties, more than 60,000 sorties in Deny Flight alone. These missions have not been risk-free. During these 60,000 sorties, there have been two aircraft shot down, one British, and just a few days ago, the American F-16. The risks will remain, but the value of Deny Flight is unquestionable in terms of the thousands of civilians saved from the shelling and bombing that would otherwise have occurred. So during 1993 and 1994, the U.N. force, with increasing support from NATO, became increasingly effective in reducing civilian casualties.

Which brings us to recent events. During 1995, Bosnia had settled into a virtual military stalemate, but a stalemate in which the momentum seemed to shift away from the Bosnian Serbs and toward the Bosnian government. In the face of this, the Bosnian Serbs brutally upped the ante by harassing the peacekeepers and by launching a rain of shells on innocent people in Sarajevo, more than 1,000 in one day.

This was incompatible with the U.N. peacekeeping mission and left the U.N. with a choice: either to give up the peacekeeping mandate and withdraw the peacekeep-

ing forces, or call in NATO air support to conduct air strikes. The U.N. decided to call in the NATO air support—and NATO responded—fully aware of the risk that the Bosnian Serbs would retaliate. But that risk had to be balanced against the risk that the Bosnian Serbs would continue to slaughter the civilian population if NATO air support was not called in. I believe the U.N. made the right decision. The NATO air strikes were the right thing to do. Bosnian Serbs could not be given free rein to slaughter innocent civilians or harass the peacekeepers.

The Bosnian Serbs responded by taking U.N. peacekeepers hostage. Given the escalated Serb aggression, the international community had three choices: first, to pull out the U.N. peacekeeping mission; second, to insert a military force to wage war on the Bosnian Serbs; or third, to strengthen the U.N. peacekeeping mission.

They rejected the choice of pulling out the U.N. peacekeeping mission, or of waging war on the Bosnian Serbs. Either of these choices would have led to a humanitarian disaster. Instead, they decided to strengthen the U.N. peacekeeping mission so it could do its job better. The NATO defense ministers met in Paris on Saturday to develop the plan for strengthening the U.N. force. We decided that the key to strengthening the peacekeeping force was to create a multinational Rapid Reaction Force that would protect and support the peacekeepers. You might think of this Rapid Reaction Force as a 911 emergency number for the peacekeepers. For example, if the peacekeepers escorting a convoy delivering food or fuel to civilians were to come under attack, the peacekeepers could call on this Rapid Reaction Force, who would quickly come to their assistance. That not only should allow the peacekeepers to do their mission, it should also serve as a deterrent to that kind of attack.

The key contributors to this force would be the British and the French, who are contributing about 10,000 troops. Several other nations have also indicated their interest in providing troops. The United States will not be providing ground troops to the Rapid Reaction Force. We strongly support the objectives of this force, and we will provide support in four different areas: First of all, we will continue to provide close air support. Second, we offered to provide various systems, including attack helicopters; artillery-locating radar; communications gear; global positioning satellite navigation systems, and night-vision equipment. Third, we offered to provide lift, especially strategic airlift of forces and equipment, to the theater of operations. And fourth, we have offered to provide U.N. commanders in Bosnia with what we call an intelligence communication cell.

This is a significant military technological advancement. The first time such an intelligence cell was used in warfare was in Desert Storm. It will be a communications network that will receive intelligence data on Bosnia collected by several nations and many sources, including tactical and national assets. It will synthesize and display these data, and reduce them to intelligence products tailored to the tactical needs of the commanders of the Rapid Reaction Force. Finally, it will disseminate the intelligence products to the relevant commanders at headquarters and field units. This intelligence cell will provide the field commanders with the timely situation awareness that will greatly enhance their ability to carry out their protection mission. It is also envisioned that this cell will have access to data collected by low-cost unmanned aerial vehicles. These UAVs would be designed to fly under the clouds and take high resolution imagery of areas of interest.

I believe that this additional U.S. support for the U.N. peacekeeping mission can make a key difference. Our support through NATO has already made a difference. I am also fully aware of the limitations of our present approach—that by itself, it will not quickly end the war in Bosnia. People find this frustrating. This frustration has led to proposals to take active measures to help the Bosnian government achieve its political and military goals, including proposals for the United States to conduct air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets, or unilaterally lift the arms embargo. But if you follow these proposals to their natural conclusion, they lead down a slippery slope to the same unintended consequence: An end to the U.N. peacekeeping mission and a humanitarian catastrophe, with the distinct possibility of a wider war breaking out and drawing in of American combat troops. And the unity of the NATO alliance would be shattered.

We cannot force a peaceful conclusion to the war in Bosnia. Only the parties can decide to end the war, and we will continue our diplomatic efforts to encourage a negotiated peace. The Bosnian government has made the right choice in accepting the Contact Group plan; regrettably, the Bosnian Serbs have not. In the meantime, we will also support efforts to keep the war from spreading, reduce the violence, and mitigate the suffering.

The British poet A.E. Housman wrote, "The troubles of our proud and angry dust, are from eternity, and shall not fail. Bear them we can, and if we can, we must. Housman's poem is about perseverance. And perseverance is what we need in Bosnia, where the troubles of its proud and angry dust seem eternal and unending."

We will persevere, but we will also put limits on our actions. Because when we put the lives of our men and women in uniform at risk, and commit our Nation on a military course of action, the price we pay must be commensurate with the risk to our Nation of not acting. Our course of action in Bosnia has reflected this important balance, and it will continue to do so.

General SHALIKASHVILI. Mr. Chairman, and Members of the committee—

Chairman THURMOND. General, we are glad to have you here and pleased to hear from you.

General SHALIKASHVILI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to begin by discussing the two events of the past few weeks that I know are matters of great concern to this committee: the air strikes that occurred on May 25 and 26, and the June 2 downing of our F-16 which was participating as part of the NATO force enforcing the no-fly zone. Following that, as Secretary Perry mentioned, I would like to make some remarks on NATO's plan 40104, the plan for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia. Let me start with the events that led to the air strike on May 25 and 26.

#### AIR STRIKES, 25-26 MAY

You are all aware that NATO had agreed to provide close air support to protect UNPROFOR personnel and to provide air strikes in support of the enforcement of the U.N. mandate. Throughout the winter of 1995, the fighting in Bosnia was at a relatively low level, due principally to the cessation of hostilities as well as the traditional winter refitting and reposturing of forces that we have repeatedly seen conducted by both sides.

In early spring, the fighting intensified when a stronger Bosnian Government force opened limited offensive actions. At the same time, the Bosnian Serbs intensified their own attacks, and began what appeared to be a systematic harassment of UNPROFOR forces, as well as stepped-up artillery attacks against civilians in the safe areas.

On April 8, the Bosnian Serbs announced that they would no longer guarantee the safety of flights in and out of Sarajevo Airport, in effect closing the airport. Throughout the month of May, Bosnian Serb harassment and restrictions of ground convoys grew so severe that only 38 percent of that month's scheduled humanitarian aid was able to be delivered to Sarajevo. The Bosnian Serbs used the same tactics to limit humanitarian aid deliveries and UNPROFOR resupply to other enclaves, as well.

Then, in mid-May, the fighting in and around Sarajevo increased dramatically. In one day alone more than 1,000 artillery rounds rained down on Sarajevo. Between May 22 and 24 the Serbs entered weapons control points outside of Sarajevo and withdrew four heavy weapons. In response, on May 24, the command of UNPROFOR issued an ultimatum giving 24 hours for both sides to cease firing heavy weapons and for the Serbs to return the four heavy weapons and within 48 hours to remove to locations outside of the exclusion zone all heavy weapons not approved inside weapons control points.

The next day, May 25, in response to the failure of the Bosnian Serbs to comply with the first part of the ultimatum, the

UNPROFOR commander requested a NATO air strike against the Pale ammunition depot. At 2:33 in the afternoon a strike was launched in response to that request. NATO attack aircraft struck the Pale ammunition depot and destroyed two bunkers. Later that day, most probably in response to that strike against a purely military target, the Bosnian Serbs shelled the public market square in Tuzla, and 70 civilians died.

The next day, May 26, because the Serbs still had failed to comply with the ultimatum, the UNPROFOR commander requested NATO to conduct an additional air strike against the Pale ammunition depot. At midmorning the second strike was launched against the six remaining bunkers. The procedure for requesting air strikes runs from the United Nations commander requesting the strike directly to the NATO commander CINCSOUTH, currently U.S. Adm. Layton Smith.

On this occasion, as has been the case every time in the past when the option of an air strike had been raised, the risk of retaliation was considered, and that the Serbs would very likely take hostages. But that risk had to be weighed against the consideration that if NATO air power were not called in then the Bosnian Serbs would most likely continue to shell civilian populations. Furthermore, UNPROFOR judged it impractical to consolidate its forces before the air strikes, because that act itself, they felt, would have been a clear signal that air strikes were imminent, and would very likely have provoked the same preemptive hostage taking. The belief was that accepting the risk of Serbian retaliation was preferable to allowing the shelling to continue and the violations on the part of the Bosnian Serbs to go unchecked.

#### SHOOT-DOWN OF F-16

Now let me turn to the shoot-down of the F-16 that occurred on 2 June, just 1 week after the second air strike. The F-16 was part of a two-ship formation that took off from Aviano Air Base at around 7:00 on the morning of June 2. They were on a combat air patrol mission over Bosnia, and they were armed as well to conduct close air support in the event that the need arose. The two aircraft were orbiting at approximately 21,000 feet when a track-mounted Bosnian Serb SA-6 site fired two missiles at the flight. The first missile exploded between the two fighters, who were flying some distance apart. But the second missile struck the underbelly of the number two aircraft. The flight leader observed his wingman's aircraft as it began its descent, but lost sight when the aircraft entered the cloud cover below.

Search and rescue missions commenced immediately, and have continued ever since, but the status of the pilot remains unknown, despite what we read in the newspapers or hear on television. A number of conflicting reports continue to appear, but frankly, we still have no information on the status of that pilot. We are vigorously continuing our search efforts. In the meantime, of course, our sympathies are for his family, and we continue to work for his safe return.

Because the fighters were orbiting in an area that had no history of known or suspected surface-to-air missile activity, these two F-16s were not accompanied by aircraft with a capability to suppress



enemy air defenses. They, of course, had their own radar warning equipment, electronic jamming equipment, and chaff. Other flights that day, those that were operating over areas where there were known or suspected surface-to-air missile threats, were accompanied by aircraft with the capability to suppress enemy air defenses.

The command was practicing a standard tactical procedure of tailoring their air packages for the expected missions and threats. Tactical judgments like this have been made for over 2 years, and for 69,000 sorties that the Deny Flight Operation has flown so far, which is a remarkable testimony to the command's operational acumen. In light of this incident, however, Admiral Smith has directed that all operations over Bosnia-Herzegovina must from now on assume a surface-to-air missile threat, and must be accompanied by aircraft with a capability to suppress enemy air defenses in order to limit the future risk to NATO aircraft.

#### NATO OPERATIONS PLAN 40104

Now I would like to brief you on the purpose and details of NATO Operations Plan 40104, to answer any questions, and then to listen to your views.

Could I have the first chart, please?

#### DETERMINED EFFORT UNPF Forces In-place



##### 35 COUNTRIES


###### - NATO

Belgium	Canada
Denmark	France
Netherlands	Norway
Portugal	Spain
Turkey	United Kingdom
United States	

###### - NON NATO

Argentina	Bangladesh
Brazil	Czech Republic
Egypt	Estonia
Finland	Ghana
Indonesia	Ireland
Jordan	Kenya
Lithuania	Malaysia
Nepal	New Zealand
Nigeria	Pakistan
Poland	Russia
Slovakia	Sweden
Switzerland	Ukraine

TOTAL MILITARY STRENGTH  
38,500




Let me start with a brief description of the area and the scale of this plan. I am confident that you are very well familiar with the territory of former Yugoslavia. United Nations peace forces are located in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia. Of the 38,500 forces from some 35 contributing nations, 22,500 of the UNPROFOR force is located in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in positions stretching throughout the breadth of that nation. They are distributed in many pockets, including those in and around the various enclaves and safe areas.

The road network and logistics infrastructure are rugged and very limited. Much of the terrain is mountainous, and many of the UNPROFOR units are in isolated and vulnerable positions. So a secure withdrawal of all of these forces presents many obstacles and difficulties, in part because of UNPROFOR's widespread distribution, in part because of the logistics and intelligence difficulties, and in part because a withdrawal could become vulnerable to harassment and to military disruption.

May I have the second chart, please?

## DETERMINED EFFORT

### NATO Plan to Support UNPROFOR Withdrawal



#### — The Plan

- Withdraws UNPROFOR from B-H or Croatia
- Provides force options for:
  - Emergency extraction
  - Total withdrawal
- Execution requires UNSC / NAC approval

#### — The Plan does *not*

- Provide for humanitarian / refugee support
- Provide for subsequent operations




The plan that has been put together by NATO could be used to withdraw U.N. forces from either Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina. But today I will focus on plans to handle the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is right now the most volatile area of U.N. operations. The plan is flexible in that it is designed to accommodate either a deliberate withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces, or an emergency extraction of UNPROFOR forces were that called for.

The most likely scenario for an emergency extraction involves the eastern enclaves, where the situation has always been most tenuous. The execution of the deliberate plan would have to be triggered by an UNPROFOR request to the United Nations Security Council to withdraw UNPROFOR forces. This would then be followed by a United Nations Security Council request to the North Atlantic Council to support that withdrawal. I should note that the plan is limited to withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces. It does not provide for humanitarian or refugee support, either during or after the withdrawal operation, nor does it include planning for any subsequent operations by U.S. or NATO forces once a withdrawal has been completed.

This plan will be executed under a single chain of command, under NATO command and control, using robust NATO rules of engagement, and there will be no dual key arrangement for any of the NATO forces. At execution, all forces, UNPROFOR included, will fall under and will remain under NATO command and control

until released back to the United Nations or the national command authorities.

Can I have the next chart, please?



#### FIVE PHASES

The operation will be conducted sequentially in five phases, and if executed as I will brief today, which is the most robust option, could take up to some 22 weeks to complete.

First, is the preparation phase. The purpose is to establish the theater communications and logistics architecture and, where possible, to secure support for staging bases and needed facilities. While these initial steps are being taken, the forces designed for the plan will conduct training and other preparatory actions.

Second is the theater opening and deployment phase. In this phase the logistics elements will deploy to establish logistics bases and to open port facilities for follow-on units. Following the establishment of the logistics structures, the main body forces which will conduct the withdrawal will deploy into the theater and assemble outside Bosnia.

Third is the execution phase. This is the critical phase of the operation. The combat forces will deploy into the theater to conduct withdrawal operations that will facilitate and safeguard the movement of UNPROFOR units.

In a fourth phase, the reorganization, UNPROFOR units will be moved to holding areas near ports of embarkation and released from NATO control back to U.N. or national control.

In phase five, redeployment, NATO units will depart the staging locations, to return to their home bases. In the event a situation arises that requires an emergency extraction, however, the plan includes a quick response option using selected NATO forces that are in close proximity to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

American participation and support for this plan are essential. The plan is built, to a large degree, on capabilities that only we possess. But just as importantly, our European allies, who are even now in a process of increasing their contributions, feel it is essential that there is a viable, workable, and supported plan capable of assisting the withdrawal of the forces in the event that becomes necessary. Because it will be executed under NATO command and control using NATO rules of engagement and there will be no dual key for NATO forces, the right arrangements will be in place.

Let me add that I believe it is extremely prudent for NATO to have such a plan on the shelf, and to be prepared to execute it. It is never a good idea to wait until an unwelcome contingency arises before beginning preparations. The approval of this plan is the best insurance possible that it will not have to be carried out. It gives UNPROFOR-contributing nations the assurance that they must have to sustain their commitments to that very important mission.

#### RAPID REACTION FORCE

Let me, if I may Mr. Chairman, turn very quickly to the two points that Secretary Perry asked me to address regarding the rapid reaction force that was just established during the meeting in Paris a few days ago. This rapid reaction force is designed to provide additional protection to existing UNPROFOR forces, to act as a deterrent to those who would wish to do harm to that force, and if any forces interfere with the execution of UNPROFOR's mission, to have a capability to be able to resolve that interference and get on with UNPROFOR's mission.

The rapid reaction force will not wear blue helmets and will not paint vehicles white. That is the same procedure that we, by the way, are using in Haiti, where our quick reaction force also does not wear blue helmets or paint its vehicles white. The rapid reaction force that is being established, however, will be under the operational control of the UNPROFOR commanders; that is, General Janvier and Gen. Rupert Smith. There will not be a national operational control chain set up to somehow mirror that of UNPROFOR. That force will respond only to the UNPROFOR commanders. So there will not be a dual chain of command.

I hope that that is helpful, and that concludes my remarks. And I think now both Secretary Perry and I will be happy to try to answer questions.

Chairman THURMOND [presiding]. Thank you very much. I understand that you and General Shalikashvili have to leave here at 1:00, is that correct?

Secretary PERRY. That is correct, Mr. Chairman, so that we can testify to the House National Security Committee.

Chairman THURMOND. We will have to confine our questions, then, to about 5 minutes each.

Now, I understand that Senator Kempthorne did not have a chance to make an opening statement. Senator Kempthorne.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Mr. Chairman, I was able to. I think Senator Inhofe has not had the opportunity.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Inhofe. Take about 2 minutes, if you will.

Senator INHOFE. I will confine it to probably less than that. First of all, I can cut mine short because, with the exception of the comments made by the Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. Kennedy, I agree in substance with almost everything that has been stated by the Senators on this panel. There are several of us, and I do not mean, General Shalikashvili and Dr. Perry, to be critical of you two, because you were not in the positions that you are in today back when the first decision was made on air drops over Bosnia-Herzegovina, but those of us who were on the House committee at that time stated a deep concern for the original drops and the original involvement into that area, with the idea that someday we would have to be making a decision as to whether or not we are going to send ground troops into the area. And both of you are historians, both of you remember very well in World War II, and of course you just articulated, General Shalikashvili, with the terrain and the problems that are in that area, how the Yugoslavians, the former Yugoslavians, were able to hold off the very best that Hitler had to offer at a ratio of one to eight, and this has been a great concern.

I felt at that time, I feel today, that if we send American troops in we will lose American lives. And for that reason, 2 days ago Senator Specter and I introduced a resolution that resolved that the President is not authorized to use the United States ground forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina unless, number one, the use of the United States ground forces is authorized in advance by Congress, and second, the deployment of the United States ground forces into Bosnia-Herzegovina is vital to the national security interests of the United States.

Two years after we expressed this concern, I have still not heard a mission that is vital to the security interests of the United States, and so perhaps I am the only one on this panel who has already decided that I am opposed to sending ground troops into Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Last, Mr. President, there are several questions that were asked on the floor of the United States Senate by our leader, Senator Dole, and I hope that during the course of these questions you will have an opportunity to respond to those questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Byrd, I understand you wanted to make a brief statement. We will hear from you at this time.

I will ask Senator Warner to take over temporarily till I get back.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Perry, General Shalikashvili, thank you for coming here this morning. Can you hear me?

Secretary PERRY. Yes.

Senator BYRD. Can you understand what I am saying?

Secretary PERRY. Yes, so far.

Senator BYRD. Any proposed involvement of U.S. military personnel in a conflict as deep-rooted and complex as the one in Bosnia is a very serious matter, and merits a full debate. Now, there may be a role for the United States to play as a member of NATO in providing assistance in the evacuation of United Nations peace-keeping forces from Bosnia. I have serious doubts that there exist

the vital national interests necessary to commit American ground troops in other roles in Bosnia. Such an action would surely run the risk of engaging in an extended involvement with significant casualties, and without the ability to support such a level of commitment. I would suggest that any new action should not be taken without the clear support of Congress.

Consultation—I do not know what that word means, in this context. Consultation, full as it might be, can never substitute for a record vote of this body. Only that will focus us all on the responsibilities we may be undertaking. Wisdom and prudence dictate the importance of having Congress and the American people behind this type of involvement. This vote can only come after a full and thorough debate that addresses the extent, duration, dangers, and costs of such an operation. This morning's hearing is a useful first step in building the consensus necessary to win support, if that is possible, for this involvement.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator Byrd. We will now proceed with the questions.

Mr. Secretary, as you well know, the Congress of the United States, both houses, will take up consideration of a proposal to withdraw the embargo, and in my judgment those proposals are gaining strength. Question: Did, at any time, you advance in your meetings with your counterparts, both you, Mr. Secretary, and you, General, the discussion of withdrawing the UNPROFOR forces now? Did they hear you out on that, did you raise it?

Secretary PERRY. Yes. There were substantial discussions on the potential of withdrawing the U.N. forces. If I could characterize the consensus of the European defense ministers who I talked with, it was that withdrawal, particularly at this time, would be a particularly bad move. It would be a cut-and-run in the face of unacceptable action taken on the part of the Bosnian Serbs. Their instinct was to strengthen the U.N. forces rather than to withdraw them. Without question, in my mind, if this rapid reaction force is not successful in strengthening UNPROFOR—

Senator WARNER. Well, that is my next question: What are the criteria by which the policy could shift such that now we are going to be called on to assist in the extraction with our ground forces?

Secretary PERRY. If the rapid reaction force is not successful, it is my opinion that the leading nations in UNPROFOR—that is, the ones who have most of the troops there—will conclude that they cannot continue and will then seek to withdraw their forces, and in all probability will come to NATO and ask for assistance in that extraction.

Senator WARNER. Is that going to be a decision just by the leading nations or are we going to participate in that decision, given the fact that we are going to take a very material role in that extraction.

Secretary PERRY. We participate in that decision in two crucial areas. First of all, it would be a decision of the U.N. to withdraw the UNPROFOR forces. An individual nation might decide unilaterally to withdraw its forces, but a decision to withdraw UNPROFOR is a U.N. decision, and of course we are on the Security Council and indeed have a veto on the Security Council.

Senator WARNER. So we would be a full partner.

Secretary PERRY. We would be a full partner.

Second, the decision to send NATO forces in to assist, then, is a decision made by the North Atlantic Council, and we are, of course, an important member of the North Atlantic Council.

Senator WARNER. My concern with the briefing thus far has been this contingency whereby we come to the assistance of the UNPROFOR or U.N. in cases of emergency. To me, that word emergency is a loophole that could widen and further draw us into this conflict, primarily on the ground. Now, you shake your head, General Shalikashvili. I accept that shaking, but let us articulate just exactly what you mean, and specifically, if I understood you, General Shalikashvili, the U.N. officers—one of them is the French General Janvier and the other is Smith—they are going to be in control of that rapid reaction force. But if you are called in to assist it, then do our troops perform that assistance under U.N. control?

General SHALIKASHVILI. First of all, the answer is they will never be under U.N. control, they will always be under NATO control. The emergency extraction option within the plan that I just alluded to can be used only once the total plan has been implemented. In other words, it is not an option that is available today. It is part of 40104, and it can only be used once the United Nations has asked for, NATO has accepted and we have implemented 40104. But because it takes so long for the main forces to move into location, it could occur that during this preparatory phase, the Serbs, for instance, would begin to start taking hostages. And so then it was felt prudent to build into a plan an option to go in and at least help those in the enclaves. But it can be used only within the context of the full plan. It is not some discrete thing that you can pull out and use by itself.

Senator WARNER. All right, so let me clarify. Secretary Perry gave the criteria by which the governing bodies would make the decision to pull out. That decision has to be made before you exercise any of the emergency operations?

General SHALIKASHVILI. That is correct, sir.

Senator WARNER. That is clear. Now, I am further concerned about the rules of engagement for our pilots who would be involved in providing close air support for the quick reaction force. If those planes are locked on or painted by anti-aircraft radar on the ground, will they be allowed to take out that radar without first seeking the U.N. go-ahead?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Sir, that is true—

Secretary PERRY. Let me caution you, we do not feel it is appropriate to discuss rules of engagement of ongoing operations. I think, however, I understand your concern, and we might be able to allay your concern, and let me ask General Shalikashvili if we can do that.

General SHALIKASHVILI. Those airplanes, today, and under the picture that you painted, will fly under existing NATO rules of engagement. Existing NATO rules of engagement allow those planes to take the action that you have just outlined.

Senator WARNER. Fine. Thank you.

Chairman THURMOND [presiding]. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. General Shalikashvili, I want to make sure I understand what you said in response to Senator Warner's question. Are you saying that until there is a withdrawal plan that has been approved and is being implemented, no emergency situation in Bosnia would require, nor would we utilize the use of any U.S. ground forces to respond to any other emergency, except in the course of implementing a withdrawal?

General SHALIKASHVILI. No, I said that the emergency extraction option that I briefed here can be used only after the full plan has been approved in the way that Secretary Perry outlined. I cannot speculate about other things. But the option that I discussed is applicable only and can be used only after the full plan has been approved.

Senator NUNN. Well, I thought on that chart that Secretary Perry had there was clearly the implication that if there were emergencies within Bosnia that we might consider using troops. Is that wrong?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Senator, the troops that are part of the plan 40104 can be used only for whatever reason——

Senator NUNN. I am not talking about 40104 or any numbers. I am talking about the use of troops. Is it your statement that we would not use troops in any emergencies except in executing a total withdrawal? Because I thought that is what Senator Warner was trying to get to.

Senator WARNER. Could we have the chart put back up so we can clarify that?

General SHALIKASHVILI. The chart that shows the emergency extraction option, please.

Senator NUNN. The chart that shows the ways we would use U.S. troops. Now, I thought there were four reasons up there. [Pause.]

Mr. Chairman, maybe they could deduct this time. I hate for my time to be used on chart-shuffling here.

I thought the third part up there, "help NATO in emergency movement of U.N. within Bosnia," I thought that was emergency situations that would not be part necessarily of a total withdrawal.

General SHALIKASHVILI. For NATO to take on that mission, which it does not now have, for which no one has put in a request, it would have to be a separate NATO action that would have to go through the same chain that Secretary Perry——

Senator NUNN. But you are not ruling that out as the use of American U.S. troops? As I understand it, you are not ruling that out?

General SHALIKASHVILI. No, I am not ruling it out, I am saying that for NATO to take on such a function you would have to go through the same process; it would have to be approved by NATO, in which we would have a full voice.

Senator NUNN. You mean if something happened tomorrow morning over there and 40104 was not approved, no matter how bad the emergency, the United States would not get involved.

General SHALIKASHVILI. The United States, as part of NATO, could not get involved because NATO has no such mission and NATO cannot just make up that mission. That is correct, Senator.

Senator NUNN. Okay. Let me move on to other areas. Strengthening forces and rapid deployment forces, Secretary, there are sev-



eral goals the U.N. has over there. One is, of course, protecting safe areas, another is enforcing a no-heavy-weapons zone, another is humanitarian relief, another is protecting the enclaves. Now, we have got our allies that are strengthening the forces. They are building up a rapid deployment force. My question really goes to what is the purpose of strengthening those forces and what is the purpose of the rapid deployment forces? Are we basically doing it primarily to prevent hostage-taking, or are we doing it to better protect the safe areas, or are we doing it to protect and enforce the no-heavy-weapons zone, or are we doing it for humanitarian relief purposes or to protect the enclaves? Which of those purposes of NATO, some of which have been fulfilled, some of which have been ignored, is the purpose of strengthening the forces?

Secretary PERRY. The rapid reaction force is to protect the UNPROFOR Force while it is carrying out its mandate. You have listed many of the specific missions in the mandate, some of which they have been doing, some of which they are not doing. The commander would have to decide. General Smith, in this case, would have to decide as he conducts his missions which of those he can more effectively conduct with the presence of this rapid reaction force.

Senator NUNN. But there is not sufficient buildup to really carry out all of those missions, is there?

Secretary PERRY. I think a fair conclusion is that the addition of these 10,000 troops would still not put UNPROFOR in a position to confidently carry out all of the missions of this mandate.

Senator NUNN. It is really more to protect the UNPROFOR personnel than it is any of the other missions, is it not?

Secretary PERRY. It is to protect them, but as they conduct the missions assigned to them by General Smith.

Senator NUNN. Okay. Let me go to another area, and this question would go to both the Secretary and General Shalikashvili. Mr. Secretary, you said something very important on page 3 and page 6 of your written testimony, and I hope my colleagues will focus on it. You make it clear on page 3, "In my value judgment, I do not believe the Bosnian war poses a threat to U.S. interest grave enough to risk the lives of thousands of our troops." You are basically saying it is an important interest, but not a vital interest at this stage, is that right?

Secretary PERRY. Exactly. I am saying it is an important interest, but not a vital national interest. I do point out, though, it could become a vital national interest if it spread.

Senator NUNN. That is what I was getting to. On page 6, and I think the American public needs to understand this, if it spreads the Secretary of Defense is saying—these are his words, quote, this is page 6: "If the conflict in Bosnia were to spread into a wider regional war it could threaten to engulf our NATO allies Greece and Turkey. This would threaten our vital national interests." I think that is important because obviously you protect your vital national interests with whatever means you have at your disposal, do you not?

Secretary PERRY. That is correct.

Senator NUNN. If I could have one more minute, Mr. Chairman, the NATO withdrawal plan makes it very clear—I think everybody

needs to understand this, too—the NATO withdrawal plan, if I am correct, does not provide for any assistance to refugees. So, if there is withdrawal, whether it is because the strengthening does not work, the fighting goes on, the U.S. lifts the embargo, whatever the reason, the refugees in those enclaves are going to be abandoned, is that right?

Secretary PERRY. That is correct.

Senator NUNN. The enclaves are going to be abandoned?

Secretary PERRY. Abandoned by UNPROFOR.

Senator NUNN. That is right.

Secretary PERRY. The Bosnian Government, of course, has military forces in the enclaves.

Senator NUNN. Are they defensible?

Secretary PERRY. Pardon me?

Senator NUNN. Are they defensible without UNPROFOR there, in your judgment?

Secretary PERRY. That is a tough call. I have an opinion about that, but I am more interested in General Shalikashvili's opinion on that point.

Senator NUNN. Could I ask General Shalikashvili on that one?

General SHALIKASHVILI. It is the view of the UNPROFOR commanders on the ground that they do not have that capability. But they all are aware that the Bosnian Government has repeatedly stated that they do have that capability.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired. I think the one other thing on that chart that jumps out, though, is that we are going to be going through, if there is withdrawal, a reorganization, a repositioning, and a redeployment. And the Secretary has said that preventing the spread is in our vital interest. Now, I will not ask this question now, but I think it is very important during the course of this hearing to talk about what would happen after withdrawal, because you have designated that stage as basically affecting our vital interest. What happens in terms of redeployment and repositioning? What do we do about Macedonia? What do we do about Kosovo after withdrawal?

Secretary PERRY. That is a crucial question.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, as I suggested in my opening statement, the Congress, the American people, and, no doubt, our allies have been confused by inconsistent conflicts in statements made by our government regarding our policy in Bosnia. Can you assure us that the policy position you have outlined this morning is settled, agreed to, and firm? Also, since the implementation of the policy must be adjusted to the changing circumstances in Bosnia, would you reiterate for us the underlying principles and national goals of our policy, things that should remain constant despite the development on the ground?

Secretary PERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am happy for the opportunity to do that. The four elements of U.S. policy in Bosnia which I listed on my first chart and which are on the first page of my testimony have been invariant, will continue to be invariant, in our program. The implementation of them will have to change as the conditions on the ground change.

For example, if the U.N. were to be withdrawn from Bosnia, that would be a dramatic change in the situation on the ground, and how we implement those policies would have to change accordingly. In particular, getting back to the question that Senator Nunn just raised, it would increase, I believe, the danger of the war spreading, and therefore we would have to take what steps we could to reduce that danger.

Chairman THURMOND. General Shalikashvili, members of the administration and Congress have expressed deep concern about the safety of U.S. personnel if we intervene with major ground forces. However, I have an equal concern for our pilots and air crews who are already in danger in Bosnia. I understand that preemptively attacking Serbian air defenses would put us in the role of a belligerent. But after loss of our F-16 pilot last week, I do not believe we can continue to ask our pilots to operate in this heavy air defense environment. Would you tell me what plans the U.S. and NATO have either to eliminate the SAM threat or to end the practice of putting our aircrews at risk in order to satisfy the political priorities of the U.N.?

General SHALIKASHVILI. The first thing, as far as taking any specific actions against air defense sites, I do not think it would be wise on my part to discuss or speculate on such matters as long as the fate of our pilot is still unknown and as long as other hostages are still being held by the Serbs. We have taken a number of measures to increase the safety of our pilots and of all NATO pilots. First and foremost we no longer permit any flights over Bosnia, anywhere in Bosnia, unless those flights are accompanied by aircraft specifically equipped to deal with enemy air defenses. Second, we have considerably increased our capability to provide timely information on any radar emissions or status of air defenses. So the information capability has been significantly increased.

Those are the measures we have taken so far, and finally, to ensure that to the maximum extent possible we have a minute-by-minute picture of the air defenses on the ground, and so organize our flights as to minimize to the maximum extent possible their exposure to air defense systems.

Chairman THURMOND. Secretary Perry, the GAO recently released a report which concludes that UNPROFOR is no longer effective and unable to carry out its mandates.

Commentators and analysts, too numerous to mention, have also concluded that UNPROFOR has failed, that the U.N. is part of the problem and not part of the solution. UNPROFOR cannot deliver humanitarian supplies, keep airports open, enforce the Sarajevo exclusion zone, protect the U.N. protected areas, even protect its own troops.

There are plans to consolidate UNPROFOR into defended enclaves which make the humanitarian and military observer mission even less viable. In light of these circumstances and the immense cost of UNPROFOR, why are we so determined to keep them in Bosnia?

Secretary PERRY. I know there is a widely felt opinion that UNPROFOR is ineffective and even counterproductive. I do not believe that opinion is borne out by the facts.

The facts are that in the 2 years plus that they have been operating they have made dramatic reductions in the casualties and in delivering humanitarian aid, which is what their mission is.

The facts also are they have a very difficult job in doing that for the reasons that Senator McCain stated earlier, mainly they are a peacekeeping operation in the midst of a war that is going on.

But, even in the face of that difficulty they have had very effective results. We will discover—if UNPROFOR is pulled out, I fear we will discover that we will be going back to the days in 1992, tens of thousands of casualties a year and an enhancement of the danger of the war spreading.

So, the situation in Bosnia is very bad today. UNPROFOR has not solved that problem but it has been a positive contributor to it, I believe, and I believe the facts bear that out.

Chairman THURMOND. Secretary Perry, we may not have a second round because we have so many to ask questions. I may send a few questions to you to answer for the record.

Secretary PERRY. We will be happy to do that, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Let me make a clarification. I don't like redundancy but I am not sure we have clarified this situation. Let me try and get these questions answered.

From the beginning of this situation, it has been the Clinton administration's position, as I understand it, that no United States ground troops would be committed in any fashion to that area except for peacekeepers after a peace had been agreed to, and, to be used only as an emergency extraction of U.N. personnel.

Secretary PERRY. That is correct, Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Now, I think we have to agree that under the President's recent statement, I believe at the United States Air Force Academy, we have now entered into a somewhat expanded third option which would also be if we were called upon to use ground troops for repositioning U.N. forces in the area if they were threatened and if we were requested to do so; is that correct?

Secretary PERRY. Senator Exon, I would describe that as an emergency withdrawal of the forces. The difference is, and what is causing the confusion is, if this were to be an isolated incident not connected with the full withdrawal and the emergency were in one of the enclaves, it is not necessary to move them out of Bosnia as a part of this emergency, you would just move them to a safer location in Bosnia, but it is still an emergency withdrawal.

Senator EXON. I agree, but that third option that I just cited is a new one and an expanded one from the previous position; is that correct?

Secretary PERRY. It is new in that it is not necessarily a part. The emergency envisioned may not necessarily be a part of a full-scale withdrawal. If the emergency happened next week, for example, we may be asked for assistance and we would consider that assistance depending on the circumstances.

Senator EXON. That is a third option that I cited which I include as an expansion. You do not seem to want to admit that it is an expansion of our previous position.

Secretary PERRY. No, it is an expansion, I do admit it.

Senator EXON. Thank you.

Secretary PERRY. The point I wanted to make, though, is that it is not a part, as has been suggested, it is not a routine reconfiguration or repositioning. We are only considering that in the event of an emergency to one of our allies that needs our help.

Senator EXON. Now, can either of you comment here, either on option 2 which would be extraction, which we had agreed to previously, or on the new expanded option dealing with repositioning. If we were required to do that, would we also and have we addressed the problem of what we would do under such a scenario if there were hostages in the area from which we were to remove United States personnel?

Would we take any offensive action or would we just go in and extract what was there and leave the hostages even if they were in adjacent areas?

I know these are tough questions but we may be facing these sometime.

Secretary PERRY. The only contingencies we have considered are the three that I mentioned. The third one being the one you are discussing now, which is going in and assisting with a NATO unit, going in to assist with the extraction of an UNPROFOR unit which is in some emergency.

We have not considered or looked at alternatives of bringing out refugees along with them or rescuing hostages. That has been not part of this.

Senator EXON. You agree that we should?

Secretary PERRY. Pardon me?

Senator EXON. Are you going to be looking at that or are you saying we should not do that?

Secretary PERRY. That is not part of, that is not part of any plan we have right now.

Senator EXON. One last question. I am sure my time is almost up.

General, could you expand a little bit and I don't want you to cause any potential peril to any of our pilots, but is it or is it not true that we have received intermittent-type signals supposedly from the unit the pilot had in the F-16 that went down? Have we received intermittent signals?

General SHALIKASHVILI. There have been reports of intermittent signals, none of which we could tie to that particular pilot or to the equipment that he carried.

Senator EXON. Thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili, neither one of you have a legal background, science and military, but you have served as advocates here this morning by, I think, trying to put the best face on a weak case.

Mr. Secretary, you indicated that there have been some successes by UNPROFOR and I agree, but the numbers you have cited, namely, of going down from 130,000 casualties to 2500 has to be put in the proper context. 130,000 casualties came about at a time when the war was at its height and since the Serbs have now conquered 70 percent of the area which they have now occupied, the

casualties have come down because they have most of what they want.

So, the U.N. forces have come in not reducing the number of casualties by virtue of their presence, but by virtue of the fact that the Serbs have most of what they were seeking in the first instance.

Second, the UNPROFOR forces have been called upon to deliver aid under circumstances which I think have invited their paying tribute in the way of fuel and medicine and foods as much as 50 percent in some cases and then being taken as hostages in the past and even exhibiting, in some cases, what I would call the Stockholm syndrome where we have observed some of the captives or hostages actually engaging in athletic events with their captors.

I think part of that has been brought about by what I would call the misuse of power. We have used threats when action was called for and then when we use force, it was insufficient to either punish or to deter.

I think as a result the Serbs have stuck a thumb in the collective eye of the U.N. and indeed those members of NATO who are currently on the ground.

I would like—and then that is just a personal opinion, you and I have discussed this in the past elsewhere—in terms of the forces that we have been talking about, I don't understand the distinction between reconfiguring forces and emergency extraction.

I think that still is unclear that if there were an emergency extraction, we would use those forces in order to redeploy them in safer areas. That is distinguishable from using emergency extraction in order to help complete a U.N. withdrawal, so I think we have to be very clear and I think you have responded in that fashion to Senator Exon on that.

I would like to talk about daytime versus nighttime operations because according to the media reports, the enhanced U.N. force is going to secure Mount Ingman Road into Sarajevo during the day but will not try to control it at night and this, I think, reliance upon daytime operations, is contrary to the U.S. preference for nighttime operations.

In particular I want to talk about the AC-130 gunships. They generally operate only at night because they fly low and under the clouds and they are very vulnerable during the daytime. We lost one during the Gulf war precisely because it stayed on patrol after daybreak.

The question I have is will the AC-130 gunships be used only for emergency extractions or will they be used for supporting ongoing UNPROFOR operations, and will they be allowed to operate only in daytime or nighttime?

I raise this because the United States is now, according to your chart, providing night vision equipment to UNPROFOR forces. The question is how much time will it take them to become acclimated to the night vision operations and then, number two, I would want to know the AC-130 gunships, I believe, are the H model and these have to operate below the clouds because they are not able to see their targets otherwise, but the newer version, the AC-130-U has radar targeting systems but I am told that will not be available at least until July.

The question I have is, is that the ship that will be used? Is it possible to accelerate its deployment or what are going to be basically the operations of daytime, nighttime, with respect to the gunships?

Secretary PERRY. Let me try a few of those questions. First of all, I think your point that the heavy casualties in 1992 occurred at the height of the fighting. I would submit to you that if UNPROFOR is withdrawn in 1995, we are going to see a new height in the fighting and, in particular, I believe we will see major battles occur at the four enclaves, possibly at Sarajevo as well, and I do think we are talking about tens of thousands of casualties.

I do not think the comparison between a post-UNPROFOR and a pre-UNPROFOR is an invalid comparison.

Senator COHEN. But the blood will run on an equal level.

Secretary PERRY. In addition to that, and I make this point because it is a question of U.S. vital interest, I do believe that we increase the risk of the war spreading beyond Bosnia. That is a subjective judgment that I make.

In terms of the reconfiguration, first of all, UNPROFOR, as of this point, and the major nations involved in it, have decided not to reconfigure the force, not to pull them in from the enclaves which had been a consideration at one time.

Second, if they do that, they will do it with their own forces. We are not signed up or offering to help do that. The only situation, the only contingency in which I would envision going in to help is in a true emergency where, say, the Dutch forces at Srebrenica came under attack, and they were in danger of being killed or captured, called for help.

The U.N. asked NATO for help and NATO agreed to do it. We would have to be part of that agreement and we would then participate in the action. That is, I think, an unlikely scenario and also, what I have described to you is a rather cumbersome approval mechanism for a real emergency. But that is the situation I have described.

In terms of the AC-130, in my judgment, it is in an air defense environment, it should be used only at night. I would agree with your judgment on that.

In terms of when and how it would be used, I will simply say that it would be used only if our air commander believed that it could be used efficiently and that the risks were acceptable. This is not a judgment I would be making. This would be a judgment he would be making.

It is not at all clear sitting in Washington what the circumstances and scenarios would be in which the AC-130 might be the weapon of choice, but it is a resource that is available to us, the ones that we have over there right now are not the U models and I don't know the answer but I will look in to get the answer to your question of when the U models might be available.

[The information follows:]

Initial Operational Capability date for the AC-130U of 8 aircrews/4 aircraft certified full mission capable is scheduled for October 1, 1995.

The AC-130U model force will be able to augment contingency deployments after the Initial Operational Capability date without impacting the training plan. The first exercise deployment will commence November 1995.

Factors limiting early fielding of the AC-130U are logistics sustainability and contract claims disputes. Time line is already compressed, there is no feasible way to accelerate maturation at this point.

However, under emergency conditions two AC-130Us could be deployed now to support contingency operations. The tradeoffs for early deployment of AC-130Us prior to the Initial Operational Capability date are an absence of a reliable 25mm gun for surgical Close Air Support, a marginal sustainment package due to limited initial availability of spares, and a significant degradation in Stateside based aircrew training.

So I believe it best to stick with the current plan of having a reliable deployment capability in October 1995.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much. Mr. Secretary, General, the need for the rapid reaction force or to provide for the protection of U.N. forces depends on what the Bosnian Serbs do; and, what the Bosnian Serbs do depends on how they view the overall military situation and how U.N. forces affect that military situation.

As we know, in April, the Muslims launched renewed attacks against the Bosnian Serbs with some success. This may make the Bosnian Serbs believe that time is working against them. So, what are the U.N. forces with the new rapid reaction force to be doing? Will it be only humanitarian relief? Will they continue to enforce safe areas and weapons exclusion zones?

Some of what the forces do are more provocative with regards to the Bosnian Serbs. Do they view that time is on their side or running out? When they have the statements that have been made by our Ambassador to the United Nations and also included in the Secretary's statement that we believe the aggressors are the Bosnian Serbs, the victims are the Bosnian Government and their people.

What can you tell us about how they are viewing this force that is coming in there? Whether this series of events which you have outlined here may be triggered will depend to a considerable extent, it would appear to me, about what kind of activities the United Nation forces are going to be involved in.

Are we going to express any preference in those areas since I think primarily what we are interested in is the humanitarian, reduction of violence and the humanitarian assistance to the million plus refugees?

Secretary PERRY. Let me comment, first of all, that in 1994 we believe that the war was at, essentially, a military stalemate but that in early 1995, the Bosnian Government forces began to increase their capabilities and there seemed to be a shift of momentum in favor of the Bosnian Government forces.

In any event, to answer your—specifically answer your question, I believe that the Bosnian Serbs perceived that shift of momentum believed that time might be operating against them and that that is what prompted them to start these aggressive actions a few weeks ago which led us to our present condition.

I believe they feared that time was against them and that they had to do something to try to stop this buildup, this momentum, that the Bosnian Government was gaining.

What the rapid reaction force does is assist—it does not get involved in that momentum or in the issue of fights between the government and Bosnian Serb forces.



Senator KENNEDY. Well, we don't intend it to. But clearly, building on your earlier response, the question is how the Bosnian Serbs view it.

Secretary PERRY. The Bosnian Serbs increasingly see, now that they see time is against them, they increasingly see that the UNPROFOR forces there may act to their disadvantage. I would like to get General Shalikashvili to comment on that, too, but I think that is a very good point.

General SHALIKASHVILI. First of all, I would share the view that most people operating in Bosnia now express the view that the Serbs must feel that time might not be on their side. How dramatic that shift is, I don't know.

As far as the RRF is concerned, I would think that the Serbs would see that as an instrument that would make it tougher for them to push the UNPROFOR around and to the degree that they find it to their advantage to be able to push UNPROFOR around, they probably would look with disfavor on the RRF.

Senator KENNEDY. General, you stated earlier that the implementation of a determined effort, the withdrawal of U.N. forces from Bosnia would take some 22 weeks from the start to finish. Does the creation of the rapid reaction force impact that time table?

General SHALIKASHVILI. The creation of the rapid reaction force that we have just been talking about, created in Paris, does not. The time line involved that I mentioned could take that long, up to 22 weeks, from the time that you decided to go ahead until the last folks are withdrawn and back home again. This time line is simply a function of the number of people involved, the very limited road network and the time that it takes to build up logistics bases, and so on.

You can cut that time down if you were to preposition some things, let's say, in Italy, and thereby reduce the time. But I painted that only as the greatest, the heaviest option with the least prepositioning.

Senator KENNEDY. Finally, General, what would be the implication of a withdrawal in terms of the Croats and that agreement that was signed here a little over a year ago in terms of the peace-keeping in that part of the former Yugoslavia.

Would it be anticipated that those forces would be withdrawn as well? What is the status of those forces? Are they being considered independently from the Bosnians?

General SHALIKASHVILI. They are being considered independently but most observers are of the view that if you withdraw UNPROFOR from Bosnia, it is highly unlikely that you would be able to maintain U.N. forces in Croatia. There is just too much connectivity between these two theaters.

So, the feeling is, while you might not intentionally wish to withdraw people from UNCRO in Croatia, you might very well have to. So you might unhinge Croatia as well.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Perry and General, I agree with you that it is in our vital national security interest to ensure that this conflict does not spread beyond the region.

Also, could I just comment very briefly. I see no virtue in publicly telling what the situation is with regards to a pilot's beeper. As long as that pilot's fate is undetermined, I see no need to know on the part of the American public the status of our efforts to rescue him and I hope we will cease that discussion until we have some definitive information about it.

General Shalikashvili, according to media reports and your statement, you advocated air strikes, you advocated the strikes on the ammo dump; is that correct? You recommended them?

General SHALIKASHVILI. That is correct.

Senator MCCAIN. In light of those air strikes, we had increased shelling of Bosnian-held areas, an American aircraft shot down and hundreds of hostages taken as a direct result of the pinprick air strike on an ammo dump.

Now, as a result of that, do you advocate further air strikes?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Again, I want to be careful in open forum what our position on air strikes is. The air strike option is clearly on the table and remains on the table. I think that you must make the judgment in each individual case and you need to weigh what the continuation of an undesirable outcome on the ground is that caused you to consider an air strike in the first place.

We have had air strikes in the past where we have been able to mitigate the behavior of the Serbs. In this particular case, it is very clear what the results of that air strike have been.

But we do not know what the results would have been had we not conducted an air strike and to what degree the shelling that now has, to a large extent, abated, to what degree that shelling would have continued that was ongoing into Sarajevo. So, I am not trying to evade the issue.

Senator MCCAIN. The fact is, General, that it is the worst kind of incrementalism. To believe that destroying an ammo dump is in some way going to modify the behavior of people like the Serbs is pure fantasy. I think we both know that. If we want to punish the Serbs in the form of a massive air campaign, that is something that may be—I do not happen to support it. But frankly, to destroy an ammo dump smacks so much of the failed strategy of Vietnam that it gives me nightmares.

Now, are we going to continue, Secretary Perry, to have our pilots fly over areas where there are known SAM sites without taking those SAM sites out? Before you answer, you can correct me if I am wrong, but last November we took out three SAM sites in Serbia. In December it was a recommendation from NATO that we take out other SAM sites, and that was overruled by the United Nations.

Now, are we going to allow our forces, even as well-protected with Wild Weasel, et cetera, to fly over areas where there are known threats to their life and safety?

Secretary PERRY. We will not ask our pilots to fly over any area where our air commander, our commander of the air forces on the ground, does not believe he has sufficient means of protecting them. That is a judgment he will make, not a judgment that I will make, and he has either, then—in planes like the F-16, we have electronic converter measures (ECM) equipment on those planes.

We also have escorts we can send along with those planes, and we also have the option that you mentioned by striking—reactively striking the ground.

All of those options are possible, and we also have the option of not flying the mission, and the air commander has that available to him as the set of options. He will make the decisions about which of those to choose, not I.

Senator MCCAIN. I would hope, Mr. Secretary, that when there are known surface-to-air missile threats in our area, once already recommendations have been made to take those out, that before we would send these young people in harm's way, we would accede to the recommendation made by NATO and take those surface-to-air missile sites out before we send them over.

I just want to return one more time to this issue of when we send troops in. If tomorrow there were 400 UNPROFOR troops surrounded and they asked for us to rescue them, would we do it? Yes or no.

Secretary PERRY. I cannot answer that yes or no.

Senator MCCAIN. Would we consider it?

Secretary PERRY. We would consider it.

Senator MCCAIN. Is it an option that we might carry out?

Secretary PERRY. We would consider it, and depending on the circumstances, depending on the feasibility of doing it, depending on the danger they are in, depending on what other ways there were of pulling them out not involving the United States, all of those factors would come into consideration.

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Chairman, let me just finish. According to media reports, according to administration officials, General Shalikashvili recommended the President expand the previous American commitment and, if asked, offer to help move the United Nations troops to more defensible positions in Bosnia. Do you still hold that position? Do you still recommend that?

Secretary PERRY. What I recommend is what I have testified to this morning, and that is what I have been recommending right along.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think all the confusion that has been in the paper and the news media about our policy, and all the statements by the people, I think some of it has been overblown for other purposes, but quite apart from that, is your statement here this morning now cleared with the White House, and is this our definitive administration position now?

Secretary PERRY. This is administration policy. It is the policy which I favor personally, and it has been approved by the White House in particular.

Senator GLENN. Thank you.

Secretary PERRY. I reviewed it with the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, and the President.

Senator GLENN. Thank you.

The rapid reaction force, to me, I view that as a whole different operation that we are going into. This is not just a blue helmet

presence, as I understand it. I hope you can clarify this if I am wrong.

As the GAO report said, the blue helmet presence was supposed to be there with the consent and cooperation of warring parties. Those were their words, and it was supposed to sort of encourage peace, and encourage them not to go at each other, and we were sort of a buffer in between, or the blue helmets were the buffer in between.

Now, as I understand the RRF, though, it is going in to reinforce—that will go in to reinforce people there on the ground in a combat role. Putting more presence in does not work, we know that, so I presume that the rapid reaction force is going to go in there as a combat force to protect the people there on the ground. Is that correct?

Secretary PERRY. I think that is a fair description. Let me ask General Shalikashvili.

General SHALIKASHVILI. That is their specific purpose, to provide added protection to the peacekeepers, the UNPROFOR forces.

Senator GLENN. This would be a combat role. When the RRF goes in, it can go in shooting, is that right?

General SHALIKASHVILI. That is correct.

Senator GLENN. General, do you think that the forces committing to this are adequate? 10,000 to me seems minimal. When you have people going into what is a 24-hour operation, part of them are supply, you are talking about actual shooters out there maybe being 3,000 out of that at any one time, 2,000 to 3,000, maybe, out of that total force. Is that correct?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I do not know exactly. It is two brigades' worth of troops. It is a force that is not designed to take UNPROFOR to war. It is a force to give some muscle to UNPROFOR to protect itself against a local warlord in a localized situation, if they are being harassed or taken hostage, or if they are being denied the ability to keep humanitarian supplies flowing, but it is not an all-encompassing capability to go to war. It is on a localized basis to be able to provide some added protection.

Senator GLENN. I am concerned about that, because ordinarily in a military situation, as you, of all people, are very much aware, you go in, you want to go in with an overwhelming force, and you solidify it and that is it, and you save lives by doing it that way.

We are sort of piecemealing this with the U.N. forces, or the RRF is going to be piecemealing it as I see it, because I do not think that is an overwhelming force. If they get in there and they are shooting and they have this rapid reaction force there on the ground, are we committed in any way by what you have discussed with our allies to going in and rescuing the RRF if it gets in trouble?

General SHALIKASHVILI. We are not.

Senator GLENN. We are not committed?

General SHALIKASHVILI. We are not.

Senator GLENN. I think there would certainly be a moral commitment there with us being involved, but we can save that for some other questions another time.

We are committed only to close air support. I noticed that. Everything is close air support. I wonder if that is the best use of our

air power, because what you normally do in a situation like this is, whether it is World War II or Korea or the Gulf war, you try and go to Berlin, Pyong Yang, and Baghdad, and convince the decisionmakers to reverse their decision.

We are not doing that here. We are hiding artillery tubes out in the woods and putting our people in harm's way, it seems to me, and what we should be doing is going after positions where we think the decisionmakers are.

Is UNPROFOR or the U.N. considering that, or is NATO considering making better use of our air power rather than just being out on the end of this octopus tentacle, out here where the conscripts are in the woods, to simplify it, as opposed to really hitting some place where it would make some difference in the decision to carry on this war?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I cannot speak for UNPROFOR. As far as NATO is concerned, they do not now have such plans.

Senator GLENN. There is no plan now to use air power to go after the decisionmakers?

General SHALIKASHVILI. There is no NATO plan. There is no NATO plan right now to do that.

Senator GLENN. Has that been discussed at all?

General SHALIKASHVILI. The targeting options have been discussed from the very beginning when NATO agreed to support UNPROFOR with air strikes or with close air support and what-not. Yes, it has been, Senator.

Senator GLENN. Secretary Perry, we are going to send equipment, we are going to provide lift, we are going to provide intelligence, undoubtedly some of those other functions that are listed as nondirect combat. The supply of equipment, lift, intelligence, will put our people in a situation where they could be shot at. Are the rules of engagement going to be such that any Americans going in can shoot back and positively bring force to bear to protect themselves?

Secretary PERRY. We are not sending people in with the equipment. If there is an intelligence coordination cell set up in Bosnia, there will not be U.S. troops as part of it.

Senator GLENN. How about lift? Would lift be in-country?

Secretary PERRY. Lift would be most likely to Croatia.

Senator GLENN. Where it would not be an in a combat situation?

Secretary PERRY. It would not be an in a combat situation.

Senator GLENN. We still might be using the gunships and so on in this situation, is that correct?

Secretary PERRY. The combat situation is close air support, but in terms of ground troops, no. Nothing we are proposing envisions putting ground troops into combat.

Senator GLENN. My time is up, but are we prepared to go in absolutely to rescue crews that are downed, with our own individual Americans going in to rescue Americans?

Secretary PERRY. Yes.

General SHALIKASHVILI. We have the best capability we have in our armed forces there in the area to do that.

Senator GLENN. We are prepared to go in shooting to rescue our people, if we have to?

General SHALIKASHVILI. That is absolutely correct, Senator.

Senator GLENN. Thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Kempthorne.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I would like to pick up on what Senator McCain was asking. He was referencing an article that was in the *New York Times*, where it stated that the recommendation of both the Secretary and the General to the President was to expand the previous American commitment, and, if asked, offer to help move the United Nations troops to more defensible positions within Bosnia.

The article goes on to say that a skeptical Mr. Christopher immediately asked Mr. Perry if such an operation could include American ground troops. According to an administration official, "Yes" replied Mr. Perry.

Secretary Perry, coupling that, then, with our discussion of this aspect of an emergency extraction, we have now clarified that the extraction does not mean necessarily from Bosnia, but an extraction from an emergency situation, so is the bottomline that we are poised, that we may insert ground troops into Bosnia in an emergency situation, and it is not for the extraction of other troops out of Bosnia?

Secretary PERRY. If an emergency arises with one of these isolated U.N. units, and if they call for help from NATO, and if NATO comes to us for help, we would consider that help, and then whether or not we said yes would be determined by the conditions which I laid out in my previous answers.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. So one of the very real options that you are considering is inserting ground troops in that sort of emergency situation, which is not for the extraction.

Secretary PERRY. It will be moving from an untenable position to a safer position, and then we would come out again.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. So in a situation where there may be an extended fire fight, we would put ground troops in there.

Secretary PERRY. That is correct.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. General Shalikashvili, what type of force would it require to contain the violence to Bosnia if the UNPROFOR forces put out from Bosnia?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I really think it is unfair for me to even speculate. We have had all kinds of experts speculating anywhere from 300,000 to 100,000 and what-not. I do not know. It would depend on the situation. The statement was made that it is America's way of going in with decisive force into any operation, because we believe it minimizes casualties.

I have testified publicly and spoken publicly that I am a great believer in that. I so recommended when we went into Haiti. I so recommended when we returned back to Somalia to help withdraw some people. I would certainly be of that same view in any operation. Therefore, even in a withdrawal operation, I have argued that we should not get hung up on a number, that we need to make enough people available so we minimize the chances of casualties.

Here, if I were to say it takes 100,000, it would somehow become the lead story. I do not know what it is. It is so situation dependent, but I argue that whenever Americans would be involved, wherever, that we go in with decisive force, and not quibble over how many people go in.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. But a key point here, Mr. Secretary, is back to the reference in your statement on page 6. It is to our vital interest as the United States that we must contain it within Bosnia, that it not begin to spread to other NATO allied countries, correct?

Secretary PERRY. That is my judgment.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Therefore, that could happen rather quickly, could it not, once UNPROFOR forces were withdrawn?

Secretary PERRY. I think that is—I do not want to overstate the case, Senator Kempthorne.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. But it is a possibility.

Secretary PERRY. It is a possibility. It is a possibility today. I think that possibility is somewhat increased if the UNPROFOR forces come out.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Then also, with regard to the F-16, Mr. Secretary, you have stated that it is up to the air commander to make these decisions, that we will not fly our aircraft without either escort or without HAARM missiles.

Did we have any intelligence that those two F-16s that were flying this mission where we have a downed aircraft, whether there was any intelligence that there was a possibility of surface-to-air missiles? Why is it that the F-16 was not armed with HAARM missiles or have an escort?

Have the rules of engagement changed because of a tragedy?

General SHALIKASHVILI. We had absolutely no intelligence information. Every bit of information we had was quite contrary to that. For months, if not for years, there had never been detected an air defense site in that area.

The commander that made those judgments, by the way, is Admiral Layton Smith, who is the overall commander. He is a naval aviator, 285 combat missions, over 4,000 hours in fighter aircraft, over 1,000 aircraft landings, knows his business, the best America has. His air component commander is a U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General, over 300 combat missions, over 3,000 hours in combat aircraft.

They were sent there specifically because of their judgment, because they know their business like no one else, and I have 100 percent trust in their judgment, and I know that neither Admiral Smith nor his air component commander would have sent anyone over that area without the air suppression aircraft if he had had the slightest inkling that they were going into harm's way.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary and General, as you know, and as I indicated in my opening statement, I feel that, though I understand why the rapid reaction force was put together, particularly by the British and the French in response to the seizing of the hostages, I do think it has the effect of reinforcing what I would call a mission impossible that we have given the U.N., and I do hope that we can find our way to withdrawal as soon as possible.

As you said, Mr. Secretary, it would be your guess that if the rapid reaction force does not succeed, or help the U.N. mission succeed, then it may well lead to a United Nations withdrawal.

I wanted to ask two brief questions about the rapid reaction force. First, I believe General Shalikashvili clarified something that has been troubling many members of the committee about the possibility that the rapid reaction force would now bring yet a third command and control structure into a situation which many of us feel has been difficult to operate in. I take it that I heard you correctly in saying that the rapid reaction force would be accountable to the United Nations and the UNPROFOR forces, is that right?

General SHALIKASHVILI. That is absolutely correct. This was a point that was made very, very clear by the French, the British, and the Dutch, all who will participate, that the commander of that force will be the UNPROFOR commander.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So that if there are British and French NATO forces under blue helmets that are in some difficulty, and their national commanders or NATO commanders want to come to the assistance with the rapid reaction force, it will take consent by the United Nations, the UNPROFOR forces, to bring that about?

General SHALIKASHVILI. They are under his command, and they will only go in if he commanded them to go there.

Senator LIEBERMAN. A very brief factual question about the extent of American involvement in support of the rapid reaction force. There is a story in the paper today which I wanted to give you a chance to respond to. As a part of the Washington Post story, there is a paragraph that says French and British officials said their Governments are satisfied with the United States contribution to the rapid reaction force, which will include AC-130 gunships manned by American crews and Cobra attack helicopters to be piloted by Europeans. Is it true that there will be AC-130 gunships made available to the rapid reaction force, and in fact they will be manned by American crews?

Secretary PERRY. There is today, Senator Lieberman, AC-130 gunships are part of our close air support to UNPROFOR, so that is not new or different at all. All the close air support, all the U.S. air support is manned by U.S. crews. Of course, the British and French close air support is manned by British and French crews, so that is not really different.

We made clear, though, that if we provide the Cobra helicopters, that we will provide them the equipment but not the crews to go with them.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me now go back to something that has been touched on, which is the question last fall about the beginning of the appearance of the surface-to-air missiles on the Serb side and the request, apparently from NATO to the United Nations, to knock out those sites.

The turning down of that request, and I wonder—and, of course, to some of us who have watched this, it highlights the difficulty of the dual command here—and I wanted to ask either or both of you to look back at that circumstance to indicate, if you could, why the U.N. to the best of your knowledge turned down—if, in fact, I am right that NATO requested permission to attack and knock out the SAM-6 sites—why the United Nations turned that around, and



then what was done by our forces—you have touched on this some—who have continued to fly missions to compensate for the continued presence of the air defense systems there, and then finally whether that also included or now does include any ability to suppress the relatively unsophisticated shoulder-fired SAM's that some of the Serbs apparently have obtained from Russia.

But most of all, I am interested in looking back at that experience last fall and why you think it happened and how badly has it endangered or jeopardized our personnel continuing to fly missions there.

General SHALIKASHVILI. At the time that the Serb air defense sites—that had been there all along, by the way—began to go active, there was the discussion within NATO whether to proceed and mount a major air campaign to eliminate all air defense sites. It was within NATO where it was decided that the circumstances did not dictate that, and that it would be a widening of the war that the majority of the troop-contributing NATO nations did not wish to see.

But it was also, I believe, a view that was held by UNPROFOR, but it was never a NATO request to UNPROFOR which was turned down by UNPROFOR.

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is important to know.

General SHALIKASHVILI. It was NATO nations who were also troop contributors on the ground who felt that it would have been an unwarranted widening of the war, that it would put the safety of their soldiers on the ground under duress.

They were also, by the way, the same nations that had pilots in the air, so they were weighing the risk to their pilots in the air to the risk to their soldiers on the ground.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So again, it was the concern about, for instance, the possible seizing of hostages, is that a fair thing to say, by the NATO countries?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Yes.

Senator LIEBERMAN. By the NATO countries that had personnel there?

General SHALIKASHVILI. That is correct.

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is a tough decision, because it represented exposing the pilots, not only American pilots but the pilots of the NATO nations also, as you correctly said, to some vulnerability to the SAM missile sites.

General SHALIKASHVILI. And it was at that time that we began to bring in additional air defense suppression aircraft to give the added safety to those pilots who would be flying in close proximity to known air defense sites.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Again, that air defense suppression capacity was not present on the mission on which the F-16 was shot down, because there was no intelligence to indicate that there were air defense capabilities on the ground in that area; is that correct?

General SHALIKASHVILI. That is absolutely correct, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. I think there was some misunderstanding on a question from Senator McCain earlier to you, General Shalikashvili. Did the United States in fact push for that air attack that led to the later reactions from the Serbs, the most recent one; or was that in fact, as you indicated in your opening testi-

mony, not a request from the United Nations for that attack to occur because the United Nations resolution was being violated?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I understood the question to be whether I supported that air strike. I did support the air strike. I was never asked. I found out about the request for the air strike when the airplanes were already in the air.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Did our Government play any unusual role in calling for that air strike?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Absolutely not.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate you clarifying.

General SHALIKASHVILI. Absolutely not.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Because I think there is some misapprehension in the press and perhaps here that we uniquely pushed for that strike.

General SHALIKASHVILI. I might have misunderstood the question. I thought he was asking me whether I was in favor of that air strike. I was, but I found out about it after the aircraft were within minutes from conducting the strike.

Secretary PERRY. Let me add something to that, though, because I know what has caused some of the confusion on this point. The Commander, General Smith, called for the air strike. And, as far as I know, nobody in our Government had anything to do with promoting or asking him to do that. But the United Nations political—the one in charge of the political force in Bosnia, turned it down when he first requested it. And then the U.S. Government, and in particular our United Nations representative, stated both to the Secretary-General and publicly that she thought that was a mistake; that the Commander ought to be supported in his request.

So, to that extent, we, the U.S. Government, did say that we thought that the political counselor, Mr. Akashi, should not override the United Nations Commander. And then, a day or two later, he withdrew his objection, and then the Commander was able to get his request for strikes.

So, to that extent, the U.S. Government was involved.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that clarification. My time is up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Hutchison.

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I think, through all of the questions and through your statements, you have established that we would consider helping NATO with the withdrawal of the United Nations forces. I think that has been established previously. But you have also said that in emergencies, in conjunction with the withdrawal, in a re-configuration, also we would look at emergencies that are not in conjunction with a withdrawal. And you have said that we will not have a policy against continuing the missions flying over air space that might have SAM's in them. And then, to Senator Glenn's question, you said that we would certainly, if our planes were shot down, go in for rescue of our pilots.

Is this not an expansion, Mr. Secretary, of our role in this conflict?

Secretary PERRY. I tried in my opening statement, Senator Hutchison, to lay out as precisely as I could what our policy was

and what the limits were on what we would do to carry out the policy. They are very substantial limits. And our allies feel those limits, and they really feel that we are not—they really wish we would go farther than we are going to go. We will not participate in UNPROFOR in the ground forces. We will not participate in the rapid reaction force with ground forces.

We continue to provide the air support. And we have, for some time, said that we would assist in a withdrawal of the UNPROFOR forces as a part of NATO.

I think the only addition to that, which has caused much controversy and much media attention as well as attention from the Congress here, is our concern for a contingency which might arise any time in the next few weeks. Which is if one unit of UNPROFOR is in a desperate situation—a Dutch unit, say in Srebrenica—and they call NATO for assistance. And we said we would consider—look at the circumstances—but we would certainly consider that. That is as far as we have gone at this point.

Senator HUTCHISON. But if you are going to have emergencies for reconfiguration, which is what that could be, and emergencies not in conjunction with withdrawal, is that not ground troops when a conflict arises in Bosnia?

Secretary PERRY. I will give you an opinion that, first of all, I do not think that contingency is going to arise. But, if it does, if they are really in extremis that way and cannot defend the units, I believe that would lead to a withdrawal. But it could happen before a formal decision had been made on withdrawal.

So I really see it as a part of the withdrawal option, but it is an emergency which could occur before a decision had been made for withdrawal. And I would not believe it is proper for the United States to abandon an ally in that sort of a situation.

Senator HUTCHISON. Let me just ask you, if you have laid out all of these contingencies in which we would be involved, why is it a United States mission or potential mission or possibility? Why the United States? Why is it so important that we not be able to say we will be supportive of our allies, but that does not mean troops on the ground, it does not mean reconfiguration; it means we will be supportive in every other way? Why does it have to be United States forces on the ground?

Secretary PERRY. We have said we would not put United States forces on the ground in Bosnia except for this extraction/withdrawal option.

Senator HUTCHISON. Or except for emergencies not in conjunction with a withdrawal.

Secretary PERRY. But my opinion, which I offered you, is that that would precede a withdrawal, even if it is not a part of a withdrawal. So I do not see the sharp distinction in my mind. If UNPROFOR is in that desperate situation, there is no doubt in my mind that it would be a precedent, it would lead rather directly to a withdrawal.

Senator HUTCHISON. Mr. Perry, it seems that our policies, from your statement and from a speech that I heard you make yesterday, it seems that our policies are to continue trying to support a United Nations peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and all of these emergencies that might arise because we keep that mission. I

would just ask you why you and this administration feel that we must continue this United Nations peacekeeping effort when there is no peace and when neither—well, when one side wants peace and the other side does not, which does not a peace agreement make? Why would we continue to support that, which is the basis then for us to have ground troops, by whatever name you would want to call, in the conflict?

Secretary PERRY. I am happy to answer that. I will give you the administration's position, but it is also my strongly held, personal view. And the reason I support these actions, which are intended to keep the UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia and strengthen them and make them more effective, is because I think the alternative, the UNPROFOR withdrawal, would lead with reasonable certainty, first of all, to a humanitarian catastrophe, tens of thousands of people being killed in the enclaves, and, second, I believe that it increases the probability that the war would spread out of Bosnia and thereby move from something which is not in our vital national interest to something that is, and could very well then involve a major commitment of U.S. forces.

Senator HUTCHISON. My time is up. But I would just say that I think your position that we would not want the war to expand is a very sound position. I think that is within the role of NATO as I understand it, and that is clear. But the involvement within Bosnia, which is really a civil war as everyone—not everyone, but many people here have said—the expansion of the role there is not necessarily part of the NATO mission to contain it. I can see withdrawal of the United Nations, lifting the arms embargo, letting the civil war go on, while we have a perimeter around which everyone knows they cannot go. I think that would be a safer position for our American troops, and it would also limit the continuing quagmire that we are going to have if we keep trying to make a United Nations peacekeeping mission where there is no peace to keep. Thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Robb.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize. I had to step out, ironically, to meet with the brother of Boutros-Boutros Ghali, to discuss the Egyptian Middle East position very briefly. And if I missed the questioning on this point, please let me know. I just have a couple of broad questions. Let me preface it by saying, as I think both Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili know, that I and, I suspect, everyone on this panel and most of the colleagues in the Congress have an extraordinarily high regard for you personally and the skills and talent that you bring to this very difficult equation.

The concern that I think most of us have focused on really is bullet number three, if you will. I will not prolong that discussion right now, but I would ask about the duration of the status quo, if you will—what you perceive in terms of days, months, years, that that might take place. And then I would like to follow up very briefly with a little clarification on where the troops and equipment and logistics and lift capability that we have right now—we are talking—in fact, maybe I will just ask it and then let you respond as you will—we are talking about three or four different groups of troops and supplies.

We have the amphibious ready group, the Kearsage, with about 2,000 marines and sailors on it, an MEU. We have the Roosevelt carrier battle group and its support for some operation. We have the 5th Army in Germany that is preparing for certain types of operations and will be presumably available within a relatively short period of time.

Then we have a scenario for a much larger phased, planned, rehearsed withdrawal—the numbers that have been used—at least a couple of them publicly, and I know that on national television you have confirmed the 25,000 as a number that is part of this discussion in a larger context of NATO and other allied forces, ranging in the 70,000 to 80,000 number if we were to do a very substantial planned withdrawal.

And then we have the prospect of a containment post-UNPROFOR situation that really has not been discussed—it may have been discussed when I was absent—and the kinds of commitments of U.S. troops and resources that we might have on that area.

Could you just, in the very brief remaining time, focus on the question of the duration of the current status quo, even including the third and obviously very controversial point with respect to under what circumstances a repositioning/reconfiguration or whatever might take place? How long do we anticipate that being part of the equation? And then, in the larger context, which of the scenarios involving U.S. troops and equipment are we most likely to face? And how would they relate to the scenarios we have been talking about?

Secretary PERRY. You already have a very clear picture of our positioning and our capabilities there. I will make a brief comment on the—

Senator ROBB. May I add one, too? And forgive me.

The question of whether or not U.S. forces would be involved in the attack helicopters—obviously, in the AC-130 Specter gunships, we are talking about U.S. personnel. Are we talking about—and in some cases we are talking about providing equipment unmanned. But when you talk about attack helicopters and what have you, it is a gray area.

Secretary PERRY. Yes, equipment only.

Senator ROBB. Equipment only, in terms of helicopters.

Secretary PERRY. Equipment only.

Senator ROBB. So the only U.S. personnel that would be involved in active suppression, rescue, or other operations at this point, save for the commitment of the MEU or the 5th Army group, would be those who are in suppress-fire—Deny Flight missions and potentially in the AC-130 gunships?

Secretary PERRY. Yes. If we had an emergency rescue operation, it would be a small unit in the near future that needed emergency rescue operation. And if we were asked to do it, if we agreed to do it—all of those ifs—we are talking about something that would take a couple of days I believe—is in rescue and out again.

Senator ROBB. You can envision that outside of the NATO environment, can you not?

Secretary PERRY. We have thought of it within the NATO environment.

Senator ROBB. I know you have. That is the reason I am asking the question.

Secretary PERRY. Yes. Yes, we have the capabilities to do it by ourselves, but we have not considered doing it by ourselves.

General.

Senator ROBB. Excuse me, one more point, and forgive me. We have about 800 U.S. personnel: about 500 along the Croatian border, about 300 in Croatia, and a relatively small number that are in the high-risk areas for which we have a responsibility specifically. And I assume that if other forces could not react to special needs there, that we would respond to a request for assistance from our own forces?

Secretary PERRY. Of course.

Senator ROBB. Okay.

General SHALIKASHVILI. We do not have any plans to relocate or do otherwise with U.S. forces. We do not even have a plan to do it under NATO, but the only consideration that has been discussed is under NATO. Never as a U.S. unilateral operation.

Senator ROBB. Would either Secretary Perry or General Shalikashvili respond to the question about a post-UNPROFOR containment scenario, whether it is brought on voluntarily or involuntarily at this point? What kinds of U.S. forces would we envision being necessary in the event that the UNPROFOR came out, either as a result of a request that they initiated or because of some deterioration of the situation, or whatever the case may be? The concern that you have raised about expanded hostile operations within the theater is certainly one that is shared; the concern about the spread of the war is one that is understood.

What kinds of commitments is the United States likely to have to provide to a containment force if that should occur?

Secretary PERRY. We have certainly considered and looked at that in considerable detail. Obviously, it depends on what actually happens in Bosnia after withdrawal. But if there turns out to be large-scale fighting—which I think is quite possible—if the United States is supplying one side—which would be the Bosnian Government side—and are seen as part of the enemy by the Bosnian Serbs, then we would have to certainly be very seriously concerned about the safety of the troops we had on the borders of Bosnia.

We have just under a battalion of forces in Macedonia and we have a medical unit in Croatia. So we would have to consider either withdrawing those or reinforcing them.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Lott.

Senator LOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, can you give us some idea of the costs that are involved here—maybe what was spent in this support role we had last year or anticipated costs this year, or maybe you could just give us some month-to-month estimate?

Secretary PERRY. First of all, let me ask General Shalikashvili to give you the costs associated with the withdrawal, the 40104.

General SHALIKASHVILI. We have looked at it. And on the assumption that it might last as long as six months we have computed it on a six-month period, with the expectation it will not last that long. We believe that the withdrawal operation would cost the United States in the neighborhood of \$700 million to \$1 billion.

Senator LOTT. General, along those lines, in response to Senator Nunn, you said that no military plan had been approved for an emergency extraction mission. I believe you said that. I am assuming that emergency means move fast. Are we on the verge of having a plan ready and approved, and approved by whom?

General SHALIKASHVILI. The plan has not yet been approved by NATO. So my statement stands.

Senator LOTT. In other words, we have a plan, but it has not been approved?

General SHALIKASHVILI. We have a plan; it has not yet been approved by all the nations, including the United States. Hopefully, we can come to closure on that. Because, as I said in my statement, it is terribly important that we do have a plan, that we all approve it, and put it on a shelf just in case an emergency arises. And with each day that goes by, we are gambling that something might happen.

Senator LOTT. General, do you differentiate between an emergency extraction mission or plan and military contingency plans? Or do you view those as one and the same?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Right now there is the one plan, 40104, that addresses both a deliberate withdrawal and an emergency withdrawal. That is the only plan we have that we are dealing with and that we wish to get approved as quickly as possible. It will give us both of those capabilities.

Senator LOTT. I wonder what the process is for getting such a plan approved here in the United States. It works through the Pentagon and is approved perhaps by the administration. What is the congressional role in being made aware and being a part of such a plan, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary PERRY. Well, it is a very expensive plan, as indicated to you by General Shalikashvili, so we would have to come to the Congress to not only describe the plan to you but to work out a mechanism for funding.

Senator LOTT. And you expect to do that shortly?

Secretary PERRY. We expect to present the plan to you as we are doing it. Well, for information right now, but we are not seeking approval for the funding until we are asked to execute the plan. And then we would have to come in and ask for approval of the plan.

Senator LOTT. Well, I hope that you will not come in after the plan has been executed and the money has been spent and say: Oh, and by the way, we need you to approve this credit card commitment. That is a word of admonishment, if you would.

Secretary PERRY. I got that signal very strongly.

Senator LOTT. On the other subject that has been touched on several times about the SAM sites. I want to be perfectly clear on it. Did NATO deny the request by the United States to take out those SAM sites, or did the United Nations specifically deny that request? There is an important distinction there.

General SHALIKASHVILI. Yes. There was no formal request from NATO to the United Nations to conduct that kind of an extensive air operation to take out all the SAM sites. There was discussion in NATO about doing it within the Council. And the NATO nations

decided not to go ahead with such a plan for the reason that I outlined.

Senator LOTT. One of the things that makes the American people nervous I think—and certainly members of Congress—is the question of what is the policy and who calls the shots here? And for military actions, the idea that the United Nations might be calling the shots, that is very unsettling to me. They can pass resolutions, but I do not want them making a military call on whether or not we take out a SAM site, or anything else quite frankly. That should be NATO's decision, or preferably a U.S. decision.

So my question here is, there have been reports that United Nations officials have vetoed military actions recommended either by the United States or the NATO forces. Is that true? And if it is not true, then who is in control over there?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I do not know specifically what instances that might be referring to. As far as the discussion about eliminating, through air strikes, all the Bosnian Serb air defense sites, that was a discussion within NATO, and the decision was within NATO not to go ahead because such an extensive air operation would have too high a risk for NATO member nations that had troops on the ground.

Senator LOTT. Is the United Nations involved in military decisions in Bosnia?

General SHALIKASHVILI. They surely are as far as the UNPROFOR is concerned. They do that every day. They also, because they are the ground component, have a say when air strikes and where air strikes are conducted. But that is no different, in a sense, than when you have, let us say, a U.S. operation and you have the Air Force providing the air strikes and the ground commander calling for it. The final word is always the ground commander's, because he is the one who is impacted by it. So it is in that sense that UNPROFOR does decide. And UNPROFOR makes military decisions constantly, as far as UNPROFOR forces are concerned.

Senator LOTT. So we have a trifurcated process here really?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Well, sure. Yes. And I have expressed my frustration about it on many occasions. Yes.

Senator LOTT. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Perry.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Secretary, many administration officials have said that the President would seek the support of Congress or will consult with Congress prior to making a decision to commit U.S. ground forces to any operation in Bosnia. I have repeatedly urged the President to seek an affirmative vote of the Congress before committing U.S. ground troops.

I believe it is essential to have the support of Congress, by a vote, and the American people's support before U.S. ground troops are inserted into situations in which casualties may be expected. The President should welcome the resolve and support of the American people and Congress. But if he cannot get it, he should also understand and appreciate that negative affirmation when facing our NATO allies.



So I ask you, is the administration going to seek a vote before committing U.S. ground troops to any operation in Bosnia?

Secretary PERRY. The President has not yet made a decision on that point. I think it will be depend on the circumstances, such as when, how many, what the risks are, how expensive it is. I do not think he has made it. Therefore, in the absence of knowing those circumstances, he has not yet made a commitment. He has made a firm commitment to fully consult and seek the support of Congress.

Senator BYRD. Well, consult does not mean that the Congress is supportive. He consults with the majority leader in each house. He consults with the minority leader. He consults with the Speaker. He may include the majority and minority whips in both houses. That is consultation. That does not mean he has the support of the Congress.

You are not in a position today to say that he will or will not; I understand that. But I think he should be very, very cautious about making moves without getting the support, by vote, of Congress. If he cannot get that support, well, maybe perhaps he would be better off in the long run knowing that he will not have that support.

My second question: If U.S. military forces are positioned near Bosnia or employed in some role in Bosnia, will the additional and unbudgeted cost incurred cause us to face the problems of last year, when the Department of Defense literally ran out of funds for training and readiness before the end of the fiscal year?

As you know, emergency designations for supplemental appropriations have not been very popular in this Congress. I have long-standing concerns about the unwillingness or the inability of the Department of Defense to budget for ongoing operations, such as the four-year operation to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq or for operations like the evacuation of UNPROFOR which the United States has been discussing for some 2 years.

Now, will you seek a supplemental appropriation? How do you plan to pay for this operation? I heard you use the figure of \$700 million a little earlier in response to a question by Senator Lott. What was the \$700 million—what contingency were we talking about?

Secretary PERRY. That figure was the one which General Shalikashvili quoted for the U.S. cost for the implementation of a withdrawal of the United Nations forces. That is what he referred to as the 40104 NATO plan.

Senator BYRD. Yes.

Secretary PERRY. The \$700 million is the U.S. cost. We would have to seek supplemental funds in order to do that.

Senator BYRD. Now, would you seek an emergency designation for any supplemental?

Secretary PERRY. I cannot answer that question at this point, Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. Well, I think these are questions we ought to ask and we ought to know what your best judgments are in this situation. And that is all the more reason why I would urge that the President think strongly about getting the approval by the Congress—not consultation with just the leaders. And I say this with

great respect for the leaders. I have been a so-called leader myself in times past.

I never thought very much of this word "consultation." Because we have a responsibility to either support the President or not. And we can do that by voting. I hope that that word of warning might circulate around the town a bit.

Secretary PERRY. Thank you. It was very clearly expressed. [Laughter.]

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Coats.

Senator COATS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am cognizant of the fact that you have to get to the House-side, so I will attempt to be brief.

Mr. Secretary, you indicated, in response to a question about our interest and involvement in this conflict, you stated the humanitarian concerns, the loss of life, and also the real concern about a withdrawal and escalation then into surrounding areas, which would then threaten our national and vital interests, and particularly the interests of some of our strategic allies.

You did not mention the fact that at this particular point, we may be there or may be making decisions because we have a commitment to NATO or to our NATO allies. Many have written about the fact that particularly Britain and France find themselves in a situation which they had not envisioned and which they do not at all find comfortable, partly because of our change in policy, our inconsistencies in terms of particular promises or at least what they perceived as commitments or directions the United States was heading in, and then a retraction from that.

Are not many of our policy decisions today, our own policy decisions, being driven by the fact that our two very important allies to the United States, Britain and France, find themselves in a real predicament and we need to keep showing some support to their efforts?

Secretary PERRY. Our policy considerations do and should take that into account; not to the extent that we have decided to join them by sending in ground forces to UNPROFOR, but to the extent that we have offered to assist them in withdrawal or to assist them in an emergency. And I do not think there has been that much confusion in their minds on that point. We have been consistently saying that we are not going to send in ground forces to UNPROFOR or to the rapid reaction force.

I met with the defense ministers in Paris on Saturday, and they brought the issue up again, but they already knew what the answer was before I gave it to them. Which was we are not going to participate with ground forces. So I did not see any confusion in their mind on that point.

Senator COATS. Well, perhaps in those private discussions there is not confusion. There certainly is public confusion about the administration's position on that issue. And, as reported in the press, I think it is fair to conclude there has been considerable confusion on that point.

Secretary PERRY. There is certainly a lot of confusion in the press. I would agree with that. [Laughter.]

Senator COATS. We have been pursuing—or UNPROFOR has been pursuing essentially an enclave strategy, which probably, in the short term, has saved some lives. But it does not appear to be a successful long-term strategy in bringing about either negotiated settlement to the conflict or any kind of military balance between the forces that would lead to a negotiated settlement.

It seems to me that we are simply now pursuing the next stage of an even more consolidated enclave strategy, with the re-deployment and provision of the reaction force to assist with that effort.

Your statement that time does not appear to be on the side of the Serbs does not run true to me. I do not understand why the creation of a rapid deployment force for the purpose of helping assist in a further retrenchment, a more narrow enclave strategy, a contingency plan for withdrawal, 40104, a commitment of U.S. troops only for the purpose of withdrawal—it seems to me that if I were looking at this from the Serbs' point of view, I would say time is on our side. It seems to me that UNPROFOR, NATO, and the United States are all moving toward a point of eventual withdrawal. That is how I would read all these signals if I were looking at it from the other side.

Am I misreading that?

Secretary PERRY. My statement was that the Bosnian Government forces have improved their military capabilities in the last eight or nine months, and that they have actually made some advances on the ground in the last few months, and that I suggested that maybe the Bosnian Serbs, seeing that movement and being war-weary after 3 years, may believe that time is not on their side and therefore that may have been the reason for the aggressive actions they took in the last few weeks. That is only a speculation. I could not confirm what is on their minds.

Senator COATS. If you conclude that that would potentially lead to a negotiated settlement by evening up the balance between the two forces, would it not then make sense to lift the embargo on the Bosnian Muslims and give them more military capacity to convince the Serbs that perhaps now is the time to reach some kind of settlement?

Secretary PERRY. Lifting the embargo would have entailed with it, of course, pulling the United Nations forces out. Those two go hand in hand. That would, I believe—the most likely outcome of that would be the Bosnian Serbs attacking the enclaves and possibly attacking Sarajevo as well. And those are very, very difficult areas to defend. And I think the danger is that they would succeed and that it would be a catastrophe.

The further danger, as I suggested, is that the war might then have a higher probability of spreading beyond Bosnia. Those are only judgments as to what could happen. Nobody can forecast that with any certainty.

Senator COATS. Mr. Secretary, when you are waiting for everybody else's five minutes, it seems like their five minutes last 15. When you get your own, it seems like they last one. And I know you have to get to get to the House side. I have been duly notified of that. I have got a dozen questions, but I will stop here.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you.

I have an announcement to make. After that, we will be dismissed. Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili, I want to thank you for your appearance and the informative presentation that you made here today. Today's testimony confirms the thoughts of a quote I heard this morning: The art of arranging how men are going to live is much more difficult than killing them.

Before we adjourn, I want to announce that tomorrow morning at 10:00 a.m., in Russell 253, the Commerce Committee Hearing Room, the committee will continue its hearing on Bosnia. Our witness will be Gen. Alexander Haig, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Secretary of State.

If there is no further business, the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

## SITUATION IN BOSNIA

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THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 1995

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Thurmond, Warner, McCain, Kempthorne, Hutchison, Inhofe, Santorum, Nunn, Exon, Glenn, Robb, and Lieberman.

Committee staff members present: Richard L. Reynard, staff director; George W. Lauffer, deputy staff director; Ann M. Mittermeyer, assistant counsel; Christine K. Cimko, press secretary.

Professional staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, Gregory J. D'Alessio, Lawrence J. Lanzillotta, Thomas G. Moore, and Cord A. Sterling.

Minority staff member present: Richard D. DeBobes, counsel.

Staff assistants present: Alec Bierbauer, Pamela L. Farrell, Shelley G. Lauffer, and Jason Rossbach.

Committee members' assistants present: Judith A. Ansley, assistant to Senator Warner; Richard F. Schwab, assistant to Senator Coats; Glen E. Talt, assistant to Senator Kempthorne; Patricia L. Stolnacker, assistant to Senator Santorum; Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; David A. Lewis, assistant to Senator Levin; Suzanne Dabkowski, assistant to Senator Robb; John F. Lilley, assistant to Senator Lieberman.

### OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND, CHAIRMAN

Chairman THURMOND. The hearing will come to order.

Before we begin, I would like to pay tribute to some magnificent Americans. I was delighted to learn this morning that our F-16 pilot who was shot down last week, Capt. Scott O'Grady, is alive and well, safe on board the U.S.S. *Kearsarge* in the Adriatic.

After 6 days, I am sure many had given him up for lost, but not our personnel in the theater. After surviving for 6 days in hostile territory, Captain O'Grady was picked up last night in an extraordinary rescue mission.

Further, I want to thank Adm. Leighton "Snuffy" Smith, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, South. His air deputy, Lt. Gen. Mike Ryan, who planned the mission, and Marine Col. Martin Berndt, who led the rescue mission.

Above all, I want to pay tribute to Capt. Scott O'Grady, and to his courage and ingenuity. Men and women like these are examples to the world of courage, skill, and willingness to sacrifice. They are the best America has to offer.

Because they are so willing, the U.S. Government has a profound obligation to them. We should never ask them to risk their lives lightly, for any purpose that does not serve vital national interests.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, we begin the hearing this morning on Bosnia, and I have a statement to make on that.

The committee meets today in the second of a series of hearings to examine U.S. policy and U.S. options regarding the deteriorating situation in Bosnia.

Yesterday we had a good hearing with Dr. Perry, Secretary of Defense, and General Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

Nearly every member of the committee was present, made thoughtful statements, and asked penetrating questions. I especially appreciate the way the members cooperated with the Chair in keeping that hearing on schedule.

Today we will hear from Gen. Alexander Haig. General Haig, I am grateful for your agreeing to appear before the committee on short notice, and on such a complex issue.

General Haig is a former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. He is also a former Secretary of State. That background makes him uniquely qualified to discuss both the foreign policy side of the equation as well as the military side.

Foreign policy and military strategy are two sides of the same coin. If the underlying foreign policy is flawed, it will negatively affect the military operations designed to implement that policy.

I hope today's testimony and questions from Senators will focus on issues that were brought out in yesterday's hearing, but were left unclear or unresolved; for example: What should we expect of the Rapid Reaction Force being organized to protect the U.N. Protection Force?

Secretary Perry has said it will be the "911 response" if UNPROFOR gets into trouble. Does that mean it will be a police force or a combat unit? Will it conduct aggressive military operations, or will it, in turn, need a larger, additional protection force if it proves inadequate?

Who will rescue the Rapid Reaction Force if it gets into trouble, the United States? This might well happen if the Rapid Reaction Force has to operate under the U.N. dual-key command arrangement.

The administration's spokesmen say that U.S. policy of keeping UNPROFOR in Bosnia is based in part on a desire to stop the conflict from spreading. This is a worthy goal, one that I share.

But in my view, it does not follow automatically that the conflict will spread if the failed U.N. mission withdraws. Perhaps there are other more effective ways the international community might keep this civil war from spreading to the rest of the Balkans.

These are the kinds of issues I hope we can illuminate today. We will continue to address this troubling issue next week as well. It is my intention to hold two more hearings on Bosnia.

Next Wednesday, June 14, we will hear from President Jimmy Carter, who helped arrange the last cease-fire in December.

Joining him will be General John Galvin, former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Then on Thursday, June 15, we will hold our final hearing with several outside experts who will summarize the choices we may have to vote on very soon.

Once again, I thank General Haig for coming today, and I thank my colleagues on the committee for keeping opening remarks as brief as possible.

At this time, I am pleased to ask the distinguished ranking member, Senator Nunn, for his opening statement, and then we will proceed to the testimony. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I again commend you for arranging today's hearing, as well as yesterday's hearing with Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili, and also I note the additional hearings you plan next week, which I think are also very timely, and I am sure will be very informative.

Before we get into the hearing today I want to join you and echo everything you said about the rescue of our pilot. I want to express my relief, and also my joy, and I am sure I speak the sentiments of most Americans today, all Americans, over the news that Air Force Capt. Scott O'Grady was rescued.

His rescue is a tribute, as you said, Mr. Chairman, to his training, and his skill, and his courage, and also to the professionalism of all the U.S. forces involved in this operation.

I think it is really commendable, and makes us all proud of our men and women in uniform.

I want to also welcome this morning former Secretary of State and former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Alexander Haig. I am not sure whether it is General or Mr. Secretary, but either way, we have known Al Haig for a long time.

He has served this country with great distinction, great effectiveness. We always welcome him and his views, and I know he is going to give us views that reflect both the history of this conflict, and also most unusual in this period of time, when everyone is good at critiquing, but not many are calling for detailed strategy, reactions to where we are now, I think he is going to lay out for our thoughts some real strategy considerations of where we go from here.

So we look forward very much to his testimony, and thank him for being here this morning.

Chairman THURMOND. Does any other member want to express himself in an opening statement very briefly?

Senator WARNER. I wish to associate myself, Mr. Chairman, with the remarks made by the Chair and the ranking member.

The downed pilot and his family happen to be a resident of Virginia. We take a little additional special pride in one of our citizens. I welcome our distinguished witness this morning.

I have known him for many, many years. As a matter of fact, he hijacked me for a job one time, for which I am everlastingly grateful. Thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. Do any other members wish to make a brief opening statement?

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, just let me associate myself with the remarks that have been made, and welcome General Haig.

He will always be general to me, whatever other titles he wishes to explore or others wish to put on him. I congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, especially for holding this hearing, and having the wisdom to call General Haig, who I think will give us a very interesting perspective on some of the do's and do not's, his wisdom and experience are going to be helpful.

I am also as excited as the other members of the committee about the successful rescue mission. I would like to suggest, Mr. Chairman, if you think it is proper, to have staff begin to check into the situation, and it might well be that at some later date we would be holding a hearing on what we might do to improve the signaling technologies that we either do or do not have.

I am so elated that this courageous pilot has been rescued. He must have shown great determination. I still do not quite understand why it took so long with our devices that I thought were better than that, especially with the forces that we have in the area. We may want to look into that at some future time. Thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. Does any other member want to make an opening statement? If not, we will proceed with questions.

Senator INHOFE. Yes. Just very briefly. I also want to echo what everyone else has said, to also say that I have been such an admirer of General Haig for so many years.

He and I were in the first group that went into Kuwait while the guns were still firing, and I have gotten to know him very well.

I think it is a very awkward situation for him to be in to respond now to where should we go from here, when I can assure you if he had been making the decisions 2 years ago, we would not be here today.

Chairman THURMOND. Anyone else? [No response.]

General Haig, we would be glad to hear any opening statements you would care to make.

#### STATEMENT OF HON. ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.

General HAIG. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, Senator Nunn, Senator Exon, Senator Inhofe.

I would like to add a footnote to the observations made about the rescue of our courageous young pilot. This past weekend when he was shot down I was at SHAPE headquarters on a social visit as an old SACEUR.

I witnessed firsthand the reaction of the NATO military headquarters, and the American chain of command at UNCOM, and the support they had from the Pentagon.

Let me tell you that there were pressures, critical pressures, from other European powers that we not undertake any risky rescue operation which could endanger the peacekeeping forces. That is a reflection of the mentality there.

I am happy to say that our military chain of command stood very, very courageously and firm that they would take every step necessary to rescue that pilot, and they put in place a number of operations which made the prompt rescue possible.

Incidentally, as I understand, Senator Exon, the reason for the long delay was that the pilot himself sought to put himself in a position where he thought he could be extracted, in terms of the ter-



rain, and thought to preserve his battery, and that is why there was a delay.

When he got into the position where he thought he could be extracted, he then energized the system.

Now, if I may, I would like to read a brief prepared statement with respect to the policy, which is a far more formidable task than even the rescue operation, I am sorry to say.

It has always been an honor for me to testify before this committee. Yet I must admit that today I take little pleasure in doing so. The subject, Bosnia, is simply too painful.

Events there have become symbolic of failure, the failure of America, I am sorry to say, its failure to lead, the failure of the United Nations to act effectively, and most recently, and we will get into this in a moment, the failure of NATO to prevail in the conduct of security operations.

My purpose, Mr. Chairman, is to make several brief observations about the roots of this disaster, and then to outline my own general recommendations for the future.

First, to the failures. Our policy simply ignored history. I said recently to a Hollywood producer who is doing the life of Richard Nixon through his film writer, "those who failed to study history are doomed to create their own". That frequently is the case here inside the Beltway, I am sorry to say.

History teaches us that peace and even tolerance of a sort has been achieved in the Balkans only by crude and rough measures, the imposition of empire, the stalemate of balance of power politics, and most recently, the Cold War.

Subtract these, and the darker side of man reappears with a swiftness and a savagery that shocks even those who thought after the world wars of this century that we were beyond shock.

Such has been the case since the old Yugoslavia broke up, a casualty of the end of the Cold War, pervasive economic decay, and nationalist agitation by former communists determined to retain power.

The international community had a duty either to recommend to the peoples of Yugoslavia that they remain in a reformed federation, or if that was impossible, that the breakup be peaceful.

Neither the western powers nor the United States had the coherence to say that, or more importantly, once the choice was made to break up, to insist upon the rules.

Second, our policy ignored reality. It is time that we dispense with the idea that the crisis was so murky and so tangled that we could not even distinguish between the aggressor and the victim. I assure you, you will hear that line next week with the testimony that you hear.

The international community knows full well that Serbian ambitions led by the dictator in Belgrade are the main reasons for the crisis in both Croatia and Bosnia. Just as clearly we knew, and we still know, that unless the Serbs are persuaded that force does not pay, the war simply will not stop.

But we pretended, and unfortunately we still pretend, that sanctions, vulnerable peacekeepers, and erratic signals will prevail. This has never, ever worked. Aggressive force can only be defeated by countervailing force.

Third, our policy confused peacekeeping with peacemaking. The U.N. was inserted into Croatia and then Bosnia on the presumption of neutrality between the parties, who were actually seeking peace. That was our assumption.

This assumption was wrong. The parties have seen the U.N. as a hostage to be manipulated. Thus, the very humanitarian nature of the mission made it impossible to deliver the effective missing element, military pressure to bring about a balance of power on the ground that would lead to productive negotiations.

These blunders effectively deprived us of the time, the leverage, and the credibility to limit the violence and to promote the peace.

Unhappily, it must be stated that both republicans and democrats have shaped this fatal course. The Bush administration chose not to lead the west, nor to intervene to set limits, when doing so might have required only a modest use of force or the credible threat to do so under the NATO flag.

The Clinton administration escalated the rhetoric of threat, and rethreat, but has been unwilling to share the risks with our allies, or to plan for the consequences. Frequent changes in the U.S. position signal the lack of American conviction.

Most recently, U.N. hostages and the downed F-16 confirm the flaws of this approach.

Equivocation, playing for the breaks, and desperate appeals to be rescued by the likes of Mr. Milosovic will earn us further dishonor, but no relief.

Mr. Chairman, I will be blunt. A NATO force of 100,000, give or take, soldiers could dominate the situation, break the back of the Serbian resistance, and deal out justice to the war criminals.

Let me tell you, history also confirms that brutes and genocists are also cowards, and we have never seemed to clearly understand that.

We all know this will not happen, the introduction of 100,000 troops. The democracies see no need for such sacrifices. I would agree with that conclusion. Milosovic, however, is no Saddam.

The dream of a greater Serbia will consume long before it upsets the European balance of power. Fortunately for us, and we should look at this very clearly, this is not 1914.

We must, therefore, rule out the option of the west waging a war to impose a peace. We must also rule out the option of a U.N. peacekeeping mission. There is no peace to keep. There are only peacekeepers to lose.

There are, however, two very important considerations that remain. Both speak to the ultimate U.S. and NATO interests. The first is political. The defeat of the Serbs, or at least their containment, is the main business of the Bosnians.

They have the most at stake. They have asked for our help and they deserve it. For if they lose out, the broader western interests of containing the conflict so that it does not risk drawing in the Albanians, the Macedonians, the Greeks, and the Turks will become much, much more difficult and risky.

The second is humanitarian. Our foreign policy should not be made by a public opinion revolted one day by the scenes of carnage and another day by the scenes of American casualties.

But we cannot turn away from the wholesale destruction of a civilian population in Sarajevo and do nothing. We would mock the sacrifices made by generations of Americans who gave their lives for a world free of such crimes.

These political and humanitarian interests coincide with the only course that makes sense now. First, the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo; second, the withdrawal of UNPROFOR; third, a determined continuing military effort to aid the Bosnians by lifting the embargo; fourth, beyond that, and we tend to overlook this too often, we need a more active U.S. leadership to shape a NATO consensus to restrain all of the parties not to attempt to change any of the external borders of the former Yugoslavia.

Let me review these steps in more detail. First, lift the siege of Sarajevo. Sarajevo is the symbol of what used to be right in the Balkans.

It has endured merciless brutality by Serbs staining indelibly their claims of righteousness in this war. The city's fall to assault or starvation simply must be prevented, and the situation worsens by the hour.

Let me tell you, as we look at radical unmeasured withdrawal proposals, which I support in principle, let us be sure that we do not let our wisdom butt up against television portrayals of the agonies of the people of Sarajevo. We simply must not have that.

The opening of the road to Sarajevo, incidently, is necessary, in any event, if UNPROFOR is to be protected. I realize that this may involve a violent clash with the Bosnian Serbs, but there is simply no choice.

We cannot protect or extract the U.N. force, or protect or feed Sarajevo, unless we open this road. This is a task for which NATO, not the United Nations, nor any coalition of European powers is best suited.

The Clinton administration, for whatever reasons, and I am baffled by this, seems to have allowed the British and the French to take the lead in assembling a quick-reaction force that can interalia be used for the purpose of lifting the siege of Sarajevo.

In my judgment, Washington should never abdicate alliance leadership in dealing with major European security problems, because history confirms that a Europe without American leadership will be a very insecure place.

Unfortunately, efforts to place the so-called Rapid Reaction Force under NATO command and control at this late point would further discredit U.S. reliability in the eyes of our allies, and the obvious benefit of unity of command under NATO would be outweighed by the political costs to our allies of yet, and I say yet, another U.S. flip-flop.

However, in preserving this command structure, we simply cannot permit the U.N. to micromanage the military operation, which is what they have been doing from day one. Thus, we must now fully support, as agreed on Saturday last, the force as constituted.

A successful opening of the road will also inflict a defeat on the Serbs that may very well make them more amenable to a political settlement.

I invite your questions on that subject. At the very least, it will satisfy increasingly the urgent and increasingly urgent humanitarian requirement.

Second, we should prepare to and then withdraw UNPROFOR. There is no peace to keep and there is no mandate for the U.N. to make war.

Third, we should lift the embargo to give the Bosnians a better fighting chance. However, we should not lift the sanctions on Milosivic until he becomes part of the solution, rather than part of the problem.

He has influence, and he can use it dramatically if he wishes. Hopefully, the opening of Sarajevo would cut down the Bosnian Serbs to a size he could better manage.

The contact group should be preserved for the singular purpose of holding out political solutions that look better once a few facts on the ground have at long last been changed.

Let me choose the words carefully. We should avoid the Bosnian mistake of allowing Belgrade to subvert its neighbor and to pay no price.

The U.S. should begin now, as it should have long ago, to shape a clear NATO consensus, which would give clear signals that attempts to duplicate Bosnia in other places, such as Macedonia, would bring an early and devastating NATO response.

In this effort we must not permit Moscow, as we have, to exercise a veto over the NATO approach.

Mr. Chairman, I am fully aware, as both a former Supreme Commander and a Secretary of State that these suggestions carry considerable risks and considerable costs. We may fail in the end, but surely if we do not change our course, we are going to fail anyway, and the costs will be more than simply Yugoslavia.

I would suggest perhaps the end of NATO as we have known it. What I suggest here corresponds to our minimal political and humanitarian interests.

To sum it up, the first best chances of preserving peace and preventing aggression in the Balkans have been lost for a lack of leadership, resolve, and a credible threat or the use of force itself.

The last best chance for achieving a poor substitute, poor, because of the cost in lives, rests on the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo, extracting the U.N. force, and helping the Bosnians to carry the main fight. They are getting quite good in their ability to do so.

To do this, the President and his team must now select the objective, add enough resources to obtain it, explain it to the American people and to this legislature, and be willing to run some unpopular risks, and at long last, they must also unify the alliance.

We failed to exercise leadership in getting into Bosnia; we must not again fail to exercise leadership if we are going to get out with even a minimum achievement.

These are my thoughts, and I thank you, and welcome your questions.

Chairman THURMOND. We will now proceed to questions.

General Haig, the cornerstone of the administration's Bosnian policy is to keep UNPROFOR in Bosnia; yet it has become clear that UNPROFOR is no longer able to carry out its mandates.

UNPROFOR cannot deliver humanitarian supplies to the enclaves, enforce a Sarajevo exclusion zone, protect the U.N. protected areas, or even protect its own troops.

The current plan to consolidate UNPROFOR in defended areas will make it even more difficult to conduct and observe a humanitarian mission that justifies the U.N.'s presence.

In light of these circumstances, and the immense costs of UNPROFOR, why do you believe the administration is so determined to keep UNPROFOR in Bosnia?

General HAIG. Well, Senator, I can only speculate, but I do believe that the White House is at long last exercising some concern for the interests of our allies.

It is very clear at this juncture that a precipitous announcement to withdraw UNPROFOR would put the political leadership in both Paris and London in some jeopardy.

I would suggest that what is underway may be really a two-step minuet in the direction of withdrawal. It is the difficulty of political leaders to accept the kind of hits that are associated with it. I may add that the White House itself might receive some hits for another zig-zag in our policy.

I think the time has come for the political leaders to face reality, and that the costs that they will ultimately pay far exceed the costs of now deciding to withdraw UNPROFOR and undertaking the steps to do so promptly.

Chairman THURMOND. General Haig, yesterday's hearing with Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili did not leave a clear picture of how the new Rapid Reaction Force will function.

It appears to be a case of reinforcing failure. Evidently, the new force will be under the U.N. dual-key command arrangement. This violates the basic principles of the unity of command and a prerequisite for success in combat. In fact, the new plan appears to violate most of the basic principles of warfare, simplicity, mass, surprise, and initiative, for example. In your view, how can a 10,000-man Rapid Reaction Force in this role contribute to stabilizing or improving the situation?

General HAIG. Well, Mr. Chairman, we are talking about an eight-mile stretch of road. We are talking about a two-brigade size force, one the British air mobile brigade, and second, the old force that was put together previously of the British, French, Dutch, and elements from other nations, which is a light-armored mobile brigade.

We are talking also about a U.S. commitment to provide airlift, gun ship support, a very sophisticated gun ship capability that I knew well in Vietnam, which has since been modernized very dramatically, and other American support efforts in intelligence and elsewhere.

It is my view that we have always painted the Bosnian-Serbian goons in mile-high proportions. I happen to believe they are a rag tail group, that whenever the Muslims and the Croats, united against them, stopped them cold.

I do not see this as a violation, a violation of good military practice, but I do think the United States has to face up to the fact that if this is, indeed, a withdrawal operation, as well as a humanitarian operation, which is essential to any element of a withdrawal

operation, that is opening that road, then we have to be prepared, if need be, to reinforce, if that be required.

I do not think it will be. My discussions with the commanders in Europe suggest to me that they think this can be done with the size force that has been put together.

Chairman THURMOND. General Haig, I believe most members of Congress support the mission to help withdraw our allies in UNPROFOR if it becomes necessary.

Well, I am concerned that the current confused policy may draw the United States into Bosnia for other less limited missions. We could once again see Americans being killed for uncertain purposes.

This could cause a backlash of public opinion that might undermine the political support for the alliance at a time when blaming and finger pointing are already hurting our allies solidarity.

Would you give us your views on this danger, and how it can be avoided?

General HAIG. Mr. Chairman, this is a very important and thoughtful question, because it seems to have dominated our performance in every post-Cold War crisis so far, such as with Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and now the former Yugoslavia.

Let me suggest that sound state craft is not dominated by the perception of whether or not the actions undertaken by a government will meet the contemporary approval of the electorate.

We elect our officials both in our legislature and in our executive branch to have them do what is right for this country, and sometimes that is a very unpopular thing. I think Edmund Burke wrote about it extensively.

In today's modern populism, many of our elected officials forget that. So I would suggest that while your question is thoughtful and very, very pertinent, that what we have to do is analyze the problem, decide what is right, develop the necessary consensus to do that, and then proceed courageously to do it. When we have done that, as in the Gulf War, except for the last round, I think the American people have stood up with amazing affirmation.

I saw a T.V. show this morning where Regis, my old Notre Dame buddy, announced the rescue of a pilot, and it was a standing approbation of applause by the American people, proud, that at long last something correct has happened.

Now, I happen to believe that these Bosnian Serbs are more noise and more brutality than they are courage and capability.

I think we can manage that thing, and if we cannot, we should put enough forces in there to do it, because the rest cannot be accomplished without it.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Haig, I, again, think that you have performed a real service here today. Whether someone agrees or does not agree, you have laid out a strategy that has some intellectual content.

There are too many strategies floating around that do not think through the logical conclusions, and are not willing to basically face some of the unpleasant parts of any option we have.

Any option we have has its unpleasant and tough parts that are going to have to be sold, so I congratulate you. I think it has been very helpful.

You have come down very hard against the Bush administration and the Clinton administration for lack of leadership. I think your points are largely valid. I also think, though, the allies have made a number of real blunders.

They are the ones who put lightly armed forces in. Now, I would say we participated in the decision at the U.N. and in NATO. So we share our part of it, but they put lightly armed forces in, that as you have said, are hostages, without leverage; in fact, almost counter-leverage.

We, in effect, reduced leverage by putting that kind of force in, in exposed positions.

But in your statement you do not really hit the allies very hard. Would you want to say anything about the French and British decision making in this period that has led us to this situation, because there is—I share with you our obligation to help our allies in emergency situations, even if it is a tough road.

I think that is imperative. What do you say about the French and British decisionmaking that has led to this?

General HAIG. Of course, I did say in my statement that there was no paucity of negligence on both sides of the Atlantic. I think I make that clear.

I did not choose to highlight what might be considered European shortcomings, but I think the basic causal contributor to that was a failure of the United States to lead in an alliance which expects and, frankly, cannot function without American leadership.

That decision was made by a leader of my party, George Bush, who decided that he would let the Europeans handle this.

He not only did that, but if you go back to the so-called Chicken Kiev speech and other things, you will find that the Bush administration's security apparatus, under Jimmy Baker, and the rest, were preoccupied with propping up Mr. Gorbachev at that time, even though he was already a corpse in his own country.

Therefore, their language suggested to the Belgrade Serbs that we would like to see unity preserved, even if armed forces had to be utilized in the process.

Now, that was not the intention of the Bush administration at all, but that is the message that was received in Belgrade. It did not help incidentally in Moscow either.

But there is where your initial flaw was. Since that time, the Clinton administration has attempted to keep its hands clean as well, using rhetorical excess, which there was no intention to follow through on, as a vehicle for appearing relevant.

Senator NUNN. Let me ask you this question, a couple of questions. You basically make it clear that we ought to open up that road, and, in effect, have to open up that road if there is going to be any kind of an evacuation or a withdrawal.

You also make it clear, as I understand what you are saying, that if the United States is needed there, you would commit ground forces for that purpose.

General HAIG. Very painfully, yes, but that decision was made by the administration with respect to the withdrawal of forces. We have committed up to 25,000.

What we have to remember here in Washington is that when a president says something, the world listens, and they expect it to

happen. When we do not do that, our credibility is destroyed, and it is very seriously damaged now in Europe.

Senator NUNN. You would be willing to commit U.S. ground forces even in the short term, if we have to, to get that road open.

General HAIG. To get that road open, and to begin a successful withdrawal process of UNPROFOR.

Senator NUNN. Now, on the withdrawal process, when that starts, we have a real dilemma about the enclaves. What would you do about withdrawing from the enclaves?

Do you believe that if we withdraw from the enclaves that they are going to be basically overrun with a huge number of people killed?

Do you believe that we have any obligation to try to take those people out? Of course, that would start the counter-charge of us participating in ethnic cleansing ourselves.

So how would you address the enclave issue and the humanitarian dilemma there?

General HAIG. Well, you have asked a very important question. I agreed to a general presentation, rather than to the nitty-gritty details. This is certainly a very important nitty-gritty detail.

I think it involves a management of the overall operation that is very refined and sensitive to the situation on the ground.

First, if we enter in and open that road, and do it with as much force as is necessary, I think it will have an important impact, an important impact, on the Bosnian Serbs with respect to those enclaves.

Second, if we announce the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, I find it difficult to share the logic that that is going to mean the destruction of UNPROFOR. I think it is very probable that the Bosnian Serbs would like them to leave.

On the other hand, they are getting increasingly nervous about the third step I recommended, and that is lifting the embargo. So there are time sequencings of this so-called strategy that have to be put together that are very delicate and very important to a successful outcome.

No one can guarantee to you that there will not be additional slaughter and bloodshed, mindless bloodshed. On the other hand, when you deal with cowards and brutes, the best way to prevent that is to convince them that if they undertake it, they are going to pay for it.

That is what we have failed to do throughout this conflict, and this bothers me.

Senator NUNN. In this strategy that you have laid out, would you think that lifting the embargo prior to withdrawal would be in order, or would you wait until the withdrawal has occurred to lift the embargo?

General HAIG. I would make the first order of business, although I have not fine-tuned this to the degree I am comfortable with making this observation, would be to get that road open, and to do it as promptly as possible.

Let me assure you, within a matter of days—they are running out of food and bread and the artillery assaults are just turning that place into an absolute untenable situation.



Innocent people are beginning to be killed in larger numbers. When the American and the international press begins to demonstrate that to the American people, they are going to want to know what we are doing here in Washington to deal with that horror.

So I frankly believe the first order of business is the relief of Sarajevo, the opening of that road to begin to make it possible to withdraw UNPROFOR safely, if that is going to have to be done.

Senator NUNN. The reason I asked that question, the first thing we may deal with, even though it is probably not in the logical sequence of things, is whether to lift the embargo unilaterally in this set of conditions, in the Congress. Would you advocate that?

General HAIG. No. I would not advocate lifting the embargo unilaterally as step one here, or even in the composite of what I have outlined, but rather, get that road opened immediately, try to develop a NATO consensus, which I think can be developed, to withdraw UNPROFOR.

I think Bill Perry said yesterday very astutely that if this thing does not work, this is the last thing before withdrawal. I happen to think it is the first thing in the direction of withdrawal. I look at it as the bottle half full.

Senator NUNN. I share your view on that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much.

General Haig, I was literally stunned by your comment that this could mean the end of NATO as we know it. I think it would be very important if you were to expand on that observation.

General HAIG. Well, I want to caution that what I am saying is not in any way a criticism of NATO. NATO is the victim of wrong-headed political decisions that put the burden of this whole issue at the United Nations' doorstep, when they are simply incapable, by not only their structural organization, but by their mandate, to be peacemakers, rather than peacekeepers.

Incidentally, they are peacekeepers only to the degree that there is no veto, and we forget that very often.

What made the United Nations begin to look like the solution to the millennium of the new world order, which is also a crock, was the conviction that they had done so well in Cambodia and other places, and they had, because the Soviets no longer exercised their veto.

Now, they are starting to veto. So what I am saying is that NATO has been discredited in this process, this situation, a problem over which they had no control.

Senator WARNER. That discrediting came about not by their own decision making, but by—

General HAIG. That's correct.

Senator WARNER. The consequence of the U.N. decisionmaking.

General HAIG. Yes. The political guidance that goes to the U.N. from the capitals. After all, the U.N. is only a—

Senator WARNER. But the end of NATO is a shocking situation. Do you really think that there are the factors present here that could bring about the end of NATO as we know it now, unless this thing is promptly handled?

General HAIG. Let me add that there are a number of other contributors to that, such as the equivocation on what we were going to do about the future of NATO, the expansion of NATO, to which the administration gives lip service, but in practical terms, has created conditions for broadening NATO, which the current membership could not meet. That makes me highly suspicious of their real intentions.

Senator WARNER. Let me step forward. Following through your sequence of recommendations, there comes a time when UNPROFOR is out, presumably the Bosnian-Serbs and the Bosnian-Muslims will somehow, from the field of battle, come to some type of situation, or it spills over.

Now, if the spill-over begins, does the U.S. have a role in coming in to participate with either NATO or our principal allies in containing that spill-over?

General HAIG. No. I think we have to be very careful about what we are willing to do with respect to U.S. involvement and the resulting situation.

I happen to be reasonably optimistic in the lifting of the embargo and a steady improvement of the Bosnian-Muslim capabilities, and hope that the other elements in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Croats, will be more cooperative.

They have been cooperative on the cease-fire, and I think that is an achievement, but I think they could be more cooperative in military terms. If there is such cooperation then you are going to have a situation where the Bosnian-Serbs are going to probably be more than happy to sit down and negotiate a solution.

Negotiated solutions are always the product of the perceived interest of the parties.

Senator WARNER. I understand, but I want to return again to the possibility that this thing begins to spread, and your view as to whether the U.S. does or does not have a role in the containment of the spreading beyond the present—

General HAIG. If you are talking, as I say in my statement, about changing Yugoslavia's previous borders with its neighboring states, whether it be Macedonia, Albania, let me tell you, that is cause celebre, and it must be a NATO cause celebre, and it is the job of the United States to lead the consensus in NATO, to lay that out very clearly, be it Belgrade or elsewhere.

Senator WARNER. Right. Let me just refine it. Then if it does begin to spread beyond the borders, it is incumbent upon the United States, as a leadership role, in containing that spreading, and that would involve the commitment of our armed forces, be it ground, air, or sea.

General HAIG. I think so. I think also that the estimates of cost requirements have been rather excessive, because of a desire of most clear-headed people in the Pentagon and elsewhere to not get involved. I share that view.

We have heard figures of a half-a-million men, or 200,000 men. We are talking about a very tough and brutal enemy, but one which could be very easily managed by a 100,000 man force, in my view.

Senator WARNER. I just want to clarify, if it begins to spread beyond the borders, we not only have—

General HAIG. Absolutely.

Senator WARNER. A leadership role in policy, but also militarily.

General HAIG. Absolutely. Two wars in this century confirm—

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much.

General HAIG. The danger of that.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. General, I want to thank you again for being here. No one yet has said this, but I am about to say it, because I believe it very, very firmly.

I think the worst of all scenarios despite leadership or lack thereof, is, at this particular time, for us to be getting into a ground war in Bosnia.

As near as I have been able to ascertain, it is just not the President. The Pentagon, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Joint Chiefs have warned us from the very beginning, the inception of this, do not get involved in a ground war in that situation.

Now, your recommendations that, if necessary, we send troops in to open up that road of eight miles would be against, what at least I have been told, all of the leadership in the Pentagon.

I guess what you are saying to me today, unless I misinterpret your remarks, is that the present leadership of the Pentagon is wrong, and the only alternative we have this time is to provide leadership, and the first semblance of that would be to send whatever force is necessary, to use your phrase, in there, forthwith, to open up the road. Is that your recommendation?

General HAIG. No. Not at all. As a matter of fact, it is not a challenge to the U.S. Government's policy, which is a very clearly stated policy, and I think it was reiterated here yesterday by Bill Perry, and that is that if we have to put forces in there to accomplish the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, the United States should be prepared to do so.

The original figures that I heard were over 20,000-some American forces that are committed by the President to the European alliance, for that objective.

Now, what was being discussed yesterday was assembling a smaller force down in Italy yesterday, which the White House rather humiliatingly undercut the Pentagon on, after it began to do it. What we are talking about is how not to get into a ground war, Senator.

I am opposed to the involvement of U.S. forces in a ground war in Yugoslavia. The only place where I am talking about is the same place that the administration is talking about.

Should it be necessary? Incidentally, we are not involved in the initial stages with the Rapid Reaction Force. There are no American ground forces in the Rapid Reaction Force. They are primarily British and French, and some Dutch, primarily.

I am also saying in my statement that I believe they will succeed. I believe they will open that road. I believe that will be a major psychological setback for the Serbians, the Bosnian-Serbians.

Now, if, however, they got into trouble, I do not see how you could ever have an alliance with our friends in Europe, to have the preservation of NATO, or to maintain American credibility after

the commitments we have made in the White House if the United States did not respond.

This is no new policy that I have presented here today. This is implementing the commitments already made, and putting some circles around how to keep those commitments from becoming a ground war involvement, which I would be opposed to, unless we are talking about a push out from the existing borders of the former Yugoslavia.

Then we have a NATO crisis and a world crisis, which could escalate in very dangerous terms.

Senator EXON. Would you agree, General, that it would be a risky proposition, whether we do or do not do it, if we send in whatever forces necessary—and I, of course, cannot understand why that road could not be opened by the French and British forces.

But you seem to think that to open it successfully in a timely fashion we would have to be an important part of opening the road.

General HAIG. No. No. No.

Senator EXON. Oh. You do not think that.

General HAIG. I must have misstated my—

Senator EXON. Well, I misunderstood you. Then you are not saying that we should send troops in there at the present time to open up the road.

General HAIG. Absolutely not.

Senator EXON. The road should be opened up by the British and the French, is that correct?

General HAIG. Yes, and that is the plan, and we are in a supporting role with airlifts, gun ships, intelligence—

Senator EXON. But not ground troops.

General HAIG. Not ground troops. No.

Senator EXON. Fine.

General HAIG. The question I had, and maybe that is what misled you, and it is certainly good, was if somebody says suppose they do not make it, and they are in danger. Then I said as long as it is under the rubric of withdrawing, we made a commitment already in that regard. The United States has made such a commitment.

Senator EXON. I was very interested in your response to a question, I was going to ask, and I would like to have you amplify on it a little bit more: It is your opinion, as I took it, in answering Senator Nunn's question, that a unilateral lifting of the embargo, at least at this juncture, over the objections of the British and the French would not be wise, is that correct?

General HAIG. I do not believe it would be wise. I believe that if we leave, which we have not been doing, and we take care of the forums in Europe appropriately, with a very clear, broadly based strategy somewhere along the lines I have described here, that the Europeans will understand and accept that.

Their concern about precipitously lifting the embargo is the endangerment of their forces that are spread all over, especially in eastern Bosnia, and they do not want them slaughtered. The Bosnians have threatened to do precisely that.

So I do not think anybody would recommend throwing the gauntlet down in that regard, until we have taken the necessary steps to be sure it does not happen.

Senator EXON. General, this has been pursued. Let me go just one step further on that, if I might. Is it your military judgment—and you have had a lot of experience in this, and I have a lot of confidence in your military judgment—that if we could get the United Nations' forces out of there, and I suggest to you the quicker they come out of there, the better, I think it is a failed policy that we keep building on, and we are not going to get anywhere, if we could get the United Nations' forces out of there, and then provide some measure of assistance to the Bosnian forces, is it your military judgment that under that type of a scenario, at least there would be a good likelihood that the Bosnian forces could at least neutralize the war to the position where it could possibly, in the future, be eliminated through some kind of a peace process?

Would the Bosnians be strong enough to that, in your military judgment?

General HAIG. Well, there are a lot of uncertainties here that will have to be applied to such a calculation, but there is no doubt that in recent months the Muslim and government forces in Bosnia have become increasingly effective, not decisively so, but if they were ever joined by the Croatian capabilities—and that is always a measure of the estimate of the parties involved—there should be success.

The big shadow over all of this question is Belgrade and their capabilities. There we have to do some diplomatic and other things that are necessary to restrain that, then my suggestion would be that they would arrive before very long to a *modus vivendi*, which could be translated into a negotiated, federated Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Senator EXON. Which, in the end, is what we are all seeking.

General HAIG. That is right.

Senator EXON. General, thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you very much. Senator Robb.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Haig, I would like to follow-up on your first of the three basic proposals. I appreciate the clarification you gave to Senator Exon with respect to the lifting of the siege of Sarajevo and opening the road.

My own experience includes opening roads in combat, so I have a bit of a feel for that activity, and I am concerned.

In your statement you said this is a task for NATO, not the U.N., and I think there is widespread agreement on who should be doing certain things.

I should say at the outset that most of the rest of your prescriptive measures I agree with, and I share your basic analysis.

But when we are talking about opening a road, that is an activity that can involve very significant amounts of force. Probably an eight-mile road, to keep it open for any period of time is going to require more than their reaction force, and certainly would deprive them of the ability to respond to other areas.

Now, the United States at this point has the *Roosevelt* Carrier Battle Group in the area to provide support. It has the ARG on the Kearsarge, the MEU, about 2,000, mostly marines and sailors. It has the Fifth Army group that is going through preparation right

now to be in a position to provide some additional force. But when we are talking about NATO and U.S. leadership, we have not been talking about a NATO operation so far. We have been talking about NATO forces employed in the theater, in out-of-area type operations.

But this is, it seems to me, a very different type of commitment that you are suggesting, where you have reiterated the need for U.S. leadership, and it is, again, because I relate, as we all do, to our own personal experiences, and having taken a number of rough riders in Vietnam, I know—I lost more troops, both killed and wounded in rough riders than I did in most of the offensive, including night operations we had against the NVA or the Viet Cong.

With a relatively small force, the Viet Cong, with some assistance from the NVA in areas, were able to create enormous difficulty in just getting a road open, if you will. We would open it one day, get the supplies through, and as soon as we left, it was controlled again by the enemy.

I see this as a much more committed type operation for NATO, and if it is, we are talking, General, with all due deference, ground war in Bosnia over a significant period of time, I believe.

I would appreciate any reaction to that, because most of the rest of the scenario that you have suggested is one with which I happen to agree personally, and I think there is widespread support for it.

I am not suggesting that opening a road is not an integral part of the withdrawal. Indeed, I think it is. But to suggest that this is step number one, it is a NATO exercise, as opposed to conducted by NATO participants, it seems to me that we are upping the ante, and we ought to have a pretty clear idea of where we are going.

General HAIG. Well, first, let me say, Senator, it is my feeling that we should have made it a NATO exercise. We failed to do that. The agreement that was arrived in Paris last Saturday makes this a NATO, albeit, French-commanded, U.S.-French operation.

So there is a bilateral overtone to it, which was a product of the manhood in both capitals when their young peacekeepers were seized, and they could not do otherwise, politically.

We saw John Major stand up and move immediately, and commit forces. They did that unilaterally. He did not go up and ask Mr. Boutros Boutros Ghali whether they could do it. He did it.

Now, the same thing happened to Chirac, the new president in Paris, who simply could not be made to look like a pussycat alongside John Major. So he immediately joined it, and even criticized his military for a lack of manhood, if you recall.

So what you have here is a dog's breakfast, if I may suggest, in command and control lines. You have an UNPROFOR, and these elements are committed technically under UNPROFOR, but you have a bilateral U.K.-French command arrangement, for the first time armed, not like the other forces that were in there as peacekeepers, with artillery, two batteries of artillery, I would like to see about four, but they had two, helicopter gun ships, and armored personnel carriers, like tanks.

One is an air-mobile unit, to go and leap frog along the road; the other is a punch-through unit.

Now, like you, I had quite a bit of experience opening roads, in Vietnam. It does not mean that we are creating I-95. It means that

we have enough force on the ground to keep that road open as needed. I think the judgments made there, in military terms, are fairly sound, with the U.S. backup, as with air power.

Senator ROBB. General, if I may, with the U.S. backup, that is the reason I am raising the question, though, we have two separate forces at this point, the Fifth Army force, and the MEU, each of approximately 2,000—

General HAIG. They are not involved.

Senator ROBB. I know they are not involved at this point, but we are talking now about a NATO exercise. You have made reference to the 25,000. That, at this point, is a paper figure.

General HAIG. That is right.

Senator ROBB. I spent last week with the commander of USACOM as well as CINCLANT and others talking about those, and they realize that at some point they will be tasked to provide those numbers, but at this point, those numbers have not even been designated, much less prepared for that kind of a full-scale withdrawal or retrograde operation.

So we are talking about the only U.S. forces in a potential NATO operation are the ones that are there, or can reinforce from ground forces in Europe, or ones that we would emergency lift from this area. It is—

General HAIG. Senator, let me say, this is not technically a U.N. operation.

Senator ROBB. That is the reason I was looking for clarification. This is a task for which NATO—

General HAIG. Yes. Let me—

Senator ROBB.—is best suited. I—

General HAIG. After that, I say unfortunately, the U.S. Government did not take up that cajole, and it has permitted the French and the British to establish a Rapid Reaction Force under the UN, but with very strong bilateral responsiveness, in my view, especially by the French commander.

What I am saying is, now to correct that, and to get the kind of chain of command that I would like to have seen, would be yet another flip-flop on our part, after an agreement was arrived at in Paris last Saturday.

We have had so many flip-flops, and the matter is so urgent, that I think we should go ahead, honor the U.N. with very strong bilateral leadership, especially from Paris. We have seen them do some fighting, incidentally, even their peacekeeping forces. The French are not less than courageous.

They are very courageous, the French.

Senator ROBB. There is no question about that. I share much of the analysis, and I respectfully suggest that characterizing the action that we may want to see taken as asking somebody to make another flip-flop may not be the kind of encouragement that the command structure is looking for in terms of support for that operation.

But I understand the point that you are making, that it reflects a change.

My time has expired, and I thank you, General.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. General, it is great to see you again. Thank you for your testimony, and both the directness and comprehensiveness of your paper.

I must say that the second section about policy ignoring reality states with great force and clarity the underlying realities here, which, as you say, are that Serbian ambitions led by the dictator in Belgrade, are the main reason for the crisis in both Croatia and Bosnia.

Second, unless the Serbs are persuaded that force does not pay, the war will not stop. Obviously, we can all disagree on what policies to follow after that, but unfortunately, along the way, there has been some ignoring of that reality at different places, and I appreciate you restating it to us.

I want to go through certain parts of your statement, one which was the understatement of truth, which is that we have confused peacekeeping with peacemaking here when it comes to the United Nations.

Of course, we have been struggling, and in some ways stumbling in the last 4 or 5 years after the Cold War, about what the appropriate role and use of the U.N. is.

In your opinion, was the entire U.N. mission here a mistake, because there was no peace to keep, or was there a way in which the U.N. might better have been used to have brought about a better resolution?

General HAIG. Well, Senator, I am one that is a great supporter of the United Nations. It has come to play an indispensable role in a number of functional areas of global cooperation and coordination, but the euphoria that accompanied the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the proclamation of a new world order I think was wrongheaded.

It is the same dirty old world. There are nations that believe in rule of law and peaceful change, and there are nations that believe in the rule of the bayonet.

If anything, the world has become more unruly, because it is now lacking the restraint of a Soviet super power, which had other axes to grind.

For example, I do not think there ever would have been an Iraq conflict, had the Soviet Union been strong and viable. They had other axes to grind with the West, and that was not one of them.

Be that as it may, the anticipation that accompanied the so-called end of the Cold War with respect to the United Nations was wrongheaded and naive, in my view.

We had, as a matter of fact, recently, the first Russian exercise of a veto on a substantive issue. We are going to see more of it. What I am saying is that I predict increasing Soviet vetoes, and maybe with respect to this very course of action that I am outlining today.

So I do not think the U.N. was the right vehicle for dealing, especially, because of Russian interests. We have given Russia victory after victory. They now are very formidable. They are in UNPROFOR. They are there and they have not earned it by constructive diplomacy.

Having said that, what should have happened when this thing began was that the United States should have gone to NATO,



called an emergency session of the North Atlantic Council, and laid out some ground-rules to contain this thing, and to warn Belgrade that forceful change of the status quo would not be tolerated.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. Early on.

General HAIG. Early on.

Senator LIEBERMAN. 1991, 1992.

General HAIG. Absolutely.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. Let me follow-on, because that last statement leads me to my next question. One of the things that Secretary Perry said yesterday, and it has been a tenet of our policy, is that if the United Nations' forces are withdrawn, and as you said, he suggested that this Rapid Reaction Force may be the last chance to make the U.N. mission successful, I agree with you that it is the first step in ultimately withdrawing, but if they are withdrawn, he is concerned, and has always been, about the spreading of the conflict areas where we not only have a security interest, as is generally concluded about Bosnia, but that we have a vital national interest as well as NATO Treaty obligations in Macedonia and beyond.

Let me just speak in a little more detail. Let us assume that the policy like the one you have outlined, or any similar policy that results in the U.N. forces, UNPROFOR forces withdrawing from Bosnia, is carried out in the next 6 months.

What should we specifically do to make sure that we do not allow that cause celebre that you talked about to occur, that we do not allow this to go over into Macedonia, let alone—a little more internal, but beyond the existing borders. What are the steps we should do to avoid that?

General HAIG. Senator, I think there are countless contributors to the development of a realization in Belgrade, or perhaps elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, that such a thing would not be tolerable, and that would involve some of the measures I have outlined here today, because if people do not believe your threats, you no longer have credibility.

I am sorry to say that is true not only of the United States, but of the United Nations, and probably NATO as well, among the decisionmakers in the former Yugoslavia. So this will help to do that.

The other thing is a very clearheaded demonstration of something that has been lacking for 4 years, a firm American leadership in NATO to develop a consensus within the NATO membership that will enable them to say, "Hey, this is a cause celebre, and we are going to put Belgrade on notice that it is a cause celebre". But we must also be prepared to react if our warnings are ignored.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So the beginning of it is to localize responsibility in Belgrade, and let them know that if they do spread the conflict, that there will be consequences, but then, obviously, to carry out those consequences—

General HAIG. Yes.

Senator LIEBERMAN. If it is spread. How do you feel about the relatively small force, I guess around 500, in Macedonia.

Is it part of a containment strategy to expand that force, or is that force adequate as a trip wire, and what really will matter is the ultimatum and willingness to follow through on the ultimatum?

General HAIG. Well, I favor a trip wire concept, but it has to be backed up with credible diplomacy, which thus far has been lacking.

I think our forces in Macedonia have served their purpose thus far; although, I do not think there has been any temptation to test them, because of too much going on in Bosnia and elsewhere.

It may never be tested. So I do not see any reason to anticipate a large increase there as a deterrent, but if events begin to deteriorate, then I think we will want to take prompt action, and it should be NATO, not the United States.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me ask a last question, which is a little more macro. One of the concerns that people have had as this conflict has gone on, and we have not come to the side of the, well, Muslims, is the impact our policy would have on our relations with the Muslim world.

Is there any reality to that? In other words, do you think that in any sense, our unwillingness to have lifted the embargo, arm the Bosnians, has, in fact, deteriorated our relations with the Muslims.

General HAIG. I am very glad you asked that question, because we have already paid a heavy price. I have been to Turkey often, and if there is any single country in our national security spectrum that we have failed to treat properly, it is Turkey.

What we are doing is undercutting the secular government of Turkey by these actions, from attacks on human rights, with respect to the Kurds, to other public fingerwagging. I am a great advocate of human rights, but such threats, and embargoes as from Norway on a weapon system, all of this is mindless.

The most dangerous cauldron for potential conflict in the globe today, in my view, is in the Turkish area.

Turkey is our most important strategic asset, and we should be working day and night to be sure that we are helping that government, supporting its assimilation into Europe, which we have not done vigorously. I would give the same lecture, whether I be in Paris, London, or Norway. Turkey is critical to future peace.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you.

General HAIG. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sorry I could not be here for the first part of your hearing today.

Chairman THURMOND. I was my usual erudite, calm, passive self.

Senator GLENN. I depend on that all the way through. I do not know if you made any observations earlier about our use of air power. My view has been that as long as we use air power only for close-air support we are just hitting artillery tubes out in the woods, places out there.

What we should be going for are the command centers where it would change some decisionmakers' minds about pursuing this. Did you make any comments about that earlier? If not, what do you think on that?

General HAIG. Well, I think I saw somewhere in yesterday's testimony the suggestion that the U.S. military, not the politicians, the military have been pushing for air strikes.

In my calculations, the U.S. military has not been pushing for air strikes for a period of over 2 years, because of the mindless re-

straints and constraints that have been applied to the application of our air power in Yugoslavia.

So in answer to your question, I believe that if we are involved in a shooting situation, God forbid, with American air power, that it must be used in the most comprehensive and complete way possible.

Senator GLENN. How far up the line do we go? Would you hit Belgrade? Would you advocate—

General HAIG. No.

Senator GLENN. Bombing Belgrade?

General HAIG. No.

Senator GLENN. Why?

General HAIG. Well, I would have perhaps have recommended that early on when it came to applying what I call sanctions to prevent conflict, but now we are in it, it is localized, and I do not think I would recommend that. I do not think the American people would want it.

Senator GLENN. How do we make the decisionmakers change their minds as to changing the directions of things—

General HAIG. Well—

Senator GLENN. Not willing to hit close to where they are?

General HAIG, I think there are several ways, and none of them are guaranteed to succeed, but one is that the military has to speak frankly and courageously to the political leaders.

We have to make it very clear to the United Nations, which we have not, that these kinds of political restraints are self-defeating, in the extreme, and then we have to get a coherent plan put together and get it approved.

Senator GLENN. Where this comes apart to me is, we have been involved with the blue helmet people over there now, because we had, and I quote out of the GAO report, "Consent and cooperation of warring parties that that was a good idea." Now, we have moved beyond that.

General HAIG. Way beyond that.

Senator GLENN. Blue helmets do not mean much now, and so we are going in with the Rapid Reaction Force, or they are, because just putting in more presence is not any good now. We are in a situation where they are taking hostages and so on.

So we are moving into an active combat role now, and we are going to be involved with that, to some extent. I am not quite sure how far.

You insist on the lifting of siege of Sarajevo, I do not disagree with that, getting UNPROFOR out, aiding the Bosnians, which I believe was your third point, lifting the embargo.

Would we then provide the arms for the Bosnians? From where do they arms? Do we provide that, or would NATO provide them, or who?

General HAIG. Well, first let me say, they are getting a considerable amount from places as far away as Malaysia.

Senator GLENN. Let me follow this up. Just lifting embargoes does not put any combat capability in their hands.

General HAIG. Well, I think that is a sensitive question, which it might be premature to answer, until we see the results of all the steps we take. But if it is necessary to establish military equi-

librium in the direction of a negotiated peace, then I think it would be worth doing.

Senator GLENN. For us to supply the arms.

General HAIG. If it is the difference between that and continuing conflict and bloodshed.

Senator GLENN. Is that the choice? Do we think that giving them the arms would not create more bloodshed?

General HAIG. Well—

Senator GLENN. It probably would.

General HAIG. But I think the basic premise is that there is not going to be a negotiated settlement as long as one party thinks it can win militarily.

Senator GLENN. If we furnish arms to the Bosnians, then it would put them in a position of equality where we might get some real negotiations.

General HAIG. That is right.

Senator GLENN. You also advocated your fourth plan, I think, more active U.S. leadership to shape NATO consensus to restrain all the parties not to change external borders by force.

Now, that has not been very effective so far, obviously. Would we then back that up with force? You indicated earlier in your statement, I believe, which I have read, that you thought about 100,000 people could go in there and stabilize the place, at least for a while. Would you propose that we do that?

General HAIG. I would propose that this be a NATO operation, that the NATO consensus be developed, that is the first step, to do this, and then that NATO planning would envision the distribution of risks. That would include everyone from German forces, British, French—

Senator GLENN. United States.

General Haig:—U.S. Absolutely. If we are an ally, we are an ally. If we are not, we better fold up our tent and leave Europe.

Senator GLENN. But there is another factor here, too, I think we ignore sometimes, and I think it limits what the administration, or the previous administration, or anybody can do, and that is public opinion here. We have seen in the past what I have called, for a lack of better words, the Dover factor.

You bring some flag-draped coffins back through Dover, Delaware, and American public opinion in the past has done a 180.

We, to our everlasting credit, I think, saved probably a million lives in Somalia when we took 18 American casualties, and it was on American T.V., and we did an 180 in public opinion from about 80 percent in favor of what we were doing, to 80 percent against in a period of about 14 days.

The President felt we had to pull out, and granted, in the middle of that, the U.N. mission had changed, we did not drop off at that time, and so we got ourselves a little more involved.

I just think this Dover factor, to me, is a very real limitation on what we can do. I do not think most Americans see the situation in the Balkans as being something that affects their everyday life here, or their kids' lives, or their kids' future.

General HAIG. Well, I do not think I say any different in my paper. As a matter of fact, I say do not get involved.

Senator GLENN. Getting our involvement, or being willing to get us involved in getting the road open to Sarajevo, no matter what the casualties might be—

General HAIG. Well, that is to get us out, Senator. You are not going to be able to get them out, unless you do it that way. I also would say this about American public opinion and the Dover factor, and that is that, Americans will always object to stupid, incompetent governorship. When we conduct stupid policies, you can expect the American people to rise up and say no.

I happen to think Somalia was not a test tube case of how to do it, but that is another testimony that would take a long time.

Senator GLENN. I would agree with that. What situation would you think—my time is up here, but I have just one more question. What situation would you want to see prevail, if we get in?

Let us say we establish peace in that area. Then how do we get out? Let us say that we get NATO consensus to go in and say there are not going to be any more border changes no matter what, we are not going to do that, no matter what, and there are not going to be border changes. Then we have to back that up.

Now, how do we do that?

General HAIG. Well, that has been the chore of NATO for the last 50 years, only with an enemy that was far more formidable, and the risks were far more damaging and costly, to include even nuclear exchange, and yet, we did it.

We stood as a nation that stood for something. We must stand for something, Senator. That means that the slaughter of innocent people in Sarajevo is not going to be comfortable for the American people to watch while we sit on our hands.

I tell you, it will be a devastating outcome, politically, for the administration.

There are two motivations for this. One is, we have to help these people, who are extremists; two, we have to get our innocent peacekeepers out of the country; and three, we ought to give those who are defending their territory and interests the means to do it.

Hopefully, that will bring about a peace at long last, without any American involvement, other than the involvement necessary to get that road open, which is very limited, which the administration has already committed to.

Senator GLENN. Thank you. My time is up.

Senator Nunn [presiding]: General Haig, let me ask you one question on behalf of Senator Thurmond and myself, and then I have two on behalf of Senator Thurmond, and I think that will pretty well wrap us up.

The one on behalf of Senator Thurmond and myself relates to the spreading of the conflict. Secretary Perry said yesterday that he believed if the conflict spread, involved Greece, Turkey, and so forth, it would involve U.S. vital interests.

What I hear you saying this morning is that you concur that this would involve U.S. vital interests if the conflict spreads.

General HAIG. If it did, yes. I would not predict that it would in the near term, but the possibility is there, and the seeds are set to lead people to believe they can change borders, and that NATO, the United States, the Western world, or the United Nations are going to be helpless to prevent it. That is the issue.

Senator NUNN. Senator Thurmond's question is: Please tell us in more detail how your recommendations might offer a better chance of containing the conflict in our present course of action.

General HAIG. Well, nobody can give an assurance that my ideas, cooked up after some thought, but not a hell of a lot, since I was just asked this week to appear here—I would suggest that if we do not do something like what I am suggesting, we are going to lose.

The situation is going to continue to deteriorate. You are going to see horrible circumstances, as I note with the situation developing in Sarajevo.

It is already beginning to develop. They are running out of flour. They cannot make bread. The hospitals cannot treat the wounded. It is the same old story.

Senator NUNN. Probably in the enclaves, also.

General HAIG. In the enclaves, the same thing.

Senator NUNN. You distinguish between Sarajevo and the enclaves, though, it seems to me, and that is intentional, right?

General HAIG. Yes. That was intentional. So what I am suggesting is that we (a) get the peacekeepers out of a situation in which there is no peace, that has been said in this town many times; (b) that we give the combatants a level playing field in Bosnia-Herzegovina, (c) that we not lift the restraints against Belgrade, until they become more cooperative, and that is a price they may be willing to pay, if they see a little backbone in the Western camp.

There is no guarantee of success, but I think this offers the prospect of success. It also answers the conundrum that is beginning to develop everywhere, which is how can we go on with this mindless peacekeeping operation, when we are endangering peacekeepers who are unarmed, and not mandated to defend themselves, and unable to do so.

Senator NUNN. Let me follow-up on that with another question on behalf of Senator Thurmond, and along the same lines. I am quoting his question. "As we focus our attention on Bosnia, we should not forget the 500 U.S. troops under U.N. control in Macedonia. They are deployed in lightly defended observation posts or on foot patrols, keeping watch on the border between Macedonia, and Serbia, Yugoslavia.

"In effect, they are a trip wire. If the conflict escalates, and Serbia, Yugoslavia, comes in the war on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, those U.S. troops are vulnerable to attack or capture. "In light of the growing tensions, what do you believe we should do to support or reinforce them, and what changes, if any, should be made to that mission?"

General HAIG. Well, I think Senator Lieberman asked pretty much that question, and I have already beat it to death. But I think right now that that 500-man force is serving its purpose as a trip wire.

I do not see any immediate danger to it because of the continuing complexity in the form of Yugoslavia itself. I do not know of anybody who could responsibly suggest that if American armed forces are under duress, because of enemy action and the violation of law, that we would not move immediately to reinforce and to protect them.

I tell you, you would not have an army, navy, or an air force if they thought our political leadership was of any other mind set.

I write in my book, "Innercircles," which I would encourage you all to read, because it discusses Vietnam a little differently than Robert MacNamara did. In my book I talk about a political leader in the Pentagon who refused to let our rescue forces go in and get a downed pilot following the strikes that were made after the Gulf of Tonkin, and in my view, that was a criminal act.

Senator NUNN. This is the final question. This is on behalf of Senator Thurmond. In your prepared statement you call for lifting the arms embargo, and allowing the Bosnian government to have the means to defend themselves.

It is both morale and practical to let the people who are being attacked fight for their interest, rather than on depending on outside help. These are the questions.

Who would provide arms to the Muslims, and how would they deliver them? Who would train them in the use of the weapons, and where would the training be conducted? What would be the strategic objectives of the arming, simply to equalize the sides, or enable the Muslims to roll back Serbian gain?

General HAIG. Well, these are very tough questions, which I do not think preset answers are particularly constructive. They are important questions. They are inevitably questions that may have to be faced, but right now they do not have to be.

There is a certain amount of arms flowing in now, but mostly these are small arms, automatic weapons and shoulder-held systems.

The problem is a lack of fire power, artillery, which the Serbs have, and being well trained by the Russians for so many years, they have in ample numbers. So I think we would need artillery.

It could come from NATO stocks, it could come from contributing nations, or it can come from the United States. I have seen figures suggesting billions of dollars of equipment, and that is the worst thing you can say in Washington these days.

If you want to kill anything, put a price tag on it, and I am a great budget balancer.

But having said that, I would not answer that question yet. I think we have to do what we have to do to get some kind of an equilibrium that will bring us peace.

Senator NUNN. Okay. I have one more question on my behalf, making sure I understand your—your sequence would be getting the U.N. forces out before lifting the embargo, as I understand your testimony.

General HAIG. Yes. That is my initial thinking, because we do not want to do things to create incentives for the Serbs to make it difficult to withdraw.

Senator NUNN. I agree with that. I think you are right on that. I have always favored the embargo. I think that has been counter-productive.

But I also think that if we did it alone, and we left the British and French on the ground over there while we were doing it legislatively here, it would be a fundamental error, and would come close to eroding the alliances severely, as the way you have described it.

Do you concur generally in that, that we ought to be doing this together with allies?

General HAIG. Absolutely. Absolutely.

Senator NUNN. General Haig, thank you very much. I think it has been a very meaningful day, in terms of testimony. Everybody has not agreed with you, obviously, but you have laid out—as I have said, you have laid out a scenario and a strategy, and that is not what we have been getting from most.

We get a partial strategy, mainly a critique of existing course, without thinking through the consequences of alternate courses. The course that you have laid out this morning would also have, as you well realize, some very high risks, but at least it is coherent.

Any withdrawal is going to carry a huge price. The withdrawal itself is going to be difficult. Right now, the withdrawal plans, in order to get out 25,000, 30,000, 35,000 people, and putting in 50,000, that is a tough thing of withdrawing, and then you have to withdraw the 50,000 you put in to get out the 35,000.

Then you have the enclave question, and what you do about that when people—you could see some more Vietnam-type scenes, with people literally clinging onto the vehicles trying to get the U.N. soldiers out, when they think they are going to be slaughtered.

That is what the Bosnian government now says they want. They want us to withdraw and lift, but when it starts happening, they may not want it, because it is their people who will be getting killed.

It seems to me that probably that is more of a public posture than it is a private set of views. So there are some real complexities here, but your testimony has been very helpful, and I hope you will not hesitate to get in touch with the committee and any of us individually as these matters unfold over the weeks to come.

General HAIG. Thank you very much, Senator, and thank your staff and everyone so involved for their hospitality, and for the extra burdens they have given me over the last 24 hours.

Senator NUNN. Good. Senator Thurmond and I are going to order all the staff to buy your book, too.

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]



## SITUATION IN BOSNIA

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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 14, 1995

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a.m., in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Thurmond, Warner, Cohen, McCain, Kempthorne, Hutchison, Santorum, Nunn, Exon, Levin, Glenn, Robb, Lieberman, and Bryan.

Committee staff members present: Richard L. Reynard, staff director; George W. Lauffer, deputy staff director, Melinda K. Koutsoumpas, chief clerk; Christine K. Cimko, press secretary.

Professional staff members present: Lawrence J. Lanzillotta, Thomas G. Moore.

Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, counsel; John W. Douglass, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Alec Bierbauer, Pamela L. Farrell, Shelley G. Lauffer, Kathleen M. Paralusz, and Jason Rossbach.

Committee members' assistants present: Judith A. Ansley, assistant to Senator Warner; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Ann E. Sauer and Walter Lohman, assistants to Senator McCain; Richard F. Schwab, assistant to Senator Coats; Glen E. Tait, assistant to Senator Kempthorne; Patricia L. Stolnacker, assistant to Senator Santorum; Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; David A. Lewis, assistant to Senator Levin; Patricia J. Buckheit, assistant to Senator Glenn; Lisa W. Tuite, assistant to Senator Byrd; Suzanne Dabkowski, assistant to Senator Robb; John F. Lilley, assistant to Senator Lieberman; and Randall A. Schieber, assistant to Senator Bryan.

### OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND, CHAIRMAN

Chairman THURMOND. The committee meets today for the third time to examine U.S. policy regarding the increasingly troubled and confused situation in Bosnia.

Last week, we heard a defense of the administration's policy from Secretary of Defense Perry and General Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Next, we heard from General Alexander Haig, former Secretary of State and former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

Today the committee has the unusual privilege of hearing from former President Jimmy Carter.

Mr. President, I understand this is the first time you have testified before a congressional committee in Washington since leaving office. Your appearance here this morning does us honor, and signifies the importance you attach to settling this tragic conflict.

Mr. President, you have a particular interest in the Bosnian tragedy. Last December you arranged a 4-month cease-fire, and for a while, hopes were high that this latest peace effort might bear fruit.

Unfortunately, Balkan animosities are too deep, and this conflict proved too much, even for your well-known peacemaking skills. We hope you will share your insights gained from that experience.

Joining President Carter on the witness panel is General John Galvin, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. General Galvin, your views on the proper relation between foreign policy and military force are widely respected. I am grateful to you both for appearing before the committee.

It has become clear from prior testimony that none of the choices facing the United States or our allies in Bosnia are attractive. Unfortunately, the responsibility of governing means we sometimes have to choose, even though there are no good options.

Refusing to make a choice in situations like this results in paralysis, confusion, loss of credibility, and damage to our leadership. Such paralysis always makes a bad situation worse.

I hope the Clinton administration can avoid slipping into paralysis in the face of such a difficult dilemma. The administration needs to develop a more realistic foreign policy that balances United States national interests with relations with our allies, one that will lead us to a sound strategy for the proper use of force in the Balkans.

In particular, the administration needs to insist on an end to the so-called dual-key command arrangement between the United Nations and NATO, which has proven, at best, ineffective, and at worst, puts U.S. and NATO personnel in unnecessary danger.

Then we must build a political consensus that will support the policy and the resulting strategy. I believe there is a consensus on this committee not to allow U.S. troops to get involved on the ground, or for that matter, U.S. air crews sent needlessly into danger, to satisfy the delusions of U.N. officials on the scene.

Second, I believe we are all committed to the stability and strength of the Atlantic Alliance, which the mishandling of the crisis has jeopardized.

Out of loyalty to our allies, most, though not all of us, support U.S. participation in a NATO mission to cover the withdrawal of U.N. forces from Bosnia.

However, I am deeply troubled that the administration is invoking the principle of allied solidarity as an excuse not to exercise U.S. leadership.

In other words, instead of leading the allies, we are deferring to them, even though they are pursuing an unwise course in sending more troops into Bosnia under the failed U.N. mission.

In the successful 45-year history of NATO, U.S. leadership was the chief means of building and maintaining allied solidarity. Now, President Clinton is turning that historically vital relationship on

its head. Allied solidarity is becoming the means for weakening U.S. leadership.

Our obligation to our allies can best be fulfilled by helping in the withdrawal of their U.N. troops from Bosnia. But if they persist in another course of action, we should not feel bound to join them.

It is my personal view that the U.S. ought to apply strong leadership to end the U.N. mission that has proven a costly failure, despite its good intentions. Then, once allied U.N. troops are out of danger, the United States ought to exercise its leadership to enable Bosnia to defend themselves.

I believe our consensus holds that open-ended U.S. military intervention, especially on the ground, must be avoided. The West cannot impose a solution to this conflict.

The questions then remain: Can we at least assist the parties to find common ground if and when they are ready to negotiate a genuine settlement? Is a negotiated settlement possible? Can we keep the conflict from spreading into the southern Balkans so that it does not jeopardize vital U.S. and Western interests?

These are some of the questions we must wrestle with as the situation in Bosnia grows worse. I hope our witnesses today can shed some light on these issues, and I look forward to their testimony.

Once again, Mr. President and General Galvin, I thank you for coming.

At this time, I am pleased to recognize the distinguished ranking member, Senator Nunn, for an opening statement, and then we will proceed to opening statements from members who wish to be heard before receiving testimony.

I ask members to cooperate with the Chair in keeping your statements as brief as possible, so we can give ample time to our distinguished witnesses. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Chairman Thurmond. I again commend you on holding this series of hearings on Bosnia.

I want to extend a warm welcome to today's witnesses, President Carter and General Galvin. We know them both well for their work over the years.

This will be President Carter's first appearance before a congressional committee, and we are honored that it is this committee, the Committee on Armed Services.

As I understand it, President Carter is only the fifth former President of the United States to testify before a congressional committee, and the first since President Truman testified on government reorganization a number of years ago. For the record, the other former Presidents who testified were President John Tyler, Theodore Roosevelt, and Herbert Hoover.

I know that President Carter is making this historic appearance, because he feels very strongly about the need to make every effort to end the conflict in Bosnia. I want to take this opportunity to acknowledge President Carter's ceaseless efforts for peace throughout the world.

Based on my trip with President Carter and General Powell to Port-au-Prince, Haiti last September, I can certify that President Carter's determination and strength of will was the single most important factor that allowed that mission to succeed. He literally would not let it fail.

My other comments on his humanitarian missions around the world, his work in health care, and many, many other endeavors, including his work in Atlanta, and cities throughout this country, are too lengthy to give this morning, but I commend him for his leadership.

I also want to welcome General Galvin, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. General Galvin has testified before us on many occasions. He has been a valuable resource and a tremendous leader for a long number of years.

General Galvin served in the spring of 1994 as a U.S. ambassador at large, to assist in developing the military aspect of the Bosnian-Croat Croatian federation. General Galvin and President Carter have visited the area, and know the military leadership of the Bosnian parties.

Mr. Chairman, we have had numerous witnesses testify on Bosnia over the last 3 to 4 years. We have had all sorts of closed-door testimony.

We have had intelligence witnesses. We have had military witnesses. I think this session this morning, though, is almost unique in the fact that it is going to focus on people who have been involved in the diplomatic side of this conflict, and that is the side of the conflict we have not heard much about.

So I think we have much to learn from these two witnesses, and I look forward to their testimony. I thank both of them for being here.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Warner, do you have an opening statement?

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I shall be very brief, because I am quite anxious to hear from the distinguished witnesses.

I say to my colleague, Senator Nunn, I think history reflects that George Washington once came to the Hill and was so incensed by the manner in which he was treated he never went back again, and that is a precedent, I believe, for Presidents to abstain.

But you are a man of courage, Mr. President, and those of us who may have differed with you in years past certainly have formed the greatest respect for the manner in which you have labored tirelessly for the cause of peace. You are to be commended.

And General Galvin, I draw on memories of visiting you in Europe, and your appearance today adds to that dimension of one who understands not only the implications to NATO, but also one with a sense of European history, dating to the very origins, and much of this conflict, in my judgment, is deep rooted in historical precedence, and that is why it is so difficult for us here in the United States to comprehend how civilized people can conduct such a horrible war as this.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Let me add my congratulations to you, Mr. Chairman.

I have been on this committee for a long, long time, and the balance with which you have called the witnesses, and certainly these two excellent witnesses which we have today, I attribute to your fairness and even-handedness as we approach something here that is one of the most difficult decisions that I think I have made, that most of us have made, on matters of great importance.

Mr. President, a few years ago, at least 3 or 4, I believe it was in 1970, there were 15 new Governors elected at that time, and there was a new one from Georgia that I had never heard of before, and there was a new one from Nebraska that you had never heard of before, but here we are many, many, many years later.

I want to associate myself with the remarks made by my three predecessors, saluting you for what you have done since you left the oval office. Few people have traveled so long and so hard to help humanity here at home, and to do the Lord's work, I suggest, and work for peace around the world in North Korea, in Haiti, and now in Bosnia.

Thank you for being here, and we are looking forward very, very much to your remarks.

General Galvin, I believe this is the first time I have seen you before the committee not in uniform. I like you when you are in uniform, I like you out of uniform.

And certainly I happen to think that the two people who we have at this table today, Mr. Chairman, the advice and input that they give us will probably be the most important that we have received in this series of testimony, and I look forward very much to their counsel and their advice.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

President Carter and General Galvin, I want to thank you for being here today.

President Carter, I know you have made a great personal effort to assist the administration in achieving peace in Bosnia, and I believe it is fitting and appropriate that you are here to testify here today, and we are obviously honored by your presence.

Everyone wants peace in Bosnia. I believe that we all want justice in Bosnia. The real question is how we get there. I believe and I have made clear countless times that without a just settlement of dispute in Bosnia, peace will be impossible.

A peace that does not honor the Republic of Bosnia's sovereignty within its internationally recognized borders is not only morally wrong, it is unworkable.

President Carter, the cease-fire you negotiated was a respite from the fighting, and for achieving this, you have our appreciation and our commendation. It created an opportunity for one last attempt to settle the war through diplomacy. However, it was bound to collapse.

The aggressor in the conflict was unwilling to cede territory it had won in war, and the victim was unwilling to passively accept the absorption of its territory. But we cannot ask the Bosnian government and people to wait forever.

To do so again is a gross injustice, and it rewards the aggressor. This war has gone on for 3 years. It is time to recognize that justice, and, therefore, peace will only be achieved in Bosnia when government forces are able to defend themselves, to wit, the lifting of the arms embargo.

It is time to recognize UNPROFOR's failure to keep the peace by pulling it out of Bosnia, and letting the Bosnian government do the job the U.N. has failed to do, which the prime minister last week,

in meetings with Senators, made it clear that not only is the U.N. free to leave, but the Bosnian government would assist its withdrawal.

I believe we would all consider supporting the U.S. forces to assist in the withdrawal, but I think it should be made clear that beyond that, there should be no subsequent U.S. involvement in Bosnia.

It must be clear that this is the end game of coherent U.S. policy toward Bosnia, not just another blind step leading to a deeper ill-considered involvement.

I thank you both for being here today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. I am calling on the Senators according to the early bird rule. I believe the next is Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome. I am glad to have you here today. I look forward to your statement.

Thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you, Senator. Senator Kempthorne.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. President, your tireless efforts toward conflict resolution and humanitarian efforts, I think, are a tremendous extension of your career of public service.

General Galvin, I salute you for the reputation you have achieved in the military service. I am here to listen.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Robb.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

President Carter, General Galvin, I join my colleagues and welcome you. As you know, part of the ritual that you have to undergo is to hear our speeches before we have an opportunity to hear and profit from your testimony.

We thank you for the commitment that you have made to peace and conflict resolution. Whatever differences we may have on some of the issues here, we have enormous respect for you, and we thank you for coming.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Santorum.

Senator SANTORUM. I just also want to welcome you to the committee, and look forward to your statements.

Thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. These are getting briefer as we go along.

Thank you for your extraordinary continuing service to this Nation, both of you. It is unique, and welcome.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Hutchison.

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you.

I do want to welcome the former President, and add my accolades for the untiring efforts that you have made for humanitarian purposes, and the extra efforts that you have made with the Carter Center to provide a place for people to come. And I thank you, General Galvin.

I was in Croatia and Macedonia just 2 weeks ago, and I believe firmly that although the U.N. has tried valiantly, nevertheless, the U.N. can only be effective if there are two warring parties that want to make peace, or if there is a peace agreement to enforce. I do not see those two situations present in the former Yugoslavia.

I believe that because the United Nations is there, that, not through any fault of its own, but perhaps unwittingly, we have continued to allow an uneven situation to occur in the hopes that it would bring peace, but, in fact, it has not.

I do think it is time for us to address the unevenness of the battle, and determine if this is, in fact, a civil war, where our United Nations efforts must now be spent to contain it within those borders, rather than try to make a peace where none exists.

So I am anxious to hear your remarks. I do think that all of us have the same goal, and that is a peace in Bosnia that does restore some sense of fairness, but sometimes we do not have the option of reaching the goal that we would all like to have, and I think then we have to step back and see what are the best choices among some not very good options.

So thank you for being here. I appreciate it.

Chairman THURMOND. President Carter is a resident of Georgia, but his ancestors were born and bred in South Carolina, so South Carolina claims him, too. [Laughter.]

Mr. President, we are glad to hear from you.

#### STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES CARTER, FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

President CARTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and my four friends in the Senate, who were a great help to me when I was President, and the newly elected members of the Senate.

It is an honor and a pleasure for me to come before this committee with some degree of trepidation, since I am one of the rare ones who have been willing to come. I think it is accurate to say that had General Galvin not joined with me in this appearance, I may not be here.

I agreed to come, because General Galvin's experience and interest in this Balkan region is strongly complementary to my own, and I think that his views are basically compatible with my own.

We feel that our joint testimony might be helpful in finding a way to bring peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We are here as private citizens, with no authority to speak for others, and with no desire to be critical of our own government, or others who are attempting to prevent violence in the area and to protect innocent people.

We also want to make it clear that we do not excuse or condone any of the human rights abuses, the violations of cease-fires, the taking of hostages, or failure to comply with United Nations resolutions by any of the combatants in the area.

I have been asked to speak first, and will outline briefly my own recent involvement in the region, since this is the basis for my recommendations, which I will give at the conclusion of my remarks.

At the Carter Center, we monitor regularly the world's conflicts, attempting to understand their history, the primary participants, issues that are currently in dispute, and efforts that are now being made to resolve them.

We receive many requests from active or potential combatants for assistance, but our policy is to encourage mediation by others, and not to duplicate their efforts or compete with them.

When we believe it is advisable to accept one of these mediation requests in a sensitive political arena, we first assure that we have the approval of the President of the United States, President Reagan, President Bush, or President Clinton, and when appropriate, we also consult the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

When our proposal is not accepted to be mediators, we do not act. We have received such approval in a number of cases, including Nicaragua, Somalia, Liberia, North Korea, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Haiti, and the Sudan.

We constantly face one of two basic questions that make mediation very difficult, and sometimes unpopular; first, how to correlate the inviolability of a nation's sovereignty with self-determination for minority groups within that country, and second, how do you deal with leaders who are condemned by our government if they are the only ones who can resolve a crisis and prevent further human suffering?

In our work we are always very careful to comply with U.S. policy and with any pertinent resolutions of the United Nations.

We do not ask for official status or authority, and always submit any potential agreements, as was the case in North Korea and Haiti, to our government for final approval and further action. We have followed these guidelines meticulously in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Last year, on December 7, I was asked by the Bosnian Serb leader, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, to receive a delegation from him. He said that many demands were being made of the Serbs, and he had not been able to discuss his responses with anyone in authority.

After calling President Bill Clinton and obtaining his approval, on December 14, I received a three-person delegation at my home in Plains.

After extensive discussions, a tentative agreement was reached that I would go to Bosnia-Herzegovina, provided the Serbs would, first, release unilaterally all prisoners of war who were less than 19 years old, and mutually exchange all other POWs with the government officials in Sarajevo; second, permit United Nations convoys to deliver relief supplies to Sarajevo and other safe havens; third, impose a cease-fire around Sarajevo; fourth, open the airport there to United Nations flights; and fifth, guarantee respect for human rights, and let human rights reporters come into the area to confirm this commitment.

By telephone, I confirmed this commitment brought by the delegation personally with Dr. Karadzic, and also shared the information with President Clinton on the phone at the same time, who approved the agreement.

Dr. Karadzic then offered to confirm his promises publicly and asked that CNN permit him to do this through a televised live interview, which took place.

Following briefings from the State Department and White House officials, and after being informed by them that the Serb promises to me were "substantially fulfilled," my wife Rosalynn and I traveled to the area, arriving first in Zagreb on December 18, where we met with Croatian President Tujdman and U.N. officials, and then proceeded to Sarajevo.



That evening we met with President Alija Izetbegovic and other officials of the Bosnian-Herzegovina government. Although at first skeptical of our mission, they seemed reassured when we explained that our goal was not to initiate a new peace agenda, but to promote negotiations on the basis of the Contact Group plan.

Approving this effort, they made it clear that they would accept a cease-fire for not more than 3 months.

Later that night I drafted what I considered to be a comprehensive cease-fire proposal, based on the discussions with the Serb delegation in my home, my talks in Zagreb and Sarajevo, and briefings from U.S. and U.N. officials.

Before going to Pale, I requested of the Serbs that both Dr. Karadzic and the military commander, General Ratko Mladic, meet with me, to assure that whatever we evolved would have both political and military backing. Our negotiations in Pale included them and a number of other top Serb officials.

We had some difficult moments, but finally concluded an agreement with some modifications of my original draft. Its terms included; first, an immediate cease-fire and cessation of hostilities for at least 4 months—they wanted longer, but we finally negotiated it down to 4 months—to be enforced by the interposition of United Nations forces; second, the prevention of the firing of any guns or weapons that might damage people or property; third, a comprehensive peace agreement to be negotiated during this period, under the auspices of the Contact Group, the 5-nation group, using mediators proposed by the Contact Group and mutually agreed by the parties.

In all respects, both sides are to be given equal treatment. During this period, unrestricted movement of relief convoys, use of the airport at Sarajevo, and the delivery of humanitarian services, with U.N. forces helping to assure that no armaments or weapons of war are in the cargoes to be delivered.

Each side would be responsible within its controlled areas for the protection of human rights in accordance with international standards. Special reporters are to have unimpeded access to insure compliance.

All people, regardless of age, sex, or ethnic origin will have the right to live in a location of their choice, and an early exchange of all detainees.

The Serbs agreed to negotiate in good faith on the basis of the Contact Group plan that requires a division of territory, with the Serbs to control 49 percent and the Muslim/Croat federation 51 percent.

Mutually agreed modifications to this plan would be negotiated during the peace talks.

By telephone, I read this document to representatives of the State Department and White House, and with their approval, I signed the document as a witness to the signatures of Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic. That is enclosure A in the testimony I have given you.

Back in Sarajevo the next morning, we obtained a closely parallel agreement with President Izetbegovic, with only one difference, the Bosnian government demanded that the Serbs accept the 51 per-

cent/49 percent map as a prerequisite to peace talks. That is enclosure B.

In order to clarify some issues and make implementation dates earlier and more specific, we returned them to Pale and concluded an additional agreement, and back in Sarajevo, President Izetbegovic accepted the additions. That is enclosure C to the testimony.

Now we had a common agreement for a temporary period of peace during the holidays, Christmas and New Year's, a 4-month cease-fire through the month of April, a cessation of hostilities between military forces of both sides, with UNPROFOR to interpose its units between them, the withdrawal of government forces from the demilitarized zone on Mount Igman near the Sarajevo airport, an early exchange of all detainees, and an opportunity for the Contact Group to work with both sides to resolve any remaining issues.

I pointed out to the news media on my departure that the only unresolved issue was that Muslim/Croat officials were insisting that as a prerequisite to peace talks, the Serbs would have to accept the 51 percent/49 percent plan.

The Serbs, on the other hand, were willing to negotiate on the basis of the same plan. Since that time, we have received reports from U.S. and U.N. officials, and with their approval, have maintained contact with leaders in the region.

The Bosnian Serbs have presented to us their own territorial proposal, reducing their controlled area from 70 percent to 53 percent, and professing their willingness to negotiate the remaining differences. I understand that the Bosnian Serb proposal was provided to members of the Contact Group in March.

On one occasion in January, Mr. Chairman, the full Contact Group did have one meeting with Bosnian Serbs, and the U.S. member visited Pale once or twice, but since then, the Contact Group has isolated the Bosnian Serbs and maintained a policy of communicating only with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic on matters involving the Bosnian Serbs.

The end of the cease-fire period came at the end of April, with no negotiations having been undertaken. Since then, as is well known by members of this committee, government forces have attacked from within the safe zones, the Serbs have responded with shelling, travel through the relief supply routes and the Sarajevo airport has been restricted, NATO planes have bombed Serb positions, hostages have been taken, and a higher level of conflict is now threatened.

The question is: Where can we go from here? Although no one can guarantee ultimate results, there are two basic alternatives: The escalation of military conflict or a determined attempt to negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement.

The United Nations is facing an almost impossible dilemma, serving as a peace enforcer when there is no peace agreement.

However, the United Nations Protective Force, UNPROFOR, has performed well, I believe, both with its humanitarian mission and also in reducing the level of fighting and the resulting casualties. If you compare this past year or so with the previous times, there has been a dramatic reduction.

Some have called for a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo by the U.S. to permit the Muslim-Croat federation to obtain weapons.

Under these circumstances, the United Nations military commander, both the one now and the one before, has stated that his forces could not fulfill their mission, and both France and Great Britain have stated that their forces will be withdrawn.

This would likely result in a much greater involvement of the United States in both military training and support, and an escalation in bloodshed in Bosnia. The war could also widen to Croatia, Serbia, or southward to Kosovo and Macedonia. We hope not, but that is a possibility.

With an almost hopeless prospect for ending the crisis through military means, it is time to reassess the possibilities for a mediated settlement of basic issues. What should be the prerequisites for such negotiations?

If comprehensive peace talks without preconditions are not acceptable to the Contact Group, I believe a clear demonstration of good faith by both sides should be adequate. Proven performance of a practical nature can be required, such as those negotiated in December, a total cessation of hostilities and disengagement of armed forces; freedom of movement of U.N. peacekeepers; unrestricted movement of U.N. convoys to deliver relief supplies to Sarajevo and other safe havens; the Sarajevo airport open to U.N. flights; the release of all detainees; and human rights guarantees, including unrestricted return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes.

As earlier agreed by the Bosnian Serbs and Muslim-Croat federation officials in Sarajevo when we were there, there would be during this peace period, balanced and equal treatment of the two sides.

This period of peace might also include the lifting of United Nations trade sanctions against the Serbs as long as Serbia and the Bosnian groups act in good faith. This would be a powerful incentive for compliance.

Peace talks would best be held in a neutral place under the auspices of the United Nations or the Contact Group, and with an agenda that might include such constitutional issues as the degree of autonomy of the Muslim/Croatian and the Serbian groups, within a united Bosnia, mutually agreeable territorial divisions based on the 51/49 proposal of the Contact Group, and the rights of special relationships with Serbia and Croatia.

Both sides, the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serbs, must be at the negotiating table. All those interested in peace, including the Government of the United States, should urge both sides to seek a peaceful resolution of this continuing crisis.

Obviously, we cannot speak for any parties to the dispute or for those involved in peacekeeping, but there is every reason for exploring these ideas as a reasonable alternative to the existing deadlock and the strong possibility of another surge in bloodshed.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me present these views.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of President Carter follows:]

## PREPARED STATEMENT BY FORMER PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER

## BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Although I have been invited on a number of occasions since leaving the White House, this is the first time I have come to Washington to testify before a congressional committee. I agreed to do so only after consulting with General John Calvin, whose unique experience and interest in the Balkan region is strongly complementary to my own and whose views seem to be basically compatible. We feel that our joint testimony might be helpful in finding a way to bring peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We are here as private citizens, with no authority to speak for others and with no desire to be critical of our own Government or others who are attempting to prevent violence in the area and to protect innocent people.

We also want to make it clear that we do not excuse or condone any of the human rights abuses, violations of cease-fires, taking of hostages, or failure to comply with United Nations resolutions by any of the combatants in the area.

I have been asked to speak first, and will outline briefly my own recent involvement in the region, since this is the basis for my later recommendations.

At The Carter Center we monitor regularly the world's conflicts, attempting to understand their history, the primary participants, issues that are currently in dispute, and efforts that are being made to resolve them. We receive many requests from active or potential combatants for assistance, but our policy is to encourage mediation by others, and not to duplicate their efforts or compete with them.

When we believe it advisable to accept one of these mediation requests in a sensitive political arena, we first assure that we have the approval of the President of the United States and, when appropriate, the Secretary-General of the United Nations. When our proposal is not accepted, we do not act. We have received such approval in a number of cases, including Nicaragua, Somalia, Liberia, North Korea, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Haiti, and the Sudan.

We constantly face one of two basic questions that make mediation difficult and sometimes unpopular:

How to correlate the inviolability of a nation's sovereignty with self determination for minority groups?

How to deal with leaders who are condemned by our Government if they are the only ones who can resolve a crisis and prevent further human suffering?

In our work we are always careful to comply with U.S. policy and with any pertinent resolutions of the United Nations. We do not ask for official status or authority, and always submit any potential agreements to our Government for final approval and further action.

We have followed these guidelines meticulously in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Last year, on December 7, I was asked by the Bosnian Serb leader, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, to receive a delegation from him. He said that many demands were being made of the Serbs and he had not been able to discuss his responses with anyone in authority.

After calling President Bill Clinton and obtaining his approval, on December 14 I received a three-person delegation at my home in Plains. After extensive discussions, a tentative agreement was reached that I would go to Bosnia-Herzegovina provided the Serbs would (a) release unilaterally all prisoners of war who were less than 19 years old and mutually exchange all other POWs with the government officials in Sarajevo, (b) permit United Nations convoys to deliver relief supplies to Sarajevo and other safe havens, (c) impose a cease-fire around Sarajevo, (d) open the airport there to United Nations flights, and (e) guarantee respect for human rights.

By telephone, I confirmed this commitment with Dr. Karadzic and also shared the information with President Clinton, who approved the agreement. Dr. Karadzic then offered to confirm his promises publicly and asked that CNN permit him to do so through a televised live interview.

Following briefings from State Department and White House officials and after being informed by them that the Serb promises to me were "substantially fulfilled," my wife Rosalynn and I traveled to the area, arriving first in Zagreb on December 18. There we met with Croatian President Tudjman and U.N. officials and then proceeded to Sarajevo.

That evening we met with President Alija Izetbegovic and other officials of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government. Although at first skeptical of our mission, they seemed reassured when we explained that our goal was not to initiate a new agenda but to promote negotiations on the basis of the Contact Group plan. Approving this effort, they made it clear that they would accept a cease-fire for not more than 3 months.

Later that night I drafted what I considered to be a comprehensive cease-fire proposal, based on the discussions with the Serb delegation in my home, my talks in Zagreb and Sarajevo, and briefings from U.S. and U.N. officials.

Before going to Pale, I requested of the Serbs that both Dr. Karadzic and the military commander, Gen. Ratko Mladic, meet with me, to assure that whatever we evolved would have both political and military backing. Our negotiations in Pale included them and a number of other top Serb officials. We had some difficult moments, but finally concluded an agreement with some modifications of my original draft. Its terms included:

(a) An immediate cease-fire and cessation of hostilities for at least 4 months, to be enforced by the interposition of United Nations forces.

(b) The prevention of the firing of any guns or weapons that might damage people or property.

(c) A comprehensive peace agreement to be negotiated during this period, under the auspices of the Contact Group, using mediators proposed by the Contact Group and mutually agreed by the parties.

(d) In all respects, both sides to be given equal treatment.

(e) During this period, unrestricted movement of relief convoys, use of the airport at Sarajevo, and the delivery of humanitarian services, with U.N. forces helping to assure that no armaments or weapons of war are in the cargoes to be delivered.

(f) Each side to be responsible within its controlled areas for the protection of human rights in accordance with international standards. Special reporters are to have unimpeded access to insure compliance.

(g) All people, regardless of age, sex, or ethnic origin, to have the right to live in a location of their choice.

(h) An early exchange of all detainees.

The Serbs agreed to negotiate in good faith on the basis of the Contact Group plan that requires a division of territory, with the Serbs to control 49 percent and the Muslim/Croat federation 51 percent. Mutually agreed modifications would be negotiated during the peace talks.

By telephone, I read this document to representatives of the State Department and White House and, with their approval, signed the document as a witness to the signatures of Doctor Karadzic and General Mladic. (Enclosure A.)

Back in Sarajevo the next morning, we obtained a closely parallel agreement with President Izetbegovic, with only one difference: a demand that the Serbs accept the 51/49 percent map as a prerequisite to peace talks. (Enclosure B.)

In order to clarify some issues and make implementation dates earlier and more specific, we returned then to Pale and concluded an additional agreement (Enclosure C.) Back in Sarajevo, President Izetbegovic accepted the additions.

Now we had common agreement for a temporary period of peace during the holidays, a 4-month cease-fire through the month of April, a cessation of hostilities between military forces of both sides with UNPROFOR to interpose its units between them, the withdrawal of government forces from the demilitarized zone on Mount Igman near the Sarajevo airport, an early exchange of all detainees, and an opportunity for the Contact Group to work with both sides to resolve any remaining issues.

I pointed out to the news media on my departure the only unresolved issue: Muslim/Croat officials were insisting that, as a prerequisite to peace talks, the Serbs would have to "accept" the 51/49 percent plan; the Serbs, on the other hand, were willing to negotiate "on the basis of" the same plan.

Since that time we have received reports from U.S. and U.N. officials and, with their approval, have maintained contact with leaders in the region.

The Bosnian Serbs have presented to us their own territorial proposal, reducing their controlled area from 70 percent to 53 percent and professing their willingness to negotiate the remaining differences. I understand that the Bosnian Serb proposal was provided to members of the Contact Group in March.

On one occasion in January, the full Contact Group did have one meeting with the Bosnian Serbs and the U.S. member visited Pale once or twice, but since then the Contact Group has isolated the Bosnian Serbs and maintained a policy of communicating only with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic on matters involving the Bosnian Serbs.

The end of the cease-fire period came at the end of April with no negotiations having been undertaken. Since then, as is well known by Members of this committee, government forces have attacked from within the safe zones, the Serbs have responded with shelling, travel through the relief supply routes and the Sarajevo airport has been restricted, NATO planes have bombed Serb positions, hostages have been taken, and a higher level of conflict is now threatened.

The question is, where can we go from here? Although no one can guarantee ultimate results, there are two basic alternatives: the escalation of military conflict or a determined attempt to negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement.

The United Nations is facing an almost impossible dilemma, serving as a peace enforcer when there is no peace agreement. However, the United Nations Protective Force (UNPROFOR) has performed well, both with its humanitarian mission and also in reducing the level of fighting and the resulting casualties.

Some have called for a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo by the United States to permit the Muslim-Croat federation to obtain weapons. Under these circumstances, the United Nations military commander has stated that his forces could not fulfill their mission, and both France and Great Britain have stated that their forces will be withdrawn. This would likely result in a much greater involvement of the United States in both military training and support, and an escalation in bloodshed in Bosnia. The war could also widen to Croatia, Serbia, or southward to Kosovo and Macedonia.

With an almost hopeless prospect for ending the crisis through military means, it is time to reassess the possibilities for a mediated settlement of basic issues. What should be the prerequisites for such negotiations?

If comprehensive peace talks without preconditions are not acceptable to the Contact Group, I believe a clear demonstration of good faith by both sides should be adequate. Proven performance of a practical nature can be required, such as those negotiated in December:

- (a) A cessation of hostilities and disengagement of armed forces,
- (b) Freedom of movement of U.N. peacekeepers,
- (c) Unrestricted movement of United Nations convoys to deliver relief supplies to Sarajevo and other safe havens,
- (d) The Sarajevo airport open to United Nations flights,
- (e) The release of all detainees,
- (f) Human rights guarantees, including unrestricted return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes.

As earlier agreed by the Bosnian Serbs and Muslim-Croat federation officials in Sarajevo, there would be balanced and equal treatment of the two sides.

This period of peace might also include the lifting of United Nations trade sanctions against the Serbs as long as Serbia and the Bosnian groups act in good faith. This would be a powerful incentive for compliance.

Peace talks would best be held in a neutral place under the auspices of the United Nations or the Contact Group, and with an agenda that might include such constitutional issues as the degree of autonomy of the Muslim/Croatian and Serbian groups, mutually agreeable territorial divisions based on the 51/49 proposal of the Contact Group, and the right of special relationships with Serbia and Croatia.

Both sides, the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Serbs, must be at the negotiating table. All those interested in peace, including the Government of the United States, should urge both sides to seek a peaceful resolution of this continuing crisis.

Obviously, we cannot speak for any parties to the dispute or for those involved in peacekeeping, but there is every reason for exploring these ideas as a reasonable alternative to the existing deadlock and the strong possibility of another surge in bloodshed.

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[ENCLOSURE A]

December 19, 1994 Bosnian Serb Agreement

#### COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT

We the undersigned agree that we and those under our authority will:

1. Commence negotiations on an agreement for a cessation of hostilities on December 27, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by January 15, 1995. This agreement would be implemented immediately by instituting a cease-fire by interposition of U.N. forces along the line of confrontation, by cessation of all military activities and the exchange of prisoners, etc. This cessation of hostilities will last for 4 months or for a longer period if mutually agreed by both parties.

2. We agree that, while the cessation of hostilities is in effect, we shall negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement, with the proposal of the Contact Group as the basis for negotiation of all points. This will be done at a mutually acceptable site, under the auspices of the Contact Group, using mediators proposed by the Contact Group and mutually agreed by the parties. All issues are to be resolved in full co-

operation with the Contact Group. In all respects, both sides will be given equal treatment.

3. During this period there will be unrestricted movement of relief convoys, use of the airport at Sarajevo in accordance with existing agreements, and the delivery of humanitarian services by official institutions and non-governmental organizations. Each side may join with UNPROFOR inspectors to assure that no armaments or weapons of war are included in the cargoes to be delivered.

4. Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the total elimination and prevention of the firing of any guns or weapons of any kind that might be damaging to people or property.

5. Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the protection of human rights in accordance with international standards. All people, regardless of age, sex, or ethnic origin, shall have the right to live in a location of their choice. International observers, including the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, will be free to observe compliance with this agreement.

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[ENCLOSURE B]

We the undersigned agree that we and those under our authority will:

1. Immediately implement a cease-fire, monitored by U.N. forces along all lines of confrontation, by cessation of all military activities and the exchange of prisoners, etc., as described below.

2. Commence negotiations on an agreement for a total cessation of hostilities on December 27, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by January 15, 1995. This cessation of hostilities will last for 4 months, or for a longer period if mutually agreed by both parties.

3. While the cessation of hostilities is in effect, negotiate a comprehensive peace agreement, on the basis of the acceptance of the peace plan of the Contact Group as a starting point. This will be done at a mutually acceptable site, under the auspices of the Contact Group, using mediators proposed by the Contact Group and mutually agreed by the parties. All issues are to be resolved in full cooperation with the Contact Group.

It is understood that there will be unrestricted movement of relief convoys, use of the airport at Sarajevo in accordance with existing agreements, and the delivery of humanitarian services by official institutions and non-governmental organizations. Each side may join with UNPROFOR inspectors to assure that no armaments or weapons of war are included in the cargoes to be delivered.

Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the areas for the total elimination and prevention of the firing of any guns or weapons of any kind that might be damaging to people and property.

Each side will be responsible within its controlled areas for the protection of human rights in accordance with international standards. All people, regardless of age, sex, or ethnic origin, shall have the right to live in a location of their choice. International observers, including the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, will be free to observe compliance with this agreement.

There will be an early exchange of all detainees, under the auspices of the International Red Cross. In accordance with the Geneva Convention, the ICRC will have unimpeded access to all detainees to insure that the provisions of this agreement are fulfilled.

In a final agreement, all has to be agreed, otherwise, nothing is agreed.

It is realized that other difficult issues and unresolved questions will have to be resolved. This will be done peacefully, utilizing the services of the Contact Group or UNPROFOR as appropriated.

Signed 20 December 1994.

ALIJA IZETBEGOVIC,  
*President.*

JIMMY CARTER,  
*Witness.*

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[ENCLOSURE C]

20 DECEMBER 1994

Additional agreement to that of 19 Dec. 1994:

(1) It is agreed that the negotiations to establish a total cessation of hostilities will commence on 23 December, 1994, with the intent to conclude the agreement by 1 January 1995.

(2) A complete cease-fire, throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina will be implemented at noon, 23 December, 1994, to be monitored by U.N. forces along all lines of confrontation, by cessation of all military activities.

(3) Based on assurances that convoys and humanitarian services will pass freely, the Bosnian forces will withdraw from the Igman demilitarized zone in accordance with the existing agreement, prior to commencement of the negotiations described in item (1) above.

RAGOVAN KARADZIC

Witnessed: JIMMY CARTER.

[NOTE: Since we concluded this agreement during the last few minutes of our stay in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I received approval of all three of these items from President Izetbegovic by telephone from the airport before announcing them and departing.]

Chairman THURMOND. General Galvin.

### STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN R. GALVIN (RET.)

General GALVIN. Mr. Chairman, I have a paper that contains my statement that I would like to make—it is 18 pages long; so I will ask you if we can simply put that in the record, and I will make a couple of comments about it.

Chairman THURMOND. Your entire statements will go in the record.

General GALVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for inviting me here. It is an honor to be here with you and in this company.

And thank you, Mr. President, for having asked me to accompany you. I would say that your comment in the beginning that we are basically in congruences, in my opinion, and for my part, is correct.

Let me simply sum up my paper very quickly. I think there is some time here now for some cool-headed decisions, and that is basically my theme.

I hate to drag Karl von Clausewitz once more into these halls, but I would say to you that he has said several times that it is far easier to plan and conduct operations than it is to find what their purpose is. I would also use that as an opening.

I feel that the face of war has slowed. There is definitely a kind of pause here in which I hope that we have noticed, that, for example, the Serb forces have not conducted a major ground operation now for almost 2 years, except the attack, or counter-attack, or counter-counter-attack, or whatever you want to call it in the Bihac area, where the Muslim and Croat forces attacked out, and the Serbs attacked back in.

I would turn to the end of my paper and read you my conclusions, or comment on them. I think that it goes without saying that continued humanitarian support has to be there. I think we need to understand the nature of the crisis.

This is a long crisis. It is not the first long crisis we have ever seen. The crisis with the Cold War was 40 years, and we sustained our support in that crisis, and it came out in our favor.

There are many other crises, such as in Cyprus, which had a battalion in the Sinai for 12 years. We even have a marine brigade in Okinawa that has been there since 1945. There is a crisis in North Ireland that has lasted for a long time.



Let us understand that these things do not lend themselves to quick solutions, but that communications plays a very important role.

And regardless of what we think of both sides, or either side, or one side, we need a communication that involves all sides, and we have not always had that.

I agree with President Carter that the Contact Group plan is a good one. It was presented to both sides. One side accepted it unconditionally. There are reasons for that. The plan was basically designed so that they would. The other side accepted it with conditions.

There were about six, such as an opening to the sea, more room around Sarajevo, some different changes in the Drina Valley, a broadening of the Posavina corridor, and something that was called constitutional questions, which I am sure it means the future relationship between the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia.

The point is that there was not a no answer. The answer was not no from anybody involved, and there is room, I think, to proceed here. I think, myself, it is essential to keep the United Nations forces, UNPROFOR, in Bosnia, supported by NATO, although the configuration of the force may have to change.

I also believe that putting in large ground forces is not the way to go and I have always believed that, and I put four or five pages in here about the questions at the time of Dubrovnik and Vukovar, and also at the time we were thinking about putting forces in to protect Sarajevo, and basically, I can sum that up by saying we can put large ground forces in, we could suppress the fighting, but as soon as we left, the fighting would begin again, and what the lesson of that is, that peace will come in the Balkans when those who are fighting in the Balkans want peace.

We have to recognize that, stay between them, stay in there, sustain our efforts to bring them to the table. I personally do not think they are too far from this. The Bosnian Serbs are overextended, and they are outnumbered.

There are now 180,000 Muslims and Croats in Bosnia under arms there. There are 70,000 or 80,000 Serbs under arms, so it is about two to one, although the Serbs have more powerful arms that they can use, such as tanks and artillery, where the Bosnian-Muslims and Bosnian-Croats do not.

I do not believe that lifting the embargo and introducing more weapons into Bosnia-Herzegovina is a way to stop the fighting. It is a way to prolong the fighting. It is a way, also, to extend the fighting into other areas, the Criaia, Kosovo, maybe Macedonia, and maybe other places.

I would sum it up this way. I personally strongly support the cause of the Bosnian government. That said, the following needs some attention. If we cannot be neutral in this, it makes sense to be objective, which would allow us to perceive more clearly just what is going on in the Balkans and how to deal with it.

Although, there is much, much that is reprehensible about the Bosnian Serbs, they have not, as I have said, conducted a major ground attack. They are overextended, outnumbered, and tired, and by the way, so are the Muslims and Croats.

They continue to signal a willingness to give up terrain back to a 49/51 percent arrangement, although, of course, they do not say which 49 percent and 51 percent, and that is something that would have to be worked out, and they have said the Contact Group plan is a basis for negotiation.

When I talked personally with General Mladic, I did that once in Geneva, once in Pale, it was clear to me that his major concern was to stop the war, but not on unacceptable terms to the Serbs.

Unacceptable terms, as far as he was concerned, meant stopping the war through ultimatums to the Bosnian Serbs, and demand for their capitulation about some kind of a plan.

He has indicated, with great emphasis to me, that he is willing to talk, and also I can see very clearly that not only the Muslims and Croats, but the Bosnian Serbs want the Americans to be deeply involved in those talks. Are we ready to give up on peacekeeping?

If so, what does that say, not only for Bosnia, but for all the rest of the Balkans, and what does it say to the other existing crises that are inevitably going to come in this time that we are in?

Before we reach the conclusion that the crisis can be resolved only by a continuing and greater clash of arms, let us take a last-chance step here, and let us call it that, if you want to, and let us make another sustained effort at putting the fighters to the conference table, because it is only they who can make, with our assistance, a sustained and lasting peace in the Balkans.

So a short version is communicate. Keep the objective in mind. The objective is peace in the Balkans. The objective is not that, the Serbs just fired another round into Sarajevo, what are we going to do about it. That is tactics.

Let us stay out of tactics, and stay on strategy and the objective.

Contain the fighting to the current location. Suppress it by U.N. action. And look, U.N. action has suppressed the fighting. We all know that the fighting is far, far less this year, and the deaths are far, far less than they were in 1991 and 1992.

Keep up strong humanitarian support. We cannot stop that. Press hard for the cease-fire. Use the Contact Group plan. Pledge future help with reconstruction. And by all means, communicate with everybody.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to appear. Sir, I am honored to appear here.

[The prepared statement of General Galvin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. JOHN R. GALVIN, USA (RET.), FORMER SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE

Mr. Chairman: It is an honor to appear before this committee and in this company. I will do my best to make my comments on Bosnia practical and straightforward, since I believe we are at a critical stage in what has been a difficult and confusing international response to this latest crisis, one of many in the Balkans during this century, and indeed throughout a long and troubled past.

Obviously, we need to defuse the current hostage crisis within a crisis, but I refer only indirectly to that aspect in this statement.

The pressure of current controversies over national and international actions in the Balkans make it imperative to preface any discussion of what to do, or not to do, with a moment of pause to look at our overall objective. You will excuse me if I bring Karl von Clausewitz once again into these halls, but he did recognize that it is easier to plan and conduct engagements than it is to figure out their purpose. Americans have many interests in Bosnia, which we feel represent our enduring val-

ues, our human sensibilities, our moral standards, and much else, but when we consider the many practical aspects of our present and possible future commitments there, we first need to ascertain whether we are in agreement as to the objective, and whether our plans and actions fit that objective.

Our objective is, or should be, peace and stability in the Balkans. Not at any price, of course, and I will comment on that. But if we are clear about the purpose of our efforts, we will have a strategic context in which to make our day-to-day decisions—which is something very much in need right now.

If we have no consensus on our strategy, we find ourselves saying, "The Serbs have just fired another shell and we need to do something about it." We can use national interest as our guide, but that is too vague to be a strategic concept. Too much can be made to fit under that rubric. Given the objective of restoration of peace and stability, however, we can restudy the situation in Bosnia and see if our strategic approach takes into account the realities of the situation there.

First, take the situation of the Bosnian government forces; that is, the combination of the Muslims and the Croats. I helped put the military side of that combination together as part of my work assisting the American team of the Contact Group, of which more later.

I visited some Bosnian Croat and Muslim areas to come to a better understanding of their military capabilities compared to the Bosnian Serbs. Even after the linkage that freed them from the need to keep troops poised against each other, the combined forces of the Bosnian Croats and Muslims were so extended in the defense of the territory they controlled that—as the fighting in Bihac later showed—there was little possibility of their seizing more. Unlike their Serb opponents, they had little artillery and very few tanks and therefore were unable to maneuver in open ground; they were, however, well supplied with portable antitank missiles and had less trouble holding the wooded hills and narrow valleys. At that time, as now, the Bosnian government knew that any gains would have to be modest or would spread and thus weaken the already stretched defense structure. Nevertheless, their forces have conducted attacks to regain ground in half a dozen areas in the last 3 months, in the vicinities of Bihac, Travnik, Maglaj, Brcko, Gorazde, and Sarajevo, but these operations generally have not yielded much in the way of results.

There is an evident war-weariness, but at the same time both sides, tired or not, are trying to gain and hold the initiative in one way or another. The Serbs are in control of about 70 percent of the land in Bosnia and feeling the pressure of this extension. They possess heavy weapons such as tanks and artillery, but their troop strength in ground forces is only 80,000 while the Muslims and Croats together have a total of 160,000 under arms. The Serbs know that if they take more ground, they will have to defend it, making every success a new liability. While they were very aggressive early in the war, the Serbs have not carried out a significant ground attack in recent months (the fighting at Bihac, for example, was a counterattack in response to the attack out of that enclave by the Muslims and Croats, who had gained about 100 square miles of terrain which they subsequently lost).

Both sides appear to be relatively static, and this is important. I will try to develop here the point that the current situation provides more room for insisting on serious negotiation than some have realized.

In order to learn more about the ability of the new Muslim-Croat federation to defend itself, I needed to arrive at some idea of the Bosnian Serb military situation and the thinking of its leaders. I visited the commander of these forces, General Mladic, in his headquarters at Pale, on the eastern outskirts of Sarajevo (I had also talked with him in Geneva). He had some messages that he wanted to get across. He insisted that there could be no peace in the Balkans without communication with the Serbs. Although there was much posturing, which is true of both sides on these occasions, it was clear to me that he wanted talks and that he wanted strong American involvement in those talks. The main impression he wanted me to take away from this encounter was the futility of trying to resolve the conflict by leaving the Serbs out of the communications or by delivering ultimatums.

What seems to be happening in Bosnia is something like a stalemate. The fighting, heavy in the past, has been desultory for almost 2 years. The Serbs can't take and hold more terrain, and the Bosnian government can't defend more than it possesses now. The sides may be closer than we (even perhaps they) think to being ready for negotiations. As for the Bosnian Serbs, their actions have been indeed reprehensible, but all sides must be part of the solution.

Another key aspect for an understanding of the situation in Bosnia is our concept of the value of UNPROFOR, the U.N. forces there. They deserve more credit than we have been willing to give them.

When the system for humanitarian aid broke down under Serb pressure in the summer of 1992, four countries—France, The United Kingdom, Canada, and

Spain—sent forces into Bosnia, responding to a U.N. resolution of August 1992 authorizing the protection of humanitarian convoys. These countries anticipated that we Americans would soon be along. The initial four countries have been joined in Bosnia by small contingents from Argentina, Belgium, Denmark, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Sweden, and Turkey. UNPROFOR, initially at 14,000, has grown to 24,000—and this figure does not include the 18,000 troops in Croatia. The peacekeeping force is still much smaller than the Bosnian Serbs, Muslims, and Croats under arms, a total of 240,000.

Over time UNPROFOR has managed to develop its activities beyond its original mission of convoy protection by simply declaring that it would "establish and maintain conditions allowing the free passage of humanitarian assistance throughout central Bosnia," which allowed it to encompass the day-to-day jobs involved in trying to keep the combatants apart while pressing for a peaceful solution of the conflict. With lightly armed patrols and scattered outposts, there was only so much that UNPROFOR could do; however, with good tactical organization and deft work it has helped to hold the combat to low levels, provided opportunities for communications between the warring sides, and stabilized a large number of areas where intermittent fighting was going on. Unfortunately, we have tended to look on the more than 2 years of UNPROFOR deployment as a kind of gap in time, a hiatus during which nothing happened except that the war continued as before. In actuality, the pace of the war has slowed considerably and the rate of casualties has dropped.

In addition to suppressing the fighting, saving many lives, and getting humanitarian supplies delivered (albeit sporadically), the U.N. Bosnia-Herzegovina Command has been sometimes hindered, sometimes helped by the various initiatives which to date have included a number of U.N. resolutions, several plans for resolving territorial problems, the sanctions against Belgrade (including impounding of aircraft in various countries), a sea blockade against all, the designation of exclusion zones from which heavy weapons had to be withdrawn, no-fly zones, and the not insignificant military challenge of squiring visitors and envoys from nations around the world, a task in which admittedly I was one more straw on the back of the camel.

In this environment UNPROFOR has helped establish the federation of Bosnian Croats and Muslims, who were previously at war with each other; suppressed conflict in Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and several other places (with varying success); and assisted with all of the diplomatic endeavors. The U.N. forces in Bosnia have been more neutral and objective than most of the rest of the interested world, which is often evident in the way they are criticized equally bitterly by both sides in the fighting. The military leaders like Generals Morillon, Cot, Mackenzie, de Lapresle, Rose, and now Janvier and Smith, all different but all good, all dedicated, and their multinational troops have given the world outstanding service. Moreover, any conceivable solution to the conflict will require some kind of international presence. We should keep the U.N. forces in Bosnia and not take action that would confound their efforts.

Let's review the forces now available to the U.N. in the Balkans. Besides the 18,000 U.N. observers in Croatia and the 24,000 troops in Bosnia, there are 500 (U.S.) soldiers in Macedonia, an average of 20 warships maintaining the embargo in the Adriatic, about 200 combat aircraft providing air support and patrolling the no-fly zone, along with AWACS, radar, aircraft, and other reconnaissance elements, various long range communication units, the air fleet for humanitarian assistance flights, and a logistical network that runs an airline (which some affectionately call "Air Maybe") that schedules daily flights from Zagreb to Sarajevo. Much of this lineup of capabilities comes out of NATO, which also provides a powerful and versatile reserve that can have roles. Its readiness is a deterrent against any expansion of the war to other areas and its rapid reaction forces (air, sea, and land) which are at the moment getting a great deal of attention, constitute a responsive reinforcing element in case U.N. forces find themselves in trouble. All in all, a not inconsequential commitment.

But if this commitment is for the furtherance of peace in Bosnia and the rest of the Balkans, is it enough? Or should we add 100,000 troops to solve the problem? This is a vitally important question, and much depends on the answer. It deserves more than a passing comment.

In the fall of 1991 a Serb heavy weapons battalion, part of the old Yugoslav army, attacked the Croatian port of Dubrovnik with artillery and mortar fire. Many in the watching world called for intervention by NATO. A year earlier, the North Atlantic Alliance had laid the groundwork for a change in strategy, establishing a set of principles that would move it away from its Cold War goals of deterrence and defense against massive attack from the east; the NATO nations, however, had not found it possible to become engaged as an alliance in the Gulf War nor in the humani-

tarian action to rescue the stranded Kurds along Iraq's northern border, although a majority of the member countries took part individually in both efforts. The Balkans presented a third opportunity, and Secretary General Manfred Wornier desperately wanted an alliance response that finally would demonstrate the validity of the new approach.

Watching events in the Balkans as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, I agreed with him. I was engaged in a running discussion of the crisis with military leaders within the Alliance. It was obvious that the NATO on-call Mediterranean fleet could be sent to positions off Dubrovnik, and backed up if necessary by the United States 6th Fleet, also available in the Mediterranean. This, however, would have taken a strong American initiative, and I was well aware that support for such a move did not exist. Although there was much anguish over the violence in the dissolving Yugoslavia, and many a call to arms in order to stop it, there was, in fact, no effective support in the United States or anywhere in Europe for a strong military intervention.

Should there have been? To stop a civil war, which is what Bosnia is, outside nations can join one side and help defeat the other, or use military power to force both sides to—in effect—surrender. Neither of these actions guarantees a permanent solution, of course. As soon as the intervening nations look the other way, fighting may begin anew.

We need to understand ourselves in this crisis: we are constrained by the conviction—a correct one—that we cannot resolve the issue by intervention with military force alone. The warring parties have to play the major roles in finding a way to peace. We can both assist and insist, we can drive the fighting down to a smouldering guerrilla war, but it could continue indefinitely.

The objective is peace in the Balkans: our American role is to help stop the war by every means possible, not to make it bigger and wider.

Let's second guess Dubrovnik. What could the U.N. and NATO have done, and how would it have worked? Locally, it would have been simple to stop the shelling, and many think that it would have sent an effective message of deterrence, but there was no assurance that naval interdiction would be anything more than an opening gambit, a first move. Could we have stopped the conflict by being resolute in the Adriatic? The importance and the strength of it would lie in the follow-up. At that time the Croatian Danube city of Vukovar, far inland, had been under siege for weeks and fell a few days later; our local success at Dubrovnik would have been tempered with our inability to help in other places, unless we were ready to take on the consequences of a campaign rather than a single action. We could not have cowed the Serbs with a short and swift show of force at Dubrovnik, a one-shot response that would have done the trick. A NATO counterstrike at Dubrovnik would then have required further operations in the Balkans, first at sea and in the air, later on the ground, leading to a large force presence, a fighting organization successful in major actions but incessantly engaged with Serb irregulars using hit-and-run tactics. We could drive down the level of intensity to a smouldering guerrilla war, with low level tactical conflicts resulting in about equal casualties on both sides, with warfare dragging on indefinitely. The commitment of large ground forces is not the answer.

There has been continuing criticism of the reluctance to use large ground forces. Some ask, "If we don't use them when they are needed, as in this case, why should we maintain them at all?" We don't always have to commit military power in order to benefit from possessing it, and to use it wrongly or unsuccessfully has unpalatable consequences. A relatively small force, which can be backed up by larger forces in the event of an emergency, has advantages. It is not viewed as coercive, but when interposed between warring parties, it can provide what is very often most needed, a means of communication, an excuse to stop fighting, an impetus toward negotiations. In the future we will face other choices between committing strong ground forces to compel a cessation of fighting, with the probable result that a low-level guerrilla war would continue for a long time, or going in light and small to broker cease-fires and monitor them. In the latter case, the combatants have to be helped in building a peace in which they themselves play the major roles, not just a cease-fire forced by outsiders. We need to stay with this latter choice, even though it may lack the psychic satisfaction of committing large combat forces or, as they say, "actually doing something."

Let's take another example—Sarajevo in 1992.

As the fighting intensified around Sarajevo in the spring of that year, NATO took another hard look, this time much more in earnest, at what kind of military effort it would take to stop the shelling of the city. After talking this over with senior NATO commanders, I concluded we would need two ground divisions, at least 40,000 troops, if we were serious about driving the Serbs off the mountains around

Sarajevo and keeping artillery fire away from the city. A force that size would be extremely difficult to support logistically by air alone. It would require a ground supply route about 100 miles long (from the Croatian port of Ploce to Sarajevo—42 bridges, 9 tunnels), winding through mountains and held open by another two reinforced divisions, pushing up the overall numbers to over 100,000 troops. Some saw this as an estimate that deliberately made the mission look too tough, but going into those mountains with a light force—charged with a fighting mission, not peacekeeping—would have made us not masters of the ground but merely targets. There was also another question to be considered: if we had put forces on the hills around Sarajevo, we could have pushed Serb artillery back far enough to put the city out of range, but the Serbs would have been free to move their guns elsewhere, to shell other Bosnian cities, while we had to continue to protect Sarajevo. Again, our response would have to be a campaign, not just a single action, and that would require in the long run more than 100,000 ground troops. Otherwise, the Serbs would retain the initiative.

What to do, then—for positive reasons, not negative—is to stay with peacekeeping; to recognize that a crisis such as this can be long and difficult; to hold to our purpose; and to remember that permanent peace can come only if the combatants will it so.

And we should keep NATO on tap.

NATO is the world's strongest and historically best collective politico-military organization. It should be the basis for the future Atlantic structure; it should be modernized and broadened; it should include Russian participation (and this may be beginning to work out).

NATO has a plan that would provide assistance to UNPROFOR in the event it withdraws from Bosnia, and another that would bring into Bosnia a much stronger element that would enforce the arrangements of a negotiated settlement, such as the separation of the combatants, and would also be the first application of a new Alliance strategy of crisis management.

Comprehensive U.N. sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro in the spring of 1992 were followed by a sea blockade which has continued, linking the WEU and NATO in an odd arrangement by which their naval forces shared the Adriatic, periodically swapping areas of responsibility. Sending two naval task forces into the same waters and with the same mission was a political decision that shows rather well the indecisiveness over what Europe wishes to do about its security identity. Since the operation is routine, however, the obvious command weaknesses have been overcome. The commitment of the NATO Mediterranean and Atlantic fleets into the Adriatic is the first operational deployment of naval forces in the history of the Alliance. The blockade has gone well, with about 4,000 boardings of ships suspected of carrying arms, but the embargo has been undermined by leaky borders, by outside nations surreptitiously assisting the warring parties they favor, and by American ambivalence.

NATO air forces entered the crisis piecemeal in the fall of 1992, first with radar reconnaissance aircraft, then with combat air power which was restricted to close air support in defense of U.N. forces (later extended to include enforcement of exclusion zones and protection of safe areas). A compromise has resulted in divided command of air support, with control of the skies given to NATO and of the ground to the UNPROFOR commander, who under "dual key" procedures must approve any strike. This is tactically awkward and in any pressure situation practically unworkable, akin to the division of sea control between NATO and the WEU. New U.N. resolutions brought more sanctions in the spring of 1993, along with authorization for NATO aircraft to use force to stop flights of combat aircraft in the no-fly zone—the first employment of NATO air forces in combat. To date, fighter aircraft from eight NATO countries have flown over 37,000 sorties over Bosnia in operation Deny Flight or in close air support, including air-to-ground strikes, the shootdown of Serb aircraft, and the recent experience of Captain Scott O'Grady.

There continues to be a need for NATO in the accomplishment of the international objective in the Balkans. NATO can provide the protective and rapid reaction that permits a relatively small (but good) U.N. military presence for peacekeeping purposes in Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, and possibly elsewhere in the region as needed.

At this point, how can we move ahead with our objective? The answer is to keep the Contact Group's efforts going, but make some changes.

After the failure of the Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg plans, those negotiation attempts have been followed by creation of the five-nation Contact Group, which brought together Russian, British, French, German, and United States representatives at ambassadorial level to try to find common ground among the combatants. I joined the American team with the task of helping to bring the Muslim

and Croat military forces into a single integrated organization. The two sides reached agreement at a meeting in Split in March 1994, as part of the linking of the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats into a federation which is slowly evolving. That government then was to consider a confederation with Croatia, although this step has not gone beyond the planning stage (and according to President Tudjman, would require a referendum).

The Contact Group felt that very little contact with the Bosnian Serbs was needed, apparently convinced that the Serbs would use further negotiations as a ruse to delay and disrupt the ongoing work. The group created a digitized map that had the advantage of being easily adjustable to show a limitless variety of territorial changes. With this graphic aid the members developed a division of Bosnia that adhered to the 49-51 percent Serb-vs-Muslim/Croat balance of territory agreed by both sides in earlier negotiations. When presented with this map, Bosnian Muslims and Croats, prevailed on by the United States, reluctantly concurred unconditionally with the arrangement, but the Serbs resisted, saying the map could serve as a basis for future negotiations but that they would require resolution of a number of issues before it could be considered acceptable. They wanted discussions on an opening to the sea, a clarification of "constitutional questions" (their future relationship with Serbia), an adjustment of control of some of the road network, a relook at the apportionment of the terrain around Sarajevo, control of certain portions of the Drina Valley, and assurances of equal rights for Serbs in Bosnia. This response, coming as it did from the Bosnian Serb parliament voting on an issue with strong emotional overtones, seemed to me at least exploratory.

Wary of Serb recalcitrance, however, the Contact Group had agreed beforehand that the map was to be presented to both sides as an unalterable final arrangement, a showdown. Little leverage was used with the Serbs, and the response noted above was seen, especially by the United States, as a delaying tactic that amounted to a refusal to comply.

Since the Contact Group had no assurance that the western nations were ready to take any action if the Serbs proved unwilling to accept the plan without reservations, it is interesting that the choice was to deliver an ultimatum and refuse to negotiate, even when the Serbs showed a willingness to come to the table and lay out their views (the Russians, in fact, chose to see the Serb answer as not "no" but "maybe"). This lack of agreement further weakened the Contact Group's position and resulted in a new search for ways to bring the sides together, a search that culminated in the peace mission of former President Carter. A cease fire lasted for some time, though with many violations, but progress on an agreement was nil.

The Contact Group didn't work. But it can now. We should employ the Group and the plan as the vehicle for renewed negotiations, starting with a discussion of pre-conditions.

We need to be truly non-partisan in our communications and negotiations, regardless of past acts of combatants. Justice in cases of violations of international law is an essential aspect, but it should be only one category of the talks on future relationships. And justice, after all, is non-partisan. We can try to understand these people who are locked in combat, hating each other and ready to kill because of their fears and because of what has gone before, and somehow bring them into communication, with the goal of rough convergence, area by area, detail by detail, in their long term aims. We should insist on keeping these talks continuously in session and seeking ways to make the goals converge.

When there is convergence on anything, big or small, we should press for a partial agreement—and enforce it. We can use NATO as the appropriate and available structure under the U.N., not exclusively, but rather in combination with Partnership for Peace nations and others.

We should not be afraid to make promises, using rewards as well as sanctions and other forms of punishment, and varying both as the situation changes. Among the most important rewards is assistance in the recovery, reconstruction, and rehabilitation of all the things that provide an acceptable quality of life. We should start early with examples of what the U.N. (the world) is prepared to do to reestablish peace in the Balkans. Several countries have bid to rebuild the bridge at Mostar, an opportunity for limelight; let's recognize there is much else to rebuild also. We should be patient and persistent and steady, showing the Balkan countries that our commitment and our determination are aimed at the peace and security and better life that will result. We should be prepared to pay the cost of winning the peace, if only because the cost of losing is disastrous. We can't stop the war, but we and they together can make it stop.

We should suppress and constrain the fighting, within U.N. capabilities, continuing the use of exclusion zones, safe areas, and no-fly zones. We should keep U.N. forces in roughly their current locations, responding to local exigencies, and be pre-

pared to protect them, reinforce them, or even temporarily withdraw them if U.N. decisions or actions cause a response from the combatants that tends to endanger them. When the situation improves, we should be ready to draw down the military forces, keeping up a movement of military power in and out of the Balkans as the conditions change.

Resolution of the Balkan crisis will have to come about through a patient but persistent exercise of the strategic art of using power, bringing it to bear in an orchestrated way. We need to be ready for the long haul, creative in the dispassionate orchestration of power for the collective good, and we need the vision to see that the first option is not necessarily military force, salient as it may seem in the wide field of other kinds of power—economic, industrial, financial, commercial, religious, social, psychological, diplomatic, moral, the power of public opinion and of international peer pressure, the personal power of leaders. We must respond to the call for innovation that comes in times of crisis. It is worth the enormous effort it will take to establish beyond a doubt that the post-Cold War world will not degenerate into ethnic or religious tribalism.

In the meantime, while negotiations take place, there is much else to do. First, we need to reexamine the question of lifting the embargo.

Lifting the embargo does not help meet the objective of peace in the Balkans. Some have said this would level the playing field and convince the Serbs there was nothing more to be gained by military action. Others have put it more starkly, saying we should arm the Muslims, get the U.N. out of the way, and let the fighting take its course. This seems to imply a new strategic objective. Congress voted an amendment to the defense appropriations bill, calling for the President to request that the U.N. lift the embargo. If the U.N. did not do so, the amendment went on, the President should consider withdrawing the American participants from the units enforcing the embargo. This caused a degree of international consternation, and in the end the White House and the Congress cooperated to soften the position of the United States, allowing its ships to continue to take part but placing restrictions on their searching role.

By lifting the embargo to allow the Bosnian Muslim-Croat federation to receive arms and ammunition while maintaining the sanctions against the Serbs, the U.N. would be taking sides in a situation in which up to now it has tried to interpose military units between the combatants and to bring a stop to the fighting while observing a degree of neutrality. Recognizing this, the UNPROFOR commander has stated that he could not carry out his mission under the conditions that would exist if the embargo were lifted, and he made plans to withdraw in that case. Meanwhile, NATO continues contingency planning to conduct expanded air support operations and to provide ground forces.

Consider the chain of events that would come about if the U.N. lifted the embargo. First, as the Muslims began to receive artillery pieces and ammunition, they would be faced with a training problem. It takes time and effort to prepare soldiers to coordinate the use of artillery in the traditional tactical way, in support of infantry operations or in defense against enemy attacks. No doubt some training would take place in Muslim units, but the Muslims would find themselves under attack from the Serbs, who would be spurred on by the knowledge that the Muslims would soon be better armed. The risks of spillover, such as the renewal of fighting in the Krajina or the engagement of Belgrade's forces, would be high.

If the United States decided to respond, and if the choice of support were to be air strikes, we could then enter a phase in which the United States (with or without others) would be bombing the Serbs, trying to stop their attacks. The Serbs would insist that many of the U.S. planes were not hitting troop formations or defenses but rather schools and hospitals, while the Muslims would charge that the help promised from the United States was not enough or not as effective as it should be. With weather and rugged terrain further complicating the situation, much would be uncertain, except that with the encouragement of an inflow of arms, fighting would be heavier and more deadly than we have seen up to now, with less chance for a negotiated solution until much more carnage had taken place. Lifting the embargo is not a good move.

Let's resolve to adjust intelligently and quickly to this new phase of history. For openers, we should recognize how much we have been limited by our own concepts of reality in the Balkans and our desire for quick results. We (Europeans included) still seem resolutely indisposed to admit we have walked into the middle of history in this embattled corner of the world. George Kennan has shown us a report from 1910 to remind us that the events of today fit an earlier pattern; it is only the details that have changed. Indeed, we can construct comparisons not only to World War II or to the beginning of this century but back to 1389 and the battle of Kosovo to find that a knowledge of past enmities still cannot adequately explain what it



was that drove the people of this region to commit against each other the atrocities we have seen. Perhaps we can say with some accuracy that when a place becomes for any reason ungovernable, people grow afraid, group together in traditional ways and look out for their own. At such times it doesn't take much to start a fire. Because of history, the tinder was already in place in Bosnia, as it is in so many other places in the world.

Difficult? Frustrating? No end in sight? We'd better get used to it, because around the world there is more to come in this period of instability and unpredictability, in which multiple crises will be the rule. While we keep on trying for the right combination of the various kinds of power to move the crisis toward an acceptable end, we need to study and restudy the story of Bosnia and learn from it. Will our objective continue to be peace and stability in these crises, or will we simply let the wars burn themselves out?

In sum—

It perhaps goes without saying that continued humanitarian support is necessary. Let's understand the nature of crises such as Bosnia. We will see more of them. They will not lend themselves to quick solutions.

Communication plays the most important role. In our case the Contact Team has a chance for success if it can see the Serbs as open extended and willing to negotiate on a roughly 50-50 resolution of the terrain—although even then there will still be much to do.

It is essential to keep the U.N. forces in Bosnia, supported by NATO. The configuration of the force have to be changed in view of the hostage potential.

Putting in large ground forces and becoming a combatant will not permanently resolve the problem.

Introducing more weapons will prolong the fighting, and, of course, swell the casualty list, which in recent months has been relatively low.

I personally strongly support the cause of the Bosnian government. That said, the following needs some attention.

If we cannot be neutral, it makes sense to be objective, which will allow us to perceive perhaps more clearly just what is going on in the Balkans and how to deal with it. For example, although there is much, much that is reprehensible about the Bosnian Serbs, they have not conducted major ground attacks for the last 2 years except where the Muslims and Croats have tried to take the offensive; they are over extended and out numbered 2 to 1 and time is not on their side; they have had comparatively little recent outside support; they have continued to signal a willingness to give up terrain and drop back from 70 percent to about 50 percent; they have said that the Contact Group plan could be the basis for negotiations. There seems to be some room here for action by the U.N., by us Americans, and by others.

Are we ready to give up on peacekeeping? If so, what does that say, not only for Bosnia and the rest of the Balkans, but for all the other existing crises and, inevitably, those yet to come? Before we reach the conclusion that the crisis can be resolved only by a continuing and greater clash of arms, let's make another sustained effort at peacekeeping and negotiations.

A short version, then, of what to do in Bosnia:

- Communicate;
- Keep the objective in mind;
- Stay off tactics and on strategy;
- Contain the fighting to current locations;
- Suppress it by U.N. action and NATO backup;
- Keep up strong humanitarian support;
- Press hard for a cease fire and negotiations;
- Use the Contact Group plan;
- Pledge future help with reconstruction;
- By all means, communicate.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you very much. We will now begin the questions.

President Carter, I think we all agree that the Serbs are the primary aggressors in this conflict. Their ethnic cleansing and indiscriminate warfare against women, children, and the elderly are shameful atrocities, and have hurt the Serbian cause, in Western public opinion. Nevertheless, we should not lose sight of the violent history of this region.

Only a generation ago Serbs were the primary victims. Bosnia and Croatian Serbs are no more willing to be a minority in Bosnia or Croatia than Bosnian Muslims and Croats are willing to be a persecuted minority in Greater Serbia.

How can they negotiate a settlement, reconcile the legitimate claims of the Bosnian victims with the legitimate desire for self-determination of the Serbs?

President CARTER. Mr. Chairman, no one would disagree with the horror and the atrocities that have occurred recently, and as you say, all the way back through history, maybe more than 1,000 years.

I have been pretty well briefed on the history of the region. Before I went, I had thorough briefing from the State Department. I had another one in Zagreb from President Tudjman. I had another one from President Izetbegovic.

I had another briefing in Pale, and when I went to Belgrade to meet with President Milosevic, I had another history lesson.

I do not think there is any doubt that the tense animosity and the ethnic and religious competition there is overwhelming. The basic question, though, is: What do we do about it?

I think that the United States, the United Nations, and others deserve a great deal of credit for having dramatically reduced the suffering, as has been pointed out by General Galvin and by me.

There is no need to condone the human rights abuses and suffering of the people caused by the Serbs. That is not what we had in mind at all. The idea is to stop future suffering, and to try to work out an accommodation among the people that did exist at least at the time of Tito, between the groups there.

I think there are two phases, both of which can be very productive. One is an extension of the basic cease-fire that existed for 4 months. There were a few violations, but, basically, it held.

And this includes an end to the humanitarian abuses. It includes food, and water, and medicines to the people in Sarajevo and other safe havens.

It includes the release of all detainees, and the refusal of anyone to take prisoners, certainly, hostages. And it also includes a commitment to honor human rights, and the right of the United Nations troops, as small in number, and as inadequate as they are, to move in between the opposing forces.

All of us can agree that if this can be reserved during the time of peace talks, that, in itself, will be a great benefit. And if these are violated during that time, then I believe that the condemnation will be very clearly assignable.

We have worked with the Serbs and with the government in Bosnia, with our own government, with United Nations officials, and also with President Milosevic since December, addressing some of the basic questions on constitutional arrangements.

I think it is active to say that both sides will agree that Bosnia is a unity, and a union, Bosnia-Herzegovina, is where the negotiations will take place, with the presumption that there will be some sharing of autonomy between the Serbs on the one hand, and the Muslims and Croats on the other.

In addition to that, there has to be some way for the Serbs to relate to Serbia, and for the Croats in Bosnia to relate to Croatia. That, I think, can be reasonably assured.

The most difficult point is what will be the boundaries between the Serbs on the one hand, and the Muslims and Croats on the other, within Bosnia.

I have looked at the maps fairly closely. The Contact Group plan was worked out basically with the government in Sarajevo. It has been presented as an ultimatum, you might say, to the Bosnian Serbs, unless you accept this in advance, we will not talk to you.

The Bosnian Serbs, I do not think, are going to accept. They are tough people. They make many mistakes. They have committed atrocities. There is no excuse for that. But I do not think they are going to accept it. They have proven this.

They came back with an alternative proposal, with some excessive modifications for reducing their 70 percent down to 53 percent, which is not all that far from 49 percent, but, of course, it is a significant difference. This is what I see in the way of negotiations.

I understand that the British and French are basically supportive of negotiations. The United States has not been willing to negotiate with anyone except President Milosevic in Belgrade.

If the Contact Group said we are going to meet in Geneva on the 15th of July, without preconditions, or on the basis of the Contact Group plan, I think that both sides will come. And to me, that is the only alternative to a continuation of the present status of animosity and lack of cooperation, and I think almost inevitably, an increase in violence.

The news media this morning is saying that the Bosnian government is marshaling its troops northwest of Sarajevo. It is very likely that U.N. forces will be withdrawn within the next 6 months, also. I think this is a better alternative to peace talks.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you very much. We have a vote on; so we have to take a 10-minute break. We will come back in 10 minutes. [Recess.]

Senator WARNER [presiding]. The Chairman asked me to move along with the hearing, because we will be experiencing other votes, and we are all very anxious to have the opportunity to exchange ideas.

Mr. President, having witnessed in my lifetime a period of history when in World War II every American was so solidly behind our President, and the men and women in uniform, followed by Korea, in which there was, to a lesser degree, that support, and then, of course, we all know the chapter of Vietnam.

And we have had two recent conflicts, the Gulf and Somalia, together with other important operations. I do not mean to limit any of them.

But if there is one thing that I have learned it is that we should never send our troops abroad unless there is a clear understanding as to that mission in the minds of the American people, particularly the families who have loved ones in uniform, and that that should be understood by the people as to why they are being sent.

I find a noted absence, as I travel through my State, and elsewhere in the country, of a clear understanding by the American

people, so I shall pose two questions today, and ask each of you to address both questions.

I have had the opportunity to visit that region, as have other members of this committee and of the Congress, and I have made two trips to Sarajevo, and I have tried to accompany those trips with the most intense study, historically and otherwise, of this conflict.

And I am having difficulty, to this day, understanding why people who lived together so happily as recently as the olympics of the winter games, who shared the joy in the streets, the schools, every lifestyle, and who are comparatively speaking, to other troubled areas of the world, educated people, with a sense of history, I find trouble in understanding what are the roots of this conflict and how that can be explained to the American people.

What is your analysis, Mr. President, of the roots of this conflict, and how would you respond to the American people so that they have an understanding, and if the President calls upon them, he can justify it?

And my second question is whether or not this conflict, as it exists today, with the UNPROFOR forces, and the augmentation by our principle allies, and the determination to make those forces work, perform the mission of UNPROFOR, is it in our strategic interest, is it vital to our national security that we become further involved? And that seems to me the second question that must be put and explained to the American people.

So first, as to the roots of the controversy, and second, is it your judgment that the controversy today is in our vital security interests, and should it spill-over, is it in our vital security interests to have a greater participation? Thank you, Mr. President.

President CARTER. Senator, I do not claim to be an expert on the history of the Balkans, although, I have, like you, studied, superficially, at least, the ancient origins.

Most of those with whom I have met in Croatia, Serbia, and in Bosnia recently, emphasize their experiences during the Second World War, although they go back to ancient history on occasion.

I think that what has precipitated as recent controversy is the separation of Bosnia-Herzegovina from Serbia and from Croatia.

I do not think there was much argument about Slovenia. Obviously, the Serb president, President Milosevic, has never accepted the permanent separation or independence of Croatia or Bosnia.

And as you know, our entreaties to him, and I use the word advisably, to recognize the statehood, or the independence, or the sovereignty of Bosnia or Croatia, is something that he would not accept. I do not think he will ever accept it.

So the Serbs, who live in the eastern part of Bosnia primarily, and also, of course, around the north and to the west as well, still feel an element of allegiance, of a family relationship, with the Serbs in Serbia, and other points to the east.

And, I think that only recently I have been informed by the Serb leaders that they would accept the concept of the union, which might imply the sovereignty, of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

They still would like some ability within a constitution to relate to Serbia. And I presume, although I have not talked to them, that the Croatians who now have a Federation with the Muslims, also

would like some constitutional right to relate to their brothers and sisters in Croatia.

Another factor is the dominance of the Serbian military inherited from Yugoslavia and Tito, compared to the Muslim-Croatian federation in Sarajevo.

The Serbs have now been able to take and to hold 70 percent of the territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and although they have offered to reduce that to 53 percent, as their opening negotiation position in peace talks, that is still a ways from the 49 percent, and there are obviously some deviations as well.

Another thing is that both sides fear being a minority in a country where their ancient enemies make the policies, or control the government.

I think it is obvious that General Galvin would have a much clearer experience and views on this first question than I, and before starting on the second question, maybe he would correct my mistakes, or add something.

Senator WARNER. General Galvin, as to the roots of this problem—

General GALVIN. Sir, let me comment on the roots from three different points of view very quickly. First of all, there are historical roots.

The Dniepa Slavs moved into the region, and then became separate peoples, when they were one people in the beginning, and that had to do with religion. It had to do with occupations that rolled over that area of the Balkans for a long time.

So you had a separation where people began to see each other as different. Then the political aspect of it, I think, is—I would just take one fairly recent example, and that is, I would agree with President Carter that we recognized Croatia too quickly, and then felt we had to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina.

And we recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina without specifying how a number of political aspects of that country would be taken care of, which leads to the third cause of all of the trouble and violence, and that is, the human cause.

And I think we have found out sometimes in our own inner-cities, or in a lot of other places, that if the point comes when human beings begin to feel that there is nobody in charge, that there is no respect for their rights, that ungovernability is seeping in and undermining everything, they will then start looking out for themselves, in terms of whichever ways they want to group together. That is what happens.

Senator WARNER. My time is just about to expire. Let us go quickly to the vital security interests of this nation. Are they present in this conflict today, and if not, would they be present, should this begin to spill-over and become a greater Balkan conflict? Go ahead and lead, General, followed by the President.

General GALVIN. The answer to that quickly, Senator, is not vital security interests, no, but I think we have to be very careful.

I said in my paper national interests because everything fits under that rubric. Security interests, no, not at present, but the possibility of the overflow, which would destabilize Albania, destabilize Greece, and then Turkey, in quick succession, would pull in

other countries like Romania and Bulgaria, and then would go on from there.

I am not trying to say a domino theory, but the problem of deeper and deeper instability.

Senator WARNER. Today, no, but should they have a spill-over, yes. Mr. President.

President CARTER. Well, I certainly agree with that. You know, we have a few troops now in Macedonia, and if there should be an escalation of the war, first of all, you have a resumption of terrible human rights abuses and suffering of innocent civilians, and we have some responsibility for that morally.

The other is that I think we would almost inevitably be directly involved militarily as a member, a leading member of NATO if it did extend into Kosovo, Macedonia, and other places.

Senator WARNER. Mr. President, that is clear on the spill-over doctrine, but as it exists today do we have a vital national security interest in this conflict?

President CARTER. Not as far as security is concerned, Senator, but I think as far as a moral obligation to protect innocent lives and to reduce human rights abuses, we should continue doing what we are doing, support those who are our allies, and who put their troops in, on the ground.

Senator WARNER. Thank you. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

I am sorry that I had to go and vote, and I would hope that I am not repetitious. I would first like to ask both of you, since I came back last weekend from a very important conference in Madrid, Spain, with 11 leaders of the Duma, representing all the different fractions.

It was quite a fascinating meeting. And there was some contentiousness in that meeting with regard to the United States' position on the Bosnian crisis.

They, the Russians, seem to think that we just did not understand the situation. Certainly, the Russians have to be in the position of playing a key role in all of this.

What do either or both of you feel has been the good thing or the bad thing that has happened thus far, and how responsible do you feel the Russian presence there has been in the interest of securing some type of negotiated peace?

President CARTER. I think compared to the role of the United States, Great Britain, and France, the Russians have played a relatively minor role.

Of course, their basic allegiance, or basic friendship, is with Milosevic and the Serbs. As you know, the German basic relationship and friendship is with the Croatsians.

The British and French are the ones who have troops in there, and the United States has very few, if any troops, but is a world power to shape policy and also, I think, to educate, through the media, our own people.

So I think the Russians, from what I hear here in Washington, have been fairly constructive. The foreign minister has been to Belgrade on several occasions to try and get Milosevic to use his influence in Bosnia to promote peace.

The Russians have not been obstructionist in the region, but they have played a secondary role in the basic negotiations, because their primary relationship is with the Serbs in Belgrade.

Senator EXON. General.

General GALVIN. I do not really have much to add to that, Senator. I think the Russians have not obstructed the efforts at peace at the Balkans.

In fact, the member representing Russia on the Contact Group, Cherkin, has been, I think, very forthcoming. There have been, of course, long sessions and so forth, but we have never seen the Russians step back away from the efforts of the Contact Group, or any of the other efforts of the Vance-Owen effort, the Stoltenburg-Owen effort, the Harrington effort, and given the fact that the Russians feel very close to their fellow Slavs, this is very interesting, that they have been as forthcoming as they have.

Senator EXON. My feeling in talking to them was probably what you both have just said, but, in essence, I happen to feel, since they obviously are more in tune to the Serbs than the rest of us, it seems to me that they have to play a critical role in that that is part of the give and take.

And I took it, at least from the discussions that we had there, that they were most concerned, regardless of their close association with their brothers, that this might spread beyond the borders, and, therefore, it could come right down to roost on them.

I get the impression that they are trying to play a reasonably level hand in all of this. Do you both agree with that?

President CARTER. I certainly do.

General GALVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator EXON. Let me ask you this question, and this is an iffy one, but I think it is something we have to concentrate on.

If the U.N. mission of six safe areas in Bosnia is ended, and the fighting escalates, would you expect, under those circumstances, the Serbian forces to increase their attacks on civilian population?

In other words, if we were bow out, would you expect for the Serbs to take advantage of that, which it clearly would be in the short term, from the military standpoint that they have at the present time, as I see it?

President CARTER. Well, I derived my opinion basically from reading General Galvin's testimony. As he pointed out, in the last 2 years, it has been obvious that the Serbs have all they can handle.

They have 70 percent of the territory, and they have to defend that, and their troop numbers are less than half of what is controlled by the Muslims and Croatsians.

For the last 2 years, the Serbs have not launched an attack, initiated an attack. They have responded, though, obviously, to the government's incursions or excursions from some of the safe havens, into territory controlled by the Serbs.

I think in a dastardly way, part of their response has been to shell the safe havens, and civilians have died.

This, I think, indicates to me that if there is a truce, if there is a peace agreement, both sides would honor it. If there is a withdrawal of U.N. protection forces, I do not anticipate that the Serbs

would initiate an effort to take more territory. I think they would primarily be on a defensive role.

The general consensus, not particularly mine, I did not originate it, is that the government is now determined that there will not be a 4th year of sustained conflict, and that the government is the side that is likely to initiate military action. I would certainly defer to General Galvin's assessment.

General GALVIN. Senator, I think we need to look at the method of operation of the Bosnian Serbs. They try, of course, to maximize their advantages. They have heavy weapons, they do not have large forces.

So they also do not want more terrain. In fact, they are talking about giving up terrain. But, of course, the history of the thing is that they cannot afford to give up terrain, because they already took a lot of terrain.

When they come under attack by the Muslims and Croats, they do two things, they use the advantage that they have, but they have a lot of officers who are good tacticians from the old Yugoslav army, which the Muslims do not have, so they have very often trapped the Muslims and Croats into pockets where they then strike them with artillery.

They also, and this is a hard part for anybody to understand, it is certainly hard for me to understand, and that is, they say if you attack us, we are not going to necessarily defend where you attack us, we are going to hit you where it hurts, which is in your cities.

And every time we fire into the city, we cannot miss, it is bound to hit something, and that way, we are going to make you pay.

So I think what will happen, if there is, let us say, a pullout of forces, there will be this—the Muslims and Croats feel themselves strong at the moment, and growing stronger. They will conduct these attacks.

The Serbs will answer with the same method of operation they have used before. They will trap the Muslims here and there where they can.

That is getting harder and harder to do, as the Muslims and Croats get to be better tacticians, and then they will continue to, the Bosnian Serbs will continue to strike at cities, because that is what they feel is using their advantage.

Senator EXON. An escalation, is that what you are saying?

General GALVIN. Yes.

Chairman THURMOND [presiding]. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And President Carter and General Galvin, especially President Carter, I want to thank you for all your efforts, not only on this issue, but throughout the world.

I have had the occasion to be with you on a couple of instances, and I have had the opportunity to observe your efforts firsthand.

I would like to really go to the issue that confronts Congress today, and may confront the Senate in a relatively short time period.

As you know, Mr. President, the House of Representatives voted yesterday or the day before on a resolution to lift the arms embargo, and it was an overwhelming vote in the House.



It is not my job to count votes here in the Senate, but I would surmise that there is probably significant sentiment here in the Senate to do that as well, which would confront the President with a serious dilemma, obviously, to veto or not, which certainly at this time he would veto such a resolution on the part of Congress for a variety of reasons.

But this sentiment was reinforced, Mr. President, by the presence of a Bosnian prime minister here just last week, earlier this week, who stated fairly unequivocally that he felt the arms embargo was the major reason why he has lost 70 percent of his territory and so many people killed, I am expressing his views, as related to us, and that if we lifted the arms embargo, that he would assist the UNPROFOR contingent to leave, and that he would not seek air strikes on the part of the United States in order to support his efforts.

We, I think, are confronted with the views of what most observers view as the victim of aggression, and the least perpetrator, not a non-perpetrator, but the least perpetrator of war crimes.

Our CIA has determined that 90 percent of the war crimes have been committed by the Serbs. So there is an enormous amount of moral suasion here directed at allowing the Bosnian government and people to defend themselves, rather than do what we have been doing, and that is to ensure an unequal military equation on the battlefield.

So I guess what we are seeking is your response to those arguments and your advice as to what the Congress should do, and what would be the proper role for the Congress to play in this situation.

President CARTER. Senator McCain, I appreciate the fact that you are very interested in what we have done in the past, and your help to the Carter Center.

The basic reason that General Galvin decided to come is to try to interpose one additional step before we reach that crisis stage, and that is good faith, proven peace talks, to explore the resolution of these differences that are so apparent under the aegis of a Contact Group, both to resolve long-range constitutional issues, and to have a period of cessation of hostilities, relief supplies being brought in, and so forth.

I think if we do eventually decide to lift the arms embargo, that there ought to be two prerequisites. One, I have already mentioned, and that is to exhaust the peace effort, after a good faith attempt, using the maximum influence of the Contact Group members, to get both sides to sit down together.

The second one is to withdraw the United Nations forces. I think they will have to be withdrawn before we lift the arms embargo. As I said in my opening statement, both the present and former commanders of the U.N. forces say that their mission could not be fulfilled if the arms embargo is lifted.

I think it is accurate to say, I read former Secretary Kissinger's op ed piece in The Washington Post, I think, Monday, both the British and French have said that if the arms embargo is lifted, they would withdraw their forces. So that means that the U.N. forces are out.

I know Prime Minister Zhologes. I have met with him, talked with him at length in Zagreb, even before I went to Bosnia, and I cannot dispute what he says.

If he feels that the Muslim-Croatian forces are fully capable, without U.N. presence, without U.S. air power to prevail militarily, I think that is taking a great chance of his part, but I could not question his own judgment of the relative strength of the military forces.

But I hope that before we reach that point, Senator, we will have the peace effort, and then the withdrawal of U.N. forces, and then lift the arms embargo.

I think that will result, as we said earlier, both of us, in a great chance of high levels of casualties, an increase in hatred and animosity, and maybe a spreading of the conflict outside Bosnia to neighboring countries.

Senator MCCAIN. If the good faith efforts fail, would you then at that time consider that scenario that you have described. In your statement, you mentioned the United Nations is facing an almost impossible dilemma serving as a peace enforcer, when there is no peace agreement.

Would you think that if there is a good faith effort, that the train should be set in motion for the scenario of eventually lifting the arms embargo?

President CARTER. I would have to answer your question, yes. Senator, I can see the difficulties. I know the intense feelings on both sides.

And I would hope and expect that the peace talks, once convened, might last for a year or more, because of the details of exactly where you draw a line on the map, what you do with the division of Sarajevo, what you do with the northern corridor, are very complicated.

And I think it will require a great deal of patience. And during that period of time, we would at least have a year of relative peace, and delivery of food and water, and things of that kind. That is my hope.

But if that does fail, and if they show a lack of commitment to genuine peace efforts, then I think that the final stages should be as you described.

One thing that I mentioned in my statements with some degree of trepidation I would like to say, against the advice of my close associates, was that during this time of good faith demonstration toward peace by the Serbs in Serbia, the Serbs in Bosnia, and the government, that there should be a lifting of the U.N. trade sanctions.

I think this would encourage Milosevic to add whatever influence he has in Bosnia, comply with all the agreements that you have committed to honor.

When I left Bosnia, and went back through Croatia, and over to Belgrade to meet with Milosevic, he was the most enthusiastic supporter I found for the 4-month cease-fire and for direct talks between the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serbs.

He was the most enthusiastic. And as I said earlier, we are offering him a cessation or a temporary lifting of the trade sanctions,

if he will in some way recognize the statehood of Croatia and Bosnia. He is not going to do that. He is not going to do that.

And the only alternative is to offer him the lifting of the sanctions if he will use his full influence to promote a peace resolution. If that does not work, then I agree with you, the U.N. forces should be withdrawn, and the arms embargo should be lifted.

Senator McCAIN. My time has expired.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me take the flip side of the other side of the possibilities from Senator McCain's question, although, I would think that the likelihood of his hypothetical happening would be more likely than mine, but let us assume we do get some peace agreement.

Let us assume that we follow the course, Mr. President, you have outlined, and the parties agree in a reasonable period of time.

At that stage, I would ask both of you, would you favor the United States deploying substantial numbers, up to 25,000 ground forces to help NATO and the U.N. actually enforce a peace agreement?

General Galvin, may I pose that to you, and then——

President CARTER. I would like to have him answer first.

General GALVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator Nunn, I think that if we get a peace agreement, it is a responsibility of ours to help enforce it. I do not know how many troops would be used.

I do not know what type of enforcement the United States would agree to, but I cannot imagine that we would be the leaders in finally accomplishing a peace agreement, and that we would then say we were not willing to enforce it.

Certainly enforcing a peace agreement should have less of a risk to us than trying to do what we are doing now, which is staying halfway in between peace enforcers, peacekeepers, et cetera.

Now, enforcing the agreement has to be defined. I think if we are going to enforce the agreement by our presence, by our pressure, and so forth, we would still feel that there would be a point at which if the agreement were not kept, then we would not go to any length whatsoever to—we would not take any kind of effort, and all kinds of effort, to enforce it.

There is only so much that we could do. But I think enforcing it by our presence is probably necessary.

Senator, I would like to also at some point comment about what I think would happen if we lift the embargo, because if we——

Senator NUNN. I was going to ask you that question next. What do you think would happen, as a former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, what would happen if the United States unilaterally lifts the embargo before the U.N. forces are withdrawn?

General GALVIN. I think this is definitely the most important question right at this time; although, the real question is peace.

However, if we are going to lift the embargo, we have to be prepared for the kind of ugliness that is going to come, which is going to be a lot worse than perhaps what we have seen so far.

First of all, there is going to be massive fighting, in which, depending on what kind of support the Muslims and Croats get, they are going to begin to drive back the Serbs out of a lot of areas.

We have not considered yet the change of consequences of that. How would that be accepted, first of all, by Milosevic and the Serbs of Serbia Montenegro? But also how will it be accepted by the Criana Serbs in Croatia, which represent a large and powerful group of Serbs, also?

How will a defeat of the Serbs be accepted in the Eastern Mediterranean, when we start to see the differences between Greeks and Turks over that issue?

We do not really, although the Russians have been, I would say, helpful, and, indeed, quiescent on this whole question, how would they feel about a continuing war, and how far would the Muslims and Croats want to carry this?

If we look back at just the short range of history to World War II, we find that when the Serbs were down, their opponents were willing to carry measures to an extreme degree.

Senator NUNN. So you think, General Galvin, that lifting the embargo would be a fundamental mistake, is that correct—

General GALVIN. I think it would be a fundamental—

Senator NUNN [continuing]. If it is unilateral, and if—

General GALVIN. Absolutely.

Senator NUNN. What about the effect on NATO itself? I want to ask you another couple of questions. My time is going to run out here, so I would like to move along, if I could.

General GALVIN. If you pull the U.N. forces out, and you say the U.N. is no longer going to be involved, and you also pull NATO out, then there is not a question of lifting the embargo, there is no embargo after that.

Senator NUNN. Okay. Let me ask this other question, because we have not talked about Croatia and the Federation. I want to get, General Galvin, your view about the Federation, because you worked on that.

The federation between the government of Bosnia and the Croats in Bosnia, will that hold, in your opinion? And also, I would like to ask President Carter and you to comment, if you could, about the possibility of renewed conflict between Croatia and Serbia.

We focused almost exclusively on Bosnia this morning, and probably in most of the news coverage, but there is also a real possibility of another real conflict between Croatia and Serbia, the Serbs.

General GALVIN. Very quickly, there is a good chance that the Federation between the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims would hold. There was also, of course, the question of the confederation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

That really never got off the drawing board, and I am not sure it would. President Tadjman has said that that would require a vote of the whole populous, and so forth, so I do not think that is going to hold. But I think the other one, yes, would.

Senator NUNN. Can you comment, President Carter, about Croatia and Serbia, and the Croats, of course, are anxious to get back their territory, which was theirs. Did you get involved in that part of the equation?

President CARTER. Well, when I was there in December, President Tudjman told me that as of March, he was going to ask United Nations forces to withdraw totally from Croatia, because he thought they were perpetuating the Serbian holding of about 30 percent of Croatia, if I remember the percentage right.

Subsequently, under intense pressure from all sides, including the United States, he reversed that position after some altercations took place.

I think if the U.N. forces withdraw from Croatia, and I presume they would, under the scenario that you have described, that it is very likely that Serbia and Croatian forces inside Croatia would again resume fighting.

Senator NUNN. It is very likely they would.

President CARTER. I think so.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Kempthorne.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. President, you have listed in your testimony the conditions by which you feel that it would be necessary to enter into another cease-fire and negotiations that would follow.

President CARTER. Yes.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. They are very similar, as I read them, to what you had prescribed in December of last year.

President CARTER. Yes.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. And then in your testimony, you state, and I quote, and this is referencing the first cease-fire effort, "that the end of the cease-fire period came at the end of April, with no negotiations having been undertaken."

President CARTER. Yes.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. What has happened since then that would cause you to believe that they now would be serious about entering into a cease-fire, and to meet the conditions that you have prescribed?

And I couple that with, for example, former President Nixon had said on more than one occasion that in order for participants to meaningfully come to a peace table, you have to have a condition where one side does not feel dominant; otherwise, there is no motivation.

And with what we have seen taking place by the Serbs, what would be the motivation for these parties to now come to the table, because I think one side feels dominant at this point, as long as that embargo is in place?

President CARTER. There is a matter of subtle semantics in the basis for peace talks that is also quite significant. The Balkan Serbs and President Milosevic will support peace talks under the Contact Group on the basis of the Contact Group plan, the 49/51 percent plan.

The Bosnian-Muslim-Croatian Federation leaders say that the Bosnian Serbs must, in advance of the peace talks, accept this plan. There is a difference. But my hope is that we can get away from the semantics.

We have even gotten the Bosnian Serbs to agree to use the word agreement with the Contact Group plan. They will not, I wish they would, accept in advance the peace plan.

They will not use the words "we accept it," because they do not think the 49 percent is fair. And as I said in my statement, they have come back with a 53 percent proposal.

General Galvin has spelled out the provisos with which the Bosnian Serb leaders, executive and the parliament, rejected this plan at the beginning, but they want some access to the sea, they want a broader area in the north, to combine the eastern and the western sides, the so-called Serbian territories, and so forth. So that is the basic difference.

My hope is that the Contact Group would use its power and its authority to influence forgetting about preconditions, let us go to Geneva. We know that the Bosnian government insists on prior acceptance.

We know that the Bosnian Serbs say we will negotiate on the basis of this plan. Let us forget about all that, and go, and sit down on July 15, and negotiate the differences.

That, I think, is a crucial element, and it is a tragedy, in my opinion, that the whole thing is going to break down on the basis of the insistence that the Bosnian Serbs must, in advance, accept the 49/51 percent. I am not excusing anyone, but that is an answer to your question.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. And I appreciate that. My concern is you have provided an excellent framework for these talks to take place, but as you pointed out, at the end of April, no talks had taken place, and I just wonder if we can get beyond semantics, and get to the point where we are not seeing the killing, because there have been so many innocent victims on all sides of this that have been killed since then, that it is even a greater conflict.

President CARTER. I am not being critical, but we only have a 5-nation Contact Group. There are strong differences of opinion within the Contact Group members, among them, and in these sort of mediations in which I have ever been involved, you cannot have the lowest common denominator among mediators as a prerequisite to peace talks.

Somehow there has to be some resolution there. And I think the other members of the Contact Group are probably waiting for the United States to say this is what we must do, and we have not been able or willing to do that.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. I appreciate that.

President CARTER. I would like General Galvin to correct—

General GALVIN. I cannot correct that. I agree with that.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. General Galvin, let me ask you this question, because last week it became very clear that the administration is willing to commit ground forces for emergency extraction of U.N. forces that are in Bosnia, but it is not necessarily for the extraction out of Bosnia, but just to move them from a critical situation to something that is more safe.

In Somalia, we saw the peacekeeping effort, and we saw this term "mission creep." What are the dangers now with this potential policy of the administration that we will now begin to see mission creep in Bosnia, pulling the United States more and more into this conflict, that we may go down paths we do not wish to go down?

General GALVIN. I think we have to be very careful about mission creep. You have to—that is why I brought up Clausewitz because

he says over and over that mission creep is one of the major problems of conflict, that you get into conflicts in which you are not clear as to why you are doing it, which then allows mission creep.

One of the subordinate questions here, once we decide how we are going to do this, is to make sure that the objective we have is clearly stated, and everyone understands it, and then if we are going to change that objective at some point, we need to then go through that effort to do so, but not allow a quiet and probably misunderstood mission creep.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. All right. I appreciate that.

Mr. President, my final question then to you is: Because of your very unique experience and background, can you compare for me, please, the current multipolar international security environment with the bipolar world that existed when you were president?

President CARTER. Well, it is not—there is not a question now that the only super power on earth is the United States.

I think in many cases other nations defer to us, to take the leadership role, in some very remote places, obviously, including Somalia, obviously, including Haiti, including North Korea, when they were building up nuclear arsenals, also in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This was not necessarily the case when I was there, because in almost every troubled area of the world when I was president, that responsibility was there, but also it was complicated by intense competition between the Soviet Union and the United States for hegemony, or influence, or trade relationships, and this included places like Ethiopia, and Zaire, even, and obviously, Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, I could name a whole string, but anywhere we were involved in trying to do something, our responsibility was clouded by the competition between democracy and freedom on one hand, and totalitarian communism on the other, and the Soviets looked upon us as trying to usurp their privileges.

So now there is a much clearer, I would say, inheritance of world leadership, but we have a reticence about injecting ourselves in an uncontrollable situation.

And when we have done it in the past, sometimes it has been tragic, like in Somalia, I think sometimes it has been notably successful, as it has been in Haiti, and perhaps even in North Korea. We do not know how that is going to turn out yet.

So I think that is the basic difference, Senator.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Thank you.

Senator Levin, you are next.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Kempthorne.

I want to get back to the time line, President Carter, that you have set forth in terms of lifting the arms embargo. I have favored lifting that arms embargo, first, removing the U.N. troops, and allowing the Bosnian government to defend itself, like any other state can defend itself.

I do not know of any other state recognized by the United Nations that is not allowed the inherent right of self-defense.

I find it morally repugnant that we have denied the Bosnian government that same right, particularly in light of the fact that the ethnic cleansing, the rape, the robbery, the forced marches, which the State Department has identified being carried out by the Serbs, and the U.N. estimate that the Bosnian Serb forces, and here is a

quote from the U.N., "have expelled, killed, or imprisoned over 90 percent of the 1.7 million non-Serbs, who before the war lived throughout the territory now held by the Bosnian Serbs."

So in light of that activity and those atrocities, mainly by the Bosnian Serbs, I find it particularly abhorrent that we do not allow a recognized government, the Bosnian government, to defend itself like any other state recognized by the U.N. can defend itself.

If we will not defend them, and I cannot justify sending ground forces there to defend the Bosnian government, either, at least let them defend themselves, after the removal of the U.N. forces.

Now, what you are setting forth this morning is a scenario which would permit that, after a reasonable length of time has passed for negotiations, to try to work again, and after the removal of the U.N. troops.

Those are the two preconditions that you have set before the lifting of the embargo.

But then when you said a reasonable time period, you used the words a year or more, which is an awfully long period of time.

Even then, it was not precise, because I think you attached another condition, which was that there are not good-faith negotiations at the end of that time, which means that you are not setting even a precise deadline for negotiations to succeed and the troops to be removed before the embargo would be lifted.

Would you be willing to be more precise in that regard, and to say that unless negotiations resulted in a settlement within a certain time period, and identify a time period, that at that time, you would recommend that the U.N. remove its forces, and that the arms embargo be lifted unilaterally, if necessary?

Would you be willing to be that precise, or do you prefer to leave it, as I think you left it, a little more ambiguous than that, and, therefore, I think less attractive to those of us who felt that the arms embargo should have been lifted a long time ago?

President CARTER. I will try to recapitulate my position as quickly as I can. First of all, I think that when we come to the point of U.N. forces being withdrawn, and the arms embargo lifted, I think it ought to be in that sequence, we face a horrible tragedy in Bosnia.

We can wash our hands of it. We can see the war resume. We can watch atrocities committed again, and we can see a possible extension of the war to adjacent areas. But I do not think there is any alternative to that as an ultimate failure.

All I would like to see is the Contact Group and the U.N. working in harmony, say, before this happens, before we go any further, let us have good-faith talks forced on the parties by the year end, and the Contact Group.

During those talks, I see a period of peace, of commerce, of trade, a lack of animosity, that I would not regret seeing continued for an extended period of time, maybe a year or more.

That is what I see, but as long as both sides are in Geneva, or wherever, trying to find a way to evolve an acceptable constitution, an acceptable division of territory, let that continue.

I see no downside to that. U.N. forces can be there. In effect, you would have a peace agreement.



Senator LEVIN. Would you be willing to say that when those talks break down that then you would support the removal of the troops, and then the lifting of the embargo, unilaterally, if necessary? Would you be willing to phrase it that way?

President CARTER. I do not think there is any alternative to that, but I think that is a tragic ultimate alternative.

Senator LEVIN. And I agree, but I think that the wording is important, because if the talks break down, say, at any point after a year, and if the Bosnian government then gives up on trying to reach a negotiated settlement and leaves those peace talks, that would constitute a breakdown in the peace talks.

Then the removal of the troops would come, and then the lifting of the arms embargo, unilaterally, if necessary.

If that is what you are saying this morning, it seems to me that that is at least a definitive timetable. I do not share your year approach, but at least then it is a definitive timetable, where there would be a lifting of the embargo after a precise period of time, if negotiations had not led to a settlement, providing the troops had been first removed. That, I think, would be—

President CARTER. I understand. I think we understand each other, Senator, but we are not exactly on the same—

Senator LEVIN. Well, is my last formulation something that you—the breakdown of a talks after a year, then removal of the troops, then lifting of the embargo, is that a formulation that you could concur with?

President CARTER. As an ultimate tragedy, yes. I do not see any alternative to it. I would like to hear what General Galvin has to say, if you—

Senator LEVIN. My time is up. That is not in my control. I would love to hear what General Galvin says, if I am allowed to get that in.

Senator COHEN. How long would you wish to take to explain?

General GALVIN. I will take a half a minute, if that is permitted.

Senator COHEN. You can take a full minute.

General GALVIN. First, I really think that I do not like the idea behind all of this. I think that we have to once again get back to the objective.

Is the objective peace, or is the objective an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth? If it is an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth, there is a destructive concept of where we are going.

So I do not like getting to the point where once again we have some kind of a cutoff that says at the end of a year, if we do not have an agreement, then it is an eye for an eye.

I would say at the end of a—first of all, I sure hope we try to do this, and I did say I think it is the last chance. I think that if at the end of a year this has not happened, then events are probably going to take their way anyway.

I would just add one thing to what President Carter has said.

And that is, I agree with that, except that I would still hope that somewhere in there, there is some other forlorn hope before we say, "Okay, gang, have at it in there. We will give you all the arms you want. We will wash our hands of this affair. Do not expect us to do any air strikes. Do not expect us to be in there, but go ahead and duke it out until eventually you arrive at some kind of com-

plete exhaustion, rather than the partial exhaustion you are at now."

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much, General Galvin.

I want to at least make a couple of points. Number one, we should recognize that there are no innocent parties in that particular conflict.

There are various degrees of guilt shared by all parties, and some may be more aggravated than others, given the time period of when the atrocities may be committed. But I think what we have seen recently is an escalation of that aggression by the Serbs, and I think their degree of guilt has increased accordingly.

Second, I want to make the point that Henry Kissinger made in his piece in *The Washington Post*, that we ought to give great praise to the UNPROFOR forces who are there, for the courage and the sacrifice that the men and women who are deployed there on the ground, as well as in the air, but on the ground, especially, for what they are currently enduring.

They have great courage, and they have sacrificed their lives for this peacekeeping mission. I do also want to make the point, however, President Carter, you reiterated something that Secretary Perry said a few days ago, that the U.N. mission has been successful in that it has resulted in a substantial reduction of casualties.

My own view is that what has caused the reduction of casualties has not been the presence of U.N. forces as much as it has been that Serbs have conquered 70 percent of the territory, and after engaging in massive killing, they have succeeded in much of what they had sought to do, and that the U.N. forces were not the causal factor for the reduction of casualties, but rather, they are now performing the mission for which they were sent, and that is to provide humanitarian relief for the areas that are currently under siege.

So I think that we ought not to draw the causal connection. I think they have performed a noble and heroic mission, but I do not think that is the cause of why there are reduced casualties today.

The second point I would make is that, as you point out, the Serbs are outnumbered two to one, and you added that they have the big guns and the tanks, and it brought to mind the similarities between the Israelis, who are outnumbered maybe by one hundred to one, except for the fact that they have a rather qualitative superiority, in terms of their firepower, as such.

So I do not think we should weep too much for the predicament of the Serbs at this point by being outnumbered two to one, yet, having the tanks and the heavy firepower.

I would like to turn, General Galvin, if I could, to your statement, on page 14. You indicate that we should suppress and constrain the fighting within U.N. capabilities, continuing the use of exclusion zones, safe areas, and no-fly zones, which would keep U.N. forces in roughly their current locations, responding to local exigencies, and be prepared to protect them.

I guess one of the great difficulties is that by keeping them in their present circumstances and positions, that we have invited them being taken hostage.

So it seems to me that we cannot keep them in their current situation, without having the same situation that we have today,

namely, of them being taken hostage and used as human shields to prevent any sort of retaliation on the part of the U.N., or NATO, or the United States.

So I do not understand how we can keep them where they are, under the current circumstances, as long as there is no peace that is achieved.

General GALVIN. I think that we can reconfigure somewhat. I did not mean that everybody has to be in exactly the same spot that he was a few weeks ago or something. I think keeping them interposed between the forces, basically as they are today, is still a feasible thing to do.

We have had, yes, this hostage situation take place, and we, of course, know that something else like that could take place. After all, we have 24,000 in there, and there are 240,000 other troops in the country. So if you add everybody together, they are outnumbered ten to one.

However, it is not that that is going to provide the security. It is the questions of the rapid reaction force, and their own internal configuration of the forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Senator COHEN. One of the problems that I think I have had with respect to the UNPROFOR forces is that there has been a misuse of their mission, they really should only be deployed where there is a genuine peace, and not where there is continued aggression and fighting for the past year or so.

We have witnessed the Serbs taking the U.N. forces and extracting tribute from them, demanding 50 percent of their fuel, their food, their medical supplies, using them as hostages temporarily, from time to time. It has been a degradation, it seems to me, of the U.N. mission.

There has been an inappropriate reaction on the part of the United States, by the U.N., and by NATO, itself. It seems to me there is no fear factor involved.

We have actually encouraged the Serbs to engage in what I think all of us would agree to be completely unacceptable behavior. There has been no penalty that they have had to pay.

Under those circumstances, it achieves a level of immorality, almost, on our part, to allow blue helmet men and women to go into areas in which they—now at the whim of those forces, who fear no retaliation, nor fear any kind of punitive reaction from the United States, NATO, or the U.N.

For that reason alone, I think that we have to be very clear in sending a message to the Serbs, if they harm one hair on the heads of those peacekeepers, there is going to be a penalty to pay, a disproportionate penalty for them to pay.

I think we have to say it, and we have to mean it. At this point in time, I have not seen that kind of declaration or commitment, and as the result, you have had a flaunting of the U.N., and in many minds, the U.N. and NATO have been merged, even though it is a disastrous dual-key arrangement, as such, in terms of those forces calling for military support being denied that by U.N. personnel.

I think that if we are going to have this reconfiguration that you are talking about, and put them into areas that are safe and defensible, we really have to have a big stick. We have to say that if you

continue this type of activity, you are going to pay a penalty, even though we do not want to be in the position of passing moral judgments as to who is right, who is guilty, who is innocent, given the circumstances.

Nonetheless, there have to be some guidelines, and without those guidelines saying you are going to invite serious retribution if you harm those people, then we are going to see a continuation of this kind of humiliation that I see, the peacekeepers being captive, and hand-cuffed to munitions dumps and other types of military targets.

I guess my time has expired. Let me just conclude by thanking the both of you for coming. I think it is very important that we listen to the two of you before we take any action on formulating policies, and it has been helpful to listen to both of you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Go ahead. I have to leave.

Senator COHEN [presiding]. My time is up.

Senator NUNN. I just have a couple other questions. I know your time is running out, and people are having to go to other meetings now, but your testimony has been very helpful, very valuable, and to both of you, we express our great appreciation, Mr. President and General Galvin.

General Galvin, on the eastern enclaves, if there is a withdrawal, I know you do not advocate a withdrawal, I know you want a peace effort, all out, the diplomatic effort first, both of you completely agree on that, and I share that view.

But if there is a withdrawal, and I happen to believe that at some point we have to say that the peace efforts have failed, unless they, of course, take another turn, but if there is a failure of the peace efforts, and there is a withdrawal, could you tell us what you think is likely to happen in the eastern enclaves?

Are those territories defensible by the Muslim forces once the U.N. has withdrawn?

General GALVIN. No. Sabac, and Gorazde, and Srebrenica are not defensible.

Senator NUNN. Are we going to be caught in a situation with pictures like the Vietnam pictures, where people were trying to get on the helicopters, and trying to get on the vehicles in any way they could to get out of there?

Are we going to have the U.N. forces caught in that situation as they try to withdraw, with people in those enclaves trying to leave to avoid being slaughtered?

General GALVIN. It is quite possible that that would happen. We could also see, of course, a beginning of major efforts by the Croats and Muslims to take back terrain, including those enclaves at probably a later time.

Senator NUNN. But you do not think they are defensible now by the Muslim forces as—

General GALVIN. No.

Senator NUNN [continuing]. You know them.

General GALVIN. No. Not with the withdrawal. They are not defensible.

Senator NUNN. Now, the other question, I would ask you to comment on this, and any at least framework, I am not asking you to

lay out a whole plan, but assuming the worst, assuming no peace agreement, assuming U.N. withdrawal, is there a containment strategy that comes to mind, because containment, and not letting the conflict spread, as you said, and President Carter also said this very clearly, is probably where we cross the line between important and vital interest, if it started, involving Greece and Turkey, and possibly even Russian volunteers, those kinds of things.

Do you have any kind of strategy in mind regarding that?

General GALVIN. I think containment is going to be an extremely difficult thing. We are very lucky if some nations do not take it into their hands to exercise their kind of contribution to containment, because there are so many different kinds of areas.

There is Vojvodina, which is really a part of Serbia Montenegro, and nobody disputes that, but it is 90 percent Albanian population, and so forth.

There are many others like Vojvodina, and places that could bring in almost any of the abutting countries, and there are many of those.

Senator NUNN. So containment is going to be a major challenge.

General GALVIN. Absolutely.

Senator NUNN. Do you agree it has to be done if we get to that situation?

General GALVIN. Yes. If we think we have a problem now, getting a situation started, which, by the way, would come if we decide to simply get out and support the Muslims, and give them whatever they need, and let them get back to reign, and so forth and so on, the problems that we are going to run into then are going to make these problems look small.

Senator NUNN. I have one final question.

Senator Robb, I apologize. I did not see you there. I know you have not had your questions yet.

You have been a Supreme Allied Commander in the NATO Alliance. If the United States follows the House of Representatives, if we basically adopt as a national policy a unilateral lifting of the embargo, what does this do, in your opinion, to the NATO alliance itself?

General GALVIN. It goes against some of our major allies. I do not think you can do that too many times and in too many situations before you have very much weakened the glue of NATO.

Senator NUNN. Thank you. Senator Robb—I apologize.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I had to depart, and unfortunately, as is the case frequently around here, we get trapped in other venues. I will be very brief. If you have covered these couple of questions, please let me know, and I will look to the record.

Mr. President, just a question, with respect to the appropriate U.S. response in the event the Bosnian Serbs in some way interdict or refuse to allow humanitarian re-supply to get through to some of the areas that need them, or if hostages are taken from the peacekeepers, or other U.N. high commissioner observers, what kinds of U.S. response ought to be considered or on the table if those kinds of actions are taken, not withholding your very strong commitment to the negotiated peace process?

President CARTER. Senator Robb, I do not see any possibility of U.S. action in that case. As you know, all of the supply routes, including Sarajevo, are under Serb control. They certainly have the ability, which they have demonstrated frequently, including now, to interdict convoys going to Sarajevo and other safe areas.

One of the prerequisites for my going to Bosnia at all was an agreement by the Serbs to open up those supply lines. As I said in my testimony, the State Department certified that they were basically in compliance.

When I got to Zagreb, I got a report from the U.N., and on the days before I arrived, there were 20 requests for convoys to go to safe havens. Seventeen were approved by the Serbs. One was withdrawn by the United Nations. Two were turned down for various reasons.

So I think that even at this moment, the Serbs are totally in control of the delivery of supplies, which includes water, food, and medicine. Sarajevo is at their mercy.

So they repeatedly demonstrated their inclination and their ability to interrupt those supplies. At the last minute, they let enough supplies go through. But I do not think the U.S. has any ability, with no troops there, to open up supply routes.

When the French and British have tried to do that, their efforts have been unsuccessful. If we just said, okay, if you do not open up supply routes, we are going to bomb your ammunition dumps, or bomb Pale, I think this would just escalate the war, as we have seen in the past.

Senator ROBB. Mr. President, if I may, I was thinking in terms of U.S. policy toward the process that you have outlined—

President CARTER. Yes, sir.

Senator ROBB [continuing]. You and General Galvin, not the tactical response, but the larger question of how long we permit that kind of momentum to remain in the hands of the Bosnian Serbs, to take whatever action they deem appropriate, whether or not it is consistent with agreed-upon principles, or the peace process.

President CARTER. I will let General Galvin talk about the military aspects. I can tell you that the Bosnian Serbs have repeatedly told us that if we could move toward peace talks, that they will guarantee that the supply route will be kept open, and the Sarajevo airport will be open to U.N. flights, and so forth.

But if they should close off those supply routes to the extent that the people of Sarajevo were starving to death, or could not get water to drink, then I think that would be an extreme case.

I would rather defer to General Galvin about what can be done militarily, not by us directly, but by U.N. forces.

Senator ROBB. But do we maintain our commitment to the peace process that you have outlined in—

President CARTER. No.

Senator ROBB [continuing]. In spite of any provocation, I guess—

President CARTER. No. As I said in my statement, I think that the prerequisite to going to Geneva, or wherever, should be a commitment by the Bosnian Serbs to let the supply routes be opened up, and to let there be unrestricted movement of U.N. forces inside

the entire area of Bosnia, and the restriction on the Sarajevo airport being lifted.

Those kinds of things ought to be prerequisites to the peace talks, and they ought to exist all the way through the peace talks. If at anytime the Bosnian Serbs violate those, I think we ought to break off any inclination to negotiate with the Bosnian Serbs.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. President. That was the essential point, that there is some point where it would break off.

General Galvin, just very briefly, you had made an eloquent statement about maintaining the commitment to the negotiated peace process, as President Carter has done.

How long do we maintain this posture and maintain credibility in terms of the international community, or our ability to deal with other events?

Do we have 6 months? Do we go through the winter season? If nothing materializes, do we then take a look at other options, or do we try to keep this process for an unlimited period of time?

General GALVIN. I do not think unlimited, Senator. I think if we move into a peace negotiation, it might take a little while to get that move to take place, but I do not see that as taking months and months. It should take a few weeks.

If we get the negotiations at Geneva, or somewhere else, as President Carter has said, then I would agree with him that at least a year—the point is that we should consider that a long crisis is not unusual, that we cannot expect to snap our fingers and have everything happen, that something like in the neighborhood of a year's worth of effort is probably going to be required to go from where we are now, which is, we have a plan that both sides seem to think could be the basis for an eventual agreement. That eventuality might be a year in coming, something like that.

If, during that time, as you said, we could not keep a cease-fire, a fairly adequate cease-fire, all cease-fires, or most of them leak a little, as you know, but if we could keep that going, then I think that is a reasonable definition of what I called the last chance.

Senator ROBB. I have one final question. In the event, following up on Senator Nunn's question about containment, assuming all of the good-faith efforts, for whatever reason come to not, and a very different situation were to obtain within the area that we were referring to at this point, what general magnitude of forces, NATO, U.N., United States, are we talking about for a containment policy that would essentially contain the area that you referred to in your testimony.

I believe President Carter did, too. Just give me some sense of, 100,000, 400,000, 50,000, some general concept of what kind of troops we are talking about, in place.

General GALVIN. Certainly, it is going to be a big troop commitment. If what we are talking about by containment means we do not want fighting in Macedonia, we do not want it in Kosovo, we do not want it in the Criaana, we do not want it anywhere in Croatia, we do not want it in the abutting countries that are—you begin to see that this is an enormous piece of geography that we are talking about.

The real problem is that much of that is internal. I mean Vojvodina is part of Serbian Montenegro, and so is Kosovo. Criaana

is part of Croatia. So when do you decide that you are going to contain it?

If you are going to contain it externally, what is the external versus the internal? We have had a country dissolve itself, Yugoslavia, so we would have to then define all of that.

I do not think I could really put a number on that, except to say that if all of those worst cases happened, and they really could happen, there would be an international commitment of proportions we have not seen anywhere.

Senator ROBB. Would it be fair to say that it would be the essential equivalent of one of our major regional conflicts in terms of the kind of resources that we and the international community would have to divert?

General GALVIN. It could amount to that. I think it really could amount to that.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, General.

Thank you, President Carter.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator COHEN. I have just a couple of more questions, and we will release you from your hostage situation from behind the table.

Perhaps you could clarify this, President Carter and General Galvin, either one. Senator Nunn asked the question as to whether or not the enclaves in the eastern part of the country were indefensible, or undefensible.

My understanding is that in your written statement, General Galvin, you indicated, and President Carter, you also stated that the Serbs have all the territory they want, so they may be indefensible now, but there is no indication that Serbs want to proceed against them, or would proceed against them, is there?

President CARTER. I do not think—oh, excuse me.

General GALVIN. No. No. Please.

President CARTER. I do not think either one of us said they have all the territory they want. I think they have as much territory as they want, but there is no doubt, for instance, if they want to clarify and maybe expand the amount of territory they have in the southern part of Sarajevo, and in the northern passage, it goes to the western parts of Serb territory, they want a broader corridor.

And I think they certainly do want to see more control over those eastern enclaves. But I think the total amount of territory they have, Senator, is all they want to defend at this time.

They have not launched any military initiative in the last couple of years. They have been fairly dormant, because they are satisfied with the total amount of territory. In the map that they presented to us, they did make some modifications along the lines that I described to you.

They also want some access to the sea, to the Adriatic. I think in the past the Croatians have been willing to yield a corridor, the right to go through a corridor for the Serbs to reach the ocean.

So there are some adjustments they want to make, those adjustments are probably going to be the key factors in the extensive nature of any peace talks, what do we do, where every concession by the Bosnian government or the Serbs is beneficial, because of the gains they make, those kinds of principles of mediation.



Senator COHEN. General Galvin, do you essentially agree with him?

General GALVIN. I would just like to make a specific point on it, and that is, well, first of all, I think that the enclaves demonstrate that the Serbs do not have everything they might want, and that actually—I would go back to UNPROFOR, you praised them.

I should have praised them much more than I did in this session, because I think people like General Cot, and General McKenzie, and de Lapresle, and Janvier, and many of the others have done magnificent work in leading UNPROFOR, and the troops have been good, and some good things have happened, such as the Muslims and Croats are no longer fighting each other.

There is basically a force that is executed by UNPROFOR. When we get to a point where one side or the other, and in this case, especially the Serbs, get fairly desperate, then they may take some moves that they wish they had not, such as the hostages.

But that does not mean that we have here an impotent force. It has done, I think, some great things in the country. It probably will get recognized over time.

But these kinds of risks, the hostage risk, and so forth, have to be taken. We are not going to get pure peacekeeping as it divides out from peace enforcement, or any of these other definitions.

We are always going to get what you always get in these situations, and that is kind of a muddy approach, in which you do not know whether you are peace enforcing or peacekeeping.

Leaders like that take some risks and take some chances. They are supposed to be in there, for example, to support humanitarian assistance up the road, so they try to also put some pressure on stopping the fighting. They have done a magnificent job.

The Serbs want more, but they also can be forced to take less, if we get into these negotiations.

Senator COHEN. Well, let me go from the point you just made about NATO and UNPROFOR, and talk about a lack of clarity on the part of UNPROFOR, or the U.N., in terms of mission, and how to accomplish that mission.

Last week, for example, it appeared that NATO and the U.N. were preparing to step up their activities in support of UNPROFOR troops securing lines of communication, humanitarian aid to those designated safe haven areas, including Sarajevo.

This week we seem to be, once again, rushing to trim back the commitments even more so, turning the forces into little more than an observer group.

I mention this by way of a piece that appeared in the New York Times international section today, an article written by Christopher Wren.

He said, "When Serbian gunners fired on Danish peacekeepers outside the embattled Bosnian town of Tuzla last year, the Danes did not hunker down. They shot back, letting loose more than 70 rounds from their cannon on their leopard tanks. The brief battle had two consequences. First, the United Nations' officials moved to restrain the Danish soldiers from overstepping a theoretical line drawn between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. And second, the Serbs stopped harassing the Danes."

Later in the piece he points out that the United Nations has undercut its authority, and that minor concessions have left it looking malleable and indecisive. For example, the Serbs initially granted the peacekeepers freedom of movement around Bosnia.

As a courtesy, the United Nations officials began consulting informally on helicopter flights to the point where the Serbs now exercise a right of clearance of such flights.

It seems to me that what has been absent here is a consistent and coherent picture of exactly what the guidelines are going to be, what the rules of engagement are going to be, so we do not have a situation where we, in fact, invite the Serbs to take advantage of every minor concession that it has made in order to further the peace, and suddenly you grant them one inch, they take a foot, and then they start taking hostages.

It seems to me that is one of the persistent problems that we face in dealing with the situation, a lack of clear guidelines, so you do not have the U.N. overruling constantly, or military judgments, or leaving those judgments ill-defined, with no clear guidelines about rules of engagement.

We are going to have, I think, some testimony in the future concerning the recent rescue mission, for example, in terms of what are the guidelines. Do you shoot back when you are shot at? Do you shoot when you are radiated by the radars on the ground?

This has to be resolved before very long; otherwise, we are going to see, I think, a continued reduction or diminution of the authority of the U.N. and NATO, along with it.

Let me just conclude by a question to President Carter, and to you, General Galvin. We have, I think, roughly, what, 500, maybe 700 troops in Macedonia.

In the event that the worst comes to the forefront, that we—and by the way, I assume that both of you would support President Clinton's declaration of sending as many as 25,000 troops to assist in the pullout of U.N. forces, is that correct?

We have the prospect, we hope it does not come about, of the United States deploying 25,000 troops to help U.N. and NATO forces come out of Bosnia. At the same time, we have in the south, 500 troops serving as a trip wire. You have talked to Senator Nunn and others about containment.

What would your advice be at that point, in terms of using 25,000 troops to pull out U.N. forces, and leaving, or withdrawing, or beefing up and augmenting those forces in Macedonia?

Would you recommend that we pull the 500 troops out, or would you put one or two divisions in there, General Galvin, in order to make sure that the lines do not get crossed?

General GALVIN. First, Senator, this goes along with what I had said earlier, that if we get to the stage where we are going to pull out, we are going to find out that you really cannot pull out from a situation that involves your security, because once we pull out, and the thing starts to spread, and it almost inevitably will, then we will be back into questions like: Well, what do we do about our forces in Macedonia? Do we pull out of there, too? And if we do, and Macedonia falls apart, and Greece and Turkey get into a battle over that, or Albania and Greece, or somebody else—

Senator COHEN. I am asking you to assume the worst. I am asking you to assume that there is a U.N. withdrawal, that we are assisting in that withdrawal, what would you, as a military advisor, recommend at that time? Would you leave 500 troops, or would you ask for a division? What would you do?

General GALVIN. Well, the first thing is, I would have to understand what the situation in Macedonia was.

Senator COHEN. You would now go to advise President Carter, "We have a problem, President."

General GALVIN. If the situation—there is no way to answer that just arbitrarily. If the situation called for removal, you know, first of all, what would be the overall plan that we are going to do about containment.

We do not have a plan for containment, but we are talking about withdrawing, and we are talking about lifting the embargo, but we do not have any kind of plan for what we are going to do if we lift the embargo and it turns out to be worst case. But when do we get into some of that?

When do we look at what I call the chain of consequences that I tried to explain, that you lift the embargo, and it does not just mean that we can wash our hands of it forever and happily move away, and let them duke it out, and see who the—may the best side win.

It will overflow into these other areas, almost inevitably, so in the meantime, we have to scramble and get a plan for that.

Senator COHEN. President Carter.

President CARTER. I do not have anything to add, Senator. I do not know. You always have the problem of a few of those 500 people being killed.

What do you do, withdraw the other 495 in disgrace, or go in there in retribution against those who committed those attacks, or do you send in 25,000 troops to defend Macedonia?

I think that a responsibility of this committee, if you will let me be presumptuous, might be to inquire if the Defense Department and the White House have a containment plan, because if we are seriously considering withdrawing UNPROFOR and lifting the embargo, I think that an absolutely necessary prerequisite is to have a comprehensive containment plan, that American government officials, and the American public, and the world understands, this is what we are going to do if the war tends to spread to Kosovo, to Macedonia, and other places. We do not have that now.

Senator COHEN. I completely agree with you. I was just contemplating the perception Senator Warner talked about, the perception that the American people would have if we are putting 25,000 forces in to help the U.N. evacuate, and then we would have to make a decision to either put a division or two, or pull out altogether out of the south.

President CARTER. I think it is very likely. I am just surmising. I do not have any official knowledge. I think the 10,000-person strike-force, one of the purposes of it might very well be to prepare for assisting the UNPROFOR to withdraw, as well as to protect enclaves that might be threatened with hostage taking and so forth. I think that is obviously the logical additional purpose for that group.

Senator COHEN. General Galvin, I have one final question. Early on in the Bosnian conflict, you, I believe, expressed the view that military involvement in Bosnia would not drag the U.S. into a Vietnam-like quagmire, because we could always end the mission and leave. Do you still hold that view?

General GALVIN. First let me say what the view was, quickly. I said that if we commit forces, we should commit them with clear objectives, and then be ready to take them out if those objectives are not accomplished.

This was our problem in Vietnam, we kept spending good pennies after bad, because we could not face the idea of saying this is not working, and we need to do something about it.

So I do not think—what I tried to say, if you go back and look at what I did say, what I tried to say was, do not feel committed just because you have put forces in.

That does not mean that they are going to have to stay there forever. And if the situation changes, or if you change your mind, then be prescient enough to say so and get out, rather than for a political or other reasons, keep after something that is just not working.

Senator COHEN. Okay. What are the strategic consequences or implications of setting an objective, omitting failure, and pulling out, what does that do in terms of the U.S. or NATO credibility?

General GALVIN. Well, we have done it. We did—

Senator COHEN. We did it in Somalia. Yes.

General GALVIN. We did it in Vietnam, after, of course, we allowed the objective to creep all over the place.

Senator COHEN. Well, we also did it in Somalia, and I think we are still paying some consequences of having committed a force, and then withdrawing it under hostile conditions.

Has that not impacted, in terms of when you make a commitment, that you then find that it is unsuccessful, and then decide to pull out? It is not quite as easy getting out as getting in.

General GALVIN. It certainly has an impact. You would have to then make a judgment, does it have an impact that is greater than the impact of leaving them in? In this case, the judgement was, and I tend to concur with that. But either way is a bad choice, but get out.

Senator COHEN. A better choice might be not to get in, in the first place.

General GALVIN. Well, that is, of course, right.

Senator COHEN. Let me on behalf of the committee thank both of you very much, and commend both of you for coming forward and testifying before the committee. It has been very helpful.

The committee will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:01 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

## **CURRENT SITUATION AND U.S. POLICY OPTIONS IN BOSNIA**

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**THURSDAY, JUNE 15, 1995**

**U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
Washington, DC.**

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Thurmond, Warner, Lott, Nunn, Exon and Robb.

Committee staff members present: Richard L. Reynard, staff director; George W. Lauffer, deputy staff director.

Professional staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, Lawrence J. Lanzillotta, John H. Miller, and Thomas G. Moore.

Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, counsel; John W. Douglass, and Michael J. McCord, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Alec Bierbauer, Pamela L. Farrell, Jennifer A. Lambert, and Jason Rossbach.

Committee members' assistants present: Judith A. Ansley, assistant to Senator Warner; Walter Lohman, assistant to Senator McCain; Samuel D. Adcock, assistant to Senator Lott; Richard F. Schwab, assistant to Senator Coats; Glen E. Tait, assistant to Senator Kempthorne; Patricia L. Stalnacker, assistant to Senator Santorum; Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; and John F. Lilley, assistant to Senator Lieberman.

### **OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND, CHAIRMAN**

Chairman THURMOND. The committee will come to order. The committee meets today to conclude a series of hearings on Bosnia.

Yesterday was an historic occasion with the appearance of former President Jimmy Carter, the first time he has testified before a congressional committee.

Joining him was General John Galvin, former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Both men were very persuasive and gave us much to consider.

The testimony we have heard to date has covered a wide range of views on this troubling issue. I want to commend my colleagues for their attentiveness and their participation in this long and sometimes grueling series of hearings. I believe the potential seriousness of the situation in Bosnia amply justifies the time and effort we have devoted to these hearings.

Some members have suggested a future hearing to deal with the apparent intelligence failure that led to the shooting down of Captain Scott O'Grady. I understand the Defense Department is investigating the circumstances surrounding this near tragic episode.

Once enough information is forthcoming to warrant a full committee hearing, I will try to work it into our schedule.

Today I am pleased to welcome Dr. James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and former Secretary of Energy. Following Dr. Schlesinger will be Ambassador Richard Armitage, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. More recently, Ambassador Armitage was Director of U.S. Assistance to the Newly Independent States.

Both of you gentlemen are highly regarded for your experience in national security and for your clear and forceful views on the proper use of American military power. I thank you for coming and look forward to hearing from you.

I am also delighted to welcome Colonel Harry Summers, one of America's best known authors and commentators on military strategy and defense issues.

Colonel Summers, among your many works is the definitive study of the Vietnam war, "On Strategy." I am eager to hear your views on the parallels between our Vietnam experience and the incremental or piecemeal approach to the Balkan conflict.

I observed yesterday that none of the choices we face in Bosnia are simple or desirable. That view is reinforced by all of the prior testimony. But if I could simplify the choices before us, I would say that they boil down basically to three.

I would describe them in shorthand as "Lift and Strike" on one end of the spectrum, with "Stay and Talk" on the other end. In the middle is "Leave and Lift," which is my position. By that, I mean that the United Nations mission should leave Bosnia, since it can no longer fulfill its mandates.

Then, once our allies are out of danger, the embargo should be lifted so the Bosnians can obtain the means to defend themselves.

However, I recognize that this course of action, like all the others, carries certain risk. Many times members have used the expression "there are no good options."

This is not merely a convenient catch-phrase. It means that there is a serious potential penalty attached to each course of action or inaction. Whatever we decide, we must be prepared to accept the consequences.

I believe one key responsibility of this committee is to make those potential consequences clear to the rest of the Congress, to the administration and to the American people.

As General Galvin said yesterday, "If we cannot be neutral, we must at least be objective."

This committee, above all, must have a clear understanding of where the various courses of action might lead. Whether we lift the embargo or try again for a negotiated settlement, we must look at the subsequent steps at what General Galvin called the "chain of consequences."

I agree with President Carter that this part of our oversight role. I hope one result of these hearings will be to ensure that the Defense Department develops a sound plan to deal with the chain of

consequences and to contain the conflict if the policy of the United States and our allies should fail.

Once again, I thank our outstanding witnesses for coming. At this time, I will recognize the distinguished ranking member, Senator Nunn, for an opening statement, and then other members who may wish to make brief opening statements.

Please keep your statements brief so we can give ample time to our witnesses.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I commend you again, Mr. Chairman, for having these very timely and informative hearings on U.S. policy options in Bosnia, as well as the policy options for NATO and the U.N.

The hearings have been extremely valuable and timely, and the Senate will likely be considering a joint resolution on Bosnia in the next week or so. Today's hearing, the last in a series, promises to be at least valuable as our earlier hearings, because we have an outstanding panel of witnesses.

I want to welcome Dr. James Schlesinger and Ambassador Richard Armitage and Colonel Harry Summers.

We all know Dr. Jim Schlesinger, a former Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Director of Central Intelligence, and probably a lot of other things that I do not even remember that he did before I was born.

He has appeared before this committee many times in the past. He has provided us with wise counsel on a host of national security issues over the years, and we value very much his input and his appearance.

Ambassador Rich Armitage, a former Director of U.S. Assistance to the Newly Independent States of the Soviet Union and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, has also testified frequently before this committee and is well known and respected for his direct, no-frill views.

And I understand we have another one of those coming today, which will be very helpful to us.

Ambassador Armitage, one page of a past statement for today's hearing, I think demonstrates his very direct and very valuable approach.

Colonel Summers has also appeared before the committee, although I do not believe very recently. But his views have been conveyed to us over the years through his many books, articles and editorials, which we always find both informative and interesting and helpful.

So we look forward to the testimony of all our witnesses and a chance to pose questions to each of them.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. The distinguished Senator from Nebraska.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, I will not have an opening statement. I just want to join you in welcoming these very distinguished guests that we have here today for this continuing, most informative series of meetings, Mr. Chairman, that you have arranged on this matter.

I do not know what we are going to hear today, but the massive evidence that we have had and testimony would indicate that the people who have become us, by and large, with maybe one or two

exceptions, have said, "Be careful. Go slow. Don't rush into some kind of a proposition, however well intentioned on the floor of the U.S. Senate, before you weigh all of the possible eventualities as a result of that."

And I expect that we are going to hear more of that this morning. I will have some questions for the witnesses. And once again, Mr. Chairman, I heartily congratulate you for the very even-handed manner that you have conducted these hearings and the people that have come here that, as do these witnesses, have the experience and the background that we should listen to before we make our individual judgments on what we should or should not do in this complicated matter on the floor of the Senate.

Chairman THURMOND. We will be pleased now to hear from you, Dr. Schlesinger.

**STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES SCHLESINGER, FORMER  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, FORMER SECRETARY OF ENERGY**

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I should state at the outset, Mr. Chairman, that whatever you may hear in the next few minutes, that the suspicion that there might have been advance collaboration between your introductory statement and my statement is not correct. [Laughter.]

Chairman Thurmond, Senator Nunn, Senator Exon, I welcome this opportunity to appear before this committee to discuss the continuously evolving situation in Bosnia and what it may portend for American policy.

This committee will understand the need to settle on a coherent policy before taking action. It will understand the danger of exposing either American forces or American prestige simply out of a desire to do something.

Bosnia is in its own way unique. But it is also representative of difficulties that regularly crop up in regional confrontations marginal to America's interests.

Let me start by referring to a number of fragile elements that have repeatedly appeared in America's responses and against which we should be on guard.

First, we have a touching faith that sending signals to parties determined to achieve their objectives, that by doing so we will persuade them to desist. Such signals are associated with incrementalism, modest measures more likely reveal our ambivalence than our determination.

When one is sending signals that one might be prepared to do something, and even worse, accompanying those signals by increasingly desperate pleas to negotiate to a party determined to achieve its own goals, one regrettably is only signaling weakness.

Second, we tend to assume that such signals are being sent to rational parties eager for a settlement and eager to avoid violence. Instead those parties regularly are deeply passionate, ruthless and unscrupulous, driven by historic memories, determined to achieve their historic goals and fearful of the consequences of failing to do so.

Third, in such conditions, impelled by our own humanitarian impulses and the belief that something must be done, we are inclined



to send modest forces to help the parties reach a settlement and to keep them separated in the interim.

But such modest, really token, forces are vulnerable to at least one of the warring parties, if the lofty goals of peacekeeping turns awry.

All this points to a fundamental weakness in the peacekeeping mission. Both warring parties, both warring parties, must be prepared to embrace the peacekeeping, to be open to a settlement on reasonable terms, and to continue to believe in the impartiality of the peacekeeping forces.

At any point that either party, usually the stronger party, ceases to believe in the impartiality of the peacekeeping force, the entire mission likely will run off the rails.

The insufficiency of the peacekeeping force to impose a settlement will become obvious, and the issue is immediately posed of escalation or departure.

In recent years, this scenario manifested itself in Lebanon, in Somalia, and even briefly with the voyage of the Harlan County in Haiti. Clearly, that sequence has once again in Bosnia.

One of the warring parties decides that the presumably neutral peacekeepers actually siding with the opponents. And the inherent weakness of peacekeeping operations is then revealed.

In Lebanon, the Druse and the Shiites decided, quite rightly, that the Americans were siding with their Maronite opposites and took steps to pin down and then drive out the modest peacekeeping force.

All this at a minimum points to the absolute necessity of scrutinizing in advance the parties to ascertain whether they are truly interested in reaching and maintaining a settlement and having a peacekeeping force. This has happened, as in the Sinai.

Nonetheless, it points to this absolute need for advanced scrutiny, rather than plunging ahead on the premise that something must be done.

Alternatively, one can deploy forces sufficiently large to intimidate the parties and to impose a settlement. I have frequently contrasted the substantial force that President Eisenhower dispatched to Lebanon in 1958, which clearly awed the disputants, as opposed to the very modest Marine force deployed in 1983.

If a settlement can only be imposed on the parties, do not confuse that condition with one susceptible to peacekeeping operations.

This brings to Bosnia, which has dramatically illustrated all of the above difficulties. In Bosnia, the original peacekeeping is now over, finished.

In my judgment, it is best to shed the illusion still found in certain quarters in New York and perhaps here in Washington, that the classical peacekeeping operation can be revived.

Under existing conditions, neither party is now prepared to accept a compromise settlement. Both parties have violated the understandings on which the peacekeeping mission was undertaken, as well as the frequent cease fires.

The brazenness of the Bosnian Serbs in seizing 300 peacekeepers as hostages and in shooting down an American aircraft is only the latest, if final, indicator.

The humanitarian assistance the peacekeepers are supposed to deliver to the enclaves is now impeded. The shelling of the safe havens continues.

The steadily strengthened Muslim forces have used the peacekeeping forces as a shield. The Serbs treat them as an available and handy set of hostages, through which they can discourage a sterner response.

In contrast to Lebanon, there is no securer deployment on the seacoast to facilitate a rapid withdrawal. The forces are pinned down in enclaves.

However, a peacekeeping operation requires robust forces and a secure line of communication. In Bosnia, the peacekeeping mission is now finished. We must move on to the next phase.

This committee is interested in what the options for U.S. policy are now. None is attractive. And that should be acknowledged at the outset. If there had been easy and attractive options, the Bush Administration would have embraced them 3 years ago.

Its inability to find an attractive option testify to the difficulty of the circumstances at that earlier date. And now, after 3 years, the alternatives have deteriorated further.

In seeking the best course of action now, we should bear in mind the need to find a coherent strategy. We must anticipate the further consequences of any course of action that we now choose.

Repeated changes of direction will only reduce our credibility and our influence. In matters such as these, which frankly are marginal to our interests, it is at least as important to have a firm hand on the tiller as it is in deciding on the precise direction.

We must avoid giving false impressions. We must avoid seeming to act impulsively.

The first rule must be: Do no harm. Therefore, we must take care to avoid measures that endanger the forces on the ground of our allies. These are the same nations that were with us in the recent Gulf war and in other wars.

And, since I hear criticism of the actions of our allies in Bosnia, I must underscore that the United States strongly urged these nations to deploy these peacekeeping forces to Bosnia in this peacekeeping operation. We, therefore, have a moral obligation to avoid actions that might endanger forces deployed at our behest.

What then are the options, bearing in mind the necessity of choosing a coherent policy and adhering to it firmly?

One, escalation. Given their recent brazenness, we might be sorely tempted to crush Bosnian Serb impudence by a massive military response. For a number of reasons, I believe that would be unwise.

In the first place, it would initially endanger the forces of our allies. Even more important, full resolution of the conflict would require our intervention on the ground, and there is no public support for that. Nor is there support among our allies for a major offensive on the ground.

A lesser alternative would be to strike back massively through the air. That would certainly deliver the message to the Bosnian Serbs that they could not commit these outrages with impunity.

But it would immediately endanger the forces of our allies. It would probably lead to further and massive hostage taking. It

would lead to immediate and major attacks on the so-called safe havens.

It would likely cripple our ability to sustain some of the enclaves. For these reasons, a major air offensive must now be deferred. Yet, it should be held in reserve and not be permanently abandoned.

Two, lifting the embargo. The alternative of lifting the embargo has a great deal of appeal. The Bosnian government urges a listing, despite the attendant risks which that government may underestimate.

It would redress the injustice associated with the imbalance between the warring parties with respect to heavy equipment. If the embargo could be lifted multilaterally, I would be for it, despite the attendant risks.

But our lifting the embargo unilaterally is something I would approach with great caution. Embargoes have become a principal tool of U.S. policy, and America's unilateral disregard of an agreed-on multilateral embargo would play merry hob with our policies elsewhere, Iraq and Libya most prominently.

Moreover, it would place the forces of our allies in danger and severely strain our relations with them. It might well lead to the same consequences as military escalation, the taking of hostages, the assault on the enclaves or safe havens, and the strangulation of humanitarian assistance.

Consequently, at least until the allies have sorted out what they wish to do with the peacekeeping forces, I would not proceed with this unilateral lifting of the embargo.

Third, diplomatic settlement. From the first, a diplomatic settlement has been the most appealing to outside parties who lack the passions of the disputants. Yet, we have not been realistic regarding the terms available for a settlement.

Having occupied 70 percent of Bosnia, the Serbs are not likely to surrender the gains on the battlefield simply to make the Americans or other outsiders happy.

Their recent successes have, no doubt, further emboldened them regarding the terms of the settlement. They are unlikely to surrender half of their gains in the absence of major military pressures against them.

Yet, the Bosnian government is hopeful of winning back much of the territory, given their hopes of the embargo lifted, the inflow of heavy equipment, and the possibility of outside air support.

This may be somewhat naive in that the training and the logistics for such equipment would consume time. And in the interim, a number of the enclaves would likely fall, with all the attendant horrors.

Nonetheless, in the absence of strong outside pressure, those hopes will not lightly be abandoned.

Mr. Chairman, none of this is attractive. But that, unavoidably, is the case when options, which were initially poor, have deteriorated significantly since the days that the Bush administration sought to choose amongst them.

This is unavoidably the case when a peacekeeping mission has gone awry and has provided hostages for the more aggressive of the warring parties.

The Serbs have correctly assessed that the outside world has little inclination to mount a full-scale operation on the ground and that the presence of the peacekeeping forces provides them with an effective hostage, thereby precluding a satisfactory response from the west.

When the alternatives are poor, we should recognize that reality. One should avoid impulsive actions or engaging in gestures. The choice of policy must be prudent.

A final alternative is withdrawal of the peacekeeping mission, but that is a decision that has already failed. But that is a decision that rests ultimately with our allies, whom we have encouraged to undertake this mission.

My guess is that, without substantial improvement in the diplomatic prospects, the allies will not go through another winter of this operation. But they will have to sort it out for themselves. Until that occurs, we should avoid making things worse.

Up until such a withdrawal, we and our allies should engage in a last ditch diplomatic offensive, bringing in the Russians and others, in an effort to bring the parties together.

That will require considerable realism on our side and a willingness to put pressure on the Muslims, as well as the Serbs. If such a withdrawal does occur and the parties proceed to fight it out, we should take measures to keep the conflict contained.

All this may not be very satisfying, Mr. Chairman, but it is probably the best we can do under the circumstances.

Mr. Chairman, I close with this observation. It is sometimes said that the United States has no serious national interest in what is going on in the former Yugoslavia. That is no longer true.

We do have a vital interest, one that cannot readily be conveyed in television images, but remains real, if intangible, nonetheless.

Our allies are now engaged on the ground. We must come out of the Balkans with the North Atlantic Alliance reasonably intact. If a choice has to be made, NATO is far more important than Bosnia.

NATO must not be allowed to become the principal victim of the Bosnian struggle. If a withdrawal under duress does take place, American forces must assist our allies in that withdrawal.

We must live up to our commitments. When our allies are in trouble, our response should not be, in a moral sense cannot be, to put their forces at greater risk through our deliberate action.

Indeed, our only honorable response must be: You can count on us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you, Dr. Schlesinger.

Ambassador Armitage.

# **STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, FORMER DI- RECTOR, U.S. ASSISTANCE TO NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES**

Ambassador ARMITAGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think that was a terrific statement, and I would like to congratulate Dr. Schlesinger.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Nunn, Senator Exon, I suspect that you are just about hearing-ed out on this question. I will be mercifully

brief and address simply the questions that you raised in your letter to me.

First of all, in my view, nothing in the Balkans is worth a falling out among traditional allies. I am a lot less concerned with who wins or loses this latest Balkan war than I am with the fates of the Canadians and the British and French and Jordanian and other soldiers who are trying to keep a nonexistent peace in Bosnia and Croatia.

So I would support without reservation the use of American force to help secure the evacuation of UNPROFOR from Bosnia.

Second, UNPROFOR should be evacuated. It is quite ludicrous to have a protection force which in turn needs protection. The use of outside military forces in this Third World corner of Europe seems to me to present us with two stark choices.

One is choose sides and force a military outcome, or the second is to stay out, let the warring parties eventually come to some sort of armistice and request a neutral monitoring group.

With UNPROFOR, we have the worst of all worlds, as you have discussed at great length in the hearings over the previous weeks. I will say that I was neither happy nor gratified to hear an administration official state that our policy was to keep UNPROFOR in and keep us out.

It seems to me, the administration needs a guide in just who our friends are. And the prospect of a large number of our allies and friends dying on the ground while we stand on the sidelines, playing with fire provides as good an illustration as any of moral vacuity, as far as I can see.

On the question of embargo. I would say no to the unilateral lifting of the embargo for the reasons very eloquently stated by my colleague on the panel. I do not know how we can expect to maintain solidarity on Iraq or develop solidarity in embargoes with Iran if we can unilaterally dismiss these embargoes.

Fourth, I think that some basic decisions have to be made, if we do consider listing an embargo. And that is: Who is going to do what concerning air power, et cetera, to bring about some sort of tactical equilibrium on the battlefield if the embargo is lifted.

Regarding multilateral lifting, I would support it if UNPROFOR is removed first, if we have made very clear decisions on who is going to do what in terms of support, air and other, for the Muslims until that tactical equilibrium is developed.

And third, my third condition would be that we do not have U.S. arms going to any of the warring sides. I would be very leery of any allies in the Balkans.

Finally, I do not put much faith in Mr. Milosevic, and Belgrade's willingness to really pressure the Bosnian Serbs. If the Serbs are the aggressors, and I am not arguing with the facts, but if we made that determination and they seem to have such an affection for the 13th century, then we ought to do everything in our power diplomatically to return them to that time for which they seem to have such an affection.

And I am talking way beyond an embargo. I wonder why Serbian nationals can travel anywhere in the world. I wonder why any financial transactions can take place there. But that is a separate question.

In summation, Mr. Chairman and Senator Nunn, my real concern is the health of the Atlantic Alliance. And should this alliance flounder on, of all things, a war in the Balkans, the administration will have undone, by sheer carelessness or inadvertence, the work of every American President since Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you, Ambassador Armitage.  
Colonel Summers.

#### STATEMENT OF COL. HARRY G. SUMMERS, JR., U.S. ARMY (RETIRED)

Colonel SUMMERS. I must say, being the cleanup speakers, I agree with everything Dr. Schlesinger said and Ambassador Armitage.

But I do want to provide a little bit different perspective, and that is that many people have compared U.S. policy in the Balkans and said that it would lead to another Vietnam. That is really what I would like to talk about today.

Does Bosnia have the potential to become another Vietnam? That was a question posed in my *Los Angeles Times Syndicate* column that appeared in this morning's *Washington Times*.

In one sense, the answer is clear, for in their specifics all wars are sui generis. "The main lesson of Vietnam," said one cynic, "is never again to become involved in a war in a former French colony in Indochina."

In another sense, the great Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz pointed out over a century ago, wars have certain principles and rules that can "provide a thinking man with a frame of reference."

Ignoring these principles led to disaster in Vietnam, and failure to consider them before becoming further involved in Bosnia can lead to similar grief there.

To my mind, four key rules were violated in Vietnam. First was a failure to understand the fundamental nature of the American military.

Second was the inability to set clear and unambiguous political objectives that were understandable to the American people, and it could be translated into attainable military tasks.

Third—and again I follow Dr. Schlesinger—was to confuse signaling with warfighting and in so doing encourage rather than deter aggression. Finally, there was the notion that the task could be accomplished quickly and easily by air power alone. "Vietnam is a reaffirmation of the peculiar relationship between the American Army and the American people," said then Army Chief of Staff Fred Weyand in July 1976.

The American Army really is a people's army in the sense that it belongs to the American people, who take a jealous and proprietary interest in its involvement. When the Army is committed, the American people are committed. When the American people lose their commitment, it is futile to try to keep the Army committed. "In the final analysis, the Army is not so much an army of the executive branch as it is an arm of the American people. The Army, therefore, cannot be committed lightly."

General Weyand's words were certainly true of the Vietnam conflict. As Harvard researcher Stephen Peter Rosen quotes Robert Osgood, one of the more influential of the limited war theorists, as "concluding that even though the American people will be hostile because of their traditions and ideology to the kind of strategy he proposes, that strategy must still be adopted."

Then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara simply factored the American people out of the strategic equation.

As he was quoted as saying, "The greatest contribution Vietnam is making—right or wrong is beside the point—is that it is developing an ability in the United States to fight a limited war, to go to war without the necessity of arousing the public ire."

As former Secretary of Defense Dean Rusk pointed out, it was one of the most consequential and far-reaching mistakes of the Vietnam war. "We tried to do in cold blood perhaps that can only be done in hot blood, when sacrifices of this order are involved," Rusk said. "At least that's a problem that people have to think of if anything, God forbid, should happen again."

But there are those who would ignore that issue. Those clamoring for U.S. military intervention in Bosnia are not standing in line at the recruiting office.

Edward Luttwak, a self-styled military strategist, who has successfully avoided ever hearing a shot fired in anger, wrote last year that Americans should be more sanguine about taking casualties in the pursuit of great power status.

One can assume he did not have himself or his family in mind. [Laughter.]

As The Washington Post columnist Richard Cohen, the celebrated coward of the Vietnam war, who bragged publicly that he had joined the National Guard to beat the draft with the full intention of deserting to Canada if his unit was mobilized, also wrote last year, that with the end of the draft, we had hired a volunteer force who, like fireman and policemen, should be ready to lay their lives on the line to protect their betters like Cohen.

These elitists did not know anyone in the military and did not even know anyone who knew anyone on the military. [Laughter.]

Their attitude seemed to be: Who cares whether they live or die?

It turned out, as General Weyand said, that the American people care. So did the representatives of the Congress. The "basic high school civics lesson" Senator Robert Byrd sent to the White House in the wake of the Mogadishu debacle, and these very hearings, are proof positive that the American people still take a jealous and proprietary interest in their military's commitment. The Army still cannot be committed lightly.

Over 10 years ago, drawing on the lessons of Vietnam, then Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger listed as one of his six preconditions for American involvement abroad the principle that there must be some reasonable assurance of public and congressional support.

Although derided at the time, it was restated almost word for word last year in President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive 25 on peacekeeping operations.

How do you get that support? A simple equation is involved.

As Clausewitz explained over a century ago, "Since war is not an act of senseless passion, but is controlled by its political purpose, the value of this purpose must determine the sacrifice made for it in magnitude and in duration."

Thus, it is a political purpose for our involvement, not casualties per se, as some pundits would argue, that determine the length and intensity of U.S. involvement.

In World War II, the political purpose was survival of nations. We paid over a million casualties in pursuit of it. In Vietnam, the political purpose was never clear. According to one analyst, there were some 22 separate official U.S. rationales for involvement, many of which were mutually exclusive.

With the value never fully established, the cost eventually became exorbitant. In the fall of 1967, after 30 months of fighting and 16,000 American killed in battle, American opinion turned against the war.

For all intents and purposes, although it would drag on for another 8 years, the war was lost. The equation was a work more recently in Somalia, where the political purpose was also vague. There 18 Americans deaths were enough to force a U.S. withdrawal.

With its constant vacillation on the Bosnian policy, the Clinton administration seems intent on breaking the Vietnam record on the number of U.S. objectives. The value that would determine the magnitude and duration of American sacrifices has not been said.

Last November, Secretary of Defense William Perry made that very point. "In Bosnia," he said, "it would take hundreds of thousands of troops and probably significant casualties to impose the outcome we want, peace. That's a level of blood and treasure that is not commensurate with our national interest. Therefore," he concluded, "we're not about to enter that war as a combatant."

That was the speech his predecessor, the feckless Robert McNamara, ought to have made in 1965 when he concluded that the war in Vietnam was militarily unwinnable. But he did not, and tens of thousands of Americans died as a result.

Bosnia holds a similar peril. Now flirting with a variety of pretext for committing U.S. ground troops in Bosnia, Perry needs to stick to his original wise admonition against U.S. involvement.

The Defense Department needs to stand firm, for it appears that the State Department is still enamored of the Vietnam-era limited war fantasy that wars are a matter of sending signals rather than imposing your will on the enemy by force of arms. "If the enemy is to be coerced," said Clausewitz, "you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call upon him to make. Otherwise, he wouldn't give but would wait for things to improve."

But that principle is lost on the limited war theorists who, as Rosen pointed out, share "the happy belief that the study of limited war in no way depended on any actual knowledge about war."

According to Robert Osgood, "Military problems are no proper part of a theory of limited war, because limited war is essentially a diplomatic instrument, a tool for bargaining with the enemy." "Military forces," these theorists preached, "are not for fighting but for signaling."



In a story with disturbing parallels with the recent shootdown of the American F-16 over Bosnia, where, reportedly for political reasons, the U.N. refused to let "Wild Weasel" electronic warfare countermeasure aircraft fly cover for the fighters, General William C. Westmoreland told of a particularly idiotic application of such limited war theories. "In 1965, we observed the construction of the first surface-to-air missile sites in North Vietnam, and the military sought permission to attack them before they were completed to save American casualties. The Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton ridiculed the idea.

"You don't think the North Vietnamese are going to use them," he scoffed to Seventh Air Force Commander Joseph Moore. "Putting them in is just a political ploy by the Russians to appease Hanoi." It was all a matter of signals for the clever civilian theorists in Washington. We won't bomb the SAM sites, which signals the North Vietnamese not to use them."

But our enemies were not playing Washington's silly games. A month later, the United States lost its first aircraft to a SAM.

The United States was sending signals, just as the limited war theorists had recommended, but the signal was that the United States was a paper tiger.

Unlike North Vietnam, the United States was never serious about warfighting. In words that sound suspiciously like U.S. Bosnian policy today, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor told the Senate in 1966 that we were not trying to defeat North Vietnam, only "to cause them to mend their ways."

Taylor likened the concept of defeating the enemy to "Appomattox or something of that sort."

But Appomattox was exactly the way the war ended, for the enemy was playing by the old rules where the very object of war is victory.

And it would appear that Bosnian Serbs, Muslim and Christian alike, are playing by exactly the same rules. Peacekeeping there is a farce, for there is no peace there to keep. Both sides still believe they have more to gain by fighting than by negotiating.

One of the strangest legacies of the Vietnam war is the emergence of what, for lack of a better name, could be called the interventionist doves.

Opposed to all past U.S. military interventions, and Vietnam in particular, they now see the military as a kind of *deus ex machina*, literally "God from a machine," the ancient Greco-Roman dramatic device of luring God by stage machinery down into the middle of a play to sort out the complications of the plot. [Laughter.]

Military forces, they believe, and air power in particular, can solve all our problems in Bosnia. On a radio talk show recently, a former ambassador there assured the audience that American air power could end the conflict in a week.

He and his ilk are strange bedfellows with the air power zealots who believed that the war in Vietnam could have been won with an intensified bombing campaign like the so-called Christmas bombing in December 1972 that brought Vietnam back to the negotiating table.

But others have argued, persuasively to my mind, that it was President Richard Nixon's unexpected exercise of will that brought Hanoi back to the table, not the bombing itself.

As he said at the time, "We have the power to destroy North Vietnam's war-making capability. The only question is whether we have the will to use that power. What distinguishes me from Johnson is that I have the will in spades."

It is fair to say that what distinguishes President Clinton from Nixon is that when it comes to Bosnia, he has no will to wage war whatsoever. And neither do the American people.

As the furor over the shoot-down of Air Force Captain Scott O'Grady made clear, air power does not provide a cost-free way.

Given the lack of objectives, any cost in American lives, as in Mogadishu, will apt to be excessive in the eyes of the American people. That being the case, the United States should stay out of the fray.

Secretary Perry had it right last November. With no U.S. vital interests involved, we should declare a pox on all their houses and let them have at it. In any event, that is what they are going to do whether we like it or not.

Thank you very much.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you, Colonel Summers, for your fine statement.

I want to thank all you gentlemen for your splendid statements.

Speaking of the Vietnam war, my understanding was that Secretary of Defense McNamara took the position that his goal was not to win, just stop communism. You cannot fight a war like that. If you are going to war, you have to go into it to win.

If we had bombed Hanoi and bombed it more, we could have won the war. But Secretary McNamara did not follow that goal. And President Johnson followed Secretary McNamara. That is the reason we did not win the Vietnam war, in my opinion.

Now, Dr. Schlesinger, in our first hearing on Bosnia last week, Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili expressed their main concern that the Bosnia war might spread and that this might jeopardize vital U.S. interests. I share that concern.

I am equally concerned that the administration does not appear to have a plan to contain the conflict, except to pursue the status quo. That includes a deployment of 500 lightly armed and lightly defended U.S. troops under the U.N. in Macedonia.

What plans would you propose to keep the conflict from spreading into the Southern Balkans? And how would you deal with what General John Galvin calls "the chain of consequences"?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It is hard, Mr. Chairman, to respond immediately to that question. One has to think about it at length.

Some of the factors that I might enumerate involve settling the dispute over Macedonia. Part of our diplomatic offensive should be to persuade the Greek government, to cease withholding the outside world's acceptance of Macedonia.

We are in the strange position of having troops in a country that is not generally recognized. And incidently, in Bosnia, we have no troops in a country that is generally recognized.

Chairman THURMOND. Dr. Schlesinger, please speak in the loud-speaker so we can all hear you.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Right.

Another element is that either way we go, we can create risks of a spreading conflict. One of the reasons for some care on our part with regard to enlarging the conflict within Bosnia and with the Serbs is that it would undoubtedly bring major Russian support for the Serbs.

And the images of an extending conflict, in which the West was beating up the Serbs, appearing on Russian television would have the same effect on Russian opinion as the Russian troops beating up on Chechens has had in the United States.

I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, but I cannot give a complete answer to that question. It would require very careful analysis in advance. I do hope that the administration is proceeding in that direction.

Chairman THURMOND. Ambassador Armitage, the administration is clearly committed to giving the allied nations a leading role in Bosnia.

Yet most observers agree that the United Nations can no longer carry out its mandates and that the presence of UNPROFOR may actually be an impediment to a solution.

UNPROFOR cannot deliver humanitarian supplies to the enclaves, enforce the Sarajevo exclusion zone, protect the U.N.-protected areas or even protect its own troops. If UNPROFOR withdraws into defended areas, it will be even more difficult to conduct its humanitarian and military observer missions.

In light of these circumstances, Mr. Ambassador, and the immense cost, why you believe the administration is so determined to keep UNPROFOR in Bosnia?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. Well, I can only repeat what I said in my statement about some administration official who spoke to the newspapers and said that our policy was to keep UNPROFOR in and to keep us out.

You have correctly identified all the problems. There is no reason to keep UNPROFOR in Bosnia at all, in my view.

Further, I believe the administration is hiding behind the United Nations. There is a basic disconnect here. The last time I checked, we were the most powerful member of the Security Council, and yet we continually seek to cede to the Secretary General powers that are not envisioned in the charter of the United Nations Security Council.

So I think the administration, to large measure, is using the United Nations to hide behind. They do this because they feel that the United States cannot act in a moral way, so we have to kind of take the edge off great power action by hiding in the U.N. context.

Chairman THURMOND. Colonel Summers, your prepared statement provides an excellent analysis of Western failures regarding Bosnia at the level of strategy. But we have also seen disgraceful failures at the operational level.

Our air crews are sent over Bosnia Serb territory without an air defense suppression capability and are shot down. U.N. troops are put into exposed positions to be killed or captured.

U.N. troops and now our allies are sending in a Rapid Reaction Force, whose mission and rules of engagement are not clear.

Rules of command is violated by the so-called dual-key arrangement between the United Nations and NATO. Would you please give us your analysis of why these operational failures persist and what the U.S. Government might do to end them?

Colonel SUMMERS. Well, I think, as in the Vietnam war, the initial failure is strategic; that is, a lack of clear-cut objectives and clear-cut goals that need to be accomplished.

Absent that clarity at the strategic level, at the operational and tactical level, it is bound to come apart because this other piece—you cannot have a tactic or an operational maneuver that is not in consonance with your overall strategy.

So what we need to do is have absolute clarity about exactly what we are trying to accomplish in Bosnia. And with that clarity, then you can build the operational considerations and the tactical considerations to support it.

But right now, again, the great tragedy of Vietnam in my mind, having two tours there and losing a lot of friends, is that all the effort, all the bravery, all the dedication was unfocused. And because it was unfocused, it was to no avail.

And that is exactly what we are seeing in Bosnia today. There is a lack of focus on the U.N. operations and the air power and all the rest, because—and the lack of focus is because we lack an objective.

Chairman THURMOND. Dr. Schlesinger, most members of Congress support a possible NATO mission to cover the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, if necessary.

But if we end up being in it for any other reason—for example, to support the new Rapid Reaction Force—Americans could be killed for dubious purposes. And public opinion could blame our allies.

The potential backlash could determine political support for the allies, at a time when blaming and finger pointing are already hurting allies solidarity.

Would you please give us your views on this danger and how it can be avoided?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The danger is substantial. One of the reasons that I am concerned about precipitous American action in Bosnia is that it could lead to attacks on our allied forces and the allied governments and allied public opinion would blame the United States for precipitating the actions that put their troops at risk.

So one of the things that we must be careful about is not giving our allies cause to believe that the impetuosity of the United States was the thing that triggered their troubles.

With regard to the Rapid Reaction Force, Mr. Chairman, I must say that it is not clear to me what its specific purpose is, other than to intimidate the Bosnian Serbs.

If it is successful in intimidating the Bosnia Serbs, that is a desirable thing. But unfortunately, it does not seem to have any clear purpose related to the other functions of UNPROFOR.

If it goes in, I think it will be able to take care of itself. Those are well-armed troops. What will be at risk is not so much the allied casualties, which they themselves will have precipitated, rather than our precipitating it, it will be the possibility of major sweeps against the safe havens by the Serbs.

I think that the casualties, under those circumstances, are much more likely to occur on the other side.

In any event, I do not think that those forces would need support from the United States. Attacks on those limited deployments of UNPROFOR, if precipitated by the introduction of the rapid reaction force, it seems to me that we should be willing to help in those circumstances, as we would be willing to help in circumstances in which the Bosnian Serbs themselves precipitated the action.

But I think that it should be a prelude to the total withdrawal of UNPROFOR. As I have stated earlier, that mission is finished. It is over.

There is no peacekeeping mission of a classical nature left, and we should recognize that. Our allies, I hope, will come to recognize it.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you, Dr. Schlesinger. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a couple questions here that I hope I can get a brief answer to. I think that the record should be very clear on this. I believe it probably already is.

But the House of Representatives voted last week for a unilateral lift of the arms embargo on the government of Bosnia. Each one of you have talked about that, but could I get for the record for each of you: Do you agree with that action. If the same question is presented in the Senate, would you favor that unilateral lift? Dr. Schlesinger.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, I would hesitate to make any invidious comments about the other body in this chamber. But if the Senate is cautious, that would be desirable. It should exercise its wisdom and judgment—

Senator NUNN. Well, I thought you already said you were against a unilateral lift?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, I have.

Senator NUNN. Okay. Well, that is the answer I was looking for. [Laughter.]

Ambassador Armitage.

Ambassador ARMITAGE. I oppose the unilateral lift, sir.

Senator NUNN. Because of?

Colonel SUMMERS. Again, because of the importance of our allies, I oppose doing it unilaterally. But I think post-withdrawal of our allies from there, I think then the question could be reconsidered.

Senator NUNN. Okay. I believe each one of you—I believe Secretary Schlesinger suggested kind of a final effort at diplomacy as a prelude, but each one of you have envisions a withdrawal for forces, of U.N. forces, at some point with the peacekeeping mission being over.

I believe Dr. Schlesinger made it clear that should be done by the allies, not our decision, but their decision.

But let us assume that they do withdraw. Now, when they do withdraw, one of the big problems is going to be enclaves. Those people are probably going to want to leave with them. If they do not leave with them, they is probably going to be some big conflict there.

From all the military analysis I have had, with the Bosnian government being the only exception, those enclaves are virtually undefendable.

Now, when we get into that situation, withdrawal taking place, huge fighting breaks out in the enclave, people are getting killed, displayed on CNN, American public, public around the world, understand are sympathetic to that, at that stage, would you favor air strikes to protect the enclaves?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Once the UNPROFOR is out, I think the answer is yes. I think that the Bosnian Serbs have earned this kind of response.

Senator NUNN. Ambassador Armitage.

Ambassador ARMITAGE. Yes, I do.

Senator NUNN. Colonel Summers.

Colonel SUMMERS. As an infantryman in two wars, I am not that enamored of air power and the ability to accomplish what many people believe that it would. I think you are either in or your are out. If you go in with air power, then what? Then when our pilots go down, you go in and you rescue them.

I mean, it begins again the whole chain of escalation. I think we make a decision either we are in or we are out. And if we are out, we stay out.

Senator NUNN. We talked about the European rapid reaction force. They are doing that through the U.N., the French and the British.

That means that expenses will be assessed to the United Nations' members council, resulting in possibly a 30-percent charge to the United States. Do you favor the United States approval of paying our part of that charge to the U.N? Dr. Schlesinger.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Ambassador Armitage.

Ambassador ARMITAGE. Yes, I favor it, and I would also favor use of our enormous influence there to measure it with the huge cost we are bearing.

Senator NUNN. Colonel Summers.

Colonel SUMMERS. Yes. I would favor it as well, yes.

Senator NUNN. I had a recent meeting with a top official from Bosnia. In effect, he said the United States had wronged his country by the embargo and that we had a moral obligation to give air cover once the embargo is lifted and so forth.

Do you think we have acquired a moral obligation to come to the aid of Bosnia after withdrawal?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I think that we have no moral obligation to come to the aid of Bosnia, but we do have a moral obligation which comes from the complexity or duality of American policy.

We have encouraged over these last three years the Bosnian Muslims to stand their ground on the premise, the hope, that some outside assistance was coming to them.

As a result, there have been many more mortalities than had needed to be the case. And in addition to that, they have steadily lost ground to the Bosnian Serbs.

If we are not going to help, we ought not to provide the inference for them to draw that we are going to help. So we have something

of a moral blot on our record, but I do not think that that requires our intervention.

Senator NUNN. Ambassador Armitage.

Ambassador ARMITAGE. We have no moral—

Senator NUNN. Colonel Summers.

Colonel SUMMERS. I was at General Shalikashvili's New Year's party, and I told Secretary Perry how impressed I was with his statement on why the United States ought not to become involved on the ground in Bosnia.

Unbeknownst to me, the Bosnia Ambassador was standing next to him, who is not nearly as happy with that statement as I was.

But as I said to him at the time, "At least we ought to be honest with you."

We ought not to do what we did in Vietnam, saying, "We are your big buddies. We are here for you. We are going to take care of you," and then cut and run when it got difficult.

So I think that—again, we ought to make it clear that U.S. interests are not involved, and we have no moral commitment to Bosnia. Otherwise we just prolong the feeling that they could depend on us when in fact they cannot.

Senator NUNN. And we are caught in that somewhat ambivalent situation today.

Colonel SUMMERS. Precisely.

Senator NUNN. You each talked about—I think you have covered the major points, but I want to make one other—one other question I want to make sure we get the answer on, and that is, we have talked about the obligation of the United States to help our NATO forces withdraw when they decide to withdraw.

Do you believe that we ought to be urging them to withdraw now? Do you think the United States policy ought to be to urge the allies to withdraw?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. That may be a trifle too strong. But certainly, we should urge them carefully to consider the benefits of withdraw.

Ambassador ARMITAGE. I would be urging them to withdraw.

Colonel SUMMERS. I would as well. At least quietly perhaps, but I think yes.

Senator NUNN. The other question is: Let's forget the total withdrawal for a moment. Let's say that emergency situations develop on the ground in Bosnia now, next week, next month, before withdrawal.

Would you favor the United States helping the allies, even if it included committing ground forces temporarily, briefly, in emergency situations where their lives are in peril?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I do not think that situation should arise. But if it did arise, I would be prepared to go to the support of the allies.

Ambassador ARMITAGE. Senator Nunn, my answer would be yes. But in that case, I would be redoubling my efforts to get the allies to withdraw as well.

Colonel SUMMERS. I think Ambassador Armitage made the key point. The prize is our NATO alliance and our NATO allies. And that, I think, would warrant the use of U.S. forces, if they were in danger, but in support of NATO and our NATO allies, much more so than support of a Bosnian policy.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.

I just would say that all the witnesses, I think, have been enormously helpful. And I would note that we have not had a single witness before this committee, that I know of, in this set of hearings—perhaps if I am wrong, someone could correct me—that has called for agreed for a unilateral withdrawal or, rather, a unilateral lifting of the embargo, while our allies are still on the ground in Bosnia.

Not a single witness has agreed with that. And, in fact, every witness we have had has stated from whatever that overall perspective, that that would be a serious mistake.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join others in commending these individuals to come before this committee today and their testimony has been of great value, as it has been in the past, from all three.

Let me just recount. You may have been over these points. I have been on the floor with the present measure, and I am sorry I was not here for your opening statements.

Yesterday, we had a very distinguished panel, as we do today, with the President and General Galvin. And I distinctly put two questions, and I want to put the same two questions.

Given the status of the conflict today and the likelihood that it would continue in this status for some time, do we, the United States, have a vital national security interest in that conflict? Just sort of yes or no.

Dr. Schlesinger.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. As I indicated in my testimony, we have a vital interest now, and that is the preservation of the NATO alliance. With regard to the area itself, we have no vital interest.

Senator WARNER. So in terms of the strategic ramifications, no, but it is just the association with NATO.

Ambassador ARMITAGE. I agree with that, sir.

Colonel SUMMERS. I agree, as well.

Senator WARNER. Now, much thought is given to the danger of spillover. And that, of course, could be at varying degrees. But if the conflict were to get into a spillover situation, would then we have a vital national security interest in terms of the strategic geography of that area?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It depends where the spillover occurs.

Senator WARNER. I understand that. But let's assume that it is spillover which could begin to involve, say, Greece and Turkey and perhaps Romania, Bulgaria; in other words, the threat of a generalized Balkan conflict.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I can imagine circumstances in which that would occur. I think that they are very unlikely. The worst possibility is a fight between Greece and Turkey. But they have avoided fights over issues closer to their own direct interest, as opposed to what is going on in Serbia.

Senator WARNER. But the question is: Should that occur? We are postulating. Then does the United States have a vital national security interest?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. It could arise. As I suggested earlier, we must take measures to—in advance, diplomatic measures to contain that.



Senator WARNER. Well, I understand that. But the question was addressed, if all of those efforts failed, and you do find a creeping spread beyond the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. If a vital interest does seem to occur, then we will have to react to it, and I will cross that bridge when I come to it.

Senator WARNER. Secretary Armitage.

Ambassador ARMITAGE. It seems to me that if Greece and Turkey are on the verge of fighting, it is not quite a vital interest, but it is a very serious political matter for the United States, an enormous one, and a serious national matter.

Senator WARNER. Colonel Summers.

Colonel SUMMERS. Again, it is just amazing to me that the domino theory once again surfaces in Bosnia, as it did in Vietnam. I do not think it was applicable in Vietnam. I do not think it is applicable in Bosnia.

Again, if our NATO allies start to confront each other, certainly the United States has to take action to try to ameliorate that. But, you know, the Bosnian Serbs are not from Mars.

Why should they be—Abe Rosenthal makes a point in *The New York Times*, kind of interesting, the fight over Bosnia, within the pages of *The New York Times* between Anthony Lewis and Rosenthal.

But the Bosnian Serbs are native to the area. I mean, they are not invaders from outer space. So why should they be extending their war into Macedonia and elsewhere? I just do not see—I do not buy the original premise, I guess, is my problem.

Senator WARNER. Yesterday, a group of us had an opportunity to visit with President Giscard of France, and he seemed to think that if UNPROFOR would pull out, that the conflict certainly would occur, and occur in proportions that the Serbs, given their strength of arms today, are likely to take whatever remains of Bosnia they desire.

And that is it. They would not, in any way, try to engender a spillover into other areas—President Shiraque—excuse me—spillover into other areas.

So that what an interesting observation. President Shiraque also said that he felt that the addition of the French and British forces, the augmentation forces, were necessary, of course, to protect their forces in place, and presumably other UNPROFOR forces. But the U.N.—and I copied this down in my notes. “The U.N. will define the mission of those forces.”

So we will have to await that definition, as to what that mission is and how they are to be utilized. And that, of course, further engages us in some concern about this conflict.

Last, Senator Nunn put forth the hypothetical on emergencies. And this was one that—this was a situation that Secretary Perry and the Chairman dealt with before this committee several days ago.

And it caused this senator a good deal of concern, because I do not think emergency lends itself to a clear definition as it regards military operations. And it largely resides in the minds of the on-scene commander as to whether or not he thinks it is an emergency.

I do not know how much review of his judgment can be exercised, and I subscribe to Colonel Summers's doctrine. If we start going in on these things, we are involved. I mean, it would be a major headline throughout the world.

If the United States went in to try and relocate certain UNPROFOR forces, or now the augmented French and British forces, or got into it, we are in it.

And then there is another emergency and another. And it does not come down to this is an emergency situation. Simply, we are involved.

I see that as a profound risk. And because, as the distinguished Chairman has said, the sentiment in this country, and indeed in this Congress, at this point in time is—and I certainly share in that sentiment—that no further involvement beyond the sea and air that we have.

What do you feel about, Colonel Summers, the word "emergency" in military doctrine and whether it lends itself to a definition?

Colonel SUMMERS. I am reminded of an incident in Vietnam where, in the middle of the night, we get a request asking for an artillery concentration.

And we asked, "Well, what is your target?"

And the guy came back and says, "Sniper." And we said, "Well, for Christ's sake, we don't fire artillery concentrations at snipers. Do you know what they cost?"

And the guy said, "I don't give a damn what they cost. This bastard is trying to kill me."

So in his estimation, that was an emergency.

Senator WARNER. Yes.

Colonel SUMMERS. But it is all in the eyes of the beholder. But I think for the United States to become involved militarily, it has to be certainly something that is of major consequence to the United States.

And we have to weigh each one of these on its own merits. And I think that you cannot predetermine your response in an emergency, because you do not know what the emergency is.

But I would think that if it was a serious challenge to our NATO allies, I think then the United States—again, the key is NATO, not Bosnia. And I think we ought to keep our eye on the prize, and the prize is NATO.

Senator NUNN. One of the—if I could intervene on this point?

Senator WARNER. Go right ahead.

Senator NUNN. This is going to be very important when we get on the floor of the Senate with a resolution, which may authorize U.S. forces helping in a withdrawal. And that may be coming within the next week or so.

How to deal with this emergency situation. I mean, I agree with the dangers of using that term, particularly if it is a congressional enactment, because it is so vague.

On the other hand, I do not think we ought to preclude that. I do not think the Congress, the Senate, ought to preclude the United States from helping our allies in what may really, we would all sitting here agree, be an extremist situation.

One way of possibly handling that—I am just thinking out loud here, and I would like reaction from the witnesses and my col-

leagues, because this is, I think, a key point—is to say something in the resolution to the effect that nothing shall preclude the President from exercising his authority as Commander in Chief, so that you basically have that broad authority.

But it has to be dealt with somehow. I do not think we want to authorize it in the sense of opening the door to any kind of commitment. But on the other hand, I do not think we want to preclude it. But I would invite my colleague—

Senator WARNER. Well, Senator, let's just take a minute here and colloquy on that, because I think we are reaching a consensus that we should, while maybe not urging our allies to withdraw, in the words of the distinguished former Secretary of Defense, we should be pointing out the virtues.

Maybe the semantics are going to be lost here. But it seems to me if they are determined to continue, as I understand it, to try and make the UNPROFOR work and perform some type of mission, maybe a variation from the original, with the augmentation forces backing up that mission, then if we are periodically called in on an emergency situation, we are partners now in that mission, namely to continue to have UNPROFOR perform functions. And it seems to me we are in it.

Now, if it were an emergency that was a precursor to begin to pull them out, or a part of the withdrawal, then I would share my views with my colleague from Georgia.

But my concern is, if the allies are determined to make UNPROFOR work in some form or another, and we go in periodically on emergency missions, we are then partners in that mission.

Senator NUNN. I say to my friend he makes, I think, a good point. I do not want to get into that situation, so we are in total agreement on that.

The difficulty is if there were French or British soldiers, 100 of them surrounded, and they were being picked off one by one, and it was a clear situation where they were either going to die or somebody had to come in there beyond the forces they had, I do not think we would want to deny our allies by congressional resolution—

Senator WARNER. No. I agree with you on that.

Senator NUNN [continuing]. The ability to have that kind of relief. So it is a thin line between those two hopefully extremes.

I hope that neither one of those hypotheticals comes about, or I do not—that is why I think we have to find some way to not endorse that, not encourage it, but also not preclude some really extreme situation from U.S. participating.

Senator WARNER. Well, I think it is important—and my time is up—that we do that in a manner that does not abridge the President's constitutional powers as Commander in Chief to make those types of decisions.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, perhaps you could not count by interjection against the Senator's time.

Senator WARNER. That is all right. I had more than my share of time. I believe—Ambassador Armitage, did you wish to add something.

Ambassador ARMITAGE. Well, I am not sure I am going to add—but I think there is a dangerous underlying current that I hear in

the discussion here, particularly as evidenced in the comments of President Chirac, when he says we have to await the outcome of the U.N. deliberation, or whatever he said. Well, the U.N. is not a stand-alone body.

And as I said before, one time before, President Clinton said the U.N. has to learn to say no. Well, we have to learn to say no. We should be the guiding force behind the United Nations, as the leading member of the Security Council.

So I think we have to keep careful sight of the fact that we do control our fate, whether it is in NATO or whether it is in the United Nations, and not lose sight of that.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, if I could ask for 30 seconds, and then I will yield to my colleague. I want to make sure that I characterize accurately President Chirac's views.

It was an excellent exchange, with perhaps 8 or 10 Senators. Senator Nunn was present. And it was very constructive. But I certainly judged—and I would be interested if Senator Nunn had the same impression—that he is quite determined to try and make UNPROFOR work one last time. And that is the reason for the augmentation forces.

And he said, of course, those forces, while they are not going to wear blue helmets, somehow their mission will be defined eventually by the U.N. I gained that impression.

Did the Senator from Georgia gain the similar impression?

Senator NUNN. I think I would agree with that. I believe that the mood—I do not want to try to quote that meeting at all, because it was a private meeting.

But the mood I gathered from that meeting and other meetings generally was that our allies, based on the recent humiliating hostage taking, determined not to withdraw under humiliating circumstances.

I think I would rather say it that way, and certainly to try to make the mission as successful as possible during the interim period. But I believe—my own feeling is that the string is running out.

And it is my view that this mission has failed. And it is also my view that diplomacy has one last chance, but should not be indefinite in its application.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Robb.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To the three distinguished guests and contributors this morning, thank you. I, unfortunately, was dealing with another sensitive part of the world this morning and could not get here for your opening statements. I have had a chance to review at least two out of the three statements.

I wonder if I could ask you to focus on an area which has not received a great deal of focus to date with our various hearings on this question.

And that is precisely what the role of the United States, in conjunction with NATO—and I assume there is fairly wide concurrence that it ought to only be in that context—would be with regard to a policy of containment post-UNPROFOR?

In other words, under whatever circumstances compel, require or suggest the removal of UNPROFOR, an essential containment pol-

icy is in effect, I would ask each of you if you could comment on what the NATO and specific U.S. role in a strictly containment situation, where we are not attempting to intervene within the containment area, which presumably would be Bosnia-Herzegovina or maybe the former Yugoslavia, depending on how it breaks out.

But what kind of role—and if you could, some sense of the magnitude of force that NATO, again with a U.S. component, might have to commit to that type of an action and for what period of time, if we get to that particular stage.

Secretary Schlesinger? I do not know what order—

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, let me start then, Senator Robb. I agree with the comments made earlier that Serbia's objectives, the objectives of the Serbs are limited.

They would like to reestablish a greater Serbia. But that involves encompassing the Serbs within Serbia. It does not spill beyond.

So it would require a reaction on the part of Serbia's neighbors to go to war with Serbia over that issue. I think that so strong a reaction, as opposed to disappointment, is unlikely.

If that were to occur, it should be part of our objective now to take advance diplomatic steps to see to it that that spillover would be contained, potential spillover would be contained. I think that diplomacy should be able to do what is a very modest task.

If not, then the decision may be taken, may be taken—I doubt that it would be taken, but it might be taken—to involve outside air. It should be under the command of SACEUR—outside forces, initially air. It should be under the command of SACEUR.

Our aircraft would be operating in collaboration with ground forces of whatever power is engaged on the side that we support.

For the time being at least, it would not be necessary for us to contemplate moving in ground forces. So I think you have two fences of protection, as it were, against the spreading that you refer to.

Ambassador ARMITAGE. I do not think, Senator Robb, I can add much to that. I am not competent to come up with a number, for instance in Macedonia, a number of troops.

But it is quite clear if we are intent that that was the next area that it would spread from, it could just as well spread from within Macedonia and the problems within, rather than across the border.

So it is something that I think has to be approached pretty gingerly.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Could I add something before Colonel Summers does?

I think that the risks are of a misunderstanding of U.S. policy. We must show that we are determined to fulfill those commitments, which we airily discuss in advance. We have put forces in Macedonia.

Those forces, in my judgment, were at no risk, as long as it was clear that the Americans would back up those forces. To the extent that our policy seems to be wavering, then they could come under attack. There is a risk that can be countered only by clarity and credibility of American policy.

Colonel SUMMERS. I think part of the problem is we have seen a kind of mission creep in the UN. That is, the UN peacekeeping

operations were originally conceived to deal with disputes between nation states. And it had some limited success in that area.

But now we have a mission creep, and they are trying to resolve disputes within nation states. And to my view, that may not be doable, as a matter of fact.

So I think as we withdraw from what I think was a mistaken endeavor to begin with, then we are back to the premise of trying to keep the peace between nation states.

And I think, both with NATO and the UN, we are better equipped to do that than we are to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations. And I think that has been the mistake of trying to do that.

Senator ROBB. One other—Secretary Schlesinger, you mentioned the troops along the Macedonia border, and we of course have some additional troops in Croatia at this point, and a very small number of troops that are actually in the areas of critical concern.

Putting aside those that are in the area of fighting or potential fighting in the near term, does the decision to put the hospital and other troops into Croatia and the troops along the Macedonian border—to you have any reservations about that and/or about any potential utilization of those particular troops as trip wire, as reinforcement, as whatever else might be involved?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Well, I hesitate to put American forces in these positions, because for many of the parties involved, at some point, targeting Americans becomes part of the payoff. And that has to be thought through carefully in advance. In this case, we are already there.

So what reservations I may have seem to me to be irrelevant at this juncture.

Senator ROBB. But in terms of oversight, as has been suggested in any number of situations, whatever is done need not be permanent, would you, in terms of just counsel, not lacking support for decisions already made, but in terms of counseling future actions, would you suggest that perhaps thought ought to be given to removing those forces?

I am trying to get some sense of where we might evolve to in terms of the out-of-battle area.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I am hesitant to put in American forces, indeed any Western forces, in positions in which those forces are not sufficiently robust to defend themselves and in which the lines of communication are not such that we could, if the necessity arose, quickly extricate them.

It does not seem to me that we have been careful about these kinds of considerations in advance. We have a proclivity to do things out of impetuosity, make gestures, and then we have to worry about the consequences of the gestures that we have made.

Colonel SUMMERS. The worst possible thing you can do when using military force is to bluff, because it is obvious to the other side that you are bluffing. We ought to have learned that in Beirut, if no place else.

As Dr. Schlesinger said, when you put forces in, the perception ought to be that you are back them to the hilt, and do not fool with the United States, because if you do, something bad is going to happen to you.

Unfortunately, we have let that erode, and that is the danger of what is happening now in Bosnia. And I think the French see it very clearly that if they are forced to withdraw, sort of being forced out by the Serbs, what happens to the credibility of NATO, where they encourage other aggressors to challenges with impunity?

So whenever we put in a trip wire, there ought to be something to trip. I think that has been true in Korea and Germany, for example, over the years.

I do not think it is true in—I question whether or not it is true in Macedonia. And because it is questionable, then it becomes dangerous.

Ambassador ARMITAGE. It seems not my position to tell the oversight panel how they should conduct oversight, but it seems to me that in questions of insertion of U.S. troops in any circumstance, that you ought to require of any administration to make judgments on how many levels of violence might accompany this.

And if you force them to make those determinations of how many suggestive steps of violence might be entailed, I think it is incumbent upon the administration to come to the view that they are not going to start on level one of the violence unless they have internally made the decision they are willing to carry it through to the end.

Those are legitimate questions that very rarely are asked. I mean, I have been involved in those deliberations in the administration. We do not generally think through the whole circumstance and make some decisions in advance.

Senator ROBB. One final follow-up question with respect to those forces and the MEU, which is in the ARG, which is off the coast right now, as well as the Fifth Army Corps that is transitioning from Germany to Italy or whatever the case may be.

Would those forces, in your judgment, Colonel Summers or anybody else, on the ground, be sufficient to provide the kind of emergency support necessary for that limited commitment to a non-combat area?

Colonel SUMMERS. It is hard to say without knowing the nature of the emergency. But I think someone raised President Eisenhower's response in Lebanon earlier.

I mean, he let it be known that he was willing to go the limit, including the use of nuclear weapons, if necessary, to enforce the U.S. position there. That is, a small force went in, but behind it was all the force and majesty of the United States.

So if a Marine expeditionary unit goes in, behind it ought to be the will and determination of the United States. And that ought to be clear. If you screw with these people, shame on you, because something bad is going to happen to you.

Senator ROBB. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would concur with the statements that were made earlier and certainly with my friend and colleague from Georgia, that we ought to be very careful about any attempt to restrict the power of the Commander in Chief in his capacity as Commander in Chief to take whatever actions he believes is necessary, might be necessary, in that regard, even though we might want to constrain in other ways in terms of the advice and counsel that we give.

I would certainly be very much opposed to specific limitations on that power.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Mr. Chairman, may I add one thing to the question that Senator Robb has raised?

During the Cold War, there was great caution about targeting Americans, targeting American forces. And the Soviets saw to it that any of their satellites or any of their instrumentalities were very careful with regard to targeting Americans.

One of the consequences with the end of the Cold War is that you have a whole array of forces out there which are, by previous standards, quite undisciplined. And, therefore, we must be more cautious about putting Americans in the line of fire simply for reasons of political symbolism.

Senator ROBB. Mr. Chairman, could I just—30 seconds, just to follow up on that.

Would there be any distinction that you would make between U.S. forces and U.S. nationals that might be part of a western relief organization or some NGO, whatever the case may be?

In other words, ought our concern be to those who wear the uniform and specifically represent the United States, as opposed to those who happen to be U.S. citizens serving in some other capacity?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. There is greater concern for those who wear the uniform of the United States. They are our official representative.

Usually, the others are volunteers to be there. They may know the risks. We should be concerned about them, but they have gone there knowing the risks to themselves and have proceeded to go into the regions.

The long series of hostage taking in the Middle East was a clear example of that.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. Ambassador Armitage, as a former Director of the U.S. Assistance Program to the former Soviet States, you have developed a widely acknowledged expertise on Russia and their role in post-Cold War Europe. Of course, Russia is a traditional ally of the Serbs.

Do you feel Russia is playing a positive role in helping to end the Bosnian conflict, or playing a double game? And if the conflict does spread in Serbia-Yugoslavia wins the war on the side of the Bosnian and Croatian Serbs, what actions will Russia take?

Ambassador ARMITAGE. I can respond, Mr. Chairman, by telling you what the Russians tell me. They say, first of all, the West does not understand the Serbian character, as we Russians do.

And our understanding is of centuries duration, most recently during the World War II when, of course, the Serbs and the Russians were allies against the Croats and the Muslims and the Germans.

Second of all, the Russians tell me that we do not understand further the fact that the Serbs like it when we bomb them. It makes them mad, but they like it. It gives them a focus for their anger. Serbs need this.



So I would not want to say so much that the Russians are playing a double game as they are pursuing their own national interests.

And they say it is their national interest—and I think it is to some extent a domestic political imperative that they stand as closely as possible to the Serbs.

I am not aware that they are in large way violating embargoes, et cetera.

Colonel SUMMERS. If I just might add to that last point, in our relationships with Great Britain and France over this issue, it reminds me of the Suez crisis some years ago, where Richard Nendstadt wrote a book reminding everyone that all politics is domestic politics.

That is, France's reaction to withdraw, Britain's reaction to withdraw, is going to depend on internal domestic politics, as should the actions of the United States. And, of course, they will.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Let me add one thing at that point, too. The Russians have a long emotional attachment to Serbia. It is not something that is pretense. It is not something that is part of a calculation about how to manipulate the politics of the Balkans. It is genuine.

It reflects the feeling that this is a group of Orthodox Christians, who have been beleaguered by the Catholics of Croatia, the Muslims in Bosnia, the Turks and others further to the south, that it is an island that use the Cyrillic alphabet, and the number of nations using the Cyrillic alphabet, a few in number—I do not think that we should ever believe that the Russians are going to be engaged here primarily out of calculation as opposed to emotion.

That is why I wondered earlier if the United States were seen to be engaged in major hostile activities against Serbia, what the consequences would be for Russian public opinion, because this would then appear on Russian television.

Chairman THURMOND. Dr. Schlesinger, news accounts this morning indicate the Clinton administration has warned the Bosnian government not to launch a military operation to lift the siege of Sarajevo.

However, since the ceasefire broke down in April, Sarajevo Airport has been closed, and no aid is getting in by land. Food supplies are almost totally exhausted, and the U.N. has been unable to enforce the exclusion zone or get humanitarian aid into the city.

Under these circumstances, what choices does the Bosnian government have, and how would you respond to the U.S. warning if you are a Bosnian government leader?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Mr. Chairman, I think that we have been altogether too free with our advice and that, over time, that advice tends to be in conflict with previous advice.

I have a certain sympathy for what Congressman Obey said the other day: "Most of us learned sometime ago, if you don't like the President's position on a particular issue, you simply need to wait a few weeks."

We have given steadily inconsistent advice to the Muslims. And, therefore, it loses its credibility in the first place.

And in the second place, it means that they have been encouraged to do things that they ought not to have done. They have been discouraged from doing things that they ought to have done.

I think that, if we are not prepared to do anything, that we should at least have the good grace to refrain from offering advice.

In this case, if they are determined to go ahead and run an operation to open up Sarajevo, they are not going to be deterred by the latest set of comments from the United States.

We are in a position in which, over the course of a year, we have moved from seeking to indict Milosevic as a war criminal to being out there now groveling before him for his support.

That is not an edifying spectacle, and it raises some question about the degree of consistency of U.S. policy and the validity of U.S. advice.

Chairman THURMOND. Any further comments by anyone?

I just want to say that today's testimony has been one of the best this committee has received on Bosnia.

All three witnesses have provided insights and discussion that have been remarkably clear, thoughtful and helpful. We thank you again for coming and testifying before this committee.

Dr. SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. We now stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

## BRIEFING ON THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1995

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:45 p.m. in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Thurmond, Warner, Coats, Kempthorne, Hutchison, and Robb.

Committee staff members present: Richard L. Reynard, staff director; Donald A. Deline, general counsel.

Professional staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, Lucia M. Chavez, Stephen L. Madey, Jr., Joseph G. Pallone, and Cord A. Sterling.

Minority staff members present: Richard E. Combs, Jr. and Michael J. McCord, Professional Staff Members.

Staff assistants present: Sharen Reaves and DeasyWagner.

Committee members' assistants present: Judith A. Ansley, assistant to Senator Warner; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Ann E. Sauer, assistant to Senator McCain; Richard F. Schwab, assistant to assistant to Senator Coats; David J. Gribbin, assistant to Senator Coats; Glen E. Tait, assistant to Senator Kempthorne; David W. Davis, assistant to Senator Hutchison; Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; Stephen A. Wolfe, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Patricia J. Buckheit, assistant to Senator Glenn; Suzanne M. McKenna, assistant to Senator Glenn; Lisa W. Tuite, assistant to Senator Byrd; and William Owens, assistant to Senator Robb.

### OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND, CHAIRMAN

Chairman THURMOND. The committee will come to order.

I would like to welcome our briefers today: John White, the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Defense; and Adm. William Owens of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Walter Slocombe, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Mr. John Kornblum, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, is he here?

Dr. WHITE. Mr. Kornblum will not be able to make it, Mr. Chairman, because of the change in the time of the meeting.

Chairman THURMOND. This briefing will be conducted at the Top Secret level. Will the Clerk verify that all Senate staff in attendance are appropriately cleared?

Ms. CHAVEZ. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Dr. White, I ask that you verify for the committee that all individuals accompanying you this afternoon are appropriately cleared.

Dr. WHITE. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. As you are no doubt aware, members of Congress have expressed great concern with the amount of information available to them from the administration, in the process of consultation, on the proper use of U.S. military forces to implement any peace agreement in Bosnia.

The members of the Congress and the American people need answers to important questions before the United States sends any U.S. military troops to Bosnia to enforce or implement a possible peace agreement. I believe the American public and Congress are willing to use U.S. military forces to defend U.S. national security interests. We must, however, understand the risks and weigh those risks carefully.

The Congress is not yet in possession of the facts necessary to make this judgment. Certainly the administration cannot make this judgment prior to a peace agreement and actual peace in the region without having answers to the following questions.

What U.S. national security interests warrant the deployment of U.S. military forces?

Will the administration seek Congressional authority prior to deployment of U.S. military forces?

How many U.S. military forces are we talking about sending?

How long will they stay, and what are the conditions for withdrawal?

What is their mission?

Are they peacekeepers?

What are the rules of engagement?

What is their command structure?

Will this be a NATO operation or a UN operation?

How much will this operation cost and where does the Department plan to get the funds?

Will Russia and other non-NATO countries participate in this operation?

There are no Democratic Senators here to make opening statements. Dr. White, I would ask that you begin the briefing. I hope that you can provide this committee with answers to the questions which I have posed and other questions which members will ask about this very important issue. Dr. White.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WHITE, DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACCOMPANIED BY: ADM. WILLIAM OWENS, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; AND WALTER SLOCOMBE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY**

Dr. WHITE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, let me begin, if I may, with a brief overview in terms of where we are in the negotiations, and let me stress in that regard that, of course, those negotiations are not yet complete. They are going on at this time.

We have made some progress. Let me outline the basic concept for peace. The basic concept is a 51-49 split in principle in the re-

gion between the Bosnian Serbs and the Croats and Muslims, a single autonomous state with a countrywide structure. It would have a legislature, as has been agreed to in the most recent meetings, a judicial system with a court, and presidents.

In addition to that, this would include a substantial pullback on the part of Serbs from a number of areas and some by the Croats and the Muslims. We have particularly difficult problems in particular regions, most of all, of course, in Sarajevo and Gorazde, but also the Posavina Corridor and perhaps others.

We also have issues of the embargo. We anticipate, if there is a peace agreement, the arms embargo will be lifted, and that other issues will also be resolved. As I said earlier, we are not finished yet, but the discussion today which we would like to have and the information we would like to present to you operates under the assumption that there would be such an agreement.

Let me underline the administration's position. The President articulated again today that he will not send forces into Bosnia until there is such an agreement.

Our expectation is that if there is an agreement, then this will clearly, from our point of view, be a NATO operation. We will be part of it as the principal American representatives in NATO, as the leaders in NATO. Other NATO countries will be involved. There may be other non-NATO countries involved, but they would be involved as part of the NATO structure. As it is currently contemplated, there would be no dual key.

Let me, if I may, Mr. Chairman, turn to the charts and go through with you basically what we think will be the cases in terms of the planning.

Take the first chart down, please.

(Chart.) [Deleted.]

Mr. Chairman, as indicated in the chart, the North Atlantic Council or NAC has already directed the implementation plan, and under that implementation plan after the peace agreement SACEUR would have overall command and control in the region.

CINCSOUTH, Admiral Leyton-Smith, would be the operational commander for NATO and for any non-NATO forces, as I indicated earlier. There would be NATO rules of engagement. In our view those would be robust rules of engagement. We intend to go in with a substantial force so that in fact we are the dominant military force in the region.

In addition to that, there would be a control on the part of the NATO forces to coordinate the withdrawal of the UN forces, to the extent that any UN forces that stayed behind, would become part of the NATO force.

Let me also stress, Mr. Chairman, what will not be included in this NATO force for implementation. They would not be given tasks with respect to nation-building. They would not deliver humanitarian aid. They would not provide police functions and they would not be expected collect or control weapons in the region. That is, there are no expectations there would be any attempt to gather up the weapons held by the combatants currently.

After the peace, we would be in effect in the position, under a chapter 7 resolution from the UN, but under a NATO task as indicated, to provide these capabilities in the region.

Most of the forces would be in the area controlled by the Croats and the Muslims, but we do anticipate that there will be or may be some of our forces in the Serbian area of control. (Chart.) [Deleted.]

Now, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn to Admiral Owens so he can give us a current update as of today in terms of what is happening in the region. I think that will set the context for us in terms of the rest of the discussion. Admiral Owens will go through in more detail some of the planning that is going on now.

Admiral OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to briefly run through where we stand today, as Dr. White said. You can see the map as it stands today, with the success of the Muslims and the Croatians, especially here in the northwest corner of Bosnia.

You will recall that this offensive has been a very successful one for them. Some limited fighting is continuing up here in the northwest corner. There are two villages, one called Sanski Most and the other Bosanski Novi, and where we still find random gunfire and artillery rounds even today.

There has been a significant offensive by the Bosnian forces here in the Ozren Pocket. If we had looked at this a couple of weeks ago, this pocket would have been significantly larger. The Muslims have been successful in pushing the Serbs out to the northwest.

There is a village called Doboj here which is still in the BSA hands, but the situation is still tense here, with continued random gunfire in this area. Posavina Corridor up here, of course, has been an area of great interest, still contested on both sides of the corridor. We continue to see this as a focal point for continued negotiation among the mapmakers as this debate goes on.

Around Sarajevo today, which is quiet, there a couple of things of interest. There is a plan tomorrow to open the three principal roads around Sarajevo to civilian traffic. One is the Kiseljak Road up here in the northwest; the other is the Hadzici Road from the northwest; and the third is the Pale Road.

I think if that occurs tomorrow that will be a significant step for the opening of access around Sarajevo. Of course, the Gorazde Corridor has been a topic of a lot of conversation and we find random gunfire in this area over the last 10 days. It is very limited, but nevertheless there is an occasional round that is released here. That corridor, of course, will be an important consideration for the eventual 51-49 map.

[Deleted.]

In general, it is peaceful here. The four Safe Areas are unthreatened and the convoys are flowing into them. Access into the four Safe Areas is unrestricted.

(Chart.) [Deleted.]

I would like to now walk through some of the elements of this Implementation Force, or IFOR that Dr. White mentioned to you. I would like to run through some key military tasks, some of the tasks that would be undertaken under the mission statement that Dr. White briefed you on earlier.

Now, here it will be, as he said, an integrated NATO military command structure which will assume command of the theater, not

just Bosnia but the theater, because so many of the other elements adjacent to Bosnia are involved in this.

The first element, of course, would be to get a command and control capability here that will allow us to integrate the various force activities. It's going to be very important to get in there quickly when we decide to do this and building on these in-place forces we will move into the area assigned very quickly.

What we are referring to here is the Rapid Reaction Forces of the Brits and the French and the Dutch that are already in or around Sarajevo. There are significant numbers of them, over 10,000, who would then become no longer a part of the UNPROFOR forces, but would shift to become a part of the NATO I-FORCE and would be under the command and control of NATO at that time.

So American heavy forces, capable forces such as Apaches, MLRS battalions, and heavy equipment would be there complementary to the Rapid Reaction Forces that are already present, giving a very rapid insertion and therefore the capability to defend ourselves very quickly, even after the peace is established, as Dr. White said.

In all of this, we're assuming that the peace will be established before we go in. We don't want to take any chances with American lives as we go in. So this deployment would be done very rapidly. There would be an introduction of substantial follow-on forces after that is done.

This total time period would, depending on weather, be about 30 days for the total insertion of all of the IFOR forces. After we were in country, we would control the withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces. That is, the 20,000-plus UNPROFOR forces that are presently located in Bosnia have to be brought out, and that would be controlled by the NATO IFOR commanders in theater.

Of course, in all of this we would have to protect our force, and we have spent a lot of time thinking about how this would go. We are satisfied with the ROE to do so. We are satisfied that the ROE are essentially the same as the U.S. rules of engagement and that we can protect ourselves and that we can protect our freedom of movement inside the country.

Continuing with these key military tasks, we would monitor and enforce compliance with the military parts of this peace agreement. I reiterate that we assume that there would be a peace before we put these troops in. We want to go in strong. We want to go in strong so, if there are rebel units that would cross the border, they can be crossed back without danger to our troops. We also want to go in strong because it is more likely that we will not use force if we have force in the theater.

So we will go in strong and be prepared to address an enforcement element, although we hope that, because of our strength, there will not have to be an enforcement piece of this.

We will mark the boundaries, or they will be marked, as a part of this effort, and areas of separation will be established between the Muslims, the Croats, and the Serbs. The width of that area of separation is not established yet and is a topic of discussion now.

NATO Air would stay in theater pretty much as it is now. There will be a judgment made as to the size of that air force. But, as you know, the NATO air campaign is continuing to provide cover over Bosnia as we speak, and that NATO air structure will be left

pretty much in place, flying from the many NATO bases that are being used today in support of UNPROFOR.

There would probably be a reduced maritime force presence in the Adriatic, but there will continue to be some NATO maritime force present.

(Chart.) [Deleted.]

I would like to just briefly walk through the command structure. What this implies is that this would start with a United Nations Security Council resolution. This is not a command and control circuit that comes this way; this is simply the establishment of NATO as the command and control of this effort through a UN Security Council resolution.

Once that is passed, then the military command structure of NATO is the way that we would undertake this operation. Through the NAC, the North Atlantic Council, of course, George Joulwan, our SACEUR, would be commanding. We would have our theater commander Admiral Leighton-Smith, an American in Naples, who would be the theater commander. Under him is General Janvier, who is a French commander, who is really double-hatted. He is commander of the UNPROFOR, but he is also on the ground as commander in Bosnia of the land forces. Under them are component commanders.

I should note that General Janvier during this time also will keep command of purely U.N. forces, that is the UNCRO forces in Croatia, which would be dramatically downsized, and also the UNPREDEP force, the United Nations Preventive Deployment in Macedonia. This is where we have a battalion of forces in Macedonia. So this would be done separately and under General Janvier, as it is today.

This is an integrated NATO military command structure that would undertake the operation.

(Chart.) [Deleted.]

Again, this would be done under NATO ROE. The concept of operation as it is being discussed in NATO, in NAC, at this time is five-phased: a preparation phase, which we are involved with right now, completing the planning, thinking about what kind of prepositioning we need in the terms of logistics and communications.

After this preparation phase is completed, we would go into an entry phase where, as I described before, we would rapidly deploy a heavy but very flexible force, capable of defending themselves and doing the military tasks I described, the separation and withdrawal of nonresidual forces. This is to assume that they would already be separated and that the peace would be in place. These troops would have the capability, if there were these rebel units that came across the lines, of separating them and maintaining those boundaries.

There would be a transition to the internal peace, that is a condition where there could be a continued internal peace, without NATO forces on the ground. When that had been established, there would be an exit strategy that would hand the defense off to Federation forces and rapidly redeploy our forces out of Bosnia.

With that, sir, I will pass this back to Dr. White to briefly talk through the NATO decision process as it stands now. You can see



the two areas that have been completed and what remains to be done.

(Chart.) [Deleted.]

Dr. WHITE. This, then, is basically a status report, Mr. Chairman of where we are today. That is, as we indicated earlier, there was an authorization to begin planning some nine days ago. They are now considering inputs from the military authorities and others in terms of the activity.

The SACEUR, General Joulwan, then has to develop a concept of operations, which will then be approved by the NAC. That will be done in a matter of days.

Subsequent to that, the SACEUR and his subordinate commanders will develop a specific plan. We think that will take about three weeks to do. Then we will have to confirm the force structure and the NAC will have to authorize the deployment.

So we are out probably somewhere on the order of seven or eight weeks if we start from where we are today. But of course, all of this has to depend upon the fact that there is a peace in place before we, of course, would agree to execute the plan. The planning process itself will take another several weeks before it will be completed.

(Chart.) [Deleted.]

That is our status report. As we indicated at the beginning and briefed you, this is an ongoing process, both in terms of the negotiations and the planning. Bearing that in mind, we would welcome an attempt to answer any questions that the committee may have.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you.

Dr. White, as I indicated in my comments during the meeting at the White House, I believe it is vitally important for the American public to understand what the United States' national or vital interests or security interests are before we commit U.S. military forces. What are the national security interests or vital national interests at stake here that warrant the deployment of U.S. military forces?

Dr. WHITE. Well, I will ask my colleagues to join me, Mr. Chairman. As we see it, of course, this is a vital region in Europe. Europe is critical to the world and to our own success. We as the leader in NATO think that the very continued operation and effectiveness of NATO is critical to peace in Europe and in the larger scheme in the world at large.

We are concerned that in fact, if we do not contain the conflict in this region, that it will spill over into other related regions, other regions in the area. That would make for a larger war, more conflict, and in fact could be very destabilizing in Europe.

So from our point of view we think it is central to our interests in terms of the leadership of the free world and to our leadership of NATO.

Chairman THURMOND. Mr. Slocombe, why has the administration decided to deploy U.S. forces under a Chapter 7 peace enforcement operation versus a chapter 6 deployment, which would be a peace-keeping force?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Mr. Chairman, essentially because we want to make sure that when the force goes in it has all the tools, both in terms of equipment and in terms of authority, that it needs. As Ad-

miral Owens said we would not send the force in unless there was a peace agreement, and we would expect that the parties would abide by that peace agreement.

The history of this region, both recently and longer back, is such that we want to make sure that any force that NATO participates in or that the U.S. participates in has the tools necessary to do the job. That requires the broad chapter 7 authority.

Chairman THURMOND. Admiral Owens, how many U.S. military troops is the administration looking at deploying in an implementation force, and what would be the breakdown of forces from other nations? Would you be as specific as you can?

Admiral OWENS. Mr. Chairman, unfortunately we are not far enough along in this planning process to be able to give you any numbers. The discussion, the level of the planning in NATO and under SACEUR, has not gotten to the stage where there are bona fide numbers being addressed, either in total or in terms of our contribution.

Of course, inside the staffs there are various discussions. At this point there is no confirmation or firmness on any of the numbers.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Warner.

#### STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Gentlemen, there are a lot of problems resulting from this confusion of terms. We have got peacekeeping, peace enforcement, nation-building. I could go on and on.

What about just saying this is an army of occupation going in, simply to try and work out and secure a ceasefire? I mean, the trouble is you call it peace and the next thing you know somebody fires a shot, somebody gets killed, the American people get all exercised about it.

Do the three of you want to deal with that? I mean, you would make your problem and our problem a lot simpler if you would just sort of stick with some terms that the American people understand: just plain and simple, an army of occupation going in by NATO. I don't care what you call it.

In the aftermath of World War II and the aftermath of other conflicts we have had, that is what we are doing. When you try and tell everybody we are going in to keep the peace and so forth, and then the shooting starts, all of a sudden we are the ones that really have to make the first response.

Dr. WHITE. Well, Senator, let me say first of all that, as you know, we do not expect or in fact we will not engage U.S. forces in the region until there is peace, and we want to be satisfied—

Senator WARNER. What is your definition of "peace," then?

Dr. WHITE. Peace will be, sir, that in fact there is agreement on a treaty that will provide for a government of the region which will represent—

Senator WARNER. Okay, you are spelling it out. But those of us who have been there several times know there is a gun under every bed. There is not a strict command and control of all these mercenary or military forces.

Dr. WHITE. We would not anticipate that we would try to do that, either. We certainly would anticipate that the parties who agree to this particular arrangement would in fact then execute the agreement in terms of moving behind the borders that are designated and so on.

This force would be there, hopefully not having to engage, but if it had to engage either to protect itself or to implement under rules of engagement that particular agreement, then we would do so.

The people in the region tell us that they will not get an agreement, nor will they be able to sustain an agreement, unless in fact they have a force which is U.S.-led and NATO-organized on the ground. We believe that and we think it is an important undertaking and that we ought to do it.

Senator WARNER. Well some of us wish to make suggestions.

What about the cost of this? I am sure you cannot give us anything now, but I think the Secretary should be asked and you can put in the record what your estimates are.

Dr. WHITE. As the Admiral said, Senator, we do not have any estimates yet. We do not have the size of the force yet. When we have the size of the force, we will have the cost, and then we will consult with the Congress on that cost, because we recognize that that money has to come from the Congress.

Senator WARNER. Where does Russia figure in this equation?

Dr. WHITE. I will ask Mr. Slocombe to address that in more detail, but let me say we welcome Russia. If they are to participate, we think they ought to do so in the structure that we have envisioned here. We have had conversations with them in that regard, but they are very preliminary.

Senator WARNER. How do you work out your command and control, and will they agree to the ROE and various things?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I met two days ago with the Russian ambassador to NATO and discussed these issues with him. They were also discussed in a meeting between Secretary Christopher and Foreign Minister Kozyrev the day before. As you know, Strobe Talbot also went to Moscow and discussed these.

We are beginning to get a sense of what the Russian perspective on this is and what their concerns and their worries are. Partly, they want to assert the proposition that they are part of the political process. This is not simply a question of whether they are or are not going to participate in an implementation force, but whether this is going on without their being consulted and having some sense of involvement in a region that they at least claim to have interests in, and certainly they have an historical connection with.

So far as the negotiations, they are skeptical about whether this will work. They asked some of the same questions that get asked in other centers. Their view, which we disagree with, is that this deal is not fair to the Serbs. We are more familiar with the objection that it is not fair to the Bosnians, but their position essentially is that people are being unfair to the Serbs.

Senator WARNER. I think you have pretty well answered my question. You are trying to work it out. I do not want to take any more than my allocated time, but I just want to make one other observation.

Are you going to divide this up geographically into sectors, a British sector, a French sector, an American sector, much like we did in Berlin, and then perhaps the Russian sector? Are the forces going to be integrated? Or are you that far down the pike?

Dr. WHITE. We are not that far yet, although I think it is fair to say that we would anticipate there would be a division of responsibility between the principal forces, certainly between the U.S., the British, and the French.

Senator WARNER. An allocation of geographic areas accordingly?

Dr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Going back to the Russian question, if I could, Senator.

Senator WARNER. Yes.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. One of the things we are very anxious to avoid is the situation where you have the Russians on the Serb side and the West and the British, French, Americans, and NATO forces on the other. I think actually the Russians agree with that proposition.

Senator WARNER. I think that is an important thing, too.

Last, just another observation, and that is that the American serviceperson, regrettably, could well be a prime target for anybody who wants to cause problems, because we have under the leadership of the President—the President deserves certain credit here—pretty well made this thing whatever you call it, a peace agreement come about. I just call it a ceasefire.

Accordingly, you have got to take some security measures, maybe a little bit differently than for the other nations. That is just another bit of free advice.

Dr. WHITE. We recognize that, Senator.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Coats.

#### STATEMENT OF HON. DAN COATS, A U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

Senator COATS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to pursue the question of how we determine when peace is established. You began, Secretary White, by saying that there must be an agreed upon treaty by all the parties. I think there is more to follow on that, and I wonder if you could elaborate on that.

Dr. WHITE. Yes, sir. From our point of view, there has to of course be an agreement. There has to be an agreement among all the parties, and then they have to have implemented the agreement. That is, not to the last dot, but we expect that before we enter they will have certainly substantially executed the changes in terms of the adjustment of the map, which of course is critical to all of this. So the fighting will have ceased and the parties will have then moved back to their respective regions under this particular agreement, and the government will be up and running.

Senator COATS. What do you contemplate in regards to any disarmament among the parties?

Dr. WHITE. There is a discussion under way in terms of planning in the administration and, more broadly, with our principal allies as to whether or not there should be an attempt to have some sort of an arms control agreement. But we are not very far on that.

As I indicated earlier in the presentation, we do not anticipate—any role on the part of the NATO forces to disarm people.

Senator COATS. The term was used that our mission would be to monitor and enforce compliance. What does “enforce compliance” mean?

Dr. WHITE. Again, we are still working through various situations. It means in fact that if in a particular area you had, let us say, a local commander on the Serb side that said, no, we are not going to, we are not going to adhere to the agreement, then the NATO force will take that under consideration and may in fact use force to implement the agreement. It certainly would be there to use force to protect itself.

Senator COATS. But one is offensive and one is defensive. “Enforce compliance” would include both?

Dr. WHITE. It could, yes, sir.

Senator COATS. That would involve U.S. troops as well as other forces, other NATO forces?

Dr. WHITE. Yes, it would. Yes, it would.

Admiral OWENS. But I might add, Senator, that our sense here is that we would not go in unless those boundaries were established first. So enforcement of those boundaries would not be an element of the first movement into the country.

We are considering the possibility of a rebel movement across the boundaries, a relatively small operation that we are able to, again, put back in its place and enforce those boundaries, and certainly not a view that this would be inserting ourselves between a major force on either side, which is not expected here, because we would not go in unless there was a peace first.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Senator, could I add a point on that? The agreement will come into effect, of course, when it is formally signed in all of its terms. But as we go through the negotiations there is in effect a kind of phased implementation. There is already a ceasefire around Sarajevo. The airport is open. The roads are beginning to be opened, as Admiral Owens briefed. There will be three routes which will be opened for civilian traffic.

Clearly, one of the next steps in the process is a broader ceasefire and access to other areas where access is now restricted. There will be the beginning of compliance by the parties and winding down of fighting and ending the war even before the full agreement is formally in place.

Of course, there is always a possibility that things will go wrong. But there will be some evidences of an intention by the party to carry out their agreement, in a sense by their conduct, even before they have signed it. If all that falls apart, then there's no deal.

Senator COATS. How long do we contemplate keeping U.S. forces?

Dr. WHITE. Again, we have not settled it, but our internal view is that it ought to be a date certain, and probably something around 12 months.

Senator COATS. You all know more about the history of the area than I do. But given the history and the enmity that exists between the various factions, and if our commitment is to a date certain of 12 months or less, how do you anticipate maintaining enforced compliance beyond that point?

Dr. WHITE. Well, there are several elements to the plan beyond the implementation force, Senator, one would be a program to arm and possibly train the Federation forces, the Croats and the Muslims. That would take place during that year.

In addition to that, of course, there would be an effort in terms of economic redevelopment, and there would be border monitoring and other activities that would take place in the region, but be beyond the particular force.

Senator COATS. Would that revert to an UNPROFOR type of monitoring situation then after one year?

Dr. WHITE. No, sir, we do not anticipate an UNPROFOR type.

Senator COATS. Who is going to do the monitoring?

Dr. WHITE. Walt, you want to speak to the monitoring that's under discussion?

Senator COATS. I mean after one year.

Dr. WHITE. Yes.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. If there is monitoring, if there is any kind of a follow-on monitoring activity, which is still something being negotiated by the parties, it would presumably be carried on by the OSCE. That is the most likely candidate. They have monitoring operations going on in a number of countries.

But it would be on a very, very small scale. It would be measured by hundreds, not tens of thousands like UNPROFOR is now.

Senator COATS. This is my last question, Mr. Chairman. Does anybody have any assurance that a plan that inserts forces into the area to enforce compliance essentially through arming and training one of the factions in the region and then withdrawing after 12 months is going to lead to anything other than a 12-month cessation of hostilities, which will immediately resume after we leave, given the history of the area?

Dr. WHITE. Well, Senator.

First of all, we do not know. Second, there is under discussion an arms agreement that may bring down the amount of arms in the region.

Third, to some extent it seems to us that if all these steps that we have indicated have gone through, that there is an indication that these people really do want to stop the fighting and do not want to start it right up again and go back to the bloodshed that they have today. So our expectation would be that that would not happen, although obviously there are no guarantees.

Senator COATS. Do you think that is a realistic expectation?

Dr. WHITE. Yes, sir, I do.

Senator COATS. Admiral Owens, do you think that is realistic?

Admiral OWENS. As Dr. White said, Senator, I think that none of us know what is going to happen in the Balkans, but that if the going in point is that all parties have agreed to these boundaries and that the boundaries are contiguous to the greatest degree possible and that we do have an element of arming of the Bosnians to some degree, that there is a better chance that there would not be more hostilities afterwards than there is in the existing situation.

Senator COATS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you.

Senator Robb.

**STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES S. ROBB, A U.S. SENATOR  
FROM VIRGINIA**

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize, I was over with President Mubarak and did not hear the opening discussion. I wonder if you would just give me a quick recap, quick and dirty. I did get the duration in terms of 12 months and the questions Senator Coats asked, but I would like some sense of how we would deploy the forces, what kinds of numbers we are talking about, what kinds of dollars we are talking about, what kinds of control structure, rules of engagement. One good paragraph would do it, just to get some sense of the scope of the commitment.

Dr. WHITE. Senator, the NAC has instructed General Joulwan to undertake such planning. He is doing it now. It will take probably about three weeks to do the initial round of that planning, and then that has to be considered by the NAC again.

We anticipate that it will be somewhere on the order of about eight weeks before a complete plan will be in place and could be executed, even though of course it awaits the peace agreement.

It is clearly a NATO structure. There is no dual key. We and the French and the British and other NATO allies would be a part of the force. We are going to welcome as part of the NATO structure non-NATO countries, particularly some PFP countries we anticipate. There is the issue of the Russians and also the possibility of Islamic countries who might participate.

We do not yet know the size until we hear back from General Joulwan in terms of his planning, but we clearly think that the U.S. will provide a significant element of this robust force and that it will be under NATO rules of engagement, which will be spelled out before the force is implemented.

Senator ROBB. You mentioned that the size has not been determined yet, and I realize this is all preliminary. But there were numbers in the range of 25,000 that had to do with the earlier commitment on an extraction and an emergency force and-or some sort of a retrograde operation. More recently, both publicly and I think in a discussion that I had with Tony Lake a couple of nights ago just informally, a smaller figure as a ballpark figure, around 15,000, was used.

Is that somewhere within the range that you are looking at, give or take a few thousand?

Dr. WHITE. It is probably within the range, Senator. I do not want to sound evasive. I just do not know.

Senator ROBB. I am just trying to get some idea of the scope.

Dr. WHITE. Yes, Senator. As you indicated, the 25,000 number keeps coming back.

Senator ROBB. I understand that that does not relate to this operation. I am just trying to get a relative sense of where that comes from.

What kind of a dollar figure in terms of additional appropriations and what amount will probably be an emergency supplemental that you think might be required to take care of an operation like this over and above your normal O&M that would be consumed by the same forces?

Dr. WHITE. Again, Senator, with all the caveats, and I will not repeat them, I would anticipate that you want to think somewhere around a billion dollars.

Chairman THURMOND. How much did you say?

Dr. WHITE. A billion dollars, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ROBB. One final question in that regard. There was a discussion on the floor just a few minutes ago in preparation for a very short break as to whether or not to take up a Sense of the Senate resolution which was going to be offered by Senator Gregg of New Hampshire. We have not seen the language, but it seems to suggest that it would track existing language from some document already approved by the Senate and-or the National Security Council and-or the President. I am not quite certain.

But there seemed to be a fair amount of concern about a resolution that would be a Sense of the Senate that would say, in effect, before committing such a force the President agrees to consult with the Congress. My only question to you is what, in a resolution of that sort, would you find particularly worrisome?

Dr. WHITE. Well, I think it is fair to say, Senator, that we would find that premature. We are up here now, we are doing a lot of consultation. The President committed yet again today that he will come to the Congress and eagerly engage the Congress in this process. The exact form of that discussion or the way it will be done has not yet, of course, been laid out.

Senator ROBB. I think that your appearance today is a form of consultation and give and take.

Dr. WHITE. Yes, sir.

Senator ROBB. I have pointed that out when suggestions have been made that there has been no consultation. I am speaking specifically about a resolution that seems, on the basis of the very brief discussion on the floor, to be relatively benign, and yet I sense that, at least within some ranks, there was concern that that might go forward and a fairly significant resistance to permitting it.

I am just wondering what the basis is for concern about that type of resolution.

Dr. WHITE. I can only react to what you have told me, since obviously I was not there and I have not heard it. I would just say that it strikes us, if someone came to me with such a proposition, my reaction would be it strikes me as premature. We are a long way from there. We want the opportunity to consult.

The President, as you know, held a meeting. We were at that meeting today. It was in our view a very successful meeting, a very constructive meeting. We are here for the same purpose.

We intend to do a good deal of this, and before the Senate somehow speaks as the Senate it seems to us desirable to have this conversation.

Senator ROBB. I do not want to debate what I have not seen and do not know specifically, either. Indeed, I tend to try to preserve as much executive and commander in chief prerogative as possible. But if the resolution simply said it is the Sense of the Senate that the commander in chief ought to consult with Congress before committing U.S. forces to a peacekeeping agreement, is there anything inherently wrong with that language?



Again, I have no idea whether that is the language that we are talking about or not. But I am trying to get some sense of why something that seems to be common sense and indeed has been an ongoing part of the dialogue between the executive and legislative branch would be prejudicial.

Dr. WHITE. I can only say, Senator, that the President reiterated today his commitment to consult with the Congress.

Senator ROBB. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you.

Senator Kempthorne will come back in a few minutes. I have to go and vote. I will ask him to close up here when he gets through voting.

Dr. White, in closing I would like to put the Department of Defense and the Joint Staff and the Department of State on notice. This committee intends to follow up on these briefings with further hearings and briefings. We need to be kept up to date by the administration on the status of the peace agreement and discussions to use U.S. forces in an enforcement action.

I would request that you make yourselves available to the committee so that we can keep informed. We appreciate it.

Dr. WHITE. We would welcome such hearings and briefings, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. In the meantime, the committee will recess now until Senator Kempthorne comes back.

(Recess.)

#### STATEMENT OF HON. DIRK KEMPTHORNE, A U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

Senator KEMPTHORNE [presiding]. Gentlemen, I will call this meeting back to order, and I appreciate your indulgence as we have been running to vote. I have some questions.

First of all, Secretary White, have you in your planning done any assessments as to projected casualties that may be inflicted on U.S. troops?

Dr. WHITE. No, sir. As of now, of course, the planning is all being done in the NATO context. We the United States are not currently, as the U.S., doing planning. It is too early in the process.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. No range even?

Dr. WHITE. We have not even gotten that far, Senator.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Okay. Have the Serbs given up on the idea of a Greater Serbia?

Dr. WHITE. Walt, do you want to address that?

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Secretary Slocombe.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think it is very clear that Milosevic has given up on the idea of a Greater Serbia as anything that he is going to work for in the immediate context. I suppose in some sense the Serbs will not ever give up on the idea of a greater Serbia as long as there are Serbs. But Milosevic has clearly made the decision that he wants a deal to get the sanctions lifted for some internal political reasons and otherwise.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. What are the military capabilities of the Serbs and the Muslims that would pose the greatest risk to U.S. forces?

Dr. WHITE. Well, sir, the Serbs have in fact heavy weapons, of course. They have tanks, they have field artillery, APC's. So they're a lethal force.

The Muslims are more lightly equipped. But as we indicated earlier, I am not sure Senator, when you had to leave, but in fact part of the overall scheme, not of the implementation of course, but part of the total scheme would be a program that would arm and possibly train the Muslims during the period of the implementation.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. So how probable is a firefight between the Serbs and U.S. forces once we are deployed?

Dr. WHITE. Well, (A), I do not know and (B), I think a lot of it will depend on our assessment as we go in. We obviously do not want to go in unless we think that this is a solid agreement and people have pulled back and returned to their own areas.

There will be a corridor. We have not yet settled on the width of that corridor, but there will be a separation corridor between these forces. In that sense, we do not expect there will be accidental or other such incidents, because we are working very hard to make sure that does not occur.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Could I add a point on that?

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Yes, please.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. This force is going to go in with complete NATO ROE's to be able to do self-defense. One of the things which happened in Haiti, if I remember, the first weekend was at a police station in Cape Haitien. A group of former Haitian police made the mistake of attempting to draw a weapon on an American Marine unit.

If I remember correctly, the American Marine unit responded immediately, vigorously, and several of the Haitian police were killed. That sent a message.

We will go in on the operating assumption that anybody who does create trouble for the American force would get a similar response, and that would be true of the whole NATO force. This is not going to be a force that goes in under the kind of UN rules of engagement.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. In the current Bosnian situation, who are the aggressors?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Current situation? I think there is no question that the Bosnian Serbs are the aggressors.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Then how would we characterize what the Croats have been doing?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The Croats in recent weeks have been reoccupying territory that has been a part of, first in the Krajina a part of Croatia, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina almost entirely territory that has been historically Croatian.

There are no saints in this part of the world, not even the Bosniacs, not even the Bosnian Government. I took your question to mean who in some sense bears the greatest responsibility for the war. Is there any act by anybody that could be described as aggressive? Yes, by lots of the parties.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. I remember early on it was difficult. We sometimes were told that there may be an attack and it might be the Serbs and the Croats attacking Muslims. Then it would turn

and the alliance would shift. Is there still any shifting alliance, or are things more sorted out now?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think it is fair to say that the Croatian success, although it has been favorable to the Bosnian cause in the short term, makes the Bosnians somewhat nervous.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. What is the criteria—if you have covered this, if you would just note this and I will then check the record. But what is the criteria for the exit strategy?

Dr. WHITE. Sir, we indicated earlier that our expectation is that the exit would be at a date certain. That will probably be in about one year.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. What I find incredible is that, after the history of the centuries of what has taken place there, that in 12 months we think it will be stable. Will we leave if it is still unstable when that date certain arrives?

Dr. WHITE. I think it is pretty difficult to speculate on a hypothetical, Senator. We obviously are going in with the understanding that it in fact will be stable, and in fact we anticipate that if even during that year significant conflict were to break out, that is, the parties were to start the war up again, that we would withdraw, we would not stay.

So our condition in terms of going in is that there is a peace, and what we are providing is a breathing time so that there can be some stability.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. I appreciate there is a great deal on which we have to speculate. But as you say, a date certain. Would we withdraw if it is unstable when that date certain arrives?

Dr. WHITE. Well, I guess, Senator, I do not know what "unstable" means, so I guess I am at a loss to say. Our desire obviously is to put in place a strong force, to have that force there for a fixed period, and hopefully, if things go well along that period, to withdraw the force incrementally over time, so that there would be a drawdown and that they would be left to their own devices at the end of that period.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think the short answer to your question, sir, is yes, that that's what a date certain means, that the idea is to try to broker an agreement, put in a force. I like to use the analogy of giving a massive dose of antibiotics, of trying to cure the problem. That is in the sense of getting the people back to the lines that they will already have agreed to, be there for a limited period of time to enforce that separation.

If it does not work, if it is not working at the end of the period, pull out. Indeed, as the Secretary says, if it is evident in the course of that period that there has been a total breakdown, to pull out before.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. I appreciate that, because that is what I was probing. Do we all agree on what "date certain" means and what the consequences may be?

I know we have been operating under the philosophy to put in always such overwhelming force that it protects our service personnel. When we talk about 25,000 troops, is that the ceiling or in any of your analysis might it be determined that you need more than 25,000 to ensure the safety of those troops that are deployed?

Dr. WHITE. Senator, we are not today talking about 25,000 troops. We are not talking about any fixed number.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Mr. Secretary, if I may just interrupt for clarification. I continually have heard that from the administration. I continually read that.

Dr. WHITE. I think it is unfortunate that you were not here when we had this discussion with Senator Robb. The 25,000 was the number for the so-called 40104, that is the withdrawal of the UNPROFOR forces if we all had to go in.

We anticipate, as I indicated to Senator Robb, while we do not have a number, that it is our expectation that the U.S. contribution to this force would presumably be less than 25,000. The total force, of course, would be substantially larger than that.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. But there is not a predetermined ceiling. Again, the thrust of your question I take to be, if the military people decide, especially in the course of the operation, that there is some additional capability that is required, that would be taken into account.

The reason we are so reluctant to get into a numbers game about the number is that we have not started out and said, you can send N thousand to five significant figures and work within that total. There is a mission and it is a limited mission, but we need to know the force necessary to carry out that mission.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. As you know, at a recent meeting with Secretary Perry I believe he was using the figure of 18,000.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think, if I understand what happened, he said: This would be on a scale of a division. And somebody said: A division is about 18,000? And he said: Yes, a division is about 18,000. But that does not mean the number is going to be 18,000.

It is clearly going to be more than hundreds, less than tens and tens of thousands. The exact number will be worked out in the course of the planning process. The American contribution—we are of course talking about the troops on the ground. There will be air and naval forces as well. The American contribution depends in part on the shape of the peace agreement, but in part on what contributions are made by other countries.

Dr. WHITE. Let me also say, Senator, when we have a number we obviously will come up and consult with you on the structure of that number. So we are not trying to avoid your question; we just do not have an answer.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. If I could make this point, I think if you were to interview folks out in the street I think there is a number that had been bandied about and they would state that number. I think the concern, regardless of where individual members of this committee may come down, whether or not there should be any deployment, I think it is absolutely necessary that you come back with what you think is the right number, not the politically acceptable number, because we do not want to put any of our military in a situation that we are going to understate what we need because of political considerations.

Dr. WHITE. The administration has been very clear, Senator, that we intend to support the number that is necessary in order to do the job.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. We did see mission creep in Somalia. How will we ensure that we will not see mission creep in Bosnia? What was the lesson learned from Somalia and how is it being applied?

Dr. WHITE. Well, we are spending a great deal of time on the structure of this and, as we have indicated earlier, this is a NATO force, governed under NATO rules of engagement, structured around NATO allies, under the normal political as well as military structure of NATO, where there will be written orders given to the commander which could not be changed, of course, without the agreement of the parties.

So we think in that sense we have got a pretty good handle on exactly what this mission is, not what it ought to be. I think we have seen in other situations—you mentioned Somalia. I think we would say even in terms of UNPROFOR and the changes that we have been through in this environment that it is crystal-clear to us that we have to be very, very clear what we are there for and make sure we have got the forces necessary to do what we are there for.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. I was speaking to one of the officers in the Army who had been to this area, and I think he characterized it quite well when he said: It is hideous when you see what people do to one another. I think so many Americans, when they watch this on TV, think of it as "hideous" and "tragic."

Having said that, I do not think the case has yet been made to the public as to the involvement of the United States to the extent that you are suggesting now. I simply make that as an editorial commitment. I do not think the case has yet been made.

Dr. WHITE. We recognize and the administration recognizes that we have an obligation to make that case, Senator.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. In light of the fact that votes have been taking place and I know there are other Senators who had questions that wanted to ask them of you, we will keep the record, the hearing record, open so that members can provide you questions and you can respond on the record.

Dr. WHITE. We will be happy to do so, sir.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. I appreciate very much both of you with your input and wish you well.

Dr. WHITE. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:51 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]



# U.S. POLICY ON BOSNIA AND THE USE OF MILITARY FORCES TO IMPLEMENT A PEACE AGREEMENT

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TUESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1995

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Thurmond, Warner, Cohen, McCain, Lott, Coats, Kempthorne, Hutchison, Inhofe, Santorum, Nunn, Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, Glenn, Byrd, Robb, and Bryan.

Committee staff members present: Richard L. Reynard, staff director; George W. Laufer, deputy staff director; Melinda M. Koutsoumpas, chief clerk; Christine K. Cimko, press secretary.

Professional staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, Lucia M. Chavez, Lawrence J. Lanzillotta, John H. Miller, and Cord J. Sterling.

Minority staff members present: Andrew S. Effron, minority counsel; Richard D. DeBobes, counsel; Richard E. Combs, Jr. and Patrick T. Henry, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Shelley G. Laufer, Jennifer Wallace, and Tricia Banks.

Committee members' assistants present: Judith A. Ansley, assistant to Senator Warner; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Ann E. Sauer and Walter Lohman, assistants to Senator McCain; Samuel D. Adcock, assistant to Senator Lott; Richard F. Schwab and David J. Gribbin, assistants to Senator Coats; Thomas L. Lankford, assistant to Senator Smith; Glen E. Tait, assistant to Senator Kempthorne; John F. Luddy, II, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Patricia L. Stolnacker, assistant to Senator Santorum; Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; David A. Lewis, assistant to Senator Levin; Steven A. Wolfe, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Edward McGaffigan, Jr., assistant to Senator Bingaman; Patricia J. Buckheit, and Suzanne M. McKenna, assistants to Senator Glenn; C. Richard D'Amato, and Lisa W. Tuite, assistants to Senator Byrd; William Owens, assistant to Senator Robb; John F. Lilley, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Mary Weaver, assistant to Senator Bryan; and David Davis, assistant to Senator Hutchison.

## OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND, CHAIRMAN

Chairman THURMOND. The committee will come to order.

We have been delayed a little bit this morning. I opened the Senate at 9:45 a.m., and there was supposed to have been somebody there to take my place immediately, and they were not there, so we were delayed, and now we are going forward with this hearing.

I welcome our witnesses today, Secretary of State Christopher, Secretary of Defense Perry, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili.

The witnesses have been asked to provide testimony on the administration's policy on Bosnia, and the use of U.S. military forces to enforce the peace agreement. As you are no doubt aware, a great deal of concern and skepticism has been voiced by the American public and the Congress on the national security interest, or vital interest that warrant the deployment of U.S. military forces to participate in a peace enforcement operation in Bosnia.

I have said this a number of times already, and I will say it again. The American public and the Congress need answers to important questions before the President deploys U.S. military troops to Bosnia to enforce a peace agreement. I believe the American public and Congress support the use of U.S. military forces to defend U.S. national security interests.

We must, however, understand the risks, and weigh those risks carefully. The American public and Congress are not yet in possession of the facts necessary to make this judgment.

I am concerned with recent reports that the President will not seek approval of the Congress prior to deploying U.S. military forces to Bosnia. I would like to make it clear, I respect the constitutional prerogatives of the President, as Commander in Chief, to exercise that authority. However, in this instance I believe that it is pure folly and an unwise move to deploy U.S. forces without support of the Congress.

With regard to the cost of deploying U.S. forces in the peace enforcement operation, Dr. Perry has mentioned in recent discussions that the cost of deploying U.S. forces would range between \$1 billion and \$2 billion.

A number of articles have been appearing in the press over the past weeks discussing the use of U.S. military forces, the NATO plan, the cost and the cease-fire, and for the record I want to ensure that the following questions and concerns be addressed:

What are the national security or vital interests that warrant the deployment of U.S. military forces to Bosnia?

Will the President seek congressional approval prior to a deployment of U.S. military forces?

How many U.S. military forces will be sent to participate in the peace operation, where will they come from, how long will they be deployed, and what are the conditions for withdrawal?

How will they be deployed in sectors? Will they be deployed with nonmilitary forces, and under whose command will they be deployed? What are the rules of engagement?

How much will the operation cost, and when will the Department seek funds to pay for this operation?

What non-NATO countries will participate in this operation?



I understand that Secretary Perry needs to leave the hearing by 12:15 p.m. to make another appointment. In order to honor his request, so that all Members may have an opportunity to ask questions of all the witnesses. I would ask the witnesses briefly to summarize their statements to the extent necessary to ensure that the information we are seeking is discussed.

Senator Nunn, do you have any remarks or comments you would like to make before we begin the hearing?

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do have some comments I would like to make.

I thank you for arranging the hearing this morning. It is an important hearing, as it kicks off a series of congressional hearings to consider the key questions relating to this operation, in particular, whether Congress should authorize the participation of the U.S. forces in a NATO-led operation to implement a peace agreement for Bosnia.

I believe it must be noted at the outset that at this time there is no peace agreement. A cease-fire is in place and is generally holding. Principles have been negotiated that will serve as the basis for a peace agreement, and the parties have agreed to participate in proximity talks to negotiate a peace agreement here in the United States at the end of this month, but there is still a long way to go and many important issues to be resolved before a peace agreement can be reached, and, of course, we will hear from our witnesses directly on that this morning.

Accordingly, any final judgment about the question of U.S. troop participation in a peace implementation force must of necessity await the negotiation of a peace agreement. In the meantime, however, it is, I think, timely to talk about the administration's goals for a peace agreement, and the conditions that must be met before our forces will participate as a part of the implementation force if there is a peace agreement.

The key issue that the Congress must eventually face, whether to authorize and to fund the participation of U.S. forces in the implementation force, that raises a number of questions. Senator Thurmond has already outlined several of those. We will have to reserve for another day a series of questions relating to the contents of a peace agreement once such an agreement has been negotiated, but that is the beginning point, and a very important beginning point of any decision about whether to deploy troops.

The issues that come to mind is whether the peace agreement will be clear, whether it will be a solid peace agreement, whether it will be an enforceable peace agreement with clear lines between the various forces that have been fighting.

Then, if that does happen, if we do have that kind of peace agreement, then there are a lot of other questions that follow. Is a NATO troop commitment required to implement the peace agreement? What is the mission of the NATO force? Can the NATO mission succeed if the United States forces do not participate? What are the risks to the U.S. forces as well as to the NATO forces, and as Senator Thurmond indicated, what is the cost?

Most importantly, what is the criteria for success? How do we know when we have succeeded and can therefore begin to withdraw, and what is the exit strategy for the withdrawal of NATO

forces? Will the U.S. forces be required to remain for the entire duration of NATO deployment, or considering our other responsibilities in the world, can there be a residual NATO force after U.S. withdrawal?

Do the NATO allies agree on leaving a balance of forces between the parties before NATO departure? That may be one of the most difficult questions, but I do not think we can wait until we have already entered Bosnia with a peace agreement, even with NATO leadership, before getting agreement from our allies as to whether we are going to leave a level playing field before we depart.

If that is a goal, and if NATO agrees that that is a goal, should there be a build-down of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons to get the forces more in line?

On the other hand, will it require a build-up of Bosnian heavy weapons. If so, who is going to take on that mission to supply the weapons and the training? Most importantly, do we have, or are we working on an agreement with our allies to have a level playing field and therefore a stability that would allow departure after we have completed the mission?

Are the mission statement, command arrangement, rules of engagement, and forces suitable for the operation?

I want to extend a warm welcome to our witnesses, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretary of Defense William Perry, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. John Shalikashvili. Their testimony this morning will help us to start answering these questions and other questions that pertain to this important matter.

I would like to note, in closing my statement this morning and in the presence of our witnesses who are representing the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the uniformed military, my profound sense of gratitude, appreciation, and sorrow for the three dedicated people who contributed so much to the success of the U.S. effort to bring peace to this war-torn region.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Frasure, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Kruzal, and Air Force Col. Nelson Drew from the National Security Council staff lost their lives in the mountains outside Sarajevo 2 months ago in the service of peace. Our prayers go to their families and loved ones with the hopes that their efforts will finally produce peace for all of the people of Bosnia and the region. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses this morning.

Chairman THURMOND. Secretary Christopher, we will start off with you, and follow with Secretary Perry, and General Shalikashvili. I hope that between the witnesses they can provide this committee with answers to the questions which I posed, as well as the questions which the Members will ask about this very important issue. Secretary Christopher.

#### STATEMENT OF HON. WARREN M. CHRISTOPHER, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I do not often appear before this committee, and thus, I particularly appreciate the privilege of appearing here this morning with Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili.

We are at a critical point in our efforts to achieve peace in the former Yugoslavia. As a result of American leadership, we have recently made important progress. For the first time in 4 years, we now have a real chance to reach a peaceful settlement. If we are to succeed, continued American leadership will be essential.

Our ability to sustain that leadership depends on our working closely with the Congress. It equally depends on our gaining the support and understanding of the American people. That is why I am particularly pleased to appear here this morning with my two colleagues.

It is very important to realize how far we have come in the last few months. As recently as last July, Bosnian Serb forces had overrun two U.N.-declared safe areas, murdering or expelling their inhabitants and defying the international community.

At that time, we faced a stark choice. The international community could either have taken steps to fulfill its mission, or it could have watched the mission collapse. If we had not acted, our NATO allies and other troop contributors might have been forced to pull out, leaving behind an even greater humanitarian catastrophe. If that had happened, we might well be here today discussing the need to send troops to Bosnia, not to support peace but to extract peacekeepers from a failed mission.

Under President Clinton's leadership the situation has fundamentally changed. At last July's London conference we convinced our allies to take firm measures, including the use of decisive air power, to protect the remaining safe areas. After the Bosnian Serbs attacked the Sarajevo marketplace, killing 36 people, NATO launched a 2-week air campaign to make it clear that further violations would not be tolerated. NATO stands ready to resume that campaign if it becomes necessary to do so.

In August, President Clinton launched a new American diplomatic initiative. After weeks of shuttle diplomacy, and despite the loss of three brave American negotiators—and thank you, Senator Nunn, for your tribute to them, we have taken dramatic steps on the path that the President laid out in August.

In September, the parties agreed to preserve the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its present borders and with a single international personality. They also agreed to constitutional principles and a Federal structure, including a presidency, a parliament, and a constitutional court. They have committed to free elections and the protection of human rights.

Then, less than 2 weeks ago on October 5, the parties agreed to a Bosnia-wide cease-fire, to be followed by proximity peace talks here in the United States, and eventually a peace conference.

Despite its imperfections, the cease-fire is taking hold. This has opened the way for the establishment of a land route to Gorazde, the delivery of humanitarian aid throughout the country, and the restoration of utilities to Sarajevo. There has been a quite remarkable turn-around in the quality of life in Sarajevo. The price of food and fuel has dramatically declined, streets are now illuminated by the lights of the city, not by the flash of artillery shellings from the hills.

At the end of this month, on October 31, the Presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia will come to the United States to start

the proximity peace talks. They will certainly have an immensely difficult set of issues to resolve, issues concerning territorial actions, constitutional principles and arrangements, and the return of refugees.

I plan to open these talks personally, and our negotiating team at the site will be led by Ambassador Dick Holbrooke. We are determined to work hard to help the parties overcome the very formidable obstacles that they face on the way to a peace agreement.

At the same time, Mr. Chairman and Members, I want to stress that we should not put the cart before the horse. We cannot take it for granted that a settlement can be achieved. Before we are ready to implement the settlement, before we know exactly what will be required of us from such a settlement, we must first get the parties to agree to peace. They have, as has been said this morning, a considerable distance to go.

The United States has a vital interest in sustaining progress toward peace in this volatile region. The American people remember well that twice in this century we have had to send our soldiers across the Atlantic to fight wars that began in Central Europe.

Today, after a century of hot and cold war, there is an opportunity to build an undivided, integrated Europe at peace, but we must remember that Sarajevo was the spark that once ignited the entire continent. We can now prevent that from happening again. We can help stop this conflict before it spreads beyond the borders of the former Yugoslavia, and that is a vital national interest.

If we want the killing to stop, if we want to end the worst conflict in Europe since World War II, then we must follow through on the strategy that has brought us to this point.

Let me say again that we now have the best chance we have had in 4 years to achieve peace in the former Yugoslavia. Future generations would neither understand nor forgive us if we turn our back on this opportunity to achieve peace.

The United States must continue to lead. We have this opportunity because America has been exerting determined leadership on behalf of peace. Had we not been prepared to lead, we could not possibly have made it this far, and unless we are willing to continue to lead, I believe that it is very unlikely that peace will be achieved.

There will not be a peace agreement in Bosnia unless NATO and the United States in particular take the lead in its implementation. The Bosnian Government has said to us quite directly that it will not sign a peace agreement without a commitment by the United States and NATO to help implement it. The Bosnian Government has good reason to ask for international safeguards after years of brutal fighting and dozens of broken agreements.

Only NATO has the robust forces, only NATO has the effective command and control structure, to deter or prevent the parties from breaking away from their commitments. If we ask NATO to act in Bosnia, the United States cannot fail to contribute troops to the mission.

The United States is the bedrock of NATO's strength and resolve. We cannot say to our allies, "we have come this far together but now you are on your own." That would mean abdicating our leader-

ship of the alliance. It would genuinely imperil the future of NATO and the stability of Europe.

Of course, the cost and risks of our participation in a NATO mission should be shared by our allies. Indeed, our allies, Britain and France have already borne the brunt of the casualties among international troops in Bosnia. I pay tribute to their valor, but this is not a problem that the Europeans can solve on their own.

In the last few weeks we have seen once again that if the United States does not lead, no nation or group of nations have the strength or the vision to replace us. Some still believe that the best way to implement a lasting peace in Bosnia would be to have the international community lift the arms embargo and simply walk away. Such a course would prolong the bloodshed and jeopardize all the progress we have made in the pursuit of peace, just at the moment when peace is finally within reach.

If we did this, it would make it impossible to put into place the institutions of a single Bosnian State, inevitably consigning Bosnia to partition. It would be inconsistent with what the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina wants itself. It would subject the Bosnian people to another winter of hiding in cellars and mourning in cemeteries.

If and when a final peace agreement is reached, Mr. Chairman and Members, the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Bosnia will come to an end. At that point, and only at that point, a NATO-led international force would move in to implement the agreement.

This will inevitably be a very complicated mission, and it will not be without risk, but let me assure all of you that the President will not put our troops in a situation where there is no peace to keep. The implementation force will have a limited mission and will maintain it for a limited period of time, approximately 1 year.

As my colleagues, Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili will discuss in greater detail, the implementation force will be run by the NATO command and NATO structure. There will be no dual key.

Some non-NATO countries may also participate, and Russia, for example, can make an important contribution. We are working with Russia to try to identify an appropriate role, consistent, though, with the principles that I have outlined of a NATO command and control structure.

Military implementation must be accompanied by reconstruction efforts so that the peace will endure. The European Union will take the lead in reconstruction, but our own contribution will also be vital.

In addition, the international community, working through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, will help to organize elections in Bosnia to ensure that they are free and fair. Let me also emphasize, as the President did over the weekend in Connecticut, that the United States will continue our strong support for the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal. We will not accept a peace agreement that undermines the tribunal and its very important work.

Mr. Chairman and Members, we are committed to working closely with you on every aspect of our involvement in Bosnia. The Congress is asking the right questions, as Senator Thurmond and Sen-

ator Nunn have done this morning, and we will continue to do our very best to answer them.

Secretary Perry, General Shalikashvili, and I will be testifying four times, in all, within the next 48 hours. In the end, it is vital that the administration, the Congress, and of course, most importantly the American people, find common ground on the need for American leadership. We must do so for the sake of our common goals of peace in the former Yugoslavia, and our common commitment to security and peace in Europe.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Members.

[The statement of Secretary Christopher follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY WARREN CHRISTOPHER, SECRETARY OF STATE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are at a critical point in our efforts to achieve peace in the former Yugoslavia. As a result of American leadership, we have made important progress. For the first time in 4 years, we have a real chance to reach a peaceful settlement.

If we are to succeed, continued American leadership will be essential. Our ability to sustain that leadership depends on our working closely with the Congress. It equally depends on gaining the support and understanding of the American people. That is why I am pleased to appear before you and the committee with my colleagues Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili.

It is important to recall how far we have come in just the last few months. As recently as last July, Bosnian Serb forces had overrun two U.N.-declared safe areas, murdering or expelling their inhabitants, and defying the international community.

Then, we faced a stark choice. The international community could either take firm steps to fulfill its mission, or it could watch the mission collapse. If we had not acted, our NATO allies and other troop contributors might have been forced to pull out, leaving behind a humanitarian catastrophe. Today, we might be here discussing the need to send troops to Bosnia, not to support peace, but to extract peacekeepers from a failed mission.

Under President Clinton's leadership, the situation has been fundamentally changed. First, at last July's London Conference, we convinced our allies to take firm measures, including the use of decisive air power, to protect the remaining safe areas. After the Bosnian Serbs attacked the Sarajevo marketplace, NATO launched a 2-week air campaign to make clear that further violations would not be tolerated. NATO stands ready to resume that campaign should it become necessary.

Second, in August, the President launched a new American diplomatic initiative. After weeks of shuttle diplomacy, and despite the loss of three brave American negotiators, we have taken dramatic steps on the path the President laid out.

In September, the parties agreed to preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina within its present borders and with a single international personality. The parties agreed to constitutional principles and a federal structure, including a presidency, a parliament, and a constitutional court. They also committed to free elections and the protection of human rights.

On October 5, the parties agreed to a Bosnia-wide cease-fire, to be followed by proximity peace talks and eventually a peace conference. Despite its imperfections, the cease-fire is taking hold. This has opened the way for a land route to Gorazde, the delivery of humanitarian aid in Bosnia, and the restoration of utilities to Sarajevo. There has been a remarkable turnaround in the quality of life for the people of Sarajevo. The price of food and fuel has dramatically declined. Streets are now illuminated by the lights of the city, not by the flash of artillery firing from the hills.

On October 31, the Presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia will come to the United States to start the proximity peace talks. They will have an immensely difficult set of issues to resolve, concerning territory, elections, constitutional arrangements, and the return of refugees. I plan to open these talks and our negotiating team at the site will be led by Ambassador Dick Holbrooke. We are determined to help the parties overcome the obstacles they face, and to reach an agreement that would make possible a formal peace conference and ultimately the implementation of a settlement.

At the same time, Mr. Chairman, I want to stress that we cannot put the cart before the horse. We cannot take it for granted that a settlement will be achieved. Before we are ready to implement a settlement, before we know precisely what that

will require from us, we must first get the parties to agree to peace. They still have a considerable distance to go.

We have a vital interest in sustaining progress toward peace in this volatile region of Europe. The American people remember that twice in this century we have had to send our soldiers across the Atlantic to fight in wars that began in Central Europe. Today, after a century of hot and cold war, there is an opportunity to build an undivided Europe at peace. But we must remember, Sarajevo was once the spark that ignited an entire continent. We can prevent that from happening again. We can help stop this conflict before it spreads beyond the borders of the former Yugoslavia, threatening progress toward peace and stability across Europe.

If we want the killing to stop, if we want to end the worst conflict in Europe since World War II, then we must follow through on the strategy that brought us to this point. Let me say again that this is our best chance in 4 years to achieve peace in the former Yugoslavia. Future generations would neither understand nor forgive us if we carelessly turned our backs on this opportunity. America must continue to lead.

We have this opportunity because America exerted determined leadership on behalf of peace. Had we not been prepared to do so, we could not possibly have made it this far. Unless we are willing to continue to lead, I seriously doubt if peace can be achieved.

There will not be a peace settlement in Bosnia unless NATO, and the United States in particular, take the lead in its implementation. The Bosnian government has said directly that it will not sign a peace agreement without a commitment by the United States and NATO to help implement it. The Bosnian government has good reason to ask for international safeguards after years of brutal fighting and dozens of broken agreements. Only NATO can provide the robust forces and the effective command and control needed to deter or prevent the parties from backing away from their commitments.

If we ask NATO to act in Bosnia, we cannot fail to contribute troops to the mission. The United States is the bedrock of NATO's strength and resolve. We cannot say to our allies: "we have come this far together but now you are on your own." That would mean abdicating our leadership of the Alliance. It would imperil the future of NATO and thus the stability of Europe.

The costs and risks of our participation in a NATO mission should certainly be shared by our allies. Indeed, our allies, especially France and Britain, have already borne the bulk of the casualties among international troops in Bosnia. I pay tribute to their valor. But this is not a purely European problem that the Europeans can solve on their own. In the last few weeks, we have seen once again that if the United States does not lead, no nation or group of nations has the strength or vision to replace us.

Some still believe that the best way to implement a lasting peace in Bosnia would be to have the international community lift the arms embargo and walk away. Such a course would prolong the bloodshed and jeopardize all the progress we have made in pursuit of peace, at a moment when peace is finally within reach. It would make it impossible to put into place the institutions of a single Bosnian state, inevitably consigning Bosnia to partition. It would be inconsistent with what the government of Bosnia itself wants. It would subject the Bosnian people to another winter of hiding in cellars and mourning in cemeteries.

If and when a final peace settlement is reached, Mr. Chairman and members, the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Bosnia will come to an end. At that point, and only at that point, a NATO-led international force would move in to implement the agreement. Under any circumstances, this will be a complicated mission and it will not be risk-free. But let me assure you that the President will *not* put our troops in a situation where there is no peace to keep. The force would have a limited mission, and remain for a limited period of time—approximately 1 year.

As my colleagues will discuss in greater detail, the implementation force will be run by the NATO command and control structure. There will be no "dual key." Some non-NATO countries may also participate. Russia, for example, can make an important contribution. We are working with Russia to identify an appropriate role, consistent with the principles I have outlined.

Military implementation will be accompanied by humanitarian and reconstruction efforts, so that peace will endure. The European Union will take the lead in reconstruction, but our contribution will also be vital. In addition, the international community, working through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, will help organize elections in Bosnia to ensure they are free and fair. Let me also emphasize, as the President made clear over the weekend, that the United States will continue our strong support for the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal. We will not accept an agreement that undermines its effectiveness.

Mr. Chairman, we are committed to working closely with you on every aspect of our involvement in Bosnia. The Congress is asking the right questions and we will continue to answer them. Secretary Perry, General Shalikashvili and I are testifying on the Hill four times this week alone.

In the end, it is vital that the administration, the Congress, and most important, the American people, find common ground on the need for American leadership. We must do so for the sake of our common goal of peace in the former Yugoslavia, and our shared commitment to security in Europe.

Chairman THURMOND. Dr. Perry.

#### STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. PERRY, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Shalikashvili and I prepared a joint statement that we would like to submit for the record, then each of us would like to make a short oral statement.

This war in Bosnia has been going on for more than 3½ years, with more than 200,000 people killed, and with unspeakable atrocities being committed. For the first time, we have a real opportunity to end this tragic war. This opportunity results from an energetic and creative American diplomatic initiative. It also results from a very effective application of NATO air power.

The peace settlement, if it is realized, will finally bring some relief to the suffering of the Bosnians, but peace in Bosnia will also affect the vital national security interest of the United States. It is not just about stopping the killing in Bosnia.

There has always been a danger of this war spreading to a wider Balkan war, and so our vital national security interests are entailed in preventing that danger. They are entailed by maintaining the strength and credibility of NATO, and more generally by maintaining security and stability in Europe.

I believe that U.S. security is inextricably linked with European security, and we know from the harsh lessons of experience that when the U.S. turns its back on Europe and stability in the long run, it is forced to return at a much greater price, and so stopping the war not only serves our humanitarian interest, it is in our vital national security interest.

The peace agreement will call for a peace implementation force which we are calling by the acronym IFOR. IFOR, in my judgment, must be under NATO command and control. There is no other institution capable of directing such a large, complex military operation. Whereas NATO for decades has developed a doctrine, the organization, and the training to conduct precisely such a multinational, complex military operation.


If NATO directs this operation, the United States, in my opinion, must participate. U.S. leadership in NATO, indeed, the U.S. role in Europe, is at stake. More fundamentally, as Secretary Christopher has said, we will simply not get a peace agreement without a commitment of the U.S. military. We have said for years now that there will be no commitment of U.S. military without a peace agreement. The peace agreement will involve more than military. It involves political, economic, and military components, as indicated on this first chart.



## *Proposed Peace Agreement - Scenario*

### —Peace Plan:

- Three-way mutual recognition
- Adjusted contact group map -- more viable borders
- Agreement on new Constitutional Framework
- Long-term resolution for Eastern Slavonia
- Regional economic Reconstruction



If we go to the next chart, I want to focus for you on both the military and civil aspects of the implementation of the peace agreement. We will be talking today about the military aspects.

### *IFOR Military Objectives*

- Assure IFOR's security and freedom of movement
- Ensure compliance with the military aspects of the peace plan
- Oversee withdrawal of Federation and Bosnian Serb forces to respective territories
- Establish and monitor zone of separation

If you notice that the IFOR, the implementation force, is under the political direction of the NAC, the North Atlantic Council, which is the political body for NATO. The commander, the SACEUR, who is General George Joulwan, will be responsible for the overall command and control of IFOR. His operational commander will be our CINCSOUTH, who is Admiral Leighton Smith.

This depicts, then, how the military aspect of the operation is going to be organized.

Let me go from there to talk about the military objectives of IFOR. First is ensuring that IFOR will have security and freedom of movement. Second, ensuring the compliance with the military aspects of the peace plan. Third is overseeing the withdrawal of federation and Bosnian Serb forces to respective territories, and finally establishing and monitoring the zone of separation between the forces.

Could you put that first chart back on top again, the map?

Secretary PERRY. What does it take, in terms of military forces, to perform these missions?

We do not expect IFOR to be engaged by an organized army. We are not going over there to fight a war. All of the warring parties will have signed a peace agreement before this force goes in, but after almost 4 years of conflict and the hatreds that are fanned by that conflict, and also recognizing there is a lack of central control of some of the paramilitary forces, we recognize that peace implementation will not be easy, and IFOR will not be risk-free.

Therefore, as Secretary Christopher indicated, we will hold out for a good agreement, a good peace agreement, in particular one that will not have fundamental instabilities that would make it almost impossible to implement, such as existed in some of the earlier proposed peace agreements.

And second, we will have a powerful military force in IFOR that will intimidate opposition to this force. This force will be large. General Shalikashvili will describe to you more details of that, but NATO is thinking in terms of about 60,000 military forces, ground combat forces and combat support. It will be large and it will be heavily armed.

The U.S. components that we are looking at today would consist of mechanized brigades, and it will have robust rules of engagement. If it is attacked by anyone, it will bring a large hammer down on them immediately. They will respond quickly and decisively.

In sum, this NATO force in Bosnia will be the biggest and the toughest and the meanest dog in town. That is what we can do to reduce the risk to the force.

I would like to turn to General Shalikashvili to explain the planning as it stands at this stage.

#### **STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI, USA, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

General SHALIKASHVILI. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, just as a number of you, I have just returned from a trip to Sarajevo, Zagreb, and to our forces in Italy, and as Secretary Perry just mentioned, I would wish to update you on the current status of planning for the implementation force.

On September 29, NATO tasked the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Joulwan, to develop a concept for a peace implementation force which NATO then approved just a few days ago on October 11, and at the same time tasked General Joulwan to turn that concept into a detailed plan. This planning is currently ongoing.


ing. Secretary Perry just briefed you on its mission and on its main tasks.

Shown here on this slide are three essential conditions for U.S. participation, concepts that are fully embedded in the NATO plan now being finalized.

[Slide.]

## *NATO Command*

- NATO chain of command
- No Dual Key
- NATO rules of engagement
  - Inherent right to self defense



NATO must be in charge, and Secretary Perry just described the NATO chain of command that is also shown here on the right of this chart.

There must not be—and there will not be a dual key arrangement, and an implementation force must operate under robust NATO rules of engagement that must ensure that the force can protect itself, and that it can get the job done.

This chain of command that is shown on the right of course also provides for the participation of non-NATO forces, and they, of course, will then operate under the same conditions I just outlined.

Next chart, please.

*Use of Force*

- Apply force, as required, to protect the force and accomplish the military objective of the peace plan
- Sufficient equipment, capability, authority and rules of engagement to defend itself and deal with violations
- Reaction to violations of peace plan
  - Heavy reaction force
  - Mobile reserve
- Ground force backed by NATO airpower




Since this operation will not be without risk, the ability to use appropriate force for self-protection in the response to a hostile act, or hostile intent, will be a key part of the rules of engagement, as will be the ability to use appropriate force to get the job done, but self-protection depends not only on the right rules of engagement, but it depends as well on the force being large enough and properly equipped to deal with the unexpected.

Of course, the force will also have proper reaction forces, and mobile reserves, as well as be able to call on NATO's existing ground and sea-based air power. Nevertheless, we must be prepared that despite all precautionary measures we could very well suffer casualties.

Next chart, please.

[Chart.]

*Concept of Operations*

The operation will consist of five phases. The preparation phase is currently ongoing, and in addition to completion of necessary planning, this phase could also very well include prepositioning of selected communications, headquarters, port opening, and support personnel.

Following a decision by the President and the North Atlantic Council, forces will enter very rapidly. This will be the beginning of the entry phase. Within hours of the decision, NATO will assume control of all military operations and all dual key arrangements will cease. NATO rules of engagement will go into effect at this point.

As in Haiti, we prefer going in very heavy, but as in Haiti as well, we expect that sometime during the end of the implementation phase, or during the transition to peace phase, conditions would allow a gradual reduction of implementation forces. How soon and how deep such reductions can be made will, of course, depend upon the situation as it will unfold. While we expect such a measured drawdown, we will ensure that we maintain a capable, balanced force right up until the end.

The final size of the force has not yet been determined. It will be worked out in a detailed operational plan currently being finalized in NATO. However, as Secretary Perry just mentioned, NATO's initial planning envisions approximately 60,000 troops to be located in Bosnia.

Subject to final planning and approval by the President, the U.S. contribution is envisioned to send around a division of approximately 20,000 troops in Bosnia, with other participation in air, naval, and logistic support activities going on in surrounding areas. Such a U.S. deployment would most likely require a reserve callup of approximately 2,000 to 3,000.


NATO's plan will call for the implementation force to complete its mission in 12 months and to withdraw. Subject to the approval of the plan by the President, the cost of the U.S. part of the operation will be approximately \$1.5 billion for the 12-month period. While, as I just said, the President has not yet made a force commitment, we have been anticipating a possible requirement for operations in Bosnia.

Next slide.

### *US Troop Participation / Length of Deployment / Costs*

- Size of force still in planning
- Approximately 60,000 IFOR ground troops in Bosnia
- US contribution about 20,000 ground troops in Bosnia
- Existing Air / Naval forces in theater continue to support operations
- IFOR involvement completed in no more than 12 months
- Final US costs depend on size of the force
  - Initial estimate is \$1.5 billion

### *Training*



For a considerable period of time, for some months now, U.S. ground forces which might participate in the implementation force

have participated in a most detailed textbook training program specifically tailored to the circumstances the implementation force will likely encounter.

In short, if committed, America's troops will be very, very well prepared.

### *Exit Strategy*

- Peace agreement permits lifting of arms embargo
- Enable improvement in Federation's self defense capability
- Create military stability
  - Initial approach arms control - caps on weapons
  - As necessary, equip and train Federation forces
- Assigned IFOR tasks will be accomplished and IFOR withdrawn within 1 year

Our exit strategy is based upon our goal of a sustainable peace settlement. In the past, the primary threat to the stability and security in the former Yugoslavia has been the preponderant power of the Bosnian Serb forces, especially in heavy weapons. To ensure the durability of the peace agreement, we must redress this imbalance.

Our preferred approach is for the parties to agree to arms control measures under which the Bosnian Serbs would reduce the number of heavy weapons. In addition to any arms control measures, however, we will be prepared to assist in helping to create stability through an effort to equip and train Federation forces to improve their ability to defend the Federation.

We will limit those efforts to the minimum necessary without stimulating an arms race. Although this will be accomplished by other than implementation force troops, it will be completed and IFOR will withdraw within 1 year.

Mr. Chairman, that summarizes the current status of planning for the implementation force, and with that, Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry, and I are prepared to answer your questions.

[The joint statement of Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili follows:]

PREPARED JOINT STATEMENT BY WILLIAM J. PERRY, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND  
GEN. JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The security of the United States is inextricably intertwined with the security of Europe. We know this from the harsh lessons of experience. We have learned that when the United States turns its back on European instability, in the long run we are forced to return at much greater price.

Therefore, after World War II we made the conscious decision to stay directly involved in European security. We have re-examined the importance of that commitment in the post-Cold War era, and two administrations—Republican and Democrat—have decided that our political, economic, and security interests require us to stay involved.

The security and stability of Europe is a vital national interest for the United States, and the primary vehicle for achieving that security and stability is NATO, the most successful alliance in history. That security and stability is threatened by the prospect that the conflict in Bosnia could become a much wider war in the Balkans, potentially involving our NATO allies. A peace settlement in Bosnia is now within reach that will allow us to avoid the dangerous spread of this conflict. But that settlement will not take place without a NATO implementation force (IFOR). And NATO cannot undertake this role without U.S. participation, because the engine of NATO is U.S. leadership.

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) decision of September 29, 1995, tasked SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe) to develop, as a matter of urgency, a concept of operations for the conduct of a NATO-led operation to implement the military aspects of a peace agreement among the parties in the former Yugoslavia. The NAC approved SACEUR's Concept of Operations for the NATO-led peace implementation force on October 11, 1995. This concept of operations is based on the expectation that the parties will commit to recognize and observe national existing borders and withdraw all forces into their respective territories on the basis of an agreed map.

On this basis, when directed by the North Atlantic Council, SACEUR is to assume overall authority for the operation, designating CINCSOUTH as the commander in theater of an Implementation Force (IFOR) consisting of NATO and non-NATO forces. We expect the NAC to direct the beginning of implementation promptly after the signing of the peace agreement, in order to maximize the chances it will be effectively implemented and to prevent a deterioration into renewed fighting. A decision to begin implementation will be based, on a clear indication that the parties intend to honor their commitments under the agreement, although we recognize that irregular forces not under the parties' control may pose problems of compliance. Our demonstrated willingness and ability to react will be critical in deterring or preventing violations. CINCSOUTH is to complete the military tasks in theater associated with the peace agreement, under rules of engagement to be decided by NATO, and to be prepared to control and secure the withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia that are not transferred to the IFOR. The IFOR will be prepared to assist in the withdrawal of U.N. peacekeepers (UNCRO) in Eastern Slavonia, should that prove necessary.

The objective of the implementation force will be to ensure compliance with the military aspects of the peace plan. The force's main task will be to oversee the withdrawal of the Federation and Bosnian Serb forces to their respective territories within an agreed period as laid out in the settlement. The force will deploy and operate predominantly in Federation territory, but will be prepared to operate throughout Bosnia. The implementation force will do whatever is necessary, including the use of force, to assure its own security and freedom of movement. Once the warring parties have moved to their designated areas, the IFOR will monitor a narrow zone of separation along the internal borders between the Bosnian Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic.

The IFOR mission will not include reconstruction, resettlement, humanitarian relief, election monitoring, and other non-security efforts that will need to be undertaken in Bosnia. However, there will need to be close liaison between the IFOR commander and the entities charged with the civilian elements of peace implementation.

The force will be led by NATO, under NATO command and control, with NATO rules of engagement. Although the details of the rules of engagement have not been established, the ROE must ensure that NATO forces have an inherent right to self defense and the necessary authority to implement the agreement. There will be no dual key arrangement with the United Nations or any other political oversight authority. UNPROFOR's authority would end when NATO assumes control of the IFOR in the theater. The U.N. will have no on-going role or involvement in the



IFOR, although we will welcome a grant of authority under Chapter VII of the U.N. charter through a U.N. Security Council Resolution, if appropriate.

The Rapid Reaction Force and other elements of the UNPROFOR judged to be capable of making a contribution to the peace implementation process will be invited to become elements of the IFOR under NATO control. Other UNPROFOR units in Bosnia will be withdrawn.

The size of IFOR has not yet been determined. It will be worked out in the detailed operational plan currently being developed by NATO military authorities. Initial planning estimates call for approximately 60,000 ground troops, including combat and combat support personnel. It is our judgment that implementation can only be assured with an adequate force on the ground; air power alone would not be sufficient. The U.S. contribution is still under discussion, but it is likely to be about a division. This will mean about 20,000 U.S. troops on the ground in Bosnia. Other U.S. troops would participate in air, naval, and logistics support activities in the surrounding area.

The implementation force will complete its mission in a period not to exceed 12 months. We believe this will be more than adequate to accomplish the needed tasks that will allow the peace to become self-sustaining. As we did in Haiti, we anticipate the IFOR will go in heavy and, if successful, would begin drawing down significantly far in advance of the final exit date.

The primary threat to stability and security in the former Yugoslavia has been the preponderant power of the Bosnian Serb Army, especially in heavy weapons. To ensure the durability of the peace agreement, we must redress this imbalance. Our preferred approach would be for the parties to agree to arms control measures under which the Bosnian Serbs would reduce the number of their heavy weapons. In addition to any arms control agreement, we are prepared to assist in helping to create stability through an effort to equip and train Federation armed forces to improve their self-defense capabilities. We will limit those efforts to the minimum necessary to create a balance of forces, without stimulating an arms race. This effort will be separate from the IFOR and will not involve IFOR troops.

The precise cost to the United States for the IFOR will depend on the size of the American force involved and other details not yet worked out, but initial estimates are in the range of \$1-\$1.5 billion. Apart from normal cost sharing for common NATO infrastructure used in the operation, we will not pay the costs of other troop contributing states. We will seek assistance from countries who do not contribute troops to the force to assist in financing for the massive economic reconstruction effort that will be needed for this war-torn region.

NATO's military authorities are in the process of requesting forces for the IFOR from the member states. We expect contributions from most NATO nations including very substantial contributions from the UK and France. Non-NATO nations will also participate, as long as they can provide troops and equipment that can perform a function for IFOR and meet minimum criteria for military effectiveness, and can fund their own participation. We have not concluded discussions with other potential non-NATO participants; neither can we say with certainty to what level of participation each country will commit itself. Non-NATO countries will participate under the operational control of the IFOR commander. The military forces of certain PFP countries have already shown in various partnership exercises an ability to work closely with alliance forces.

We see many advantages to having the Russian military participate in the implementation force. If we can find an acceptable way to integrate them into the force, without sacrificing essential unity of command it would help share the burden—and it would also demonstrate that NATO and Russia can work cooperatively on a key European security question. On October 8, 1995, Secretary Perry met with Russian Minister of Defense Grachev in Geneva to consult on this question. The meeting made some progress, particularly on modalities for further discussion. Russia has sent a three-star general to SHAPE headquarters to discuss possible arrangements for Russian troop participation, and a team led by Deputy Secretary Talbott is discussing this issue with Russian authorities as we speak.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, we believe that if a peace agreement is reached, it is essential that the United States and its NATO allies, along with our international partners, be prepared to sustain that negotiated peace. As the alliance responsible for peace and security in Europe, NATO can do no less. As the leader of NATO, the United States must lead and shape this effort—an action necessary to protect vital national interests.

**Chairman THURMOND.** In order to ensure that all Members have an opportunity to ask questions, the first round of questions will

be limited to 5 minutes each. I want to be sure the clock is kept right.

Now, Secretary Christopher, I mentioned in my opening statement the need for the President to explain to the American public and the Congress the national security or vital interests that warrant the deployment of U.S. military forces to implement a peace agreement in Bosnia.

A great number of Americans and Members of Congress do not feel that deploying U.S. forces in Bosnia to enforce a peace agreement to save the NATO alliance is of vital importance. Can you explain exactly what U.S. national security interest or vital interest warrant a U.S. commitment to deploy U.S. troops to enforce a peace agreement?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Chairman, as I said in my statement, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia is the most serious conflict to take place in Europe since World War II. The United States has a strong vital interest, as Secretary Perry and I both said this morning, in preventing that conflict from spreading outside the former Yugoslavia. We also have important interests in ensuring that the killing stops, and ensuring that the humanitarian catastrophe there comes to an end.

We have an opportunity now to forward this vital interest, to advance it, by seeking a peace agreement, but that peace agreement will only come about if NATO and the United States are involved in its implementation. Hence, there is a vital national interest in bringing this conflict to an end and keeping it from spreading. To carry out that interest, we need a peace agreement, which will not come about unless there is an understanding and a decision that NATO and the United States will participate in the implementation.

Moreover, Mr. Chairman, we have a vital interest in the health and success of NATO. If NATO is asked to implement this agreement, and if the United States were to turn it down or to back away, we would imperil the future of NATO—the future of the strongest military alliance in the history of the world—and imperil the stability of Europe. I think in that congeries of events is the vital national interest of the United States.

It comes about because we have an opportunity now for the first time in 4 years to see a peace agreement, but that will only come about if we help implement it through a NATO force.

Chairman THURMOND. Secretary Christopher and Secretary Perry, a view of many Americans is that ending the war in Bosnia and enforcing a peace agreement is Europe's—I repeat, Europe's responsibility. Do you agree?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Chairman, I do not. This is a problem that Europe has not been able to solve on its own. We have learned the lesson again that the United States' leadership is essential in dealing with a problem of this magnitude.

I would have to say that for some time, there turned out to be a vain hope that Europe could resolve this problem, but Europe has not done so, and the problem festers and gets worse. So once again, it has been shown that only with the United States' leadership and participation can a problem of this magnitude be resolved. A problem of such magnitude could spread elsewhere in Europe and cre-

ate the same crisis that caused United States' forces to have to go there twice before in this century.

Chairman THURMOND. Secretary Perry.

Secretary PERRY. I believe, Mr. Chairman, the United States has vital political, economic, and security interests in Europe. The war in Bosnia, particularly the danger of that war expanding, threatens these interests, and that the opportunity to stop that war to protect those interests will involve a commitment of U.S. military forces.

Chairman THURMOND. General Shalikashvili, you were recently in Sarajevo to meet with the Bosnian Government prime minister regarding the continued fighting in Northwestern Bosnia. Does the Bosnian Government understand that they are putting at risk the ability to reach a peace agreement if they do not stop the fighting?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Mr. Chairman, I believe that from my discussions with Prime Minister Silajdzic it is clear they do understand the seriousness of cease-fire violations, and the need for maximum restraint.

Chairman THURMOND. Secretary Christopher, exactly what commitments have been made by the administration to the Bosnian Government and to NATO with regard to U.S. military participation in the peace implementation force?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Starting more than 2 years ago, the President indicated that if a peace agreement was reached, and it was a real peace agreement, the United States would participate in its implementation, but subject to close consultations with the Congress.

The Bosnian Government has made it clear to us that they are not interested in a peace agreement unless the United States is involved in its implementation. That is a conditional commitment that the United States has made, as I say, subject to our review of the peace agreement and subject to our consultation with Congress of the kind that we are involved in here today, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Christopher, first, on the basic principles that were agreed on in Geneva on September 8, the essential principle, as I understand it, of continuing the legal existence of Bosnia with its present borders and continuing international recognition, beyond that, the joint statement that was issued goes on to say "we should continue to avoid mechanisms that could make the governmental institutions of Bosnia undemocratic or nonfunctioning in their operations."

As I read those principles, however, it appears that both in the parliament and the presidency, each of which will have one-third representation of the Bosnian Serbs, a one-third minority can veto any decision. How will we have an operational, basic working government if one faction can veto both executive or legislative decisions, or am I reading that incorrectly?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Senator, it is clear the constitutional arrangements will be difficult and complex. The peace agreement will have to spell them out in more detail than those general principles. There are mechanisms built in there to try to ensure that each of the enclaves has an opportunity to express its will, and that no de-

cision is taken over its determined opposition, but at the same time I think it is very important to recognize the need of the constitutional structure, of the federal structure to take decisions.

For example, in the field of foreign affairs, there is an understanding that the decisions will be taken on a national, that is, a federal basis. I think, Senator Nunn, you have asked a very appropriate question, and we have some broad outlines sketched out in those initial agreements. There will have to be far more detailed provisions so that we have the respect for minority rights so that each of the enclaves will have a say in the future, and so that there can be a functioning government.

Senator NUNN. Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili, on the chart, General, that you showed up there, I believe you used the words, create military stability as one of our goals, and you outlined two ways of doing that. One is an arms control way. I think that is what Senator Lugar and I several months ago labeled a build-down approach, getting rid of the Serb heavy weapons to level the playing field.

You listed as an alternative equipment-trained federation forces one of the other of those, I assume. I am not sure whether I am understanding that as our American preference to creating a military stability, which I agree with completely. I think it is essential, and I do not think we can get out of that unless we do have some military stability, if we go in.

But the question is, do our allies agree with that? Was that chart representing an American preference, or was that chart representing a determination and agreement by the allies to create a military stability before we depart?

Secretary PERRY. Senator Nunn, I was at a NATO defense ministers' meeting just a week ago and discussed that very issue. I pointed out that all of us had an interest in being able to pull out this force in a year, and that that did require being able to achieve this stabilization, and they all agreed with that.

I further pointed out that the best way of achieving that was through a build-down of the weapons. We discussed specifically the proposals you had made earlier. I think your proposals dated back almost a year ago now.

Senator NUNN. That is right.

Secretary PERRY. And everybody agreed that was the preferred course. We expect that if the peace agreement will include a description, or will include a mandate for process of arms control but will not include the details about how this arms control will be conducted, that may be putting too heavy a burden on this peace agreement to actually lay out the details of that. However, it should include a process for a peace agreement, meaning a process for arms control, and therefore the actual details of how this build-down will take place are still uncertain at this point, and therefore we say we have to have a provision for being able to equip and train in the event that the build-down is not as successful as we would want it to be.

Senator NUNN. Okay. Now, on that latter point, though, I understand the preference of the allies for a build-down. I would share that preference if it is possible, if it is feasible. Those are big ifs.

Now, if the build-down does not take place, if it is not either agreed to or implemented, have the allies agreed that there still has to be a way to achieve stability, and that that way will be to equip and train the Bosnian forces?

Secretary PERRY. I have to say, Senator Nunn, I did not ask for the agreement, I simply described it. This is what we would do. The United States would do it unilaterally, if necessary, although I do not think it will be necessary. I think we will get a coalition of other nations to work with us.

Senator NUNN. Do they understand fully we are going to do that unilaterally, if they do not agree?

Secretary PERRY. I was quite explicit on that. Several of them actually expressed support, and expressed interest in working with us and cooperating with us on that, but I would not want to say that we took a vote at the meeting or got approval, because I did not seek approval. I was describing to them what our plans were.

It was a very positive discussion, though, and it is in the context of they and we wanted to see this military stabilization. They and we wanted the build-down to occur, and they and we agreed that if the build-down was not sufficient, that we were prepared to equip and train.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Each one of us up here have just returned from a period with our constituents all across this country, and speaking for myself, I think there is the deepest and the gravest concern about this proposed military operation of any I have experienced with my constituents since the close of the Vietnam War. We just simply cannot write off the fact that the American public are deeply concerned about this proposal of the President.

We cannot write it off with just one word, abdication, and I will return to that. I think it is a burden of proof which is insurmountable, unless there is a joint effort by both the President and the Congress to overcome this apprehension all across our Nation.

The President cannot do it alone, in my judgment. It will require the Congress, and put this Senator at the moment in the unconvinced column. I think no less than a joint resolution just as we passed in the Gulf War will be required to establish that joint responsibility by both the President and the Congress to gain the confidence of the American people that we are doing the right thing.

Now, in looking back over recent statements by Secretary Christopher and Secretary Perry, it seems to me that there is a split of your views with respect to whether or not the President should come up and formally seek from the Congress this joint resolution, comparable to what we had in the Gulf War.

Mind you, that was a very divisive debate, even among the members of this committee, but there was a moment when the debate was concluded, just by a mere margin of five votes, in a situation where there was absolute clarity in many respects as to who the aggressor was and who the victim was—and that is not the case here.

This is a cultural, religious and civil war, deeply rooted in hatreds that go back hundreds of years, and it has just perplexed

the American people now for these several years of the war, and so I want to ask of you—Mr. Secretary, you are the senior member of the Cabinet. Lead off. You said on September 27 you felt that we should—that is, the President should go up and get this resolution—and then I think Secretary Perry, subsequently you cast some doubt as to your view.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Senator Warner, let me first stress, as I know you would perhaps if you were sitting in my chair, that the President has, in his role as Commander in Chief, very strong constitutional authority to deploy U.S. troops. That is a constitutional authority that none of us would want to see diminished or eroded in the course of this debate. That was very clear in the course of the debate at the time of the Gulf war.

I cannot do very much better, Senator Warner, than to quote President Clinton—

Senator WARNER. In the brevity of time—and those of us who have been here many years have fought through this issue, and I pride myself in defending, indeed, the President, be that Democrat or Republican, with that constitutional right—just say it in your own words. Do you feel President Clinton should come before the Congress and seek a joint resolution similar to the Gulf war or not, just simply yes or no?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Senator, the President himself has said that he would welcome and encourage such an authorization, and I would welcome and encourage such an authorization from the Congress at the same time.

Senator WARNER. All right. That is clear enough. Secretary Perry.

Secretary PERRY. I would absolutely welcome an authorization from the Congress for the reasons you have described.

Senator WARNER. Will the President take an affirmative action to seek that authorization? I just do not think a few hearings and consultations with the leadership is going to carry the burden of proof, and to establish clearly that it is a joint decision by the two branches of our government, the executive and the legislative. Will he seek affirmatively such an authorization?

Secretary PERRY. The President will have to make that determination. I will not make that determination for him.

Senator WARNER. Will you so recommend that he seek it?

Secretary PERRY. As I said, I would welcome the authorization from the Congress.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Secretary, would you recommend that he seek such an authorization?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I have to repeat what the President said, and I feel the same way, that we would welcome and encourage such an authorization. The timing of it is something that—

Senator WARNER. Let me just move on to another question. I think you have dealt with it as best you can.

This question of abdication bothers me greatly. I just cannot accept that. If there is abdication here, it was abdication by NATO several years ago in not stepping up and recommending at that time that they take charge of this operation and run it as you now propose. That was when the abdication occurred.

To have allowed the U.N. to fumble around these several years—and I just do not say this as a critic. I have made five trips to the region, most recently just 4 or 5 weeks ago with another colleague here in the Senate, and so it is a subject that all of us have studied, and therein lies the abdication.

But look back to the history, Secretary Christopher, of the U.S. participation in NATO. Billions and billions of dollars of the U.S. taxpayer have been put into it. Today we spend annually several billion to provide our troop strength there, and in addition I would say perhaps as high as \$100 billion in addition to keep in training and in place the troops we have, and so I do not think it is an abdication.

What troubles me is this thought that in 1 year's time this thing can be resolved, and my question to you, was there any consideration that this was coupled with the election that takes place next year, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. You have asked a number of questions, Senator, and I would like to have an opportunity to comment on one or two aspects of those questions.

I think it is entirely possible, looking back in history, Senator, that it was a mistake made not by our administration but by the prior administration to believe that this matter could be handled best by the United Nations. That was discussed very seriously in 1991 and 1992, and the decision was to ask the United Nations to put in peacekeepers; that was the genesis of UNPROFOR. In retrospect, especially considering the so called "dual key" operation, I believe that was a fundamental mistake.

We are where we are now, and in recent months we have seen a change in the matter, because NATO has moved in as a result of United States leadership.

I deny completely the notion that it had something to do with an election that is now 14 months ahead. There came a confluence of events in the middle of this year that caused the President to decide the United States had to step into leadership.

Part of it was the overrunning of Srebrenica and Zepa. Part of it was the shelling of the marketplace in Sarajevo. Part of it was the sweep by Croatia through sectors North and South, which we did not either condone or advocate, but nevertheless which simplified the situation. We were able, because of those events, to persuade our allies at the London conference that NATO should take strong, substantial, decisive action, and NATO did. That produced the opportunity for a peace agreement.

Talk to some of the members of that negotiating team, and they will tell you that when NATO acted, the situation fundamentally changed. The Serbs had a different attitude than they had at an earlier time.

So there was a series of events that gave us an opportunity to seek a peace agreement. Now we have been going all out to make the most of this opportunity.

Senator, we are trying to do this as rapidly as we possibly can. If we can do it sooner rather than later, it will be much to everyone's advantage. There are very complicated issues ahead, and I would not want to either mislead you or others who might be hearing this into thinking that we have some simple solution that can

be reached the day after the conference begins at the end of this month.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, just a comment. You both, or all three of you, have emphasized that without American participation it is unlikely that we will achieve success, and that peace could not possibly be achieved in the former Yugoslavia.

It seems clear to me, though, that even with American participation, and with NATO involvement, that it is uncertain that peace will be achieved. It is hopefully going to be achieved, but it is far from certain that it will be, even with our participation.

It is important, I think, to emphasize not just the first point, that without it we surely cannot see peace in the former Yugoslavia, but it is also important that we recognize that even with NATO and U.S. participation, there is still a significant chance that this will not succeed, and we are trying to weigh the risks of that success and the price of achieving that success here.

Secretary Perry, you have indicated in your testimony that our preferred approach would be for the parties to agree to arms control measures, but in any event, as you put it, in addition to any arms control agreement we are prepared to assist in creating stability through an effort to equip and train federation armed forces. If you could put up that last chart over there, somebody, I would appreciate it.

Now, that is going to be unilateral on our part. Whether the Europeans agree or not, we are going to train the Bosnian force, is that correct?

Secretary PERRY. That is the unilateral decision, but we will seek and expect to get other partners in this venture.

Senator LEVIN. Whether or not we have formal support by NATO, we are intending to do it anyway, is that correct?

Secretary PERRY. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. Will that require the lifting of the U.N. arms embargo in order to equip the Bosnian army?

Secretary PERRY. Yes, it will.

Senator LEVIN. Will we seek then, in any event, the lifting of that embargo, and will our participation in IFOR be dependent on the lifting of the U.N. arms embargo?

Secretary PERRY. Let me turn to Secretary Christopher to describe the connection between—

Senator LEVIN. Well, just very briefly, because of time, if the U.N. arms embargo has to be lifted in order for us to do that—

Secretary PERRY. It does have to be lifted in order for us to do that, that is correct.

Senator LEVIN. Then is it not true that in order for us to participate, since that is one of our objectives, that there must be a lifting of that embargo?

Secretary PERRY. I would not put it that way, Senator Levin, because there is a time-phasing issue involved.

Senator LEVIN. Well, I do not know how we can avoid putting it that way. If, in fact, it is our determination that we are going to equip and train federation forces, I do not see how you can do that without the U.N. arms embargo being lifted, as you have just said, and so I do not know how you can put that down as a requirement



and a criteria, unless there is assurance that that arms embargo will be lifted.

Secretary PERRY. Senator Levin, as a one-time computer scientist, I am in favor of parallel processing sometimes, where you do several things simultaneously. In this case, I think it is quite possible and, in fact, desirable, to go ahead with putting the implementation forces in there while we are working to get the embargo lifted, and while we are working to start the other.

Senator LEVIN. Next question. You have indicated a number of goals here. You have also indicated a 1-year outside time limit. Is it your determination that we are out of there in 1 year whether or not the peace agreement has durability, which is one of our purposes?

Secretary PERRY. It is my judgment that we can achieve these goals in 1 year, including the stabilization goals, and pull the implementation force out of there. It is also my judgment that a military operation of this sort will go much better if there are very specific objectives set and adhered to, but there are going to be many civil tasks underway, reconstruction tasks, which are going to go on well beyond the 1-year period.

Senator LEVIN. If those goals are not achieved within 1 year, as we hope, are we out of there anyway?

Secretary PERRY. My recommendation—it will not be the final decision, but my recommendation will be to set and maintain and sustain this 1-year goal.

Senator LEVIN. General, do you fully support the strategy which has been laid out and the goals which have been laid out, and do all the Chiefs fully support that strategy and those goals?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I and the Chiefs support the concept for the conduct of this operation that I just outlined to you, yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Do you believe it is militarily achievable?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I believe it is militarily achievable, that is correct.

Senator LEVIN. The Secretary-General of NATO has set forth a number of purposes of this operation. One is to provide stability as the warring factions implement their new constitutional relationships and restore their economic ties.

Senator WARNER. Senator, I regret to say the Secretary has to leave in 1 hour. Could you just shorten that question?

Senator LEVIN. I just got my slip. I would be happy to have a very short answer.

Is your determination, both of you, that our forces will be out of there in 1 year, whether or not the warring factions have "implemented their new constitutional relationships and restored their economic ties"? Secretary Christopher.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Senator Levin, the answer to that is yes, but it is because we believe that that is a reasonable period of time for them to have accomplished the necessary steps.

I will not elaborate beyond that in the interests of time.

Secretary PERRY. My answer to that is yes, also.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, you have indicated the force is going to be called IFOR. I think you are gathering from the questions many people are suggesting it might be called WHYFOR. We have not yet been persuaded about the need to deploy up to 20,000 American troops.

I recall, Secretary Christopher, back in 1993 I believe you were on a mission to Europe to persuade our European allies about a lift and strike policy. Prior to your departure the President was given a copy of *Balkan Ghosts*, Mr. Kaplan's book, and apparently had a change of heart about that particular mission after reading about history's cauldron into which we might be stepping, and I think that particular book needs rereading as we ponder exactly where we are going with this policy.

I also want to pick up what Senator Warner was talking about a moment ago. I believe, Mr. Secretary Perry, you were quoted this past weekend that the administration would not seek congressional authorization, would welcome it but not seek it, and that if Congress refused to provide the \$1 billion or \$1.5 billion, you would try to get Congress to pay for it from unrequested defense appropriations approved by Congress.

Does this mean that if Congress were to deny the President specific appropriations or authorization, that the President would send troops anyway and then look for ways to pay for it?

Secretary PERRY. Let me be clear about what I said. In terms of the authorization, I simply was quoting what the President said, that he would welcome the authorization. I was not trying to put words in his mouth.

Second, in terms of the appropriation, I said this is a large amount of money, it is not in the defense budget, we would have to seek a supplemental appropriation, and in any supplemental appropriation a question arises, what is the source of funds, and I said I could not determine the source of funds until the 1996 defense budget was determined, which is not yet determined.

Senator COHEN. Well, at this point we do not have a clear commitment, but in September 1993, the President, in a meeting with the President of Bosnia, indicated that he would have to have the support of NATO, obviously, and that Congress would have to agree.

Hopefully, nothing has changed from the time he made that statement that Congress would have to agree, but I would also point out that you need to come to Congress. Whether you believe it is constitutionally required or not, politically it is required.

Also, I am intrigued about the chart that you put on the board over here. When President Bush initially was contemplating sending up to a 1/2-million troops to the Persian Gulf, he at that point, based upon the advice given to him based upon the theories of constitutional power, believed he did not have to come to Congress for approval. As a matter of fact, he made statements at that time indicating that he had authority from the United Nations.

I recall making a statement at that point—I do not recall any of us swearing allegiance to support the U.N. Charter. Our allegiance is to the United States Constitution. But nonetheless, initially, he felt he had authority from the U.N. to deploy those forces in the Persian Gulf.

I notice on the chart that you have up there UNSC endorses and authorizes. I assume that means United Nations Security Council, and yet, as I look at your statement, you have indicated at the bottom of the statement that the U.N. will have no ongoing role or involvement in IFOR, although we will welcome a grant of authority under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter through a U.N. Security Council resolution if appropriate. I take it at this point the U.N. has not yet authorized such a deployment of forces.

Secretary PERRY. There would be no occasion for them to authorize it until the peace agreement is reached. The peace agreement would call for this implementation force. We would welcome the U.N. to come out with a resolution supporting it.

Senator COHEN. Would you seek it?

Secretary PERRY. No, we would not seek it. It is not necessary. What is required is a NAC resolution. Some of the non-NATO nations, to participate in this, might require a U.N. resolution.

Senator COHEN. But at this point you do not believe the President has a constitutional requirement to come to Congress to seek its approval, and you do not contemplate having the United Nations Security Council specifically authorize it.

Secretary PERRY. Senator Cohen, I am not an expert on constitutional issues. I would pass on that one.

Senator COHEN. Let me turn to another subject matter. In Somalia, the administration put itself in a position of trying to negotiate with a warlord at the same time we are trying to hunt him down, and this inconsistent policy I think led to a disaster which has damaged to this point U.S. national interests. And it seems to me that we are headed somewhat in the same direction, a very analogous situation. We have U.S. military commanders on the ground in Bosnia who will need to deal with Bosnian Serb leaders, presumably including General Mladic and possibly Dr. Karadzic.

Both of these men have been indicted as war criminals, and just 2 days ago President Clinton pledged to bring Bosnian war criminals to justice. So the questions I have: If the United States or NATO troops have the opportunity, will they seize General Mladic or Dr. Karadzic or other indicated war criminals so they can be tried by the UN war crimes tribunal in Bosnia? And if not, what does President Clinton mean when he says these indictments are not negotiable, they must be tried? Would you explain that for me, please?

Secretary PERRY. The IFOR will have the responsibility, as indicated in these charts, of maintaining security in Bosnia. They will not have the authority or the responsibility of conducting dozens of other tasks, of which that would be one.

Senator COHEN. I would like an answer: Will we seek to arrest these two individuals and others and try them as war criminals? And if we do seek to make such arrests, can we expect the peace agreement to be sustained?

Secretary PERRY. That would not be an IFOR task. I cannot answer the broader question that you have in mind.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I need to go back to the beginning of your question, because it contains a fundamental misapprehension. President Milosevic of Serbia has a signed statement from Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic making him the negotiating au-

thority for the Bosnian Serbs as well as the Serbian Government. We intend to deal in this negotiation with President Milosevic of Serbia, who has not been indicted as a war criminal by the War Crimes Tribunal, and with President Izetbegovic of Bosnia and President Tudjman of Croatia. Those are the three parties who will be coming here.

With respect to the War Crimes Tribunal, that is very important to the United States. We have contributed more money to it than any other country. We will continue to support the Tribunal. We do not expect to take any action in the peace settlement that would undermine the authority of the War Crimes Tribunal. If these two individuals that you mentioned in Bosnia were to come into the hands of the IFOR, or if they would some way try to impede the conduct of IFOR, then they would be arrested and turned over to the war crimes tribunal. But that is a very hypothetical situation.

The President was absolutely correct in saying that we intend to pursue the War Crimes Tribunal's indictments. We will try to make sure in every way we can, with our financial support as well as with the support we have given them with 20 prosecutors or investigators. We are doing all we can to sustain the War Crime Tribunal, and will continue to do so.

Senator COHEN. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it is important to pause for a moment and express our appreciation to all of you and to the President for the increasing opportunities for peace and cessation of the hostilities and the kinds of cruelties and man's inhumanities to man that we have all witnessed. I think that it is really a great tribute to both those who have been involved in the military aspects of this, General, and also those who have been involved in the negotiations. All of us recognize they have had extraordinary difficulty as well as, as Senator Nunn has pointed out, those who have lost their lives. It has been an enormously significant achievement to date, and we are obviously looking as to where the next step goes, with all of the possibilities and dangers that are posed. But I think all Americans, and I would expect the people around the world, should take note of the achievement that has been made.

Just to follow up on the concept that Senator Cohen has pointed out, I am interested in what you see as the role of the personnel within the area. Maybe the question is whether they are going to find those individuals who have been involved and indicated for the war crimes. President Clinton spoke very eloquently in recent days up in Connecticut about the war crimes, the Nuremberg trials, and reminded us about this strong Nation's commitment on human rights.

So this is something that is very real. Those troops are going to find out the conditions where there have been numerous additional incidents of human rights violations and where they are going on these particular matters. As they look forward and they exist in this area, are they going to be empowered to make any adjustments or changes in the arsenals that the different powers have to try to create at least greater conditions or opportunities for peace in those areas? I would be interested just with Secretary Chris-

topher how you see any of the possibilities for the economic rehabilitation of the region. Is that something which the Western European countries and the United States intend to participate in? Does that offer any other opportunities or leverage, really, for moving the process for peace?

And, General Shalikashvili, I notice in your testimony you mention that there is the possibility that U.S. and Russian forces will be carrying out joint peacekeeping exercises later this month at Fort Riley, KS. I would be interested in what applicability to a mission in Bosnia will this exercise have. Maybe we will start with the last one, and then we will hear from Secretary Christopher, and then come back, Secretary Perry, if you would talk about, again, the expansion, how you see the human rights as well as the military balance, what you expect any of these troops to be able to do in terms of the military buildup or the unequal position of heavy weapons, in particular.

General.

General SHALIKASHVILI. Senator Kennedy, the exercise at Fort Riley, Kansas, later on this month between Russian troops and our own troops is designed to develop interoperability in such things as peacekeeping operations between our two forces, designed for the day when our two forces might participate in such operations together.

Whether it will be possible to work out the arrangements for Russia's participation in NATO for this IFOR operation is too early to tell. As we are sitting here, Russian and American negotiators are discussing this issue, but we are still quite a ways apart. I do not know whether there will be a linkage between that exercise and our ability to operate in this exercise.

Senator KENNEDY. So at least at the current time, then, the Soviet forces will not be a part of any peacekeeping process if there is a ceasefire peace?

General SHALIKASHVILI. We do not know that yet, Senator Kennedy. We are still trying to find whether it will be possible for us to have Russians participate in the implementation force without doing any damage to the NATO command and control arrangements, the NATO rules of engagement, and the other conditions that we find absolutely essential for our participation.

Senator KENNEDY. General, just there, do you anticipate the need for reinforcing these forces once you designate the number? Would you be prepared to reinforce the forces, and to what extent would that be?

General SHALIKASHVILI. It is my judgment that the force size has been designed to maximize the possibility that it will go the other way. Rather than sending in a smaller force, then later on you might find you have to reinforce, it has been my belief that it is best initially to send a larger force, and then rapidly—hopefully, rapidly—be able to downsize that force. So the expectation is not that you would have to reinforce it. The expectation rather is that you would have the ability to downsize it as soon as the situation stabilizes. But as you know, in operations like this nothing is guaranteed.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to welcome the witnesses here this morning. One of the benefits of being a ways down the line is some of your questions that you had have already been addressed. I would like to say once again, and I have said many times since the administration pledged to send American troops to Bosnia, it is impossible to keep a peace where none exists. The simple existence of a signed peace agreement does not constitute peace.

The administration has used the term peace implementation to describe the force currently being planned for Bosnia, and I think Americans want to know what is the difference between a peace implementation force and a peacemaking force. American forces should not be sent to Bosnia to make peace, even if we decide to send them to keep the peace.

Since you have answered a couple of questions concerning authorization and the arms embargo, let me just restate what I believe is the view of my colleagues, and that is that the President should come forward and seek authorization from the Congress, as we have in the past, other administrations have as well as this one, if we are going to make this kind of commitment. I understand that that decision has to be made only by the President, but I am afraid that if the President does not we might see a very ugly fight erupt which could have serious consequences for your efforts, as well as the relationship between the Congress and the executive branch. So I hope that the President will come forward and seek that authorization.

As far as lifting of the arms embargo is concerned, Mr. Secretary, I do not see how you could achieve that authorization and consensus here in the Congress without a concurrent lifting of the arms embargo at the same time that our forces are dispatched. The idea of a build-down is one which has a great deal of attractiveness in theory. I am reminded of the fact that we are dealing with the most duplicitous kind of people in this conflict, and for us to rely on some kind of a build-down concept which would require good faith on the part of all parties is, I believe, not workable. If we do not have a stable balance on the battlefield, a lasting peace, obviously, is placed in significant jeopardy.

Secretary Perry, you said in the briefing that non-NATO forces, if they are involved in IFOR, would be under NATO command, is that correct?

Secretary PERRY. That is correct.

Senator MCCAIN. Can you envision a scenario where Russia would agree to have their military forces placed under NATO command?

Secretary PERRY. They have not so agreed at this stage, and if they do not agree they will not be part of IFOR.

Senator MCCAIN. But it was my understanding that it was the administration's position that it would be very helpful if the Russians were involved in this effort, given their long-standing relationship with the Serbs.

Secretary PERRY. It would be desirable, but not necessary.

Senator MCCAIN. Not necessary. Thank you.

General Shalikashvili, as I read this force, 20,000 of the 60,000 ground forces would be United States which I think we will find

upon examination those that will be expected to do the fighting will be primarily the U.S. forces, in case hostilities ensue. Eighty percent of the air power and most of the air capability is still being provided by the United States. This smacks a little bit to me as if the United States is doing what we made a conscious decision not to do, and that was to involve ourselves militarily in this conflict.

Is the European Community, our NATO allies, are they capable, political rationale aside, are they capable militarily of carrying out this peacekeeping mission in Bosnia?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I believe, strictly from a military point of view, NATO forces are capable of carrying out this mission.

Senator MCCAIN. Without the United States' participation?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I believe that is correct.

Senator MCCAIN. Would it not be, then, more equitable to have them take over more or most of these obligations?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I have maintained all along that one of the imperatives for sending American forces into an operation such as this, that they be robust enough and structured large enough to take care of themselves without having to depend on someone else. And therefore, I have argued that driven more by this requirement than rather specific tasks, America's contribution should be built around a division, because a division contains all the elements that would allow that force to take care of itself and take care of the unexpected, as opposed to an individual brigade being attached to somebody else's larger unit.

It is that aspect, Senator McCain, that in my judgment calls for roughly this size American force on the ground. And I think that the safety of our men and women going in supports that number.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Bingaman.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Perry, one of the issues that seems to me to be confused here is precisely what the military's job would be. You say in your statement here that they would have the job of overseeing the withdrawal of Federation and Bosnian Serb forces to their respective territories, and to monitor a narrow zone of separation between the forces, and between the borders between the Bosnian Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic. Do you see the military as also enforcing the boundaries of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Secretary PERRY. On that first point, Senator Bingaman, I might say that the extent of that task depends on how closely the lines on the ground agree to the map at the time of the signing of the peace element. It looks now, as opposed to a month or two ago, like they might be fairly close. And so this first task might be relatively small.

We are not anticipating any military incursions from outside the boundaries. We see the task as being one of protecting, of maintaining the separation between the Bosnian Serb forces and the Bosnian Federation.

Senator BINGAMAN. But if such incursion did occur, would there be a response, a military response, by the NATO force, as you see it?

Secretary PERRY. The NATO military force would protect itself if that happened. We do not anticipate that happening, but they

would certainly have to protect themselves. They are strong enough that they could protect themselves.

Senator BINGAMAN. One of the issues that I am trying to get clarification on is I believe the Bosnian Government feels strongly that they want a commitment to protect their territorial borders. I have great difficulty seeing the other two parties to this agreement, the Croats and Serbs, agreeing to that kind of a provision as part of an appropriate NATO mission, and I am just wondering where we come down on that issue?

Secretary PERRY. Secretary Christopher might want to comment on that, but it would seem to me that that is simply not a realistic issue. There is no incentive at all for either Croatia or Serbia, any of the bordering nations, to undertake any military incursions. They have been working hard to try to make this peace settlement take place, and all of those countries are looking forward to peace and to being involved in the security and stability and the economic benefits of Europe. The last thing they want to do is get involved in another war.

Secretary Christopher, would you like to comment?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. That is essentially correct, Senator. The peace agreement will no doubt call for the mutual recognition of each of the countries by the other and respect for their territorial integrity. Indeed, the two statements already agreed to contain that principle. So the territorial integrity of the three entities within their currently existing borders is something that the countries would pledge themselves to. The principal function of IFOR will be a separation of forces and ensuring that there is no resumption of the battle there between the forces.

Senator BINGAMAN. What do we contemplate as far as a remaining presence once the 1-year period is up or once the IFOR troop deployment is complete? Would we expect to see, like Senator Nunn put it, that some residual force remained? Would we expect to see the United Nations reassume some kind of peacekeeping role? Would we expect that the momentum for peace would be so great nobody would need be there? What is your expectation?

Secretary PERRY. I expect that the function of external forces maintaining security will be accomplished by then, but many of the other functions on that chart will still continue, and the reconstruction of the country, the political, economic, all of those functions I think will still continue, and they may go on for many years. But the IFOR, the NATO force which is responsible—an external force for maintaining security, we expect that function to be completed in 1 year and the forces to be completely removed.

Senator BINGAMAN. You would think there would not be a need to monitor the separation of forces after the initial year?

Secretary PERRY. That is my expectation, Senator Bingaman.

Senator BINGAMAN. Would you expect that whatever might occur with regard to reversing some of the ethnic cleansing that has occurred would be done without the assistance of any international entity, either the U.N. or NATO or anyone else?

Secretary PERRY. I would expect there to be a UNHCR, High Commission on Refugees, function working on resettling refugees, and that would relate directly to the question you are asking. That would be a U.N. function, not a NATO function. I might mention



that the UNHCR has been operating in the country right along as a parallel activity to the U.N. protection force, the UNPROFOR.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Coats.

Senator COATS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank all of you for your testimony here this morning.

I think when the American people, and I feel Congress falls in the same category, think of peacekeeping, it is a different visualization and perception than what has been described this morning as peace implementation. Peace implementation sounds a lot more like peace enforcement, and we have had some unfortunate recent experiences with peace enforcement that I think have left images in our minds that cause us not to want to repeat those.

But if we are able to achieve a viable peace agreement, I assume, Mr. Secretary, that there will be a number of prerequisites listed in that peace agreement before United States troops are committed. Is that a correct assumption?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I would expect that there would be some kind of a military annex to that agreement, and the parties would be called upon to take certain actions. We would expect the parties to take those actions.

On the other hand, Senator, I think it is important that implementation take place promptly. As Secretary Perry has said, we anticipate that a U.N. Security Council resolution would be sought by some of the countries which would be involved in the implementation but which may not be members of NATO. Although it is not necessary, I would expect there to be a UN Security Council resolution sought.

Senator COATS. But among the parties themselves, would there not need to be both an agreement with and a compliance with the prerequisites relative to involvement of U.S. ground forces, their interaction with those forces, their defined geographic positions, and some evaluation of their ability to enforce the agreement on their own part?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Senator, this certainly is a complicated situation. As I say, I would expect there to be a military annex to the peace agreement which would require the parties to take certain actions. I would also expect that there might well be some exchanges of territory. The map is fairly near to the equilibrium that the Contact Group recommended as much as a year ago. The Contact Group has always contemplated the possibility, however, that within that 51-49 split there might be trading of territories between the parties.

Senator COATS. But are those not all prerequisites to our placement of troops on the ground? Or are you saying that we need the peace implementation force in place while that happens?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Well, some of both, Senator. The key factor is that it has to be a real peace agreement. It cannot be a phony peace agreement.

Senator COATS. But does not a real peace agreement include agreement by the three warring factions to certain prerequisites?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Yes.

Senator COATS. And if they agree to that, why is there the need, then, to put a peace implementing force in place consisting of 60,000 troops?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Senator, even though parties agree to things, history has shown that frequently the need some help in implementation.

Senator COATS. And history has shown that they need an extraordinary amount of help in the Balkans, is that not true?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Yes, that is certainly one of our great worries here, Senator. The Balkans have been the seed bed of conflict in the past, and that is one of the justifications, perhaps the most important justification, for ensuring that this is done right. We will not go there unless there is a real peace, but we will go there to make sure that they implement and achieve a real peace.

Senator COATS. That is where I have a problem. We will not go there unless there is a real peace, but we are going to go there to ensure that there is a real peace. The two seem contradictory to me. If there is a real peace, we would not need 60,000 troops. The prerequisites would have been met, the parties would have agreed to that, but because we cannot assure that there is going to be a real peace we have to put troops in place to create a real peace. That is an entirely different proposition that you are offering to Congress, that the President is offering to Congress, than going there to ensure, monitor is perhaps a better word, a peace agreement that is already agreed to.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Senator, the judgment about the number of forces is basically a NATO judgment. I think we looked to NATO to decide what would be necessary to implement the peace. We are in a situation where either the United States is going to take the lead and try to get this thing done, which will not be easy and will not be certain, or we can walk away from it and step back. Then we will have a situation where I feel quite sure conditions in the region will rapidly deteriorate and we will be here discussing the use of United States troops to extract the NATO forces because we will be asked to do that by our NATO colleagues.

I think the course we are following is the one that is most prudent and most likely to achieve peace in that region that so desperately needs it, and I think that it is not an either/or situation. The fact that the parties have agreed to a peace settlement does not mean that they can do it alone without the help of an implementing force, and that is what the implementing force is for.

Senator COATS. I have a number of other questions, but I will catch you on the second round. My time has expired.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we are right to have military concerns out in that area of the Balkans, and we all look to history for that. But I think we all need to look at one of the things Senator Kennedy alluded to a moment ago, and perhaps that is our involvement around the world in trying to alleviate suffering and hunger and we have food programs, AID programs, all of these things that we know about. We cannot solve all the world's problems, either peacefully or with peaceful organizations or militarily, and none of these are without risk. We have had

Peace Corps people killed, AID people killed around the world, too, and the three deaths that Senator Nunn mentioned a moment ago.

Occasionally we use military force when we believe the risks are low enough to justify it—Haiti, Somalia, and other places—in trying to reestablish order, and certainly in Bosnia there has been a tragedy and suffering, and we are told on our trip over there this weekend that all parties appear to be war weary. We can go back to the start of this and try and determine whether it was basically civil war or whether it was aggressor, an aggressor that came into that area, and we put in an embargo to hold that aggressor back and that appears to have had some impact, good impact.

And the answer, obviously, as Senator Coats said a moment ago: If all parties want peace, why do we not just do it? Just tell them you guys want peace? Well, stop fighting. It is an easy answer. Except that old enmities die very, very hard. There are ethnic, there are religious, there are patriotic differences here. They do not trust each other. A key factor here, too would also be that they do not trust the Europeans. As we were told over there also this weekend, we are the one country they trust. And with our involvement with NATO, they do trust that this thing will mean something.

I really believe that there will not be a peace agreement agreed to unless there is U.S. participation, and I think that is key. I do not think they will agree going into this unless they think that we are going to help follow up on it. The question is, "Is it right or wrong and are the risks acceptable?" I believe it is right. We can go in and provide a separation there. I think to our credit it is the first time in history that a superpower has been willing to go into situations like this for good with no ulterior motive, no territorial designs of their own. We came out of World War II, we did not take over Europe, we did not take over Japan, and we did not take over all these other countries. We stand for democracy and freedom around the world.

The NATO leadership thing that has been made much of, and I may disagree with the extent to which you have advocated NATO leadership as being a key reason why we do this, but I think there are bigger things. I think there are worldwide concerns here for peace and freedom that we have that I hope NATO shares, too, and I think they do. But just saying that we should be in there because NATO leadership is to me a little like saying there go my people, I had better rush out and lead them because I am part of that particular group. But I think there are bigger things that are very, very important here.

I think NATO is important, too, but, with all due respect, I do not think the average American person really feels that affinity for NATO now that the Cold War is over, even though we know that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is important; EU, the European Union, is important; the Partnership for Peace in its fledgling status is important; the North Atlantic Cooperative Council is important. I think the American people need to know how important those things are, and I hope we can sell some of those.

Now, we have to stay involved, I think, for good. I do not think we can just walk away from this without taking away our role for good in the world for the long-term future. We are going to jeopard-

ize lives if we do not get involved. I believe we can be involved, and I think we are on standby, though, until we get this peace agreement. I think it is a moot point to try and determine whether we come to Congress or not before we know what we are coming to Congress with or what the agreement is or what we are expected to agree to.

The peace agreement with all parties, they will trust us where they do not trust the others involved. We are not going to fight our way in, we are going to move in only, as I understand it from all the briefings we had, we are going to move in only if all parties agree that we come in and establish a presence there as a separation zone to try and prevent this becoming the 31st or 32nd violation starting with some little small incidents back and forth and growing to where the 30 previous agreements all went down the drain.

We are here to prevent those small things and hit them hard when they start, and show that the small things should not occur, and that is the way we are going in, and nothing more than that. If any one of the parties to the peace agreement, as I understand it, says we want out, we are starting a broad front here, we are not going to start fighting against Serbia and so on if that happened or if one of the other parties did exactly the same thing. We are going to put down small incidents and put them down hard and hope they never get to be the big incidents that would violate this peace.

If there is any change in the participating parties' acceptance of peace, then we are out of there. We have no commitment to stay in there whatsoever. We are indeed out of there. It is 1 year, let the benefits of peace take root, hope we can turn this back to the U.N. or UNPROFOR or something, it is not an occupation, it is not indefinite, we are implementers of a very fragile situation that hopefully will take root and grow into that.

That is obviously not a question. My time is up. I will have my questions on a subsequent round. Thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Hutchison.

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was one of the seven U.S. Senators that accompanied 22,000 pounds of peas into Sarajevo this weekend. We went on a cargo plane, and I am glad that we went, because until you see it you cannot imagine the devastation of a country. We met with NATO leaders; we met with U.N. leaders; and we met with the political leaders of Croatia and Bosnia.

We received very differing expectations about America's roles and responsibilities from the different groups with which we met. I believe it is most important—if this goes forward—that the expectations of America are very clear. Let me give you one example, and this is a question: I am concerned about the security of American troops—how are we going to make sure that they have every protection that they should have in this kind of operation?

We saw walking around Sarajevo people that could be civilians or farmers carrying AK-47's across their shoulders. We are told that this is an armed society and that will not change—that we are not going to disarm civilians. Are we going to have rules for these civilians about weapons? Are there going to be markings on shoul-

ders of people who are part of the military or part of the police force? What are we going to do to ensure the safety of our American troops that would be in a peacekeeping mission if we do this?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Senator Hutchison, we have always maintained that American troops should not be used to disarm factions such as this. I think we have enough experience to show us that that is not a fruitful endeavor to be involved in and it is needlessly dangerous to American troops. That is not to say that there should not be programs to get a handle on all those arms that you find in such an armed society that you just described.

We have had good experience with requiring local governments to register weapons and then reissue registration permits only to those who should carry weapons. It takes an awful lot of prodding to get these going, but we have had success with these programs. We have also had success with programs that buy back weapons. And, of course, incident to normal operations, our forces have in the past had success in coming upon caches or other weapons that have been stored or in places where they are not authorized to be. I think we need to use every program possible to reduce the number of weapons there.

Senator HUTCHISON. Will that be done before our troops come in? One of the inconsistencies is that we are preparing to go in immediately upon the signing of a peace agreement. Will that kind of operation be done before we send our troops into harm's way?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I do not think it is realistic to expect these kind of programs to work unless the people there have a sense that our presence provides them the security that they have gotten only from each of them carrying a weapon. So it is not something that I think you realistically can expect to have accomplished before you send troops in. Their mere presence makes these programs work. Their absence makes these programs very unrealistic, I think. At least that has been our experience in the past.

Senator HUTCHISON. General Shalikashvili, we talked to troops that came back from Somalia, and they told us that when troops would walk through the streets the local populace would wait for the Italians or the Turks or the French to walk by, and then they would throw rocks at the Americans. If we are talking about putting our troops into this kind of situation, are we not going to have friend/foe identification rules and rules of engagement before we agree that we will come in—to make sure that they do have every security? We have the leverage to say, "if we are going to come in we are going to require the following things." Citizens carrying AK-47's might be people with a grudge against America, and they might be our friends. I mean, this could be a tragic situation that we can plan ahead for and prevent. Why can we not do that?

General SHALIKASHVILI. We will have rules of engagement that allow our forces and our individual soldiers to protect themselves, not just a hostile act but a hostile intent, and the definition of a hostile intent, depending on the local circumstances, can be adjusted. But a society that has depended on its security for so long on people having individual weapons will not readily give up these weapons unless they are provided with an alternative, and so I do not want to mislead you that you can put out the word that every-

one turn in their weapons and we will not come in until they are turned in. I just do not think it will work.

What we need to do is to ensure that our men and women are trained properly to operate in such operations, that they have the rules of engagement to act on a hostile act and hostile intent, that they are armed properly and have the heavy equipment necessary so everyone will think twice before they will challenge them. I believe that our presence there will help create those conditions to diffuse this very situation that you described.

Senator HUTCHISON. General Shalikashvili, my time has expired, but I just hope that you will set the conditions prior to our coming that would set the stage for that, and I concur with my colleagues that I think the President should come here for authorization if he is going to have the support of the Congress and the American people.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary of State, we have all heard the various expressions of concern on the part of committee members in regard to the necessity for the President's getting some kind of expression of support and perhaps authorization of approval before any action is taken to send our own ground forces into the area. I have been around here quite a long time, and I have long been accustomed to the familiar pattern of chief executives and those who serve under them invoking the title of commander in chief in a way of suggesting that as a conclusion, an absolute end to constitutional invulnerability. But there is no statutory or court decision of authority in support of that conclusion.

Now, I noted in your prepared remarks you carefully avoided any reference to the commander in chief, as such. Perhaps I should say at this point that in England there are many commanders in chief. Some of them were commanders in chief of land forces, others were commanders in chief of naval forces. Our own Constitution says that the President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States.

Well, I think I should state for the record and in the presence of my friends here, lest they become overawed by the office of commander in chief, that while Congress cannot deprive the President of the command of the Army and Navy, only Congress can provide an Army and Navy to command. And while the President, under the Constitution, is commander in chief of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States, only the Congress can call the militia into the actual service of the United States.

So there is that power of the purse which I have so long and so vigorously and so arduously defended here. And I wish to stress that I think it is very important for the President to seek the approval of the Congress in this effort. Now, the title of commander in chief is one thing, but the power of the purse is the greatest power in our constitutional system. And I would urge that the administration seek the approval of the Congress.

I wrote a letter to the President on October 13th in which I referred to the press reports concerning your purported remarks, Mr.

Secretary, Mr. Perry, and I read just these excerpts from this letter.

Given the gravity, risk, and cost associated with an extended peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, I think it would be wise to have the support of the American people and Congress behind you, Mr. President. I believe the congressional majority should share full responsibility from the outset for any decision to accept the cost and risks of the proposed operation. As you know, President Bush sought and received the support of Congress and the American people for Operation Desert Storm in Iraq, and that support would have been invaluable to him had the initial casualty predictions been realized, or if international contributions had not reimbursed U.S. costs associated with the mission.

I believe that you, Mr. President, should welcome the opportunity to use your considerable persuasive skills to rally the nation behind you, and that you should ask for the approval of Congress for this proposed mission before it commences. While this effort, of course, risks rejection, a sure political foundation seems essential to carry it over the shoals and storms of difficulties which could possibly confront our forces during an extended period of American military involvement.

I ask unanimous consent that the entire letter be included in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[The information follows]

UNITED STATES SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,  
Washington, DC, October 13, 1995.

The PRESIDENT,  
*The White House, Washington, DC.*

DEAR PRESIDENT CLINTON: Press reports today quote Secretary of Defense William Perry as stating that your administration will not seek congressional authorization prior to committing United States troops to a NATO peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, although such authorization would be "welcome." If the reports are accurate, I urge you to reconsider this decision and actively seek prior authorization for this mission.

Given the gravity, risks, and costs associated with an extended peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, I think it would be wise to have the support of the American people and Congress behind you. I believe the Congressional majority should share full responsibility, from the outset, for any decision to accept the costs and risks of this proposed operation. As you know, President Bush sought and received the support of Congress and the American people for Operation Desert Storm in Iraq. That support would have been invaluable to him had the initial casualty predictions been realized, or if international contributions had not reimbursed U.S. costs associated with the mission.

Without outlining the risks and benefits of U.S. involvement in Bosnia and gaining the consent and cooperation of Congress in advance, it may well be difficult, if not impossible, to sustain or to pay for such involvement, particularly if factional fighting recurs. Secretary Perry was also quoted in the press as saying that it is "not only a possibility, but likely" that paramilitary groups would target U.S. forces in Bosnia.

I believe you should welcome the opportunity to use your considerable persuasive skills to rally the Nation behind you, and that you should ask for the approval of Congress for this proposed mission before it commences. While this effort, of course, risks rejection, a sure political foundation seems essential to carry it over the shoals and storms of difficulties which could possibly confront our forces during an extended period of American military involvement. It should also serve as a signal to those who might consider testing our staying power that a strong measure of bipartisan and popular support underpins it.

As always, I appreciate your thoughtful consideration of my views on matters of this importance to our Nation and your Presidency.

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT C. BYRD.

Senator BYRD. We are very limited in our time here, and this is no place where all of these manifold problems and issues can be resolved. But at least it is a starting point, and as a friend of the administration, as a member of the party of this President's political party, I do urge that he seek the support of the Congress in this effort. Because 1 year, you say, 1 year, it will be over, our part. We will be out. Well, 1 year away from today we are going to be heading into an election, and there is going to be an election dynamic involved. And this whole thing, like Banquo's ghost, will come back to haunt us if we are not very careful in getting involved.

I think that the President should go before the American people, state his case, he is very persuasive, and he should state his case to the Congress. And I, for one, will listen. But I am not one who would disregard the constitutional responsibilities of members of the Senate, nor will I disregard the authority and the power of the Congress of the United States and the necessity for its use of the Constitution and the principles of the Constitution and the power of the purse in carrying out its power.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all members.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to ask these kind of quickly here to try to stay within our timeframe.

Secretary Perry, last August I rejoiced when you told the Aspin Institute, and I believe this is an accurate quote, I have written down here excerpts of your speech, "I can tell you that as long as I am Secretary of Defense I will not send U.S. ground forces to be combatants in the war in Bosnia." I would have to ask you what caused you to change your mind.

Secretary PERRY. Senator Inhofe, I have not changed my mind. I have consistently taken the position for the last 2½ years that we should not get involved in the war in Bosnia. We go in if and only if we have a peace agreement. If we get that peace agreement, I have supported from the beginning the position that we should go in and participate in a peace implementation force, if this were a NATO peace implementation force.

Senator INHOFE. So you are saying, Mr. Secretary, that we are not going in as combatants?

Secretary PERRY. We are not going in as combatants, we are going in as a peace implementation force.

Senator INHOFE. Earlier in your testimony you characterize our group going in as, "the biggest, toughest, meanest dog in town." Doesn't that sound a little combative?

Secretary PERRY. Let me be as clear as I can about this, Senator. We are only going in because we have an agreement with the parties, a peace agreement with the parties. But the warring parties do not control all of the paramilitary forces there. Therefore, we must be armed. We must go in very well armed and very heavy so we can deal quickly and decisively with any attempts by any paramilitary groups not under the control of the warring parties.



Senator INHOFE. Yes, sir, but when you were asked the question—I believe you were quoted in the *Chicago Tribune*—the question was what if the peace agreement does not stick and there is an upsurge in fighting? Your response was, “we want the force to be large enough and powerful enough, first of all, to deter that kind of action,” which we all agree with, and second your statement was, if that happens, to win it quickly, decisively, and with a minimum of casualties. Again, it does not call for an answer, but that sounds like it is combative.

Secretary PERRY. I do think, Senator Inhofe, we have to be prepared for what I would see to be paramilitary forces either threatening to or actually attacking our force. We minimize that risk by being strongly prepared for it, but if it happens we have to be able to deal with it.

Senator INHOFE. Over in Somalia, after our 18 Army Rangers were killed and their corpses dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, the people of America demanded the end of the operation, Operation Restore Hope, in Somalia because those deaths could not be justified on the basis of American interests. Now, I would like to have any one of you tell me, if we are going to have hundreds of young Americans dying over there, is the mission, as you described it in your opening statement justification for their deaths?

Secretary PERRY. Yes. The United States has vital political, economic, and security interests in Europe. The war in Bosnia threatens those interests, and the U.S. vital security interests is served by stopping this war. And to do that we require U.S. participation in IFOR. This will not be without risk, it will not be without cost. But allowing the war to continue also has risks and costs, and in my judgment those risks and costs would be greater.

Senator INHOFE. Do the other two of you agree with his answer to that question? We are talking about American deaths.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Yes, Senator.

Senator INHOFE. And you, General?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I agree that vital interests are at stake and that American casualties might occur, but that the cost of not doing that could be higher and could eventually result in deeper American involvement and more casualties.

Senator INHOFE. I think we all understand that British General Michael Rose is certainly a qualified expert in that region. His statement was that the Americans are going to take casualties, and probably more than you took in the Gulf war. That was 390. Is that a threshold of deaths that is acceptable for this mission?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I do not know where that number comes from. We will do everything we can to minimize those casualties. I do not think you can assign a threshold to an operation such as this, or say that any number of deaths you will accept and a number higher you will not. You will do everything you can to minimize all of them.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you. Thank you, General.

General Shalikashvili, in the charts that were up here we talked about withdrawing under any circumstances prior to the end of 1 year. This was reconfirmed by both the secretaries. In all of your vast experience, personal experience, in all of your reading and

military history, can you recall a time when we have gone in in an environment of combat with a specific time that under any circumstances we are coming out?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I think I would not characterize it combat. By the time we go in I hope it is a peace that we are implementing. But we have, for instance, set a very specific time limit in Rwanda when we went in; we sent a very specific time limit in Haiti, which we believe we will meet and leave; so I think our experiences so far in setting time limits, and the dynamics that creates, argue that we should do that again here.

Senator INHOFE. Well, I would contend that those were conditioned time limits, but we will take that for the answer.

I am sorry I went over my time.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Robb.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I might begin by saying that I am probably as likely to be as respectful and indeed deferential to the President's role as commander in chief as anybody on this committee or in the Congress. I believe that the President has clear responsibilities, and I am willing to defer as much as possible to that. Having said that, I think the general tenor of the questions would indicate that some explicit requests and response by the Congress under the circumstances would be extremely beneficial, and I will leave that argument alone for the moment.

Let me say that I believe the situation boils down to two possible outcomes: One, the peace process succeeds and we have to fulfill our commitment as a peacekeeper, or it fails and we have to go in and help rescue UNPROFOR. I think that is where we are at this point, and for that reason I am prepared to assist you and the administration in making what I think will be an extraordinarily difficult case to the Congress and to the American people. I would underscore the statements that have been made to date that I think this is going to be a challenge that the President is going to have to meet directly in addressing the American people at the appropriate time, and it will not be an easy burden to carry, but I think that he is the only one, under the circumstances, that can carry it.

Having said that, a couple of very brief questions, and I have got many that I want to continue to ask, Secretary Christopher, with respect to the diplomatic process as it proceeds right now. We are currently about to convene proximity talks in this country, we have follow-on talks in Paris, we have the possibility of a disarmament conference in Moscow, and a reconstruction conference in London. How much of that part of the diplomatic activity would have to be completed, in your judgment, before we are at the point that we are actually talking about putting U.S. forces as a part of a peacekeeping force in position?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. This much, Senator: The proximity peace talks here in the United States would have to succeed, and that would have to be ratified or confirmed in a larger peace conference. Thereafter, there would, as I said earlier, probably have to be a U.N. Security Council resolution, but absolutely crucially, a resolution of the North Atlantic Council, the NAC. Only those steps would trigger the need for the implementation by NATO, and thus U.S. troops.

Senator ROBB. Can you give us some indication of what you believe is a realistic timeline for the completion of that phase, especially given the urgent need to do something before winter sets in, and it is clearly setting in there now, as all of us who have been there in the last few weeks can attest to?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I wish I could. Indeed, the other countries that want to have conferences have been pressing me to estimate when those conferences might be held. Until we get into the proximity peace talks and until we see the attitudes of the parties when they get here, I think it is very difficult to predict. You have to understand, these are people who have been at war, and the hatreds are very deep. That is why we are doing proximity talks to begin with.

Senator, the best I can say is I cannot think it would be very quick. On the other hand, assistant Secretary Holbrooke has moved with great determination and great velocity, and we are going to try to keep that momentum up.

Senator ROBB. If those peace talks fail, the proximity talks, are we prepared to lift the arms embargo?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Well, I would not expect the proximity talks to end in failure. They might not reach absolute success, but I would not expect them to end in failure. My determination is to pursue these matters. I do not think that a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo would be conducive to progress in the area. I think it would only cause a great deal of bloodshed. It would, I think, set the whole process back very, very deeply.

I think you were right, Senator Robb, in saying there are two basic alternatives, either we succeed in this course, or if we fail, then UNPROFOR will have to withdraw and we will be asked to help it withdraw. When we reach the latter point it will be time to discuss the lifting of the arms embargo. But that will be a very bloody mess if that happens.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Secretary Christopher.

Very briefly, Secretary Perry, may I ask with respect to the 1-year timeline that has been offered and discussed at some length, is there any rationale other than the obvious need to give folks around this table in the Congress, and the American people some sense of a termination point; i.e., not the partisan political but the typical political considerations? Is there any particular military justification for 365 days as being an appropriate length, or indeed for having any termination point against which someone could work and place us at a competitive disadvantage in terms of any negotiations?

Secretary PERRY. This 12-month figure, Senator Robb, contrary to people's assumptions here, came from the bottom up. General Shalikashvili and I recommended it up the line. We proposed it to the Secretary and to the President based on our assessment of what we needed to do to achieve the mission of this force, which was to secure some degree of security stability.

Senator ROBB. One final question: General Ruppert Smith believes that whatever peacekeeping force goes in is going to have to have three phases: One, the establishment of the peace corridors or whatever the case may be; second, confidence building measures; and third, some sort of reconstruction. Do you envision this force

being in place for either phase two or phase three, if indeed that is the way it plays out?

Secretary PERRY. This force will be in place while reconstruction is going on, but it will not be part of the reconstruction force. It will be providing the security environment which allows these other things to happen.

Senator ROBB. Mr. Chairman, thank you. My time has expired. Chairman THURMOND. Senator Kempthorne.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Two weeks ago I was in Sarajevo and Zagreb. Senator Robb and I went there together. In addition to seeing the horrors of what man can do to man, I also gained a keener understanding of the complexities of this whole issue. If I may ask, General Shalikashvili, you said that IFOR will not be risk free. What are the pentagon projections for U.S. casualties that would be inflicted with this operation?

General SHALIKASHVILI. We do not have any projection. There is no particular model for a peace implementation force that you could usefully draw upon. We know in the many years that UNPROFOR has been, the number of casualties that they suffered. But that, too, is not a good model because they had, in my judgment, inadequate rules of engagement. They were not protected as they should be.

I am counting very heavily on the rules of engagement, on being large and properly equipped, being able to act swiftly, and thereby deterring any acts against us.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. And, General, for the record, not now, but would you please provide for me what robust rules of engagement mean so that we actually spell it out?

[The information follows:]

SACEUR has not yet presented the specific Rules Of Engagement for IFOR to the North Atlantic Council so we cannot yet spell them out. To be "robust", we believe they must provide for both an assured self-defense capability, in any situation, and unimpeded mission accomplishment.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. And then also, Secretary Perry, do you expect the Serbs in Bosnia to have special hostility towards American military personnel given our Nation's role in the recent bombing?

Secretary PERRY. I think, first of all, the Bosnian Serbs will have agreed to this peace agreement. Second, I think they are war weary, and they are ready for some peace. And I also believe—I cannot prove this, Senator Kempthorne—I believe that all of the warring parties are going to welcome the presence of U.S. troops there, because they all see this as necessary to the credibility and the integrity of this peace process. So those who want the peace process will welcome the presence of U.S. troops.

As I indicated before, there are going to be some units, some paramilitary units, who will not accept the peace process. They will not welcome U.S. troops, or any other troops that are there to enforce it.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Mr. Secretary, I, too, am a supporter of lifting the arms embargo. As I understand it, that is part of this agreement, and perhaps the arming of the Bosnians. How do we accomplish that and look like we are still remaining neutral, and not have the Serbs then want to turn your attention to U.S. personnel?

Secretary PERRY. The equipping and training of the Bosnian Federation forces would be undertaken independently from this peace implementation force, as a U.S. undertaking in conjunction with what other nations were willing to join us to do that.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. All right. While we were there we met with assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke and his negotiating team, who I think are doing an excellent job. Part of the discussion dealt with the time frame and the fact that this may take years to ultimately achieve the goals. So based on the 12-month assessment that you have given us, do you gentlemen assure this committee that under no circumstances if U.S. troops are deployed that 12 months following that deployment that you would come and seek further deployment of U.S. troops?

Secretary PERRY. I cannot conceive of the circumstances which would motivate me to come back and ask an extension of that time. My best estimate and our military's best estimate is that 12 months is sufficient to do the job we are describing, and I believe there is a great value, a great management value, to putting a definite time scale on it and sticking to that time scale, and we have done that in other operations in the past.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. And therefore by sticking to that, is that an assurance that you will not seek further deployment of U.S. troops beyond the 12 months?

Secretary PERRY. Senator Kempthorne, I will not make statements about what I would or would not recommend a year in advance in terms of a situation I cannot conceive. But I am saying that this 1 year is a serious time limit, and one which I believe we can meet.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. And again, my concern is I weight that against 700 years of atrocities in this area and the history of that area. It has been stated, then, that the vital national security, the vital national interests, as portrayed by this distinguished panel this morning, is, one, to contain the conflict so that it does not spread to a Balkan war, and also that we not abdicate U.S. leadership in NATO alliance. My question is which of those is the higher priority?

Secretary PERRY. In my judgment, the former. That is, the danger of this war in Bosnia spreading to a wider Balkan war, that is the issue which affects vital national interests of the United States. That could even involve a war involving NATO allies as it spreads outside of the Balkans. So this could threaten the security and stability of all of Europe in very fundamental ways.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. And, Secretary Christopher, do you agree with that?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Yes, I do, Senator, but I would stress the interrelationship between the various elements of our vital national interests. It is our vital national interest that there not be another conflict generated in Europe, and in order to prevent that we have an opportunity to get a peace here, but we can get the peace only by agreeing to implement. And if we implement, we need to implement through NATO, which is the only organization capable of doing so.

NATO will not do it without the United States. U.S. refusal to participate would undermine NATO.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. So, to conclude then, Mr. Secretary, and either Secretary, I have properly stated the two elements, and, just to affirm what you said to Senator Inhofe, either of those or both of those are sufficient that if it requires the death of U.S. military personnel these objectives are so sufficient that we should do so?

Secretary PERRY. My judgment of those reasons are sufficiently in the vital national U.S. security interests to warrant this commitment.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Senator, we have not come to this lightly. This is a very solemn obligation that we have taken. I recommend it in those terms.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you.

Dr. Perry, can you stay for a 2-minute round?

Secretary PERRY. I am very sorry, Mr. Chairman, but I am hosting a minister of defense at the Pentagon, and I am due back there right now.

Chairman THURMOND. Well, do you have to leave now? Can you stay any time at all?

Secretary PERRY. I have to leave right now. I can certainly take more questions for the record, though, and I would be happy to do that.

Chairman THURMOND. Well, thank you for your appearance here today, and we appreciate your presence.

Secretary PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Now, I think if we just go to about 2-minute rounds, a number of the members have other engagements, so we will just take 2-minutes each.

I want to ask this question, and either one of you can answer it, Mr. Secretary or General. Cost estimates for deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia have been given out in press releases and briefings. The committee has asked the Department for more detailed planning and the committee has asked the Department for more detailed planning assumptions used to develop these estimates. The committee has been told that the plan is not sufficiently developed to provide the information. When do you believe more detailed information will be available?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Senator Thurmond, we believe that until the NATO plan is submitted and a decision has been made on the exact number of U.S. troops, we will not be able to be precise. But as I stated in my comments, we believe, based upon what we now know, that the U.S. costs for a 1-year operation will be approximately \$1.5 billion.

Chairman THURMOND. Now, does the Department's current cost estimate include the training of the Bosnian Government troops? If not, how much do you believe this training would cost?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I do not believe that cost is included in it, because we have not yet conducted the necessary survey to determine the specific needs. So as the first step, a detailed survey will have to be conducted to determine the needs of the Federation forces and how much of that would be handled by the United States and how much of it could be handled by other nations.

Chairman THURMOND. General Shalikashvili, what would be UNPROFOR's role, and how will the Rapid Reaction Force participate in the NATO implementation force?

General SHALIKASHVILI. We believe that all forces that are capable and meet the standards necessary should remain in-country and fall under the command and control of NATO. That is particularly true of the rapid reaction force, and our expectation is that that rapid reaction force would stay and would be one of the first forces that would fall under the NATO command and control.

Other UNPROFOR forces that meet the criteria could also do so. Those that do not or those that wish to leave will then be assisted in departing Bosnia.

Chairman THURMOND. My time is up. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, just briefly, I join those who believe that it would be in the President's interest and in the Nation's interest for him to come forward and seek—certainly welcome, but seek congressional approval before deployment. I also believe it would help sustain our position there if things go wrong. So from that point of view I clearly identify with the views that Senator Byrd and Senator Warner and others expressed.

I do think, though, in the interests of clarity we ought to make it clear what happened in the Persian Gulf War. There were several hundred thousand troops that were placed in Saudi Arabia before there was any congressional authority whatsoever, seven to eight times what is being talked about here, maybe 10 or 15 times.

The second point I would make is that President Bush's position was very similar to what President Clinton has expressed here, in that after the resolution was signed, or when it was signed on January 14th, President Bush wrote, quote, as I made it clear to congressional leaders at the outset, my request for congressional support did not, and my signing of this resolution does not, constitute any change in the long-standing positions of the executive branch on either the President's constitutional authority to use the armed forces to defend vital U.S. interests or the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.

The third point is the day after the President sent the letter up saying he would welcome congressional authority, this was the exact words of a news conference he had in answer to the question do you think you need such a resolution, and if you lose it would you be bound by that? This is President Bush's answer: "I do not think I need it. I think Secretary Cheney expressed it very well the other day. There are different opinions on either side of this question, but Saddam Hussein should be under no question on this, I feel I have the authority to fully implement the United Nations resolutions."

That was before Congress acted, so I believe that everyone ought to be clear about what happened during that period of time and what is happening now. That does not change my underlying point, though, that I think the President would be wise to seek congressional authority.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. I have to go to a leadership meeting. I am going to ask Senator Warner to take over and wind it up.

Senator WARNER [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Picking right up on Senator Nunn, because both of us took a very active role in that debate on the Persian Gulf, the moment that debate was resolved and a vote was taken, this Congress spoke with a unified voice, and the Senator from Georgia well remembers that, and it was that impetus that give, I think, a major element to the success of that operation.

And I say to you, Mr. Secretary, you used another word, walk away from this in this NATO situation, an abdication. We are not walking away. We have got a heavy investment right there today in our air power. Our fleet is enforcing the embargo. The American taxpayers have spent several billions of humanitarian relief. We are not walking away from NATO. And I would urge you, as this debate goes on, try not to use those terms. I really do feel very strongly about it.

I join with Senator Byrd on the 1 year. There is a political dimension. I do not know what it is, but it is a quicksand situation. When Secretary Perry says he cannot might envision what might take place 1 year from now that would change his view, that disturbed me, because the entire 3 years has been one of unpredictability of the parties.

Lastly, since you talk about the presidential thing, I strongly emphasized that in my first round. Here we have a clear situation where for 3 years the public, the American public and the world opinion, has been focused on this conflict, and therefore I think that is in sharp contrast to where a President under the Constitution had to make a quick decision in Grenada, in Panama, and indeed to some extent in Somalia. And there the public and the Congress understands when a President has to act unilaterally. Here, it has been 3 years, and we can certainly take the time to debate this thing adequately, and determine from the elected representatives in the United States Congress what are the views of the American public, and do they wish to support the President.

Last, General, to you on this question of the two-track policy of sending U.S. troops to implement a peace plan and at the same time trying to bring up, presumably, to a balanced structure the military capabilities of the Muslims to that of the Serbs, and can we pursue that two-track policy in such a way as to say our troops are there to enforce the peace but we are also arming one side. How do you reconcile that?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I think we have been very up front with all warring factions that this is a part of the agreement. I think it is absolutely necessary that it be separated from the implementation force, and that is that whatever equipping and training is being done is in fact done by a different force, by a different group of people, and whether that is done by military or by contract arrangement is yet to be seen.

My view is that the only realistic approach is to try to separate the two forces that do these two functions. But in the end, I think it is doable.

Senator WARNER. Well, I would turn to Senator Levin, but I say a contract approach is but a fig leaf, and I think, as Senator Hutchison pointed out, putting in grave danger our troops.

Senator Levin.



Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a 10-second question?

Senator WARNER. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. If it has been answered, do not, but I have not heard it. If this peace agreement takes 2, 3, 4 months to be able to finalize, are we capable of militarily being able to deploy this force in the middle of the winter?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Obviously it becomes more complex. I do not want to be cute about it, but we are not a fair weather force. We have operated in the harshest of winter conditions in our history, and we will be able to deploy that force and sustain that force and ensure it does its job, even if winter conditions exist.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Acting Chairman, I wonder if you would mind—

Senator WARNER. Senator Levin, I believe you are next. Did the Secretary wish to make a statement?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. I wish to comment briefly. Senator, I have got such great respect for you that I did not think I should leave the record in the form it is. I am sorry if I was too plain spoken in talking about walking away. But frankly, my statement meant that if NATO were to go ahead with this implementation, if we were asked to implement and NATO considered going ahead, and the United States said "No, we will not join in the implementation," I think that would be an abdication. You may not like the language, but I think that would be walking away, and I hope we will not do that, Senator.

Senator WARNER. Your case is clear. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It was just stated that only by equipping and training a different force can we have any chance of producing a stability. And I just want to make sure that Secretary Christopher agrees with that. Do you agree with what General Shalikashvili said, that we must, and this is testimony, to ensure the durability of the peace agreement, we must redress the military imbalance? Do you agree with that?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Yes, Senator. I think we have to seek an equilibrium with the forces. It might be done in various ways, building down through arms control or building up.

Senator LEVIN. No, no. I am not talking about the arms control part, because General Shalikashvili said that in addition we are prepared to help assist. And I just want to make sure that you are committed to go to the UN to lift that embargo as part of any peace agreement. I just want to make sure that that commitment is there. That is number one. Are you committed?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Yes. We are committed to go to the U.N.

Senator LEVIN. To lift the embargo?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Second, in the absence of the UN agreeing to that, will you support a peace agreement?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I think the goal is what is important to keep in mind, and that is to create an equilibrium of forces. We will do it one way or the other. I think if we reach a peace agreement, we will have a much better opportunity to persuade our allies that now has come the time to lift the embargo so the parties can have a more natural and normal way to protect themselves.

Senator LEVIN. General Shalikashvili says in his testimony, in addition to the agreement to reduce arms, the preferred agreement would be to agree to arms control measures. Are you committed to doing that or not, in addition to any arms control?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I am committed to achieving an equilibrium of forces. As General Shalikashvili said, we have not done a survey. We do not know what the present equilibrium is.

Senator LEVIN. I think there is a real difference.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. I see you are impatient there.

Senator LEVIN. I think there is a real difference here between the two of you.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. I do not think there is.

Senator LEVIN. Well, we have a flat-out commitment, I think, a statement from General Shalikashvili that it is essential that we provide heavy equipment and train the Bosnian army as part of the implementation of a new peace agreement in order to make sure it works, and I find a hesitancy on your part to commit yourself to going to the U.N. to lift the embargo, which will make that possible.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Senator, if you would just let me finish, I think maybe I can clear this up. General Shalikashvili said we have not done the survey to know what the situation is and what kind of forces they might need.

You know, the assumption has been up till now that the Bosnian Serbs are considerably stronger than the Federation forces, but what has happened in the last few months, or the last few weeks, indeed, has given rise to some question about that.

If there is a disequilibrium in forces, I think that we ought to correct it, and I think we ought to go to the U.N. and seek a lifting of the arms embargo.

I do not think it is unreasonable for me to say that I want to correct the disequilibrium only if it exists, and I think that General Shalikashvili is probably not going to disagree with that, and I urge you to give him a chance to talk.

Senator LEVIN. I would be happy to, but my time is up.

Senator WARNER. The time is up. Senator Cohen.

Senator NUNN. I think, Mr. Chairman, if we could get him to answer that, that is a pretty critical point.

Senator WARNER. The Secretary has got to leave at what period of time, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Well, thank you, Senator. My problem is that I am testifying before another committee of the Senate this afternoon at 2, and I need to get back and see what is happening in the rest of the world and then get back up here. I do not have any specific time.

Senator WARNER. Well, will you give us, then, the leverage to just have one or two questions from each of our colleagues?

General, did you wish to make a comment?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I just wanted to make the point that in all of this, the discussion is not just about redressing the balance between the Bosnian forces, it is the federation forces that we are talking about, and that is important that the record show that.

Senator WARNER. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you. As Senator Byrd has indicated, 2½ hours is not nearly enough time to discuss whether we should engage in this process or not, nor is it enough time for me to try to sum up what has been the history of the Balkans, but if I had to, I would say that the history reflects that the people would rather dig fresh graves than bury ancient hatreds.

It may be that we have now witnessed the physical and spiritual exhaustion of these people, and we are witnessing the dawn of a new century and a new era. I remain skeptical, but open to persuasion on this.

I would like to just turn quickly, Mr. Secretary, to your statement about NATO once again, that if we were to fail to join NATO in implementing this peace, it would lead to the undermining, or perhaps even disintegration of NATO itself.

I would first pose the question, have the German people abdicated their responsibility by not agreeing to deploy ground forces in Bosnia? I think the answer would be open to some doubt. Saying, given their history, perhaps they have not abdicated their responsibility, I might make a contrary argument that perhaps we ought to have German forces on the ground as well as U.S. forces. I could make the case that we could still play a major role by keeping our sea and air forces as part of the implementing process.

But nonetheless, the notion that somehow if we fail to proceed on this basis we will undermine NATO, I would like to pose it a different way. I will not even begin to challenge Senator Byrd's degree in constitutional law. He knows far more than I do, or most of us around here.

I think it is a constitutional question, but I have come to the political side of things, namely that if the President were ever to deploy forces to that region without Congress' support, or over the objection of Congress, he would stand naked unto the wind of public opinion, which at that point would rage for the redeployment back to the United States. That situation would lead more and more quickly to the disintegration of NATO than anything else.

Second and last point, Mr. Chairman, if you will just forebear with me, the issue of Russians. My understanding is that Russia now has two battalions deployed in Bosnia as a part of UNPROFOR, that Moscow has proposed that in addition to these two battalions they deploy a division as part of this enforcement force.

I would simply point out that in April the United Nations dismissed the Russia commander of the peacekeeping forces in Eastern Croatia because he supported Serbia's arming rebel Serbs, Serb forces in Croatia.

There was another general, a Russian general who served as a commander in Eastern Croatia. Instead of going back to Moscow after his tour of duty, he became a business partner and a military advisor to the Serbian paramilitary leader who is accused of war crimes in Bosnia, including the most recent mass killings that we have witnessed.

So I think this is an important issue that has to be resolved before we start grinding up the wheels of deployment and exactly finding out what the Russian role will be, and if it does not agree to participate, what that means for the process.

Thank you.

Senator WARNER. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to have to ask to speak again, but it is very uncomfortable for me to sit here and hear things that are inaccurate and not have a chance to correct them.

With respect to Germany and its participation, Germany has committed to provide 5,000 troops. Also, I think it is fair to suggest—

Senator COHEN. Ground forces?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Ground forces, yes.

Senator Cohen, it is fair to suggest the United States role in NATO is a far different one than that of Germany. The United States is the leader of NATO. Our NATO allies look to us day in and day out for leadership, and if the leader does not assist or does not go along, I think that sends exactly the wrong signal. I want to emphasize that point.

With respect to Russia, it is very important that the situation be clarified. Russia has been involved in this process. It is a member of the Contact Group. A Russian deputy foreign minister has been involved in all recent negotiations. There are negotiations going on right now in Russia on Russia's appropriate role in implementation.

Senator COHEN. Would you like to see a Russian division?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. No, I would not like to see a Russian division, but I think, ideally, we would find an appropriate role for Russian forces that does not in any way interfere with our command and control structure. There are many roles in a peace settlement, some of them relating to refugees and some of them relating to functions that are not primarily combat functions. So let us not rule out a participation that would be healthy to the U.S.-Russian relationship and the NATO-Russian relationship, and let us make sure that it does not interfere with the command and control arrangements.

Senator COHEN. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. General, you mentioned this casually almost in your remarks, about we might have 2,000 or 3,000 reserves called up. I think I heard you correctly.

3,000 would be about 15 percent of the total force if we are sending in 20,000. Can you define what those reserves would be a little more?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Generally, in those specialties where the preponderance of the force is, in fact, in the reserves, such things as people to open ports, aerial and seaports, usually in the combat support, service support area.

Senator GLENN. Good, thank you, and we set up our forces deliberately that that would be the case, when we are making overseas commitments, that some of the reserves might be called up, and they have understood that.

General SHALIKASHVILI. That is correct, sir.

Senator GLENN. I think it is important to get that out.

Would you comment on the morning news that President Tudjman is dead set on moving into Eastern Slavonia and made a tough statement about that over the weekend before his political conference, while we were there, as a matter of fact. We did not know that was what he—we knew he was making a speech. We did not know he was making a statement that he is moving into Eastern Slavonia come hell or high water, basically.

In fact, he was quoted in the *New York Times* that that is the top priority, either by peaceful or other means, was his commitment. There may not be a peace agreement for a while if that is his attitude.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Senator, we have made it absolutely clear to President Tudjman that we think that area should not be conquered or taken by force. He knows it will be very costly to Croatia in terms of its desires to become part of Western institutions. I intend to tell him again, as forcefully as I can, that I think that would be a serious mistake for him to do.

Now, there are negotiations going on between the Serbs in Sector East and the Croatian Government. There is room for those negotiations to succeed. There is an election going on in Croatia now which might have something to do with the intemperate character of the statements that are being made, but those statements are not conducive to peace, and I hope they will stop.

Senator GLENN. Just one other statement, Mr. Chairman, and that is on the Russian participation. I might take a different tack than some of the Members here. I think it is vital that they be brought in in some way, in some form, so they are part of this group and not the other way around.

I could see a situation where we get in there, we are doing some things, the Russians might take exception to it and come down to there to support their clients on the Serb side, and we would wind up with this having the potential, at least, of being a big power confrontation more than cooperation, and I know they insisted now on a combat role, and all of that. We have been through all of that, but I would hope very much we could involve them some way in this effort so that we are not setting up the potential for a situation that would be absolutely—it would—the potential implication is far beyond Bosnia. That is just a statement.

Senator WARNER. Senator Coats.

Senator COATS. In deference to our respective lunches, and you need to refuel for the afternoon, Mr. Secretary, I will try and be very, very brief.

I think there are a number of outstanding questions, and I am concerned there are a number of assumptions that underlie the policy decisions that are being made.

I have heard said this morning from one of the three of you, our mere presence is the best guarantee of peace. All sides will welcome the presence of American troops, 1 year is more than sufficient to implement a peace plan, there is no need to monitor forces after 1 year.

I think those statements tend to belie the history of this region. I think they need serious examination in terms of whether or not those are proper assumptions on which to base a policy, and I am particularly concerned about this question of arming and training

one side, how the other factions are going to view this and what their response is.

When the world's most powerful Nation, or the world's most sophisticated military equipment either through its own forces or through contracting out arms one side, it certainly does not give a lot of reassurance to the other side, nor would I think it would give a lot of reassurance to the Russians that the Bosnian Serbs are going to be put in a neutral position along with everybody else.

I just think there are still a number of questions that have to be answered. I am surprised with your statement that 5,000 German troops will be on the ground in that region of the world. That is news to me, and I do not think that adds—I do not agree with Senator Cohen that they have a responsibility. I think that adds an element of instability, rather than an element of stability.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much. Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, I will ask this question of the Secretary of State. The Secretary says in his statement, and I quote, with reference to reconstruction efforts, military implementation will be accompanied by humanitarian and reconstruction efforts so that peace will endure. The European Union will take the lead in reconstruction, but our contribution will also be vital.

What kind of a contribution are we counting on making, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Well, Senator, the total reconstruction needs, of course, are very great and almost infinite. I am glad the European Union has stepped forward and said they wanted to take the lead.

You are quite right, in the constitutional law lesson that you gave a little earlier, that only Congress can provide the kinds of funds we are talking about. What has been mentioned as a possible U.S. range is in the \$250-\$500 million range.

The total cost would obviously be in the many billion dollars category, but we would look to members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to participate in this as well, although if I can just add, not Iran or Iraq.

Senator BYRD. So we would expect to get some contributions from other countries that are not participating militarily?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Yes, sir, and good sized ones.

Senator BYRD. Well, the General has indicated a figure of \$1 billion to \$1.5 billion, is the estimated cost of this enterprise. Where is that money coming from? Is it going to be a supplemental appropriation request? Is this going to be attempted to be written off as an emergency? What is the offset?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Senator, I think probably one of the problems with my staying after Secretary Perry left is that question is really best directed to the man who is responsible for the budget of the Defense Department.

He did respond to that, or a similar question as to how that would be handled, but I wonder if I could ask that that question be answered for the record by Secretary Perry.

Senator BYRD. Yes.

One final note, Mr. Secretary. My time is up. I did want to ask you about the Blackbird. I noted in the *Washington Post* of October

15 that winter weather in that area will make it very difficult to gather intelligence from high-flying spy aircraft critical to assessing a host of ground conditions, and the story says that that will—this will become almost impossible.

Do you plan on using the SR-71 for this purpose? It is outfitted with a cloud-penetrating radar system which can provide good imagery to ground commanders on a 24-hour daily basis. No other U.S. system, satellite or aircraft can provide this kind of information in a timely and direct manner.

General SHALIKASHVILI. We do not yet have General Joulwan's specific request on all of the potential weapons systems or platforms such as you mention now, but if he should ask for them, we will certainly, if possible, provide it for him.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. Senator Kempthorne.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

General, we have discussed in the past some of the lessons learned from Vietnam. A couple of them is to have a clear objective and to know when you have met that objective, to have a clear exit strategy.

In Somalia, I do not believe those lessons were applied appropriately in how we operated in Somalia with regard to Operation Provide Comfort, which operated out of Turkey. Can you tell me, do we have an exit strategy for Operation Provide Comfort?

General SHALIKASHVILI. We have gone through a number of reviews to determine whether the presence that we now have there should be adjusted or terminated. These periodic reviews have in each case indicated that the need for those forces still remains, and as long as Saddam Hussein continues to threaten the Kurds up north that we should retain that capability. It has served us well.

Incidentally, the same sort of rationale remains down south through the Southern Watch Operation to provide protection for the Shiites.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. My concern is, I do not believe anyone really thought we would be there 4½ years later, and as I understand it, the Turkish Government every 6 months votes whether or not to renew us staying there. We may be forced to come up with an exit strategy. I simply say that to underscore my concern about this proposed operation, and whether there is a clearcut exit strategy.

General SHALIKASHVILI. I was the first commander of Provide Comfort, so I watch it very carefully all the time. The conditions that were set at the beginning were that, as long as Saddam Hussein's regime continued to threaten his population up north, that this kind of protection was necessary.

This is a very different set of conditions that are being now set for the introduction of forces into Bosnia, and we believe those conditions will in fact be completed within a year, and it is appropriate to set 1 year as the deadline for the withdrawal of those forces.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Secretary Christopher, just a final question to you. Do you feel that to date the administration has made a compelling case to the American people to support this deployment of U.S. troops?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Senator, we obviously have that obligation. We are beginning to fulfill that obligation, and I assume there will be additional hearings. I believe the case is there to be made, and we intend to make it.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. Senator Robb.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

One question each, if I may, Mr. Secretary.

With regard to the peace agreements that we are considering at this moment, both of them contemplate a Muslim-Croate federation and a Serbian republic. What guarantees do we have that the Croatian or the Bosnian-Croatian contingent will not link up with Tudjman and his forces for whatever objectives they might have that are entirely separate from the Bosnia-Herzegovina forces?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Senator, that is something that will have to be worked out very carefully in the peace agreement, but we have made it clear to President Tudjman, as have our European allies, that his support for the federation is fundamental.

President Tudjman has long had the goal of wanting to be accepted into the Western European institutions, and I think he should know that his strengthening the Federation is a critical factor in his acceptance into those institutions.

Senator ROBB. I would just add, Mr. Secretary, that when Senator Kempthorne and I visited the area a couple of weeks ago, if there was any underlying concern that permeated just about every conversation we had, it had to do with the role of President Tudjman specifically and the Croatian forces generally.

General Shalikashvili, one quick question. First of all, let me say that I was pleased with your suggestion that a division would be the appropriate U.S. response and not a brigade attached to some other unit or whatever the case might be. I would urge you to push for that.

I come back, however, to the question of the 1 year time frame. The suggestion you and Secretary Perry made was that this was a bottom-up review, although suggesting that it was made by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense on some other basis.

What military justification do we have for that kind of constraint, other than the political concerns and the pressure placed on you and others by Congress?

Let me paraphrase very briefly and say that I am certain that if you did not put a date, that we would be pestering you, why do you not have some sense of a termination date, whatever the case may be, so I acknowledge right up front that we would ask the question which was the opposite of whichever choice you took.

General SHALIKASHVILI. From a military perspective, as I evaluated the tasks we wished this force to accomplish, it was my judgment that it in fact can be done in 12 months or less.

Second, when tied to the equipping and training issue, it was my judgment that that, too, can be accomplished in less than a year, and so I felt it was important that we therefore set a target of 1 year and then bring the force back.



In the absence of that, you just find yourself staying there, and that is how, very often, mission creep comes in. The force needs to be brought home, and they need to resume normal training and be ready for other operations, and I just think 1 year—I saw no military justification for that force to stay longer than 1 year, and that is why that was my recommendation.

Senator ROBB. Indeed, you could envision a withdrawal before that period of time under certain circumstances?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I could envision a withdrawal before that if the military equilibrium between the federation forces and Bosnian-Serb forces can be achieved sooner, and if we find that our presence is not required in a separation task that we have discussed before, and that there are none of the incidents that we now fear might come up that would require our presence. If those conditions are there, then I would argue that we should come home sooner than a year.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. Senator Hutchison.

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you very much.

First, I realize your time is short, but I must say that it is the Armed Services Committee that is going to be looking at the budget policy to fund this operation, and we are going to require more time if this is going to be an administration goal.

I would like to point out a couple of areas where I agree with the presentation you have made today because you have heard differing views, which I know makes it difficult; but I do think a 1-year commitment is essential.

I think one of the problems here is the expectations of all of the parties involved about what we are going to do, and it is in some ways driving the administration to keep the commitments and the expectations that were made before Congress was really brought into the consultation.

I think having a commitment of 1 year so that they know what to expect will be important. I also think that part of being responsible, if you do this, would be to make sure that the Bosnian Muslims are trained and equipped so that in 1 year there will be some semblance of a level playing field and we can in good conscience keep our commitment to leave if we do it.

The third thing I want to say is that I do believe it is very important that the Russians be brought in to this peacekeeping force if we do it, because I think that will help the security of our troops.

So on those areas we agree. On the other questions that I would have, I do think that all of us share a goal of strengthening NATO and we want the United States to have a strong and a leadership position in NATO. However, I do not think that we have necessarily picked the right place to test NATO's strength.

I believe that for NATO to remain strong, we are going to have to accept that there are different problems, now, facing NATO. Since there are more countries that want to get into NATO's umbrella of defense protection, I think we are going to have to relook at our role—not diminish it—but I think we are going to have to have a give-and-take within NATO. I do not think that we have

looked at these options before committing to make this the test of NATO's strength.

Finally, I would like to ask a question, because I do question your assumptions about the cost of this. One of the changes in the world today is that the United States has finite resources. Every dollar that we spend on this operation is going to take something from our readiness. We are the superpower that must maintain readiness so that when we are needed we are going to be there. Therefore, I think we have to make choices about which calls to answer when we are needed.

We just approved a \$2.1 billion contingency supplemental appropriation. We sent 20,000 troops into Haiti; we now have 2,000 there. Yet we have spent upwards of \$1 billion on that operation, so your estimates of \$1.5 billion for a Bosnia operation do not seem to be high enough, if you are really prepared for a "robust" engagement.

Second, I just ask you, when the money is going toward military readiness and we have spent \$2 billion on contingencies such as Haiti, Rwanda, Somalia, Kuwait, Northern Iraq, and now we are talking about another \$1.5 billion—which I think is severely underestimated if you do this for a year in a robust way—where are you going to get these dollars, and is it not going to impinge on readiness? Do you really think \$1.5 billion is realistic?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I think that our projections of the costs of ongoing operations have been very accurate.

Right now, it is very difficult to be very accurate about this particular operation, because we do not know of the specific forces that will be required. For instance, Senator Byrd mentioned the SR-71, and for instance, if you use that kind of a platform there is a certain cost. If you do not use it, it is a different one.

So I can only tell you that we worked very hard to try to be as accurate as we can be at this time by saying that we project this operation for 12 months' period to come in at about \$1.5 billion.

Where the money comes from, clearly, I am very well aware of the readiness implications, and so are all of you. We will have to come to you to ask for a supplemental to cover these costs.

On the specifics of that, I of course have to leave that to Secretary Perry, but it is not something that we now have within our budget, so either as additional money or authority to reprogram you are going to have to tell us where that money will come from, but it is very clear that there is a readiness impact, and the later those decisions are made, the higher the readiness impact on the complete force.

Senator WARNER. We thank the witnesses, and General Shalikashvili, we are pleased that you are willing to take another 2 years as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

Mr. Secretary, I hope you carry with you the strong bipartisan message conveyed. I may have initiated this concept of the President coming in as a full partner with the Congress, but I feel ever so strongly the burden of proof has to be carried by both branches, and am very pleased that our distinguished former Majority Leader, Senator Byrd, I believe manifested the same views on that, as did Chairman Nunn, so there is strong bipartisan linkage here on that message, which I hope you will take back.

Thank you. The hearing is now adjourned.  
 [Whereupon, at 1:08 p.m., the committee adjourned.]  
 [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

##### OPERATION ABLE SENTRY IN MACEDONIA (SPC MICHAEL NEW)

Senator MCCAIN. While most Americans are focused on the situation within Bosnia and the possibility of deploying U.S. troops to that war-torn country, many may be unaware that American soldiers have been deployed to Macedonia for more than two years now as part of a conflict containment operation called Operation Able Sentry.

Recently, a young medic stationed with U.S. forces in Germany received orders to deploy with his unit to Macedonia as part of that U.N.-sponsored multinational force. This young serviceman, Specialist Michael New, refused to wear the blue beret and shoulder patch of the United Nations as part of the uniform of U.S. troops assigned to Operation Able Sentry. As a result of his refusal to wear the U.N. insignia, SPC New has been temporarily reassigned to a non-deploying status and faces possible disciplinary action.

I fully recognize the vital importance of maintaining military discipline and ensuring that all military personnel obey all legal orders issued to them. However, I can also understand the concerns which may have caused SPC New to refuse to take on the appearance of a U.N. soldier.

Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili, with respect to U.S. participation in Operation Able Sentry in Macedonia, I would like to know whether U.S. forces have been attacked or harmed in any way in the past two years. I would also like your personal assessment of the possibility that hostilities could break out in that region in the future. What is your view of the impact on our forces in Macedonia of failing to reach a peace agreement among the warring parties in Bosnia?

General SHALIKASHVILI. The situation in Macedonia remains stable for now but ethnic tensions between the country's majority Macedonians (68 percent of the population) and minority Albanians (about 20% of the population) remain a long term threat. Macedonia's ethnic Albanians have been agitating for greater autonomy while right wing elements of the majority Macedonians are pressing hard to limit Albanian rights. However, political leaders on both sides want to avoid wide-spread violence. [Deleted.]

A potential spiller of ethnic conflict from the neighboring Serbian province of Kosovo poses the second greatest threat to Macedonian stability, but the situation in this region remains relatively stable.

The presence of U.N./U.S. forces in Macedonia has helped deter the spill over of ethnic conflict from other parts of the former Yugoslavia. The force has also helped defuse tensions between Serbia and Macedonia over their ill-defined common border by providing a visible defense, and also provides a visible symbol of international support that has bolstered the legitimacy of the Skopje regime.

UNPREDEP Incidents: There have been a number of border incidents between UNPREDEP and Serbian border guards, but all have been resolved peacefully. [Deleted.]

Senator MCCAIN. I am also concerned about the command arrangements for U.S. forces in Macedonia. As I understand the current situation, our forces are operating under U.N. auspices as part of a multinational military force which is currently commanded by a foreign commander. This foreign commander exercises operational control over all forces in that operation, but command of U.S. personnel remains in a U.S. chain of command which runs from the U.S. task force commander all the way up to the Commander-in-Chief. If this is not the case, please so advise me of the current command and control arrangements.

General SHALIKASHVILI. Our forces in Macedonia are in fact under direct U.S. command, as all of our forces always are. For the length of their deployment to Macedonia, normally six month rotations, they are under the operational control of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force Commander, who is a Finnish Brigadier General.

##### POSSIBILITY OF PEACE IN BOSNIA

Senator MCCAIN. Many times during the more than 3½ years of fighting in Bosnia, the world has been told that a peace agreement is imminent.

Secretary Christopher, in your personal view, what are the realistic chances of brokering a peace agreement, and then sustaining a long-lasting peace in Bosnia?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. U.S. leadership has brought the parties within reach of a peaceful resolution of the conflict for the first time in years of terrible human tragedy.

If the negotiations now taking place under U.S. leadership in Dayton are successful, we will have a real opportunity not only to end the dreadful humanitarian suffering and outrageous atrocities that we have seen in Bosnia, but also to advance our goal of an undivided, peaceful and democratic Europe—with benefits for our own security and prosperity. Such a result is clearly in our Nation's interest.

This result, however, can only be achieved with U.S. leadership. The events of the past several months illustrate the importance of that leadership. Following the assaults on Srebrenica and Zepa by the Bosnian Serbs, the United States led the international community to take serious and effective steps to protect the remaining U.N.-mandated safe areas. We secured an agreement from our NATO allies to meet further assaults on the safe areas with a decisive military response. American pilots participated in the NATO bombing campaign following the shelling of a Sarajevo marketplace, demonstrating our resolve and helping to convince the parties to turn from the path of war to the path of negotiations and peace.

U.S. diplomatic leadership has seized the opportunity for peace that these developments created. In August, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake presented a new U.S. initiative to our allies and the Russians. Since then, our negotiating team, directed by me and led by Richard Holbrooke, has conducted tireless shuttle diplomacy throughout the region and Europe as a whole. The remarkable progress over the past three months has resulted in a cease-fire and agreement on the basic principles of a settlement, laying the groundwork for the current negotiations in Dayton.

As you know, the parties have already agreed, in the basic principles adopted in Geneva, to a single Bosnia-Herzegovina within its current borders, and to rule out any arrangements that are inconsistent with Bosnia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. As I have stressed in the past, the United States will not support any settlement that represents a partition of Bosnia. A major goal of the current negotiations is to assist the parties in reaching agreement on amendments to the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina that provide for effective central government structures for the Bosnian state while defining the scope of autonomy to be provided to the two constituent entities. We expect the agreement would also contain provisions for elections throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina under the auspices of the OSCE.

On November 10 in Dayton, Bosnian President Izetbegovic and Federation President Zubak signed an important agreement that brings the Federation and its institutions to life. The Dayton agreement, witnessed by Croatian President Tudjman and Secretary of State Christopher, provides for the political, economic and social integration of the Federation. It also defines the division of responsibilities between the Federation and the central government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. By strengthening the Federation, the agreement should give additional impetus to negotiations with the Serbs on the constitutional arrangements for Bosnia as a whole.

We must not abandon this process now. The parties, in particular the Bosnians, have made clear to us that U.S. leadership has created this opportunity for peace after years of bloodshed, and that NATO and U.S. participation is essential if they are to take decisive steps toward a peaceful future.

In short, if our commitment to helping implement a peace is broken, there will be no peace in Bosnia.

Finally, I would particularly emphasize the importance of U.S. involvement with regard to NATO. For almost 50 years, the Alliance has been the anchor of America's and Europe's common security. If we do not do our part in a NATO mission, we would weaken the Alliance and jeopardize American leadership in Europe.

Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Christopher, how do you reconcile the fact that any peace agreement in Bosnia requires the cooperation of both Radovan Karadzic and General Mladic, both of whom are identified by the U.N. as war criminals?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. On August 29, the Bosnian Serbs, including Karadzic and Mladic, signed an agreement establishing a joint Serb delegation led by Serbian President Milosevic. They have specifically empowered Milosevic to make decisions and agreements on their behalf. Under this agreement, a peace agreement is not contingent upon cooperation by Karadzic and Mladic. Neither Karadzic, Mladic, nor any other indicted war criminal has been permitted to participate in the Dayton proximity talks. The United States has consistently opposed and continues to oppose amnesty for indicted war criminals. As warrants are issued, nations will be obliged to arrest those named who are present within their jurisdictions.

Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Christopher, if a peace agreement results in the partitioning of Bosnia, do you believe that people who have been expelled from their

properties should have the right to return to their homes? And if so, how would U.S. troops be utilized in guaranteeing such a right?

**Secretary CHRISTOPHER.** The parties have already agreed, in the basic principles adopted in Geneva, to a single Bosnia-Herzegovina within its current borders, and to rule out any arrangements that are inconsistent with Bosnia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. As the President has repeatedly emphasized, the United States will not support any settlement that represents a partition of Bosnia. A major goal of the current negotiations is to assist the parties in reaching agreement on amendments to the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina that provide for effective central government structures for the Bosnian state while defining the scope of autonomy to be provided to the two constituent entities. We expect the agreement would also contain provisions for elections throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina under the auspices of the OSCE.

The conflict in Bosnia has taken a huge toll on the fabric of Bosnian life. The reprehensible practice of ethnic cleansing and the violence of war have uprooted millions of people from their homes. Atrocities unknown in Europe since the Second World War have occurred. The production and delivery of food and everyday necessities have been disrupted. Extraordinary damage has been done to economic enterprise and infrastructure.

We expect that as part of a settlement there would be a coordinated international effort to address these problems. These activities would not be part of the IFOR mission but would be undertaken by the entire international community under civilian coordination. We would not allow "mission creep" that could involve IFOR in such a nation-building role. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees would coordinate the return of refugees and displaced persons. The International Red Cross would deal with prisoners and missing persons. International aid agencies would help the people of Bosnia rebuild the immediate needs of survival. An international police task force would work to monitor and retrain civilian police.

**Senator MCCAIN.** Secretary Perry, what is your personal assessment of the viability of the current cease fire in Bosnia?

**Secretary PERRY.** The current cease fire is now generally holding throughout Bosnia, although there are occasional incidents. This is the most successful cease fire we have seen in over 3 years of fighting. The Serbs have suffered serious defeats on the ground and there is a widespread feeling throughout the region that the war has gone on far too long. It is a fragile cease-fire, however, and we must now focus on measures that will increase the momentum toward peace. Our goal is a quickly negotiated comprehensive agreement, followed almost immediately by the deployment of an international implementation force. If we do not get a settlement backed up by an implementation force, we run the risk that serious fighting will resume, along with the possibility that NATO will be called upon to assist in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR.

**Senator MCCAIN.** General Shalikashvili, what is your personal assessment of the risks facing U.S. troops which may be sent into Bosnia as part of a peace implementation force, assuming a peace agreement can be reached?

**General SHALIKASHVILI.** The risks to a peace Implementation Force (IFOR) will depend on the nature of the peace agreement that is worked out between the warring factions. The worst case situation for IFOR would be an ambiguous settlement that papers over differences between the factions and in which they later attempt to manipulate the IFOR to promote their individual interpretations of the peace agreement. The threat of large-scale military operations against IFOR by major units of the antagonists is low; however, a spectrum of localized military and environmental threats will still confront U.S. and international armed forces. Specific threats under these circumstances include:

- The three main armies in Bosnia field 300,000-350,000 troops equipped with small arms, mortars and some heavy artillery. Firing discipline on all sides is often poor and likely to trigger at least occasional random violence.

- Rolling back the factions from land they now control to conform with a final territorial settlement or helping refugees return to their areas of origin will likely provoke isolated confrontations between the IFOR and local groups.

- Extremist paramilitary elements, such as the Mujahedin (Muslim) and Arkan's Tigers (Serbian), may target IFOR contingents for perceived biases against their interests.

- Landmines and other unexploded ordinance.

- Hostage-taking to achieve short-term political objectives.

- Criminal activity such as kidnapping, hijacking, armed robberies, and organized crime.

- Hazardous road conditions, rough terrain, and difficult climatic conditions raise the risk of accidents.

Limited chemical warfare (CW) threat. All warring factions have limited capabilities although to only confirmed use of chemical weapons involved employment of riot control/tear gas agents.

#### STATUS OF MILITARY FORCES IN BOSNIA

Senator MCCAIN. General Shalikashvili, for the past few months, airstrikes against Bosnian Serb targets have been more aggressive and sustained than at any previous time. At the same time, Bosnian Muslim and Croatian forces have been engaged in heavy fighting with Bosnian Serb forces in many areas of the country.

What is the long-term impact of airstrikes on air defense and command and control capabilities of the Bosnian Serbs?

General SHALIKASHVILI. [Deleted].

Senator MCCAIN. In general, what is your assessment of the military capabilities and threats that a peace implementation force might face when deployed to Bosnia?

General SHALIKASHVILI. As I discussed above, the IFOR could face a number of risks depending on the nature of the peace settlement. The most dangerous situation would be one in which the warring factions paper over their differences for a peace agreement and then attempt to manipulate the IFOR to achieve their respective goals. The threat of large-scale military operations against the IFOR is low; however, a spectrum of localized military and environmental threats will confront the force. The three main armies in Bosnia have 300,000 to 350,000 troops in the field equipped with small arms, mortars, and some heavy artillery. Their firing discipline is often poor and likely to spark occasional violence. Also of concern are extremist paramilitary elements, land mines and other unexploded ordinance, criminal activity, and hazardous road and terrain conditions.

Senator MCCAIN. What has been the effect of the heavy fighting on the ground on the overall military capabilities of the warring parties?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Bosnian Army. The Bosnian Army remains capable of defending its core areas in central and northern Bosnia, but has very limited offensive capabilities. In western Bosnia, the Bosnian Army is over-extended following its recent gains and [deleted] Bosnian Serb Army.

Nonetheless, the BSA retains an advantage in firepower and is capable of repelling a Bosnian Army advance. It has fewer troops than the Bosnian Army, but the recent territorial losses decreased the length of the frontline it has to defend. The BSA would probably not be able to withstand a determined attack by Croatian Army units.

Bosnian Croats. Bosnian Croat forces have limited military capabilities that are mainly suited for defensive action. [Deleted].

Croatian Army. Direct intervention by Croatian Army (HV) troops in Bosnia during September drastically altered the overall military balance in the Bosnian conflict and enabled Bosnian Croat and Government forces to make significant territorial gains. The Croats have demonstrated their ability to mass large numbers of troops and equipment to conduct offensive and defensive combined arms operations as evidenced by their successful recapture of Serb-held—areas in the Krajina region earlier this spring and summer.

[Deleted].

#### RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Senator MCCAIN. The Congress and the American people have been assured many times that deployment of U.S. forces to Bosnia would only be done under U.S.-approved NATO rules of engagement. However, some skepticism remains about the final decision on this matter.

General Shalikashvili, will you commit to the Congress and to the American people today, that you will oppose the introduction of U.S. forces in Bosnia unless you are personally satisfied that our forces will be operating under rules of engagement that clearly define what they can and cannot do in a clearly hostile environment, and that those rules of engagement are appropriate for the hostile situations our forces may face in Bosnia?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Without any doubt, I can say that U.S. forces introduced into Bosnia will have the authority to respond with the appropriate force to a given situation. Furthermore, the ability to use appropriate force for self-protection in response to both hostile acts and hostile intents will be the pillar of the rules of engagement.

## NEED FOR AN AMERICAN CONTINGENT IN A PEACE IMPLEMENTATION FORCE

Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Christopher, what do you believe is the strongest argument for sending U.S. troops into Bosnia as part of a peace implementation force, rather than allowing the European community to continue to lead in this effort?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. U.S. leadership has been crucial to the success achieved thus far in the Bosnian peace process. As recently as last July, Bosnian Serb forces had overrun two U.N.-declared safe areas, murdering or expelling their inhabitants, and defying the international community. Since then, at the initiative of the United States, the situation has fundamentally changed.

At the July London Conference, we convinced our allies to take firm measures, including the use of decisive air power, to protect the remaining safe areas. After the Bosnian Serbs attacked the Sarajevo marketplace, the United States led a prolonged NATO air campaign to underscore that further violations would not be tolerated. In August, the President launched a fresh diplomatic initiative which has achieved a cease-fire and other remarkable results: Bosnia-Herzegovina will be preserved within its present borders, it will maintain a single international personality, and it will have Federal structures, including a presidency, parliament, and constitutional court. Proximity talks between the parties with the goal of achieving a comprehensive peace agreement began in Dayton on November 1.

Presidents Izetbegovic, Milosevic, and Tudjman have made clear that they will agree to a peace settlement only if it is enforced by NATO, and by U.S. troops in particular. In addition, as the leader of NATO, we do not envision other NATO countries offering to participate in peace enforcement without a similar pledge from the United States. For almost 50 years, the Alliance has been the anchor of American and European common security. If we do not do our part in a NATO mission, we weaken the Alliance and jeopardize American leadership in Europe.

Without a commitment to send U.S. troops to Bosnia to enforce a settlement, the current peace talks would almost certainly collapse, fighting would likely resume, and we would once again be at risk of a wider war that could spread beyond its current confines. U.S. leadership—both diplomatic and military—has been essential in bringing the parties as far as they have come towards peace. There is no alternative to continuing U.S. leadership in reaching, and then securing, that peace.

Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Perry, what is your assessment of the risk to NATO's future if American forces do not participate in a peace implementation force in Bosnia?

Secretary PERRY. NATO is the foundation of regional security in Europe, an area where the United States has vital political, economic, and strategic interests, and the conflict in Bosnia is the most serious current threat to the security of Europe. The United States is the natural leader of NATO. If we do not assume the responsibilities of leadership in regard to Bosnia, including providing a substantial proportion of the troops for an implementation force, the current peace initiative is likely to collapse. A resumption of the war will almost certainly bring more atrocities and refugees and increase the risk that the war will spread. Such a turn of events will undermine NATO's preeminent role in the security structure of Europe and threaten our vital national interests there.

Senator MCCAIN. General Shalikashvili, what unique and specialized skills would American soldiers bring to a peace implementation force in Bosnia that cannot be provided by troops from the nations of Europe?

General SHALIKASHVILI. The most important qualities our Armed Forces would bring to a peace implementation force is credibility and leadership. Without the commitment of U.S. armed forces, efforts aimed at restoring the peace might be viewed with less credibility, and our leadership within NATO would be diminished. That said, U.S. armed forces would also bring very specialized skills and capabilities to the operation that could not be easily (if at all) duplicated. These skills and capabilities include intelligence gathering, logistics support, strategic lift, communications, and command and control.

## EXIT STRATEGY FOR U.S. FORCES IF PEACE FAILS

Senator MCCAIN. It is possible that, after a period of weeks or months of continued efforts at implementing a peace agreement in Bosnia, fighting could again break out and it could be determined that "peace" no longer exists in Bosnia.

What provision is being made in the planning for U.S. forces' participation in a Bosnian peace implementation force for their safe exit in the event of the outbreak of significant conflict? Will U.S. forces be free to evacuate as is deemed prudent by their American commanders, or will they be required to receive permission to withdraw from any other person or organization?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. The reason we are insisting that the implementation force (IFOR) be NATO-led and made up of well-equipped units is precisely so that it can deal with any contingency. Although we hope that a mutually agreed settlement will take hold, prudent military planning requires that we be prepared for the possibility that the settlement might break down. The exact details of our response to such a contingency will, of course, depend upon the events and context at the time. If the NAC determines that the IFOR should withdraw, our plans for peacefully withdrawing the IFOR once its mission is accomplished could easily be adapted to the prevailing circumstances (extent of fighting, availability of transport routes, etc.). Decisions on withdrawal would be coordinated through NATO channels, but I do not believe there would be a problem of American commanders being overruled by other persons or organizations. The other members of NATO would naturally look to the United States for leadership in such discussions. The theater commander will be NATO's CINCSOUTH, Adm. Leighton Smith, an American. In NATO, member states always retain ultimate control of their own forces.

General SHALIKASHVILI. U.S. forces will only participate in a peace implementation operation which has been agreed upon by all the Parties. In other words, if there is not a commitment to stop fighting and pull back across the agreed zone of separation, then NATO (to include U.S.) troops will not be committed. With that in mind, we are still proposing the deployment of a powerful military force, capable of self protection. As for specific planning concerning possible early exit contingency plans developed in support of Operation Plan 40104 are being modified as required. As you are well aware, U.S. participation in a peace implementation operation in Bosnia would be part of a NATO operation. While it would be possible for the US to unilaterally evacuate its forces, the much more likely scenario for early U.S. withdrawal would follow a North Atlantic Council decision aimed at withdrawing the entire NATO operation.

#### CONTAINMENT STRATEGY IF PEACE PLAN FAILS

Senator MCCAIN. If a peace plan is not reached by the time the as-yet elusive ceasefire fails, UNPROFOR forces may then be withdrawn from Bosnia, and the world community must then continue to deal with the existence of an ongoing conflict in Europe.

- Do you believe that a NATO-led "containment" operation could prevent the expansion of the conflict outside of Bosnia?

General SHALIKASHVILI. The success of Operation Able Sentry in Macedonia shows how combined efforts with our allies can contribute to preventing conflict and stabilizing an otherwise volatile region. I do believe that long term stabilization and reconstruction within Bosnia will go a long way toward preventing expansion of the conflict outside Bosnia.

Senator MCCAIN. If such a containment force were constituted, what level of forces might be required to prevent spill-over of the conflict?

General SHALIKASHVILI. It would be impossible to provide a specific figure without a more defined scenario. However, one could easily envision a scenario in which a widening conflict would require more troops than we are contemplating contributing to IFOR.

Senator MCCAIN. In light of the obvious inconsistency of the U.N., NATO, and the U.S. to follow through on threats of use of force over the past three years, do you believe that a U.S. or NATO threat of force to prevent spill-over of the conflict would be viewed as credible by the parties to the conflict?

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. The current focus of NATO planning is to assist with stopping the fighting at its source in Bosnia. If the current peace initiative breaks down, we will have to shift our attention to preventing the spread of fighting to other sensitive areas such as Kosovo and Macedonia. NATO has not done any detailed planning on what military forces might be required to prevent a spill-over of the conflict. I believe the NATO bombing campaign of this last summer, which was a crucial factor in bringing the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table, has reestablished the credibility of any Alliance threat to use force that might have to be used to prevent a spill-over of the conflict.

General SHALIKASHVILI. I believe that the warring parties hold the U.S. and NATO as credible for three reasons. First, they know the U.S. is still a Superpower willing to use force to achieve its aims. Second, they know the U.S. and NATO are specifically willing to use force in Bosnia, as evidenced by our air campaign against the Bosnian Serbs last August and September. Third, they are well aware that the U.S. commitment of our ground troops is the ultimate sign of our determination to prevent the Bosnian war from spilling over into a wider Balkan conflict.



## CURRENT STATUS OF OPLAN 90-104

Senator MCCAIN. Several months ago, when it appeared more likely that UNPROFOR forces might have to be evacuated from Bosnia, a plan was drafted which envisioned U.S. forces acting as part of a multinational force to assist in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces? Today, military planning seems to be centered around U.S. participation in a peace implementation force into which UNPROFOR forces would be absorbed.

In the event a peace agreement does not materialize, the current ceasefire fails, and UNPROFOR troops now in Bosnia must be withdrawn, is OPLAN 90-104 still valid?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Since OPLAN 40104 was written much has changed in Bosnia. UNPROFOR has changed its deployment patterns and reduced its size. Territory has changed hands. OPLAN 40104, once updated for those changes, would remain a viable plan for UNPROFOR withdrawal.

## FUNDING FOR OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA

Senator MCCAIN. The proposed Bosnia operation promises to be an expensive undertaking. The estimated cost to the United States varies but has been placed as high as \$6 billion. In the past, funding for these operations has come from the O&M readiness accounts and has led to a cancellation of training exercises, equipment maintenance, and other important programs. This has had a negative impact upon military readiness.

- Secretary PERRY, what is the estimated cost to the DOD for this operation?
- How will these costs be paid, both in the long term and in the interim period?
- If these funds will be made available from the O&M accounts, what will be the impact on military readiness?

Secretary PERRY. As you correctly note there have been many estimates of the cost of creating peace in Bosnia. I can only speak to the cost of deploying and operating the U.S. portion of a NATO peacekeeping force, and I must caveat even this response as "representational" because the exact number and type of troops has not yet been determined. With this understanding, the estimated annual cost of a representative force of approximately 25,000 troops, together with continuation of U.S. air forces involved in Operation Deny Flight, is approximately \$1.5 billion.

Initial funding would be primarily from the operation and maintenance appropriations, from which these type costs are normally paid. The ultimate source of funds that would have to be transferred into these O&M appropriations (to ensure that military readiness is maintained) cannot be determined until Congress approves the FY 1996 budget.

There will be no affect on military readiness if sufficient funds to cover Bosnia related costs are restored in a timely manner.

Senator MCCAIN. The Senate Armed Services Committee is trying to address the issue of protecting military readiness in its conference discussions with the House on the FY 1996 Defense Authorization bill. One of the items which we are discussing is whether we should authorize funds for contingency and peacekeeping operations that were ongoing in 1995 and are expected to continue through much of 1996. We already know that the Department is going to incur these costs and that the bills will ultimately have to be paid.

- What will be the potential impact on military readiness if the Congress fails to provide these funds at this time but instead waits until a supplemental request can be submitted and approved?

Secretary PERRY. There will be no affect if a supplemental is submitted and approved in a timely manner. Approval during the second quarter of FY 1997 will allow the services to preserve military readiness from a fiscal perspective.

Senator MCCAIN. Another issue which is currently being discussed in conference is a provision in the House bill that provides improved funding mechanisms for unbudgeted operations and requires the President to budget for these operations in the future. I would like to ask you a few questions regarding this provision.

- What do you believe would be the effect of a statutory limitation on the expenditure of funds for ongoing operations for which funds were not requested in the President's annual submission?
- What is your view of providing funding for these operations through the Department of State or as a separate appropriation outside of the DOD budget?

- Why did the Department not include these funds in their normal budget request this year? Will the Department specifically provide funds for ongoing operations such as these in future budget requests?

Secretary PERRY. I can accept the limitation on expenditure of funds in paragraph (b) of the House approved revision to section 127b, as long as the definition of "Covered Operations" remains the same as approved by the House in paragraph (c) of the proposed section 127b.

These operations are undertaken by the Department primarily to assist in the maintenance of world wide peace, and are therefore related directly to the defense of the United States. The costs associated with these activities should not be funded through another Department or through a non-Defense appropriation.

The Department includes in the normal budget funding only for those operations which are known to be continuing into the fiscal year for which funds are being requested. None of the operations for which the Department has requested supplemental funding could have been projected with certainty to continue into the budget year. The Department will continue to comply with congressional direction in this regard. I can inform you that it will request funding in the FY 1997 budget for the operations around Iraq.

Senator MCCAIN. The House version of the bill included a provision that would prohibit the use of Department of Defense funds for the payment of U.N. peacekeeping assessments. I am not aware of any current authority that would allow the DOD to pay for these assessments. In fact, this committee chose not to provide the DOD with this authority when it marked up its version of the DOD Authorization Act.

Are you aware of any authority that would allow the use of DOD funds for the payment of U.N. peacekeeping assessments?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Currently there are no provisions for providing DOD funds to the U.N.

#### U.S. FORCES IN MACEDONIA

Senator MCCAIN. I am also concerned about the command arrangements for U.S. forces in Macedonia. As I understand the current situation, our forces are operating under U.N. auspices as part of a multinational military force which is currently commanded by a foreign commander. This foreign commander exercises operational control over all forces in that operation, but command of U.S. personnel remains in a U.S. chain of command which runs from the U.S. task force commander all the way up to the Commander-in-Chief. If this is not the case please so advise me of the current command and control arrangements.

Secretary CHRISTOPHER. Our forces in Macedonia are in fact under direct U.S. command, as all of our forces always are. For the length of their deployment to Macedonia, normally 6 month rotations, they are under the operational control of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) commander, who is a Finnish Brigadier General.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICK SANTORUM

##### IFOR DEADLINE

Senator SANTORUM. Secretary Perry, today you stated that the deadline of one year for the IFOR peacekeeping mission came from yourself after a "bottom up" study of the situation. Given the 700 years of conflict in the Balkan region, I'm a little skeptical that the theater will only require a peacekeeping force for one year and that military observers will not be necessary after that period. Can you tell me specifically what military factors led you to your conclusion? Additionally, do you believe that this one year deadline will be affected by the Balkan winter?

Secretary PERRY. The one year target for the implementation force (IFOR) to accomplish its mission is based on the limited nature of that mission. The main job of the IFOR is to oversee the movement of the military forces of the contending parties to mutually agreed positions and monitor a zone of separation between the forces. This is a large-scale mission that will require considerable military muscle, but it should take only a matter of months. Although winter conditions will make this task more difficult, NATO forces are trained to be fully operational in all weather conditions. Our expectation is that peace will take hold as a result of a successful separation of the forces, combined with the many non-military tasks (refugee resettlement, economic reconstruction, etc.) to be undertaken by organizations other than NATO. If there is still a threat of renewed violence, it will probably only be on a small scale, and the international community may well decide to send monitors

from the UN, the OSCE, or some other international organization. I do not believe this follow-on work should be done by NATO.

#### RESPONSIBILITY FOR CIVILIAN SAFETY

Senator SANTORUM. Secretary Perry, who will have responsibility for ensuring the safety of civilians in areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina where NATO is conducting peace-keeping operations? Will those responsibilities change if the situation became less than permissive?

Secretary PERRY. We anticipate that the separation for the regular forces of the contending parties will create an atmosphere of peace in which civilians will be safe to go about their business without fear of conventional military attack. The IFOR's main focus will be creating this atmosphere of security rather than protecting specific cities or individuals. There may also be a threat from criminal elements, and one of the international organizations—perhaps the U.N., but not NATO—is expected to organize a police element as part of the overall peace implementation effort. If there are attacks on civilians in areas adjacent to where IFOR units are deployed, the local IFOR commander will be authorized to respond as long as it does not detract from his primary mission.



# USE OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES TO ENFORCE THE BOSNIAN PEACE AGREEMENT AND THE ROLE OF NATO AND OTHER FOREIGN NATIONS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACE

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1995

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:13 a.m., in room SD-50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Thurmond, Cohen, McCain, Coats, Smith, Kempthorne, Hutchison, Santorum, Nunn, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, Glenn, Byrd, Robb, Lieberman, and Bryan.

Committee staff members present: Richard L. Reynard, staff director; George W. Laufer, deputy staff director; Melinda M. Koutsoumpas, chief clerk; Donald A. Deline, minority counsel; and Christine K. Cimko, press secretary.

Professional staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, Lucia M. Chavez, Lawrence J. Lanzillotta, Cord A. Sterling, Eric H. Thoemmes, and Burt Misuzawa.

Minority staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, minority staff director; Andrew S. Effron, minority counsel; Richard D. DeBobs, counsel; and Michael J. McCord, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Patricia L. Banks, Pamela L. Farrell, Shelley G. Laufer, Deasy Wagner, and Jennifer Wallace.

Committee members' assistants present: Judith A. Ansley, assistant to Senator Warner; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Ann E. Sauer, assistant to Senator McCain; Walter Lohman, assistant to Senator McCain; Richard F. Schwab, assistant to Senator Coats; David J. Gribbin, assistant to Senator Coats; Thomas L. Lankford, assistant to Senator Smith; Glen E. Tait, assistant to Senator Kempthorne; David W. Davis, assistant to Senator Hutchison; Patty Stalnacker, assistant to Senator Santorum; Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; David A. Lewis, assistant to Senator Levin; Steven A. Wolfe, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Patricia J. Buckheit, assistant to Senator Glenn; Suzanne M. McKenna, assistant to Senator Glenn; Lisa W. Tuite, assistant to Senator Byrd; William Owens, assistant to Senator Robb; John F. Lilley, assistant to Senator Lieberman; and Mary Weaver Bennett, assistant to Senator Bryan.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND,  
CHAIRMAN**

Chairman THURMOND. The committee will come to order.

I want to welcome our witnesses today, General Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor to President Bush; Dr. James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense, former Secretary of Energy, and former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; and Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under President Bush, and former U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia under President Reagan.

The witnesses have been asked to provide their views on the President's pledge to the Presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia to deploy U.S. military forces to implement and enforce the Bosnia peace agreement initialed and dated last week. The witnesses have also been asked to comment on NATO's role in implementing a peace agreement, the role of the United Nations and the European Community, the ability of the republics to implement and enforce the peace agreement and ensure the safety of the NATO forces, the use of non-NATO military forces and the implementation force, and the goals and objectives and exit strategy for the NATO-led operation.

As you are no doubt aware, a great deal of concern and skepticism have been voiced by the American public and the Congress about national security or vital security interests that warrant the deployment of U.S. military forces on the ground in Bosnia to implement and enforce the peace agreement. Last night, the President addressed the Nation in an effort to explain the U.S.-brokered Bosnia peace agreement, and to describe to the American public the national or vital security interests which warrant the deployment of U.S. military forces on the ground in Bosnia to enforce that agreement.

I am not yet convinced that vital U.S. security interests are threatened or at stake; however, that does not mean the United States does not have an interest in the stability of Europe and the viability of NATO. I support the North Atlantic alliance, and believe that the United States should remain engaged in and show leadership in NATO.

The President said that the mission of the implementation force would be precisely defined, with clear and realistic goals. That could be achieved in a defined time; however, the President did not describe or define the mission for the American public. He did not describe the clear and realistic goals, nor did he clearly describe the framework or the exit strategy. The American public and the Congress need to understand what we are getting into if U.S. military forces are deployed on the ground in Bosnia. Will U.S. troops be committed to undertaking a mission that is impossible? I believe that the President did make it quite clear that the deployment of U.S. military force will not be without risk.

On Sunday, the Secretary of Defense said in a news show that U.S. troops would not be deployed to Bosnia unless it was clear that the three republics were committed to implementing and enforcing the peace agreement, and that there had been an interval of time where the republics had demonstrated their compliance with the agreement. I believe that it is imperative that President

Clinton follow through and not deploy U.S. military forces to Bosnia until such time as it is clear to all that Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia, will enforce and implement the agreement, and until such time as they have shown their commitment to the peace agreement through compliance with it.

I want to emphasize two things. I believe the American public and the Congress support the use of U.S. military forces to defend U.S. national security and vital security interests. We must, however, be convinced of those security interests and understand the risk involved, and weigh those risks carefully.

I support the President's constitutional prerogatives as the commander-in-chief to deploy U.S. military forces; however, as a senator and the chairman of this committee, I have a constitutional responsibility to ensure that a thorough and public discussion takes place on this very serious matter.

Senator Nunn is here at this time. Senator Exon, do you have an opening statement?

First, before you start, I want to say this, I have to open the Senate, and I have requested the able Senator from Maine, Senator Cohen, to take my place until I return. Senator Cohen, if you will take my place, please.

#### STATEMENT OF HON. J. JAMES EXON, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I will be very, very brief.

Thank you for being here this morning, gentlemen. I just started looking over some of your opening statements, and I agree with you, this is a very, very serious thing, and I congratulate Chairman Thurmond for calling this meeting early on, and I assume that we are going to have several other meetings with several other witnesses.

I have withheld my final judgment on this until I know better what the situation is today, what the rules of engagement are with regard to the peace accord. I thought that Senator Dole made a good statement on the floor of the Senate yesterday with regard to everybody could hold their fire at the present time and give a thorough look-see at what we are doing, what we are not doing.

There is no question but whatever route we follow is a perilous one. There are many things that have to be weighed and swayed, and thus far it seems to me that partisan political considerations are largely being set aside. Everyone has their ideas, everyone has their concerns, and I share in all of those.

There are lots of questions that I will have for you and other witnesses. I just want to thank you all for being here. We have the highest respect for the three of you, who have been before this committee on many, many occasions previously. Thank you for your continuing commitment to what is best for the United States of America, and I am looking forward to your testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator COHEN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Exon.

Senator McCain, do you have a statement?

Senator MCCAIN. No.

Senator COHEN. Anyone on this side wish to make a statement? [No response.]

Senator COHEN. Fine. Then why do we not proceed with the witnesses. Brent.

**STATEMENT OF HON. BRENT SCOWCROFT, FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION**

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great privilege to appear before this distinguished committee on such an important issue. Let me make just a few introductory remarks, beginning with the basic issue about our interests and whether or not we should be involved.

I fear that we are now facing two unpalatable alternatives. It is not my impression that all of the parties in Bosnia are through fighting. The President last night seemed to agree to that when he said that without NATO deployment the fighting would resume. This makes peacekeeping a high-risk undertaking. Dissatisfied parties may try to turn the peacekeeping operation to their own advantage through such things as sniping, car bomb attacks, for example, which can be blamed on other parties.

As Senator Exon said, there are many questions which need to be answered, and I will turn to some of those. But risky as I think the situation is for U.S. troops, the alternative, in my judgment, is a clear disaster. I believe we are committed. The President has publicly stated a commitment to deploy troops if an agreement was reached. The United States took over the management of NATO's involvement in the war, acquiesced in by the British and French principally on the grounds that this would result in American participation in the operation.

The Wright-Patterson agreement is based fundamentally on deployment of 60,000 NATO troops, which is clearly impossible without a significant U.S. deployment. It can be argued that the administration should not have done this, or that it lacked the authority to do it, and that is an important domestic issue. But the world can be excused for not following the finer points of U.S. constitutional law and practice. To the world, the United States is about as committed in this enterprise as it is possible to get.

To turn our backs now would be a catastrophe for U.S. reliability, which I think is our most precious national security commodity. Our friends and our allies, indeed our opponents, make their policies based on their confidence in their relationship with the United States. And that begins with the NATO alliance. Therefore, it is my judgment that of two very unpalatable choices, turning our backs is clearly the worse option.

The President, in his comments, promised to seek congressional support. To me this gives the Congress the opportunity to press for answers to many of the questions critical to a deployment and to reducing to a minimum the risks of that deployment. Let me mention just a few.

The President has said our objective is to secure the peace. But there really is no peace. There is something of a truce. We drove the parties to stop fighting, we drove the parties to Wright-Patterson, and we drove them to sign a piece of paper. So it is difficult to say what securing the peace really means as an objective. Our



objectives, whatever they are, will clearly influence the duration of our mission.

The President said that the mission is clear and is limited, but he did not say what it was. Is it simply to keep the militaries of the three combatants separated? Is it to defend the Bosnians until they can defend themselves? Is it, in addition to keeping the forces separated, to engage in such matters as elections, return of refugees, reconstruction?

The question of duration is another important issue. The President said he estimated about a year. Since there is no peace, now it is not clear what will happen in a year to permit the exit of U.S. forces, especially if the parties themselves think that we will be gone in about a year. Will we stay until the political military conditions permit? The history of Yugoslavia suggests that could be a long, long time. Until the Bosnians are rearmed to the point that they are secure? That also could be an indefinite period of time.

What are the rules of engagement? There has been little discussion of that. How would we react to car bombs? How would we react to sniping attacks from crowds of civilians? There are many very tough, very sensitive issues involved.

Will there be any policing of the external Bosnian borders, or will everyone be permitted to rearm their clients? The issue of arming and training the Bosnian forces is another one. Will we be doing that, thus changing the military balance on the ground at the same time we are trying to keep peace among the combatants? Are we trying, in this effort, to make the Bosnians able to hold their own against the entire Yugoslav Army?

What about refugee return? The President used the term "let the refugees return to their homes." Many of those homes are now occupied by other ethnic groups. Will they be evicted, or will the refugees return instead to their own ethnic groups, wherever those may be, thus helping to contribute to the horror of ethnic cleansing.

Elections: How are they going to take place? Are the troops going to monitor them? What will be the effect of the return of refugees on the outcome of elections? That will depend a lot on the previous question.

These are only some of the issues on which there are question marks. And I believe that the Congress can play an enormously helpful rule in seeking answers and clarification of these and other questions, clarification not only for itself, for the American people, but also for the administration itself, so that as we put troops in, we put them in with full knowledge of what the risks are, and with the understanding that we have done everything possible to reduce those risks to a minimum.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much, General Scowcroft.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FORMER SECRETARY OF ENERGY AND DEFENSE, AND DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the committee for giving me this opportunity to appear on this vital issue. I should start by saying that I agree entirely with General Scowcroft with regard to the questions that he raised and the con-

clusion that he reached, given the degree of commitment that the United States has now made to being involved in Bosnia.

Mr. Chairman, the reality of the post-Cold War world is that the United States has limited political capital for foreign ventures. The public is not deeply engaged. This may not please the foreign policy experts, buffs, or elites, but those who face the electorate like yourselves understand this far better than do the experts.

The clear inference is that we should husband that political capital and expend it only on those matters that are of vital interest to the United States. If we are prudent, that political capital should be expended only selectively and cautiously. As a guideline, the national stakes involved should greatly exceed the risk of failure.

In the former Yugoslavia, such caveats are no longer an issue. Whether or not the United States should have become this deeply engaged in the Balkans is an interesting question, but one now best left to the historians. As General Scowcroft indicated, we have taken over the management of the war. We have introduced air power; we have unleashed the Croatian Government forces, which have reshaped the political landscape; we have sponsored the Dayton peace conference; we have promised to deploy our forces; and all parties have made their participation in the agreement contingent on the U.S. providing forces. Thus, the international credibility of the United States is now at stake.

In this process of deeper engagement, we have substituted a degree of realism for our prior position of posturing. We have ceased primarily to carpat our allies. We have also jettisoned some of those principles that we previously professed. Our indignation over ethnic cleansing has clearly been modified, reflecting our encouragement of the Croats to clean out the Krajina Serbs.

Our indignation over war criminals has also diminished as we now have had to deal with them. The fussiness over "rewarding aggression" has declined, because we now recognize that the facts on the ground are facts that we must take into account. The proposed outcome that emerges from Dayton is not too different from Vance-Owen, which we previously rejected with contempt. In brief, as we have become more deeply engaged we have substituted diplomatic practicality for posturing.

Let me turn from diplomatic issues to military issues. There are, as General Scowcroft indicated, very substantial risks, and particularly so given the limited initial U.S. interest in what happened in Bosnia. The likelihood of our coming out intact is quite slim. The justifications given are not persuasive. We have an agreed-on settlement. It is being suggested that our participation determines whether or not we have peace or war.

Clausewitz might comment that for the parties involved the agreement is just a mode of carrying on conflict by other means. The settlement is not in their own minds, it is in the minds, primarily, of Americans. It is also suggested that the American conscience is deeply involved because of the bloodshed. That conscience seems to be muted in places like Sudan and Liberia, and it has arrived somewhat belatedly with regard to Bosnia.

With regard to military operations, I am concerned that there may be a mismatch of the forces and the mission. The assumption

going in is that we will not need the massive firepower and the armor that we are providing. That is intended to intimidate the parties. What if we are challenged, as we have been in Lebanon and in Somalia? We need to have sound contingency plans.

But we note that with the heavy armor that our forces will be road-bound down in the valleys. In March and in April of this year, which will come soon, there will be mud everywhere, as the spring thaw comes. We will not be able, without rebuilding, to traverse the bridges. Those bridges will not bear the weight of a 60-ton tank. We will wind up, I believe, having substantially to upgrade the transportation system in the area of operations.

Given the road-bound nature of our forces, they will not be able to reach beyond the first range of hills with their direct-fire weapons. Will we send patrols into the hills? That would be risky, and that would probably result in significant casualties. Thus, our probable response would be to bash the other side. But we should recall that that technique used in Lebanon with the battleship New Jersey only infuriated the other side. So I trust that these matters have been thought through.

Our general diplomatic stance has been that we will equip and train the Muslims, and simultaneously persuade the Serbs to reduce their forces. That is an imposing task. The Serbs may then conclude that we are not being impartial, if they have not already decided on that. All this is to be achieved in 1 year's time. As General Scowcroft has indicated, the parties may just decide to wait us out. The U.S. military, I suspect, is marked by great uneasiness and a desire to avoid any additional humiliation like that experienced in the past.

Mr. Chairman, I have expressed these concerns, but I would conclude that we now have no practicable alternative other than to go in. Some months ago, while testifying before this committee on Bosnia, I said that it was sometimes said we have no national interest in Bosnia, that that was wrong, that our national interest above all things was to emerge from Bosnia with NATO intact. But now we have moved beyond the preservation of NATO. Now we have our prestige, our credibility, at stake. This Nation is the world's leading power. The President, rightly or wrongly, has committed the power and prestige of the United States to the agreement. To back away now, Mr. Chairman, from this commitment would grievously injure our international standing and our image of reliability.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Dr. Schlesinger. Mr. Wolfowitz.

#### **STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY**

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this committee on this crucial question. I have a somewhat longer statement which I'd like to submit for the record, along with a piece that I have today in the Wall Street Journal. Let me just summarize four brief points.

First, as Secretary Schlesinger said, we do not start from a blank slate. The agreements have been negotiated and initialed. And let me say that whatever one's ultimate judgment about this agreement, it must be said that the U.S. negotiators, and particularly

assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, have displayed great skill and have secured a far greater degree of agreement than was achieved during any of the previous negotiating efforts during the course of this long war. The Congress can and should debate the commitment on which this agreement is based. But the question of whether it should have been made is different from the question of whether it now should be honored.

We must also recognize that we have already been involved in Bosnia for a long time. We are involved, among other things, because our support for the arms embargo over the last 3 years has prevented the Bosnians from acquiring the means to defend themselves. I have been opposed to the arms embargo since its inception, not simply because I believe it is wrong for the United States to deny the victims of aggression the means to defend themselves.

Equally important, I believed that if we refuse to allow the Bosnians the means to protect themselves, the international community would assume the responsibility for their protection, and increasingly that protection would depend on American participation. The point at which we arrive today certainly seems to bear out that view. What Congress must do, in my view, is to assure that the appropriate steps are taken so that the Bosnians can assume the responsibility for their own protection, and relieve us of that burden as quickly as possible.

Second, as Brent Scowcroft pointed out very clearly, the peace agreement contains many complex provisions; however, one can question whether many of these provisions have a realistic chance of being implemented in good faith, particularly by the parties involved.

The most important thing about this agreement, however, is something very simple: It stops the killing, for now. But let us not enter this agreement with illusions. This peace agreement did not end the deep enmity that led to this war, or quench the desire for revenge that the war has unleashed. Neither arms control measures nor constitutional provisions nor international police task forces will hold the continuing sense of enmity and grievance in check.

What can hold that enmity in check is an appropriate military balance between the potential aggressors and the potential victims of aggression. The reason for an imbalance is not because the Bosnians are out-manned, but because they are out-gunned.

Third, and I guess this is my most important point, because all of these revolve on an issue of our exit strategy, and I think this is the most important part, third, this suggests a way of looking at the implementation force in a way that is constructive and that has a chance of working after our troops depart. The goal of U.S. policy toward Bosnia should be Bosnian self reliance. We should aim to make it possible for the Bosnian Government to defend its own country militarily. We must avoid creating a Bosnian independence which would keep us there forever.

The Congress should oppose the deployment of U.S. forces to Bosnia unless the administration makes a clear and binding commitment to create, by arming and training Bosnian and Croatian forces a qualitative military balance between Bosnian Croatian and Serb forces in former Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, the text signed at

Dayton lacks any clear commitments to equip and train the Bosnian forces, and administration statements continue to be ambiguous on this point. Indeed, it is not reassuring that we do not already have a precise estimate of Bosnian requirements, even though for 3 years the administration has said that its policy aims at lifting the arms embargo.

This reservation implies that moving too quickly or openly to arm the Bosnians would be destabilizing, but I believe the opposite is true. To assure a stable Bosnia, to be able to withdraw our troops on schedule, we must be committed publicly and resolutely to a rapid program of equipping and training. Disarmament, of course, would be preferable, but to rely on successful arms reductions in this case seems dangerously naive. It was not the presence of arms, but rather the obvious imbalance between the two sides, that created the conditions for the ongoing Bosnian tragedy.

Fourth, we should be clear that although we need to be prepared for the possibility that the war will resume when we leave, or even, unfortunately, while we are there, our basic goal is peace. Maintaining peace over at least the short and medium term, and perhaps for a long time into the future, will be best secured on the one hand through deterrence of Serb aggression and on the other through the exercise of U.S. influence and leverage on the Bosnians. Our influence will be substantial if the Bosnians can depend on our support and cooperation. That is the way to maximize our influence in Bosnia while minimizing our direct entanglement.

We can put some distance between our peacekeeping forces and this imperative of arming and training, but we must not allow illusions about neutrality to prevent us from doing what I believe is essential to an exit strategy. In fact, pretending to neutral when we are not likely to be so regarded actually increases the danger to U.S. forces at a tactical level by making it more difficult for them to decide how to respond to provocations or ambiguous situations on the ground. It was this posture which resulted in the inadequate security precautions taken by U.S. Marines in Beirut. The safety of our forces will depend on our ability to protect themselves and to make it dangerous for anyone to attack them.

Hopefully, the administration will make clear publicly that arming and training is not only consistent with our role in the peacekeeping force, it is the key to an exit strategy for our troops. And the U.S. is determined to see that it gets done as rapidly as possible. Ambiguity on this point only invites subsequent accusations by the Serbs that we are violating a spirit of the agreement, or objections from our allies who have been opposed to this idea since the U.S. first proposed it. If we do not succeed in helping to put the Bosnian Government in a position to defend itself, the administration will find when it wants to withdraw our forces after a year or so that it cannot do so without triggering a catastrophe.

There is an opportunity here for the dialogue between the executive and legislative branches on this issue to put on the public record the kind of commitments from the administration that will help the administration to accomplish its declared objectives; that is, to safeguard our troops and secure their mission, including their safe and timely exit from the Balkans.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wolfowitz follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ, DEAN OF THE PAUL H. NITZE  
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this committee on the very important question of the implementation of the Bosnian peace accords. Congress is faced with a question of the utmost seriousness, involving the deployment of American military personnel into a situation of potential combat and involving some of the most vital American interests. The question is only made more difficult by the complexity of the issues and the length and complexity of the agreement itself. In this brief statement let me just emphasize a few of the most important points that I believe Congress should consider:

First, we do not start from a blank slate. The agreements have been negotiated and initialed. And, whatever one's ultimate judgment about this agreement, it must be said that the U.S. negotiators, and particularly Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, have displayed great skill and secured a far greater degree of agreement than was achieved in any of the previous negotiating efforts during the course of this long war. The agreement is a fact and so too is the fact that it is premised on the commitment of a powerful force of international peacekeepers, including a substantial force from the United States. The Congress can and should debate that commitment, but the question of whether it should have been made is different from the question of whether it now should be honored.

We must also recognize that we have already been involved in Bosnia for a long time. We are involved because our support for the arms embargo over the last 3 years has prevented the Bosnians from acquiring the means to defend themselves. Now we are involved further because we have persuaded the Bosnians to sign a peace agreement with their enemies based on American assurances and guarantees. The ability of small countries to rely on American commitments is a key to maintaining peace and deterring aggression in many critical situations around the world. America's reputation is not something that can be thrown away without serious consequences.

I have been opposed to the arms embargo since its inception, not simply because I believe that it is wrong for the United States to deny the victims of aggression the means to defend themselves. Equally important, I believed that if we refused to allow the Bosnians the means to protect themselves the international community would assume the responsibility of protecting them, and increasingly those protection forces would depend on American participation.

The point that we have arrived at today certainly seems to bear out that view. What Congress must do, in my view, is insure that the appropriate steps are taken so that the Bosnians can assume the responsibility for their own protection and relieve us of that burden as quickly as possible.

Second, the peace agreement is an extraordinarily complex document. It contains military elements, constitutional provisions, measures for an international police force, procedures for elections, arms control and confidence building measures, and provisions for the return of refugees, among others. It is a complex and elaborate construction of diplomacy and statecraft. Almost everyone with a bright idea for reconstructing collapsed states has been able to get it into the agreement somewhere. However, one can question whether many of these provisions have a realistic chance of being implemented in good faith by the parties involved.

The most important thing about this agreement is something very simple: it stops the killing, for now. But let us not enter this agreement with illusions. This peace agreement didn't end the deep enmity that led to this war or quench the desire for revenge that the war has unleashed. Perhaps, if all of the idealistic provisions are faithfully implemented by the parties over a long period of time they will eventually transform the situation into one of genuine peace. But until that time, neither arms control measures, nor constitutional provisions nor international police task forces will hold the continuing sense of enmity and grievance in check.

What can hold that enmity in check is an appropriate military balance between the potential aggressors and the potential victims of aggression. The reason for an imbalance is not because the Bosnians are outmanned but because they're outgunned. In fact, the Bosnian Government's troops have numerical superiority over their enemies, but—as a result of the embargo—they have remained inferior in equipment, especially heavy armor and artillery. When the Bosnian Government asked for relief in the embargo, the United Nations provided instead a blue-helmeted peacekeeping force that promised to protect designated "safe areas," such as Srebrenica, but proved tragically and horribly incapable of doing so.

Third, and perhaps most important, this suggests a way of looking at the IFOR in away that is constructive and that has a chance of working after our troops depart. Ultimately, the United States and NATO can't guarantee the reintegration of Bosnia but there is something useful that we can do, that would be of limited duration, that we are morally obliged to do and that could be of lasting value:

The goal of U.S. policy toward Bosnia should be Bosnian self-reliance. We should aim to make it possible for the Bosnian Government to defend its own country militarily. We must avoid creating a Bosnian dependency, which would keep us there forever. The Congress should oppose the deployment of U.S. forces to Bosnia unless the administration makes a clear and binding commitment to create, by arming and training Bosnian and Croatian force, a qualitative military balance between Bosnian-Croatian and Serb forces in former Yugoslavia.

United States participation in the Bosnia peacekeeping force makes sense only if the administration has a well-conceived plan to arm-and-train the Bosnian forces. It also depends on the administration's ability to implement that plan despite the pressures that are already evident from our European allies to rely instead on arms control and "confidence-building measures" that are yet to be negotiated. If the peacekeeping force is conceived as a means of keeping Bosnia weak and poorly armed and therefore doomed to remain a ward of NATO or the United States, Congress should oppose it. But if that force is intended to provide protection against aggression for the year or so during which the Bosnian Government will be allowed to move toward self-reliance in the defense field, then the strategic and moral case for U.S. participation should be easier for Americans to credit.

Unfortunately, the text signed at Dayton lacks any clear and binding commitments to equip and train the Bosnian forces and administration statements continue to be ambiguous on this point. Administration officials say that they have given private assurances to the Bosnians that the United States will see to it that this goal is achieved, but that commitment itself is hedged by a misplaced faith that arms control agreements might make it unnecessary to do so. In fact, the provision of any weapons will be delayed by 90 days and heavy weapons by 180 days, pending those negotiations. And U.S. statements make it clear that we will try to get others to do this job rather than see to it ourselves. (Nor is it reassuring that we do not already have a precise estimate of Bosnian requirements, even though for 3 years the Clinton administration has said that its policy aims at lifting the arms embargo.)

These limitations imply that moving too quickly or openly to arm the Bosnians would be destabilizing, but the opposite is true. To achieve a stable Bosnia and to be able to withdraw our troops on schedule, we must be committed, publicly and resolutely, to a rapid equip-and-train program. (Defensive systems not covered by the envisioned arms control regime, such as anti-tank missiles and counter-battery radars, are needed with particular urgency, given the precarious position of Sarajevo.) Disarmament would be preferable, of course; but to rely on successful arms reductions in this case would be dangerously naive. It was not the presence of arms but rather the obvious imbalance between the two sides that created the conditions for the ongoing Bosnian tragedy.

Fourth, this does not mean that our purpose is to arm the Bosnians so as to encourage the earliest possible resumption of the war. Although we need to be prepared for the possibility that the war will resume when we leave, or even while we are there, our basic goal is peace. That, and the importance of a quick and honorable exit for American troops, are the reason to equip and train the Bosnians.

In fact, the key to maintaining face over at least the short and medium term, and perhaps for a long time into the future, will be, on the one hand, through deterrence of Serb aggression and, on the other, through the exercise of U.S. influence and leverage on the Bosnians. That influence will be substantial if they can depend on our support and cooperation. This is the way to maximize our influence in Bosnia, while minimizing our entanglement.

It is important to see clearly the purpose of the peacekeeping force: It must uphold the peace agreement generally, but it is intended also to deter the Serbs from exploiting their current (temporary) advantage in armaments. It is not correct or constructive to talk of the peacekeepers as "neutral." In fact, pretending to be neutral when we are not likely to be so regarded actually increases the danger to U.S. forces at a tactical level, by making it more difficult for them to decide how to respond to provocations or ambiguous situations on the ground. It was this posture which resulted in the inadequate security precautions taken by U.S. marines in Beirut. The safety of our forces will depend on their ability to protect themselves and to make it dangerous for anyone to attack them.

Hopefully, the administration will make clear publicly that arming and training Bosnian Federation forces is not only consistent with our role in the peacekeeping force, it is the key to the "exit strategy" for our troops, and the United States is

determined to see that it gets done as rapidly as possible. The present ambiguities on this point only invite subsequent accusations by the Serbs that we are violating the "spirit" of the agreement and objections from our allies have been opposing this idea since the United States first proposed it. If we do not succeed in helping put the Bosnian Government in a position to defend itself, the administration will find, when it wants to withdraw our forces after a year or so, that it cannot do so without triggering a catastrophe.

There is an opportunity for the dialogue between the executive and legislative branches on this issue to put on the public record the kind of commitments from the administration regarding arm-and-train that will help the administration accomplish its declared purposes; to safeguard our troops and secure their mission (including their safe and timely exit from the Balkans) and increase the prospects for peace for Bosnia.

## The Argument Clinton Isn't Making on Bosnia

By PAUL WOLFOWITZ  
AND DOMINICK J. PERES

Having concluded its arrival of American "peacekeepers" for Bosnia with little analysis and even less consultation, the Clinton administration now contends that Congress has to responsible choices that to make. To be sure, if it repudiates the president's troop commitment, Congress would be blamed for bringing about resumption of the war, a collapse of American leadership in NATO and perhaps of the United States and a dangerous perception around the world of the U.S. becoming unbalanced and unreliable.


But even worse than not backing the president's commitment would be for Congress to approve minutely a forced policy that could fail disastrously. Congress has a duty to try to force the administration to define realistic goals for the mission. Americans remember Lebanon and Somalia, where we managed to lose both care and credibility. We remain dubious of the operative in Haiti, which may succeed in restoring democracy rather than democracy. If U.S. troops end their Bosnian mission without having achieved what they came to do, especially if they take significant casualties, the consequences will be grave by far.

### Little Guidance

The administration acknowledges the problem by stressing that U.S. troops will not be deployed unless there is a peace to enforce. But the rather feeble conditions for getting in gives little guidance for how and when to get out.

There is no compelling rationale for U.S. participation in the international peacekeeping force. Bosnia has been the victim of international aggression and of crimes against humanity that the Bosnian Serbs, supported by the Milosevic regime in Belgrade, have committed against thousands of thousands of predominantly Mus-

lim Bosnians. The U.S. and our European allies and others bear a large measure of responsibility for these horrors because we have established an international arms embargo on Bosnia. The Bosnian government's troops have numerical superiority over their enemies, but, as a result of the



embargo, they have remained inferior to equipment, especially heavy armor and artillery.

The goal of U.S. policy toward Bosnia should be Bosnian self-release. We should aim to make it possible for the Bosnian government to defend its own country militarily. Congress could oppose the deployment of U.S. forces to Bosnia unless the administration makes a clear and binding commitment to create, by arming and training Bosnian Federation forces, a qualitative military balance between Bosnian-Croatian and Serb forces in the former Yugoslavia.

If the peacekeeping force is conceived as a means of leaving Bosnia subject to un-

stable arms fluctuation schemes, and therefore doomed to remain a ward of NATO or the U.S., Congress should oppose it. But if peacekeepers are intended to deter aggression for the year or so needed for the Bosnian government to move toward self-reliance in the defense field, then the strategic and overall case for U.S. participation should be easier for Americans to credit.

Unfortunately, the Dayton Accords are clear commitments to equip and train the Bosnian forces. Administration statements are disturbingly ambiguous on this point. U.S. officials say they have assured the Bosnians that federation forces will be equipped and trained, but that assurance itself is belied by a misplaced faith that new arms control agreements might make it unnecessary. According to the accord, no weapons will be delivered for six days and no heavy weapons for the day, pending arms control talks. Also, U.S. statements make it clear that we will try to get others to do the equipping and training. It is not reassuring that we still lack a good estimate of Bosnian requirements, even though for three years the Clinton administration and that it acted to lift the arms embargo.

These limitations imply that moving quickly or openly to arm the Bosnians would be destabilizing, but the opposite is true. To ensure a stable Bosnia and to be able to withdraw our troops on schedule, we should announce publicly and immediately, in a rapid step-by-step program, (Deliveries systems not covered by the conventional arms control regime, such as anti-aircraft missiles and counter-battery radars, are needed with particular urgency, given the precarious position of Sarajevo).

The administration's hesitations accordingly, to reflect a belief that equipping and training Federation forces would be in-

consistent with a "neutral" role for American peacekeepers.

It is impossible, however, to see clearly the purpose of the peacekeeping force. It must uphold the peace agreement generally, but it is located almost to deter the Serbs from taking advantage of their current (temporary) advantage in armaments. It is not correct to construct in light of the peacekeepers as "neutral." They do not have to be neutral to perform their mission as more than police have to be neutral as between shopkeepers and robbers. If that, pretending to be neutral while one of the parties is regarded as actually increasing the danger to U.S. forces at a tactical level, by making it more difficult for them to decide how to respond to provocations or ambiguous situations on the ground. It was this posture that helped produce the inadequate security, particularly, taken by U.S. troops in Beirut. The best way to shore up the peace is through a policy that deters Bosnian aggression and secures Bosnian compliance through American support and cooperation.

### That Strategy

If the administration is in any way jobless and congressional skepticism about the troop deployment, it must make clear that among our training Bosnian Federation forces is not only consistent with our role in the peacekeeping forces, it is also the key to the "exit strategy" for our troops. If we are unable to help put the Bosnian government in a position to defend itself, the administration will find, when it wants to withdraw our forces after a year or so, that it cannot do so without triggering a catastrophe.

Mr. Wolfowitz served as undersecretary of defense in the Bush administration and Mr. Peres served as deputy assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration.

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much, Dr. Wolfowitz.

We are going to operate under a 5-minute rule, given the size of the turnout here.

Senator Byrd, did you have an opening statement you wanted to make?

Senator BYRD. No, thank you.

Senator NUNN. I will just put mine in the record, in the interest of time.

[The prepared statement of Senator Nunn follows:]

### PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I want to commend you for arranging this hearing.

This is the second hearing of the Armed Services Committee to consider the key question of whether Congress should support the participation of United States forces in a NATO-led operation to implement a peace agreement for Bosnia. At the first hearing, which was held on October 17, 1995, the Committee received testimony from Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretary of Defense William Perry, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili.



Since our first hearing, President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Hercegovina, President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, and President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia initialed a peace agreement after long and difficult negotiations under the auspices of the United States and the European Union and with the active participation of the representatives of the other members of the Contact Group—Russia, Germany, France, and Great Britain. Serbian President Milosevic was empowered to initial the agreement on behalf of the Serb Republic. I want to commend President Clinton for his leadership and Secretary Christopher, Assistant Secretary Holbrooke, General Clark and their team for helping to bring about a peace agreement.

I have noted the press reports that upon their return to Sarajevo, President Isetbegovic and Prime Minister Silajdzic received a heroes' welcome. By contrast, President Tudjman and President Milosevic returned home to criticism for giving up too much for a peace agreement. I also noted that the Bosnian Serb leadership were unhappy with the agreement.

I have been informed that there are remain three conditions which must be met before President Clinton is willing to commit NATO forces including forces to Bosnia.

First—all parties including the Bosnian Serbs must sign the peace accord in Paris and publicly pledge to carry out its terms. In the case of the Bosnian Serbs this commitment remains in doubt.

Second—the peace agreement specifies—and several in the Clinton administration have emphasized, that the foreign forces, including Mujahadeen forces, now present in Bosnia must leave the country within 30 days of the entry into force of the peace agreement. Since our present plans are to deploy large segments of the NATO forces within the first 30 days, it is not clear whether this is an absolute pre-condition. It is also not now clear whether the parties are fully committed to this step.

The third precondition is subjective but important: All the parties must take good faith steps toward compliance with the peace accords.

The United Nations Security Council adopted two resolutions on November 22, 1995 in furtherance of the Bosnia peace agreement. The first resolution would terminate the arms embargo on all the states of the former Yugoslavia upon the formal signing of the Peace Agreement but would keep the embargo in place for the first 90 days and would prohibit the importation of heavy weapons and ammunition for an additional 90 days. The U.N. Security Council's second resolution would suspend trade sanctions against Serbia upon signature of the Peace Agreement and against the Bosnian Serbs upon their withdrawal from the Zones of Separation but the sanctions would be reimposed automatically if either party fails to meet their obligations under the Peace Agreement.

The ending of the arms embargo has been a goal of many in the Congress for several years. This directly impacts NATO's exit strategy especially since it appears to be time based.

There is no doubt that it will be difficult to leave Bosnia unless there is a balance of forces. At this stage the Bosnia-Croatian alliance has taken back considerable territory, but there has been no actual recent assessment of the balance of power.

The Administration makes it clear that they will first make every effort to get the parties to build down to a balance. If this fail—we appear to have made a moral commitment to train and arm the Bosnian Government. Our military leaders believe this undertaking by the American military would be incompatible with protecting U.S. forces in their peacekeeping mission. Our allies have their own views.

It is not clear whether we will call on third countries to undertake this mission instead of the United States. This question is too important to our exit strategy and to the safety of U.S. forces on the ground to leave open ended. We must seek clarity on this.

I agree with those who have stated that President Clinton has the responsibility to explain to the American people and to Congress why U.S. forces so participate. I believe that the President's speech to the Nation last night made a good start on that process.

I believe that we should approach this issue with an open mind and believe that we must be sure that we ask the right questions.

I want to extend a warm welcome to our witnesses, former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, former Secretary of everything worthwhile James Schlesinger, and former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz.

I look forward to hearing the statements of our witnesses and to having the opportunity to pose questions to them.

Senator COHEN. Well, let me begin.

Gentlemen, let me say after listening to all of you it seems to me that we find ourselves in the position that we may very well regret

a decision not to support the President, and will probably rue the day that we did, especially listening to you, General Scowcroft. Listening to the questions you have asked, it leads me to that conclusion. On the one hand, it is a mistake, if I listen to you, Dr. Schlesinger, a mistake to have committed our prestige, to have laid it on the line, but now we have no choice but to honor the error.

But the question, it seems to me, remains. At what point does the error become dishonorable and no longer supportable? If there is a threat that NATO would become unraveled if we do not follow through and support the President's commitment, what is going to be the fate of NATO if we retreat when the mission proves to be impossible, if we leave, Secretary Schlesinger, when we are mired in the mud and the blood? At that point, what will the reputation of the United States be with NATO and our allies and the rest of the world? I think we also have to look at that potential impact upon our allies and their assessment of our credibility.

There are many opinions about what we should do, now that the President has made the commitment. I listened to Secretary Kissinger last evening, and he indicated that our role should be to simply separate the warring parties to maintain that line of truce or peace for the year that we have committed ourselves to be there, that we should not engage in nation-building.

I also listened to Senator Nunn this morning, and he seemed to indicate that he thought it would be a mistake to support efforts of building down Serbian arsenals or building up those of the Bosnian Muslims, because that would, in fact, destroy the perception of our neutrality. And Dr. Wolfowitz has indicated here this morning that we need to arm the Bosnians in order to maintain military parity.

Another point that comes to mind is that we seem, in this agreement, to be using fig leaves to cover some rather naked ambiguities. The fact is that we are securing the petitioning of a country, and we are putting the American troops in the middle of that partition. I looked fairly closely at the Army's Field Manual 100-23 called Peace Operations, and I found some interesting paragraphs in there: A clearly defined and obtainable objective with a precise understanding of what constitutes success is critical when the United States is involved in peace operations, and I will not repeat all of the various references and permutations of that basic doctrine. But essentially it is saying we must know the end-state in the beginning. That is critical to any kind of peace operation.

Secretary Christopher's Dayton statements suggest that the desired end-state, and I am quoting here, is assuring the continuity of the single state of Bosnia-Herzegovina with effective federal institutions and full respect by its neighbors for its sovereignty. But Bosnia has never been a genuine single state. Bosnia has never known effective federal institutions. Bosnia has never been respected by its neighbors. And so it seems to me the desired end state appears to be the creation of a viable country out of the ashes of a failed country, a nation-building task under very unfavorable circumstances, at best.

Also, the question of the termination, the concept for termination and transition seems to be limited to getting U.S. troops out within a year, although most people think the timetable is unrealistic. The

President of France has said NATO troops will be in Bosnia for 20 years. The former UN Commander there says it will be a generation before NATO can leave. And so I think that we have to really try to define this.

General SCOWCROFT, you listed a series of questions that Congress now has an opportunity and a role to shape and limit and define. But as a practical matter, assuming we do all of that and assuming we put all the resolutions and reservations of limiting the scope and the time frame and so forth, how does one enforce that once the firing starts, once we get mired down in the mud, and once people start dying? How do we enforce what we think are the rules of engagement and what we think are the demarcation lines? How do we do that once they are over there and fighting erupts?

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Those are the questions we ought to try to answer in advance. And there will be many which cannot be answered satisfactorily. I think the possibility for significant reverses, if not disaster, is fairly high. But I think it is absolutely certain if we turn our backs now. There is no question about the catastrophe which would result there. And what I am saying is that we need to look at all these questions, we need to put the best minds in the government to answering them, and answering in a way which we can fulfill, and in a way which will reduce the risks as far as they can humanly be reduced. They will remain high.

Senator COHEN. Can we arm the Muslims and still keep the peace? Can we achieve a military parity, as such, and still be perceived as neutral peacekeepers? And can we, in fact, keep President Clinton's commitment to bring to justice the war criminals, Karadzic, Milosevic, and be seen as neutral peacekeepers under these circumstances? And I ask that of any of the witnesses.

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I have great sympathy with Dr. Wolfowitz's position on arming the Bosnians. I think it will be an extremely difficult task to do. What we are doing is changing the balance on the ground while we are trying to keep the peace.

The Bosnians have suffered grievously, but part of their lack of access to arms has not been the embargo. It has been that all the arms have had to go through Croatia, which has taken a substantial cut of all of them. The Croatians were able to rearm quite handily.

Second, in answer to your question, I have grave doubts whether the Bosnians can ever be rearmed to defend themselves against Serbia if Milosevic decides otherwise. The Yugoslav Army is still largely intact, and it is a very capable army. I doubt that the Bosnians can be brought to that stage. And not all countries are able to defend themselves against their neighbors. I think that one we will find very difficult to do.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Let me say on this, first of all, the goal is not parity, certainly not with the Serbs. And Brent is right, it would be impossible to establish parity between Bosnia and Serbia. In fact, under this agreement there are provisions that, if you work out the ratios, amount to a ratio of five for Serbia and I believe it is one and a third for the Bosnian Federation combined. The goal is to get, I think, enough balance within Bosnia that at least Milosevic is the man in charge, and that we do not have the spectacle that we have had for the last 2-1/2 years of the Bosnian Serbs

shelling Sarajevo with impunity and pushing forward and taking large chunks of the country that are not theirs.

I would also emphasize that I think, as Secretary Schlesinger has said, this agreement injects a note of realism. We may not like partition, we may say this is not partition, but at least we have some lines that put some limits on the parties. We are not arming the Bosnians to restore the boundaries of old Bosnia, but we, I think, have got to give them a capability to defend themselves or we will not be able to leave.

That does not mean that the implementation force that goes there with a different mission are the people in charge of doing it. But I think we have got to make it absolutely clear that we are going to see that it gets done, if not by other people at least by ourselves, but that it has to get done so that we can get out, and it has to get done quickly so that we can get out within a reasonable period of time.

The longer we are there, the much greater the chance of the disasters that have been described.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Senator, the first point in response to your general query, it is probably well-advised for a nation to ensure that it has the proper political base before it makes a commitment. In this case we have made the commitment before we have the political base. Nonetheless, we stand with some possibility, some significant possibility, of success in Bosnia if we are steadfast as against a clear 100 percent certainty that our international position will be badly ruined if we do not go in.

The second point: Assuring the continuity of Bosnia is probably beyond our capacity and beyond anybody's capacity.

Senator COHEN. That is the statement of Secretary Christopher as what our mission is, however.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Yes.

A third point with regard to the embargo: As General Scowcroft has indicated, the embargo has been quite leaky, indeed. The embargo imposed by the United Nations has existed more in name than in fact. The real embargo has been the Croats do not want heavy weapons given to the Bosnians because they anticipate the possibility of being engaged themselves with the Bosnians. It points, I think, to the truly fragile nature of the Federation we have sponsored.

And the fourth point on Milosevic: It is by no means certain that Milosevic will be in a position to deliver the Bosnian Serbs. I believe that was hinted at by Dr. Wolfowitz. One must remember that in 1941 the Germans thought that they had achieved what they wanted by getting the Regent, Prince Paul, to agree to a German occupation of Yugoslavia. Because he went well beyond what Serb opinion would accept, he was overthrown, and the Germans were obliged to invade. So relying on assurances seems to me to be something rather dubious in these circumstances.

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much.

Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I agree with many of the paradoxes you stated. I do not think you accurately stated my position, though, at all. In fact, I agree with part of what Mr. Wolfowitz has said, that there

ought to be some equilibrium in Bosnia. I have real doubts about whether you can bring equilibrium between Serbia and Bosnia, as well as Croatia.

But I also said just the opposite of what you stated. I said that the build-down was the administration's first strategy, before they tried to build up. The real dilemma we face is what happens if build-down does not work, and there is no equilibrium there, and then we get into where I disagree with Dr. Wolfowitz, and that is that the United States should try to play a peacekeeping role there on the ground while we are also arming and training one of the sides.

I draw different lessons from Lebanon. In fact, I think the Lebanon experience of the United States was the fact that we were perceived as not being neutral, and that is why we were in that kind of dilemma, and I see Brent Scowcroft and Dr. Schlesinger agreeing, I believe, with that statement.

So I think our dilemma here is how do we go into this situation with a goal of equilibrium, but avoid the tremendous risk to our own forces on the ground if we are perceived to be going in as a party that is engaged on behalf of one of the three sides. I think that exposes our military people on the ground to a tremendous risk, additional risk beyond what they would already face.

I also think that if this mission is going to be undertaken that we should at least explore in these hearings and in this debate as to whether some other countries, failing—if we have no build-down, whether some other countries friendly to the Bosnian Government might undertake this mission, and that is where I fundamentally disagree with Dr. Wolfowitz. I just wanted to clarify that.

But I did want to pursue this question of exit strategy and equilibrium some more, because I do think, again agreeing with Dr. Wolfowitz, that that is the key to an exit strategy. We are not going to be able to pull out of there if there is a great disparity of forces. But we start with the proposition we do not have an accurate assessment. The Bosnian Government, as well as the Croatian Government in the unity of the Federation, such that it exists at this point, were able to recapture a very large hunk of territory recently. So what is the balance of power there now, and what is the equilibrium that we are seeking? Those are crucial questions, and I would just invite Brent Scowcroft or Jim Schlesinger to comment on whether some other country, like Turkey or like Jordan or like Malaysia, would be appropriate to undertake this kind of equilibrium, if that indeed becomes essential for an exit strategy.

MR. SCOWCROFT. Senator, I think that crucial to an answer to your very good question is the position of President Milosevic. I think he holds the key to a lot of what is happening here. In bringing about the President's ceasefire, there is no question that U.S. bombing had an effect. But it was also Milosevic's decision, for whatever reason, not to continue to aid and support the Bosnian Serbs, which allowed the Croatia Bosnian forces to take back so much territory.

Now, maybe Milosevic has had a great Christian conversion, I do not know. But if he decides that the present arrangement is satisfactory to him, and he does not provide further assistance in harming to the Bosnian Serbs, indeed tries to curb them, then there is

a chance that it might work. And then the question about equilibrium may not really arise again.

Senator NUNN. Could I ask you this question: Would you go in with the goal, at this point, of both having U.S. forces as part of NATO peacekeeping and also with the goal of U.S. undertaking the arming and training of the Bosnian Government?

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I believe, Senator, that that subjects our troops to additional risks, and I believe it is—first of all, I do not think it will work. Second, as I say, it exposes our troops to additional risks.

Senator NUNN. Dr. Schlesinger, could you answer that same question?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Well, I agree with General Scowcroft. You cannot overload the mission, and we cannot simultaneously do things that appear to be contradictory. With regard to one of the questions that you raised, Senator, I think that only the United States has the authority and the prestige to overcome Croatian resistance to allowing heavy weapons to go into Bosnia. So that is one role that if we are to achieve equilibrium, it would be essential for the United States to perform.

Senator NUNN. Let me shift to another area. We all act as if this is inevitable, that the President is going to send forces and the Congress is going to have to come to a conclusion between two very difficult choices, but the President, I believe, I am told that the position of the administration right now is that there still remain a couple of preconditions, rather important ones, before the President himself would ask that the forces go in. Number one, all parties, including the Bosnian Serbs, must sign the peace accord in Paris, and I am told they must publicly pledge to carry out his terms.

At this case, at this point in time, that has not occurred. In fact, there are some indications that the Bosnian leadership as it now exists is taking a different position on it, and asking, and in fact demanding, that the agreement be changed. So let me ask this question: If, indeed, the Bosnian Serbs do not sign the agreement, or when signing the agreement come away and make public statements indicating they do not intend to carry it out, at that stage do you think it is time for NATO, and indeed the United States, to reconsider whether we go in? Or have we passed that point?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Well, I think that the administration has indicated that we would be obliged to reconsider at that point. Secretary Perry has indicated that unless the Bosnian Serbs sign up that the mission is off, we are not going in.

Senator NUNN. The other condition, as I understand it, is that the foreign troops that are now in Bosnia must leave, including the Mujahedin forces which include forces from Iran, I am told, an also from Afghanistan. Now, if that is not undertaken, and the dilemma there is they have 30 days to accomplish that and we seem to be embarked on moving in before 30 days, but if indeed that condition is not undertaken, would you at that stage reconsider the commitment?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. I do not think that we can go back on the President's commitment—contingent commitment—for what appeared to others to be trivial reasons. That would undermine the prestige of the United States.

Senator NUNN. This is in the agreement. This is an undertaking the parties have undertaken in the written agreement.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. The fact that the Bosnian Serbs failed to honor the agreement or failed to sign the agreement is a powerful reason. What you mention now is more or less of a footnote in the agreement, and I do not think that we are going to carry our allies with us as reliable partners if we say everything else is in place, but there are some Iranians there and we cannot go in because of a few Iranians. I do not think that that is credible to them.

Senator NUNN. Could I get the other two witnesses to just answer those two questions? And my time has expired. Just the question about the preconditions on us going in.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Well, I think it is absolutely clear, we have made it clear, that we are not going in unless that first precondition is met. I think in fact we would be undermining our own credibility if we then went ahead and ignored that. But I agree with Secretary Schlesinger that you cannot then pull out for relatively insignificant reasons.

If I might, Senator, for just a moment on our point earlier, I do not know how sharp our disagreement is. I am not suggesting that the U.S. peacekeepers should be involved in arming and training. I do think the United States has to see that it gets done. One reason is, in fact, not to have lots of Mujahedin and Iranians running around. But most importantly because I believe the longer we stay there the greater the risk to our troops.

I understand that if we appear not to be neutral it is the greater the risk to our troops. But let us face it, we do not appear to be neutral going in. The Serbs who want Sarajevo back are not going to see us as neutral when we stop them. If we have to take enforcement actions we are not going to be seen as neutral. The goal for protecting our troops is not going to be a false appearance of neutrality, it is going to be their ability to take protective measures, their ability to be dangerous to tangle with.

In Beirut we had the Marines who thought they were neutral who took no security precautions whatsoever. You have to decide one or the other. But I think it is a mistake if we go in thinking that the parties regard us as neutral. They do not, and they will not as we get involved there.

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I agree with my two colleagues on the answer to both your questions.

Chairman THURMOND [presiding]. Dr. Schlesinger, Dr. Wolfowitz, and Dr. Scowcroft, I ask that each of you respond to this question. Did the administration consult with you at any time during the peace negotiations or about NATO's plans to deploy U.S. military forces on the ground in Bosnia to enforce the peace agreement?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. No, sir.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. No, sir.

Mr. SCOWCROFT. No.

Chairman THURMOND. I have a question for all of you, again. Do you believe that the Presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia are in a position to implement the peace agreement within their Republics and ensure the safety of the NATO military forces?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Sir, there is some question about whether Mr. Milosevic is in that position. There is, I think, some question about

whether President Tadjman has the long-term intent of abiding by the agreement.

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I believe that if the three try hard they can do a reasonably acceptable job, but I do not trust any of them.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I agree with that, Senator.

Chairman THURMOND. General Scowcroft, settlement, not victory, is the ultimate measure of success in peace operations. However, settlement is rarely achievable through military efforts alone, and it is not clear that the administration has a real plan for achieving a settlement in Bosnia beyond simply deploying U.S. troops to enforce the agreement signed in Ohio. Do you believe the administration has thought through how it will reach a lasting settlement and put in place a mechanism to achieve a settlement?

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure. One of the causes for unease, I think, for all of us is that peacekeeping, as it is traditionally known, usually takes place after a conflict has been resolved to the relative satisfaction of the combatants. They all want a peacekeeping force in there, and it is just the presence of the peacekeepers which is sufficient to give a sense of stability to the situation. That is clearly not the case here. And that raises all kinds of questions.

The objectives, the mission, of this deployment, while the President said it is clear, has not been defined. I suspect there is a certain element of hope that within a year the three parties will get accustomed to the situation as it is, and will be prepared to continue it as the alternatives, all of them, look perhaps worse. But I think that is a hope rather than an accurate estimation.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Our hope, Mr. Chairman, would be a continued ceasefire. That is the best that we can obtain. We should not aspire realistically to a long-term settlement. I do not criticize the administration for failing to have a plan to achieve a settlement, given the history of the Balkans. If one looks at the study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace after the Balkan Wars of 1911 and 1912, it reads just as if it were written yesterday, with regard to the rivalries amongst these ethnic groups. So the administration is forced to play it by ear, and there is no settlement, no permanent settlement, that they can aspire to.

Chairman THURMOND. Dr. Wolfowitz, do you care to comment on that?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I agree with it. I think in fact I find it a little troubling that there is so much in the agreement that suggests a settlement that depends on good faith, and I think that is one thing you cannot depend upon in this setting. And on the one hand there are things in there that are fine aspirations like the return of refugees, but I think it is very unlikely to happen on any significant scale, and I hope that people do not later say the failure to implement all of those detailed provisions is a cause for tearing at the main achievement, which is a ceasefire. A ceasefire is the best we can do. We will be doing very well if we do that.

Chairman THURMOND. Secretary Schlesinger, commanders at all levels must have a common understanding of the end state and the conditions that constitute success prior to initiating operations. However, although the President appears ready to order troops into the former Yugoslavia, neither the end state nor the conditions



that constitute success appears to be clearly defined. Given the broad goals outlined by the President, what guidance do you infer could be issued to commanders to focus their efforts toward achieving the end state and the conditions that constitute success?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Well, Mr. Chairman, that is a very difficult issue, and I commend to all members of the committee an article in a recent *Foreign Affairs* by our former Deputy Commander in Europe, General Boyd. General Boyd says the first thing that we must have, if we are to go in, is a degree of honesty with regard to the relationships amongst the parties in contention. Here, 5000 miles away, we have taken the view that the Muslims are only victims and that the Serbs are only aggressors. Out there in the field it is much grayer.

The forces of the alliance have been used regularly as shields, and we must avoid allowing our forces to become shields, and we must avoid not seeing the realities on the ground which of the parties is engaged in breaking that ceasefire. If we fail to do that, as we have in the past, we will tend, when either the Croats or the Muslims break the ceasefire, to blame it on the Serbs. So I think that those are the major requirements. Also I fear our commanders in the field may not have a pristine and clear view as to what their mission may be.

Chairman THURMOND. My time is up here.

[Whereupon, the committee recessed to act on another matter, to reconvene immediately thereafter.]

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Levin.

#### STATEMENT OF HON. CARL LEVIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, let me thank you witnesses for their very thoughtful contribution to what, to me at least, is one of the most—if not the most troubling and complex risk assessments that I have ever been confronted with. The risks of going in are very clear, the risk of significant casualties being first and foremost among them. The risks of not going in are also real—you helped us see that. Some of the risks would be the widening of that war into a more dangerous war; continued ethnic cleansing, great numbers of refugees, with the problems they create; humanitarian catastrophe, not just in Bosnia but also in Croatia and Serbia, potentially in Slovenia, Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, even possibly Greece and Turkey. That risk of widening war could be felt beyond the region, as well.

For instance, right now Russia is willing to participate with the United States and with our NATO allies together in peace implementation in Bosnia. That would be historic cooperation with some long-term benefits for European security. If the peace breaks down in Bosnia, and the war widens, NATO could be weakened and fractured, and the U.S. and Russia could be pulled to opposite sides in a Europe newly divided. Hardliners in Russia would balk at working with the U.S., insist on backing the Serbs, and the most hardline nationalists in Russia could be advanced by the breakdown of this peace and the failure of us to support NATO in this effort.

That is a very significant risk factor of not going in, at least in my calculation, because in addition to the region becoming inflamed again, a widened war could result in a Russia more threatening to Europe and to U.S. interests precisely while NATO would be fractured and less able to deal with a newly threatening Russia. There has not been a lot of emphasis on that factor, but I do think it has to be placed in the calculus. Would you agree with that, Secretary Schlesinger, or any of you?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Senator, I think you go to a very important point. Our relations with Russia transcend the national security implications of anything that happens in Bosnia, and you are quite right that we have cooperation and we should do what we can to sustain and maintain that cooperation.

One point, though. The Russians are emotionally tied to the Serbs. If we are engaged in arming and training the Muslims, that will, in itself, cause tensions between ourselves and the Russians.

Senator LEVIN. That is one piece of the agreement.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Do you agree generally, though, with what I said, General?

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Yes, I do. I would add one other point. I think it is in a way fortunate that the Russian participation will be relatively small, I gather 1000 to 2000 troops, because as Jim Schlesinger said, the Russians are emotionally committed to the Bosnian Serbs. If we plan to get out in a year and the Russians had a significant force there, they could well say no, we think we will stay, and thus we would have achieved something we have been trying since 1948 to prevent; that is, Russian forces in the Balkans.

Senator LEVIN. In terms of the risk of not going in, however, and the thing falling apart, would you agree that one of the impacts could be, as I described, that it would hurt very much our hopes to increase Russian participation in European security, and we would fracture NATO at a very moment when we might be contributing, if this peace falls apart, to a more threatening Russia?

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I think that would be a distinct possibility. The Russians already think we have not dealt squarely with them with respect to Bosnia down the line, and now to have brought them this far and then walk away, absolutely.

Senator LEVIN. There is one thing which we have all touched upon so far, and you have touched upon, and I want to spend the last few minutes I have in asking you about that, and that is the question about having a mission which is clear and achievable. You have all said, I think, that the mission so far is not clear to you, and at least one of you has said that as described it is probably not achievable in terms of the nation-building aspect that Secretary Christopher described.

Yet when you three weigh the risk and look at the facts, the decision has been made, we now should carry out that decision, you have all concluded that we should now move in, if in fact this peace accord is signed and the parties comply with it, so we are not fighting our way in. But that means, it seems to me, that in your minds at least, there is a mission which is clear and definable, which you

feel comfortable with, or else I do not think you would recommend that we go in.

Whatever the reasons are for concluding that we go in, you have now concluded we should participate. And so I would ask you to help define this mission. Secretary Schlesinger was asked that question, I think, and he read from one report on it. But I do not think that it went far enough in terms of helping to define a military mission which is clear enough so that we can know what exactly that mission is, and we would know when we can leave having succeeded in achieving that mission.

Let me start perhaps with Secretary Wolfowitz.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think in various things that—well, let me say I think that we have talked about the elements here this morning. I think the mission is to achieve a stable ceasefire based on an appropriate balance between the parties and based on the negotiated lines of partition which are hard lines of partition. I think that is a realistic, achievable objective, and one that would allow us to depart with our credibility and our reputation intact, and I think leaving a situation that has a much greater chance of enduring.

I agree with you, I think, on the more general point, in fact, that if this war continues, given particularly the passions in Russia but also passions in the West, the danger at some point of it leading to a very dangerous involvement between us I think is very great. There is no question we have an interest in stability and peace there if we can achieve it. What we do not want to do is go in and try to do the impossible and guarantee failure.

Senator LEVIN. Secretary Schlesinger, would you take another crack at the sustainable mission, which is clear enough, since you have concluded we should go in for whatever reasons?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Well, let me deal with the latter half of what you have said, which was not only about clarity, but whether it was achievable. We do not know whether it is achievable. Only time will tell. It is in the lap of the Gods. We have become committed. We must do our best. But whether or not we will be successful, only time will tell.

With regard to the clarity of the mission, I think that we would do well to simply abide by what Secretary Kissinger observed the other evening, which was that keeping the warring parties separate and hoping that the immediate passions cool and that they drift down only to their historical resentments would be achievement enough.

A problem with visibly siding with the Bosnian Government, which is now a one-party government, is that we will have great trouble, not only with our Russian associates, but with our allies as well. And, therefore, if we push too far in that direction, it seems to me that we are endangering the mission.

Senator LEVIN. General Scowcroft, could you define a clear mission that you believe is either achievable or at least clear that is in your mind justifiable?

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I am in general agreement with my colleagues. I think the irreducible minimum is that we, by going in, extend the cease-fire, say, for a year, and that we go in and we say we are going to keep you guys apart for a year. And we hope, in that year, that you can learn to live with each other. After that year, we are

out. Unfortunate if you cannot live with yourselves, but we have done our best. We cannot do any more. We cannot solve your problem for you.

That is not a very satisfying one, and it departs significantly from the aura of the President's remarks last night. But I think that is kind of an irreducible minimum.

Senator LEVIN. My time is up. Thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator, your time is up.

Senator Kempthorne.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Chairman THURMOND. Let me make this statement. Some of us are continuing after you get a slip that your time is up. We cannot reach everybody unless we stop promptly when you get a slip indicating that your time is up. If necessary, I will have to call order. And I do not want to do that unless I have to.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator McCain, I believe you are next.

Senator MCCAIN. I believe I am next.

Chairman THURMOND. Is that correct? I had Kempthorne down here; who came in first?

Senator MCCAIN. I was here at the beginning.

Chairman THURMOND. Go ahead, Senator McCain.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Well, I would just note for the record I was here also, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]

Senator MCCAIN. Since I sit here and you sit there, then I will go ahead. [Laughter.]

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, it is a very difficult issue. I appreciate very much the input and the recommendations of the three witnesses, whose views I of course value enormously. And it makes it a very difficult decision for all of us and all Americans to make.

I believe that your concerns are boiled down to mine, and they evolve basically around two fundamental problems. One is the lack of an exit strategy. And the other, of course, is so far anyway, I do not believe that the majority of the American people are convinced that our vital national security interests are threatened.

Now, as far as the mission being clear, as the President said last night, I do not believe that the mission is clear by any stretch of the imagination. I was somewhat bemused when he said that we would fight fire with fire. That is very easy to do when you know where the fire is coming from and who started it. It is very difficult to do, as we found out in other conflicts, unless we are sure who the aggressors are.

I believe we will be out of there in a year, and I believe we will be out of there in a year for the wrong reasons. And that is the fact that there is an election in November of 1996.

And if that is true, then I believe that the only chance for a lasting peace or a lasting cease-fire, as Secretary Schlesinger put it, is equilibrium on the battlefield. And if the Bosnians are in such a weak position that they are unable to defend themselves upon our departure or some time after that, then I see no hope for their continued survival as a sovereign nation or even as an entity.

As far as our being perceived as taking sides, if we arm or help arm the Bosnians, I think that notion of neutrality was dispelled

when we began our bombing of the Bosnian Serbs and the installations that were connected directly to Serbia itself. And I would hope that we could make a viable, a critical part of whatever we agree to and when we leave as part of our exit strategy, an ability of the Bosnians to defend themselves absent the assistance or what I view as a temporary alliance that they have with the Croats.

I would ask the witness, starting with General Scowcroft, do you believe that there is any viability to this theory of a build-down in that part of the world?

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I do not know how you get it to happen, Senator. I think it is very unlikely. It is my understanding, for example, that the external borders of Bosnia are not going to be policed. That means anybody can send equipment in, both to the Croats and to the Serbs in Bosnia. It is a little harder to do it to the Bosnians themselves, because they are surrounded by Serb and Croats. But I think a build-down is not likely.

Senator MCCAIN. So then the option is to, if you accept the theory of a requirement or absolute necessity of equilibrium on the battlefield as being the best insurance for a lasting cease-fire, then it seems to me one of our goals should be to make sure that the Bosnians are adequately equipped.

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Well, Senator, I really believe we are in a point where we are almost going to have to rely on President Milosevic. If he has not changed his stripes, if he is just waiting, and if you look at the fine print on Eastern Slavonia, he can stay there for two more years. If he has not changed his notions, then we cannot rearm the Bosnians to withstand Milosevic.

If he is happy with what he is and is prepared to enforce it, then I do not think you have to worry about that kind of balance.

Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Schlesinger.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Senator, accepting your vision, which is that there must be equipment equal in strength on the Bosnian side—

Senator MCCAIN. Not necessarily equal in strength.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. But more or less equal.

Senator MCCAIN. But exact a significant price for further aggression.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. I think that the principal obligation of the United States will be to persuade or force the Croats to open up the lines of communication so that the equipment can flow through. At the present time, there are many, as well as ourselves, who are prepared to provide that equipment. It cannot go through because the Croats do not want to see the Bosnians heavily armed.

Senator MCCAIN. However, with a stable situation, obviously we could get the weapons in much more easily.

My time is expired. Dr. Wolfowitz, would you respond? My time is expired.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think build-down is unrealistic. And I am afraid that if we wait too long for some negotiation to prove that it is unrealistic, we simply delay the time to do what we can to produce an equilibrium. And the goal is equilibrium. It is not parity. It is not some abstract arms control notion. I think there are many ways of doing it if one recognizes the goal is the ability to defend territory, not the ability to seize territory.

There is a lot that you could do, for example, with antitank weaponry, which we have readily available and which people can be easily trained on. I think the fact that there are problems like getting through the Croats means I think is a reason why the United States, at least as a country, as a government, has got to be involved in solving the problem. It is fine if we can get the Turks to do more. It is fine if we can get other people to do more. But it is not going to get done unless we push it.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. One additional observation on Dr. Wolfowitz's. Of course, antitank weapons can be flown in; tanks cannot readily be flown in.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I think that I too want to join in thanking our panelists. They have had long and distinguished careers in national security issues, and I think they are really of great help and assistance to us today.

I think it is also useful—I know that some do not want to do it—to give the President some degree of credit for getting into a situation, which just offended so many millions of Americans and I think people all over the world, of the horrific kinds of conditions that all of us saw on television and read about, just deplorable. The worst human tragedies, obviously, since the end of World War II.

I think the idea is that at least there is a pause in that killing. The cease-fire, as defined by some, is certainly progress. And the efforts that were made with these individuals to try and bring them together so at least the possibilities of moving towards some kind of either cease-fire or towards peace have been enhanced immeasurably. And I thought the President made a strong statement last evening.

I would like to just give the statements that many of you have made of where we are, though, today—you used phrases like the possibility of disaster is high; you cannot guarantee that we will not have failure; we do not know if it is achievable; we do not know if it is successful; we have dangers of knowing who the real enemies are in that area; difficulties in terms of our allies.

Could you just comment a little bit about what you see would happen if this falls apart, if the United States was not involved? Do any of you have any doubt that there would be a resumption of the fighting and the kinds of human tragedies that we saw prior to the time of the cease-fire? Do any of you have any question in your mind that we would go back to that period?

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I think the fighting would be likely to resume in some fashion.

Senator KENNEDY. Dr. Schlesinger?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. That is right.

Senator KENNEDY. I think you all would agree with that.

Do you think that there is the real possibility of expansion of that fighting that would go down into the Balkans, into Kosovo, and involve a broader conflict? What are the chances that there would be a broader conflict than just the existing parties? How realistic is that? Is that realistic or unrealistic? What kind of assessment would you give on that, General Scowcroft?

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I would say it is rather less likely in the short run now than it was maybe a year or two ago. It is always a potential problem. Kosovo and Macedonia are both disasters waiting to happen. My guess is that nothing would take place there for some time, however.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. I think that is right. There are always predictions that the dominoes must fall. I think in this case the likelihood of dominoes falling is modest.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, can you track for us then, if you would, if for some reason that there is not the signing in Paris or some reason that there would not be support for the President's position and rejection, what you see happening in that region for any period of the future? I think we have heard very clearly what the dangers are—and I do not think anyone should underestimate it, and I think it has been done in a very, very effective way. What we are trying to look at is at the other side of this conflict to see what we could anticipate and what the complexities would be, what the real dangers would be, both in terms of that particular region and also in terms of the United States and NATO.

Could you take a crack at that? And I think my time will probably be up at the end of it. If each of you could comment on that.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Senator, let me start by saying I give the President high marks for courage in this case. So let me join you in that commendation. This is a no-win situation for him, as I think all of us will recognize.

Senator KENNEDY. I appreciate your saying that, because some are very glib about just talking about the elections and why this is going to be helpful to him in reelections and all the rest. I do not think that there is anybody out there that is listening to this that believe that that is the case. They should not. Thank you.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. What will likely happen, in my judgment is that what President Tudjman drew on a napkin in a London restaurant a year or so ago would take place—that Bosnia would be divided between Croatia and Serbia. And that we would see, if not a greater Serbia, we would see a larger Serbia, and we would also, if not see a new greater Croatia, we would see a larger Croatia. And I think that Bosnia, which does not have historical relevance as an independent state, would go back to what it was in history, which was a province of some other country.

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I think it is hazardous to predict exactly what would happen, but I think the ultimate outcome would be what Dr. Schlesinger suggests. Indeed, I think that is probably the likely outcome down the road, almost whatever happens.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Kempthorne.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Let me first state my utmost respect for the three gentlemen before us today.

General Scowcroft, you stated in your comments that not all parties are through fighting. And, Secretary Schlesinger, you said that there are substantial risks. Secretary Wolfowitz, you said that the agreement did not quench the desire for revenge.

During this Thanksgiving recess, I was in the grocery store and found that those people waiting at the checkout lines, that they were focused on this week's Time Magazine. It was causing a great

deal of discussion. This is that magazine. And on it you have a picture of a young American soldier with a question. And the question is: "Is Bosnia worth dying for?"

So I would like to ask each of you gentlemen if you would respond to that question. Is Bosnia worth dying for?

General Scowcroft?

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I do not think that is any longer the basic question. I think we have outlined the basic question now. I would have answered that question no, and I think that the U.S. posture throughout the earlier years of this war indicated that administrations from both parties would have answered that no. That is not the issue now. The issue now is the role of the United States in the world and the ability of those who depend on us.

We are the only country in the world who can have an independent policy. All the others have to set their sails to the wind that blows from the United States. If that wind is inconstant, if no one can rely on the United States, we will have a terrible world. And that is the issue that we are confronting right now.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Mr. Secretary?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. I find it hard to improve on General Scowcroft's answer. No, Bosnia is not inherently in the national interest, but we have transcended that. And the international position of the United States, the world's leading power, is now at risk. Therefore, despite the questions that Senator Cohen so well put about the possible outcomes, that we must go in.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Secretary Wolfowitz?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I agree with what has been said. And I would just elaborate by saying when one talks about the prestige of the United States, we are not talking about the image of a football team. We are talking about our ability to prevent much bigger wars. Americans did not die for Kuwait. What Americans went in and died for was to prevent a much bigger war and a much bigger threat to the United States.

And I think there is a very real risk unfortunately in both directions. If we go in and fail, in many ways, we are much worse off. But I think if we do not go in, the consequences that General Scowcroft and Secretary Schlesinger have described are very real. We are talking about a situation which is dangerous for us either way.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. I am sure all three of you would agree that if we go in, we cannot come out because we have the first casualties. If we go in, it must be to complete the mission that will be clearly defined—that we are told will be defined. But the test then, when we say to the families that may lose soldiers over there, it was worth dying for U.S. leadership and prestige and its role in NATO. Is that accurate?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. The image of U.S. reliability. The credibility of America's commitments. Those are things that must be maintained and those are, amongst other reasons, the reason we have armed forces.

Mr. SCOWCROFT. And they must be maintained because, if they are not, a lot more Americans will die someplace, sometime.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. General Scowcroft, you stated in one of your responses—and please, I am paraphrasing—but you said, I do not trust any of them, meaning the leaders of the three entities



that are there in this region. And, Secretary Schlesinger, you said there are questions of Tudjman's long-term intent. We heard recently that the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic stated that the Dayton agreement "created a new Beirut in Europe. It is going to bleed for decades."

We see a variety of quotes coming out of that region from just rank-and-file citizens. One, "Everyone has a hand grenade. Remember Somalia. We too will drag the bodies of dead soldiers through the streets."

In light of this 700-year history, what is the probability that a one-year deployment will end in success for the United States and in preserving our prestige in the world?

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I think there is a significant chance that a one-year deployment could end successfully, because the parties may decide that rather than tackle the United States, they will just wait until we leave. My comment is I do not believe there are good guys and bad guys in Yugoslavia. There are strong ones and weak ones. They are all Southern Slavs, whether they are Muslim, whether they are Orthodox, or whether they are Roman Catholic. They are all the same kind of people and they do things the same kind of way.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Secretary Schlesinger?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. I think that our chances of success are modest, but certainly not zero. And if we come out at the end of one year, we will partially have sustained our reputation. We would have demonstrated our willingness to abide by our commitments. We cannot guarantee success.

I would have preferred a mission in which we had a higher probability of success. But we can live up to the commitments that we have made, not so much to the parties in the field, but to our allies at this juncture.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. And Secretary Wolfowitz?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think if we define our objectives in a careful and limited way and if we enunciate, as I have tried to talk about, a clear exit strategy, I think there is a reasonable chance of success—of a limited success. But I also think that if we do not go in, as I think Secretary Schlesinger said, we have very real certainty of major failures.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. All right. Mr. Chairman, I thank you and I thank the panel.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Bingaman.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just try to think forward here, as some of the other members have asked questions. If we put troops in as part of this NATO force, keep them there for a year, and maintain a stable cease-fire during that year-long period, and hopefully also build up the capability of the Bosnians to some extent above what it is today, is it your view that at that time we should go ahead and pull our troops out and declare success? Or should we look for some other condition to be met before we would be willing to remove our troops?

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I would be inclined to declare success just as quickly as we reasonably can. Because if you try really to change the fundamental situation there, we could be there, as Dr. Schlesinger said, a generation anyway. So I think the first chance we get

to say it seems to be working, now it is up to you all, we ought to take it.

Senator BINGAMAN. Either of the rest of you?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. I agree with that.

Senator BINGAMAN. Okay.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I would agree with that and I would add something else. We ought to make sure our allies seize that chance also, so that we do not go back to the same situation, where we have to get in because they are involved. I think we should get peacekeepers out of the way, all of them, as reasonably quickly as we can.

Senator BINGAMAN. If we do what you just all three indicated makes sense, and which I agree it seems to make sense, your other statement, Dr. Schlesinger, and I think at least General Scowcroft agreed, the other statement was that long-term, the viability of Bosnia is not likely. And long-term, there is almost certain to be a larger Serbia and a larger Croatia, and no Bosnia.

As that eventuality is played out, I mean a year from now, we have got a stable cease-fire, we pull out the NATO troops and, presumably; in the year or several years following that, the military actions necessary to bring about the larger Serbia and the larger Croatia occur, is it your thought we could stay out, NATO should not re-commit troops or go back in to maintain the peace that we presumably have just brought about in Dayton?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. If our goal is to achieve the enduring viability of Bosnia, we will be there for the foreseeable future, probably for decades, until the tensions amongst the nations, the ethnic groups, abate. I think that if, as I believe will be the case, the Bosnian military position will improve, at the point that we think that there is some kind of equilibrium, then it is in their own hands and not our responsibility.

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I would agree with that. If we exit under some conditions that seem to be working we should not go back in unless the conflict changes its character. If you get something involved in Kosovo or Macedonia, that is a new conflict. But not to resume the old one.

Senator BINGAMAN. Secretary Wolfowitz?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think there are a few too many hypotheticals, but let me say I think the general principle is that we should not get American troops involved in that battle. That does not mean we should not be involved. I think it is true, perhaps, these are all South Slavs, but there are differences among them and even people like Milosevic are susceptible to real-world, rational calculations.

I would assume that, particularly given the enduring enmity between Croatia and Serbia, that we would have a lot of leverage on Croatia and that we ought to be exercising it—of various kinds. I think it is not going to be in our interest to simply see Bosnia swallowed up. We will pay a price in Europe. We will pay a price, frankly, in the Moslem world, which we have not mentioned yet today. But the fact is that the Western failure in Bosnia has caused us great damage in the part of the world where there is already far too much enmity to the United States and to the West.

I think all of that says it was a terrible mistake to say that when these people are ready to fight to defend themselves we insist that

they were not allowed to do that. Instead, we would send international peacekeepers—who had lacked the will to do it—to do it for them. That is the basic mistake. But I think our objective should be to try to achieve a stable, albeit greatly truncated, Bosnia. I think it is in the interest of stability and in the interest of American interests worldwide.

Senator BINGAMAN. My last question is regarding NATO's future role. Everyone is looking at this as sort of a new mission for NATO, where we would provide leadership and NATO would go outside its own membership to enforce a peace and bring fighting to an end. If we are willing to do it here in the Balkans, should we also be prepared in future years to participate in joint efforts with NATO throughout the former Soviet Union, throughout Eastern Europe, through—I mean, is there some end to what NATO should be willing to do? And, if so, how do you define that, if we are willing to do this?

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I think there is a practical end to what NATO is willing to do, and that is the interest of the NATO members. And once you get outside NATO territory, that is, the Alliance territory, the interests of the various members change quite dramatically and NATO, itself, might not be able to act in very many cases.

I would like to see NATO, for example, take over responsibility for Macedonia, where we have a few troops there. I think it would be useful to have NATO, as an Alliance, do the protection in the Gulf. But I think it is more likely to be NATO in the form of coalitions of the willing, rather than the Alliance itself.

Senator BINGAMAN. Could I ask the response from the others? Is that permitted, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman THURMOND. The time is up, but go ahead.

Senator BINGAMAN. Okay.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. We should be prepared to look at any circumstances depending upon the balance of interest and the risks. We may be prepared to deal with our partners and help persuade them to go in. But it depends on the circumstances. I do not see the NATO alliance intervening in the former Soviet Union, which is one of the things that you mentioned. I think that the risks versus the gains probably are excessive.

Second point, Senator Bingaman, I think that there is perhaps too much emphasis on the search for a purpose for NATO in these changed circumstances. It is the North Atlantic Treaty rather than the military organization that is essential. And the North Atlantic Treaty represents the cohesion of the West; indeed, the cohesion of Western civilization. That is a substantial obligation upon our part, and we ought not to be looking for military justifications when we have this vital political alliance of the democracies.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Let me just add to the point. I agree with it. You have to judge these cases by circumstances. And I doubt if you would find many that would be compelling.

I think also if one looks at how this might work, if it works, it is going to be because U.S. and NATO forces are basically doing a traditional NATO role, which is defending a boundary. In this case, I think it is called the inter-entity dividing line, but it is a boundary, and armies are good at defending those.

I think it is precisely if we think we can get into a pacification or peacekeeping role that we are likely to fail in Bosnia. And I do not think it would provide a good precedent for working elsewhere. But I think this does demonstrate that the traditional role for NATO, as we saw again in the Gulf War, remains an important mission for American forces.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Coats.

Senator COATS. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank our panelists. I think it has been very insightful, and the expert testimony you provided to us has been very helpful. I think in focusing the questions on just what it means to define the United States' vital interests and what it means to define success.

I hope that the administration has had these same discussions. I am concerned that if they did, they came to a different conclusion. Because their definition of success and their goals and mission, as outlined by the President last evening, seems to be considerably broader than what we are discussing here today. I am concerned about that, because I think the United States public already has a very narrow window of support and acceptance of engaging United States troops abroad.

We have had some unfortunate experiences—Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia—which counterbalance against our success in the Persian Gulf. And yet, what it appears that we are entering into looks a lot more like the former than the latter.

If we are past the point of defining Bosnia as a place where the United States' vital national interest is such that we will commit troops and accept acceptable losses, then it seems to me absolutely critical that we succeed in this mission. I am concerned that what we have defined here this morning as success is quite a bit different than what the President defined last evening.

If we do not succeed, now that we have made this commitment—or about to make a commitment—we are going to have two very unfortunate consequences. One is an unnecessary loss of American lives that none of us will be able to explain to the mothers and fathers whose sons and daughters sacrificed their lives in Bosnia. And, second, we will have further forfeited or squandered the support of the American people to engage in those future conflicts which may very much be in our vital national interest, but which the public will not provide support for.

There certainly will be, in the future, conflicts in which the United States will have a vital national interest and should engage, but we may not have the will or the commitment to do so.

My question is, do you agree with me that what the President outlined as success is overly broad and probably unattainable, particularly in a one-year time period? If that is the case, is it possible at this point for a more limited definition of what our mission should be and what will constitute success within that timeframe?

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Well, I agree with you, Senator Coats, to the extent that the President has really defined it, it seems to me that there is a sort of adumbration over it all, but one can infer that it is a more ambitious goal. And, to me, what you have defined is what I think is an absolutely critical role that this body can play in forcing the administration to analyze what it is doing, why it is

doing it, what are the prospects for success and failure. And if they do not have a precise mission which appears to be successful, help them redefine it.

Senator COATS. Is it too late to do that?

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I do not think so.

Senator COATS. Dr. Schlesinger, do you want to comment on that?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. No, it is not too late. The President's speech, as is unavoidable under these circumstances, was long on exhortation. But if objectives are unachievable, they will not be achieved. And therefore we must, perforce, set more limited objectives. And that, as General Scowcroft has indicated, is the role I think for the Congress to play.

You used the phrase, "unnecessary loss of life." Given the developments that have occurred, I think that we can say to those parents that the loss of life, while not driven by the circumstances of Bosnia itself, was necessary to sustain the international position of the United States.

It is about just over a century ago that the Chancellor of Imperial Germany, Prince von Bismarck, said to the King, "Nothing in the Balkans is worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier." I note that the German Government continues, basically, to follow the advice of Chancellor von Bismarck.

It is true. These conflicts have been going on for a long time. Whether or not we should have gotten this involved is a question, but we are now involved, and there we are.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I would agree very much that I think the Congress has an important role to play now in defining what we are there for in a limited and achievable way. And I think, as I said in my statement, I agree basically with what Senator McCain said earlier. I think the goal is to achieve a modest level of equilibrium among the parties and then disengage.

Senator COATS. My time has expire, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Robb.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join my colleagues in thanking the three distinguished guests for being with us this morning. All of us have had an opportunity, both privately and publicly, to benefit from their advice and counsel, and we do so again here. I would like to particularly commend all three of our friends and distinguished former representatives of the highest levels of government for taking an essentially bipartisan or nonpartisan approach to the situation that exists today. I think that that is critical.

There were, however, enough reservations and caveats, in addition to all of the very pertinent questions that you have suggested ought to be asked and indeed, in each case, indicated that it was only a partial list. Many of us have been asking those questions. Those of us who have had an opportunity to review the documents in preparation that will be formally presented later in this week, have found satisfactory answers to many of those questions already, and I think many others will be.

I have just two questions. I was originally going to ask three, but I think the question with respect to clarification of mission has been sufficiently addressed. One question looks back and one ques-

tion looks forward. And admittedly, these are designed to give you an opportunity to separate from those who may be inclined toward hand wringing, but not necessarily providing sufficiently prescriptive or precise guidance as to what we might do.

As we look back, I would be interested in each of you suggesting that in your prior capacity as a top-level advisor to a President, if you were still in that capacity in the current administration—and this is for historical purposes only, because you have all indicated that you would, at this point, support going forward, that the die has been cast—but is there anything, particularly within the last six months, the decision to take the leadership role in attempting to secure a peace, the decision to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to participating in it, the decision to bring the principals to this country for the negotiations, the decision to follow through and to be a part of that process, is there anything that you would disagree with in a fundamental way in terms of the kind of advice you might have offered to one or more of the President's that you served?

And then, looking to the other end of the spectrum, having clarified the mission with some specificity, the whole concept of an exit strategy I think is still not as crisp as it might be, notwithstanding Senator McCain's and others' attempts to pin that down a little bit, just a comment or two on whether or not you believe that what you have heard to date or what you have said is adequate, would you in any sense subscribe to a date certain as opposed to a concept of getting out at a certain time?

And, beyond that, what would you suggest, in a sentence or two, ought to define a proper exit strategy, given the situation as it exists now and not as we might wish it had been under whatever other circumstances might be relevant?

So one look back in terms of advice you might have offered to one of the Presidents that you served. And one look forward in terms of what you might still want to see incorporated in the plan as we formally adopt an exit strategy.

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Those are tough questions, Senator Robb.

Senator ROBB. They were designed to be, sir.

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Looking back, I think you put a limit of around six months or when we became active—

Senator ROBB. I did not want to reach back into a prior administration.

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Well, I do not mind that either. I think the administration is to be commended for enabling or creating, if you will, a cease-fire. There is no question about that. However, the immediate consequence of that is to place us in the dilemma in which we find ourselves. And I think I would have questioned seriously whether it was, at that time—six months ago, roughly—in the U.S. interest to grasp that nettle and to put ourselves where we are now.

Senator ROBB. Fair enough.

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Looking forward, we are not—to me, the exit strategy that looks perhaps the best in getting out with, if you will, a whole skin, would be to say, look, we are going to give this a year. We cannot do it all. We are giving you people a year to try to get your houses in order and to work together. If you cannot do it, then it is your problem.

Any other exit strategy, whether it is based on a Bosnian equilibrium, whether it is based on the general political/military situation, risks being virtually endless.

Senator ROBB. Thank you.

Mr. Schlesinger.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Senator, on that first question of clarity of mission that you did not ask, we will never be totally satisfied with the clarity of mission. There will always be ambiguities. And what we must do is when we change or adjust the mission, know what we are doing and know the consequences rather than doing it willy-nilly.

On the second question, I agree with General Scowcroft. I would have advised any President that in circumstances of this sort, the national interest must clearly dominate the risks involved. I do not think that that has been the case here. And you should see, Mr. President, whether or not you have public backing before you go in.

On the third question, we do not really have an exit strategy, because the situation is too messy. We have an exit hope. We ought not to be contemplating a date certain, because if conditions deteriorate, the parties in the conflict will simply be standing by waiting for our departure, when they can go at it again.

Senator ROBB. Dr. Wolfowitz?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I guess looking back, I think we took a somewhat stale commitment to peacekeepers and we took that as the foundation of a whole diplomacy, whereas I think we should have said this is something the parties themselves have to solve. What produced the change, in fact, was the change on the ground. It was partly because of NATO air power. It was much more because of the increased effectiveness of Bosnian and Croatian forces—particularly Croatian forces. And, therefore, Milosevic had some serious incentive to settle.

I think we should have let them find that settlement on their own, and with more of a European role in leading it, and should not have decided, before the process even began, that however it ended up, it would end up with a major American peacekeeping commitment. And I think that is something that should have been reserved to the end and possibly reserved entirely.

Looking forward, I would say that we need both more clarity about what we are not responsible for—that is, these idealistic aspirations in the agreement, like return of refugees and elections and so forth. They are good. We should work to achieve them. But we should make it absolutely clear that we are not leaving our military forces there until they are achieved. That those are separate propositions. And I think also more clarity about what needs to be achieved, in terms of achieving a military equilibrium.

And, finally, I really have grave reservations about a date certain. A date certain is not an exit strategy. And it is, to some extent, an invitation for people to manipulate you and take advantage of you. I think everyone knows we better be out of there in something like the time frame of a year. And certainly President Chirac's talk of 20 years is something the French can do on their own if that is what they want.

But I think we want to be able to make it clear that people pay a price if they make our situation there more difficult. And I think

if we declare we are absolutely out on a certain day, we may actually play into the hands of people who want to put our troops in danger.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, gentlemen.

My time is expired, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Hutchison.

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have great respect for all three of you. And I have certainly talked to you, one on one—all but you, Dr. Schlesinger—on these issues. Essentially, I hear all of you saying this: "That President Clinton made a commitment to do this a couple of years ago without consulting Congress; that it is probably bad policy" that the parties are probably still fighting; that we should have lifted the arms embargo; but we must support the President because the credibility of the United States is at stake."

Now, all of you have been in the executive branch of government. At what point do we in Congress have the responsibility, under the Constitution, to exercise our rights of consultation, and when are we committed to rubber stamp what we believe is a terrible decision of the President?

You talk about the rights of the President, but you ignore the responsibilities of Congress. I would like to hear your views on that.

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I think that is a very good question. It is one which has never been answered satisfactorily. And as one distinguished jurist said: In the area of foreign policy, the Constitution is an invitation to struggle.

These are political issues. They are not legal issues. And I think that the two branches should continually seek ways to improve on the ability to communicate and to consult, especially in advance. I think the danger here is that we are faced with a decision of world significance. And to insist on turning it into a domestic issue at this point would do grievous harm to the national interest.

I think we can do a lot better than we have domestically on the issue. And I think the answer is more complete and more early consultation, both formally, in committee hearings, and informally, to discuss these kinds of things while the problem is germinating, rather than when it is a full-blown crisis.

Senator HUTCHISON. General Scowcroft, we agree with you, of course, but how do you make that happen when Congress continues to say, for example "Well, the troops are going to Haiti; the President did not consult us and we do not like that; but, nevertheless, they are going?" We did not object then formally. We have tried to tell the President in every way possible that we thought he should have lifted the arms embargo to give these people a level playing field, and that this might have kept this situation from going on for so long. He ignored us, and then, finally, vetoed the actual bill we passed.

How do we accomplish exactly what you have said is the right thing to do, if the President continues to ignore us, if we cannot exercise our responsibility, even if it is after the fact though it was not our fault that it was after the fact?

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Well, Congress does have considerable powers over the executive branch. I would just hope they would be used at a time when the country itself is not in crisis.



Senator HUTCHISON. At what point, General Scowcroft, do we have the option to exercise those powers other than when it is before us?

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I think you can compel testimony. You still have the power of the purse. And in certain specific instances on foreign policy, the Congress has remarkable ability to stop the executive from doing a lot of things until they have properly consulted.

Senator HUTCHISON. But you are saying today that even though you think there has been bad policy up to now, we should still support the President. In effect, you are saying do not use the power of the purse, which is in fact the power that we are given constitutionally.

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I am not saying support the President as Bill Clinton. What I am saying is support the United States in the position in which it finds itself. And, to me, in this situation, that is an overriding consideration.

Senator HUTCHISON. Well, General Scowcroft, I am sorry, my time is up, and I did not get the answers from the other two.

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I wish you had started with them. [Laughter.]

Senator HUTCHISON. Well, let me just say that I believe the Constitution clearly took the right of declaring war and paying for war from the President alone and gave it to Congress, so that there would have to be a struggle. If we continue to back down from the struggle, when are we going to have the ability for our voices to be heard? I will not ask for an answer. I appreciate your time.

I would like to hear from the others of you, and will talk to you one on one. My time has expired.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank the three of you for being here, and also for at least the bottom line of it, offering the support that you have offered for the President's request to us to have the United States be part of this peacekeeping force. And coming as it does from three of you who have, at least in one measure or another, served administrations of different parties, I hope it is an omen of growing bipartisan support here in Congress for this mission.

I do want to speak for just a moment about the way in which you phrased it, and I think maybe Dr. Wolfowitz stated it—at least he stated it in a way that I now recall—which is that the question now is not whether we would have made this commitment or whether you would have made this commitment, but whether we should now honor this commitment that has been made. And there is a certain sort of reluctance to that position—a kind of what else can we do now? And I do want to draw from what you have said since there are two other conclusions that at least I have come to as I listen to you.

First, I note that you are obviously three thoughtful leaders of this country; you are natural resources, if I can call you that, in terms of our foreign and defense policy. Not every commitment that a president might have made would you support. I think that we could all assume that. And, therefore, this commitment, though each of you might not have made it in this way, is within a range that I would guess that you would say would be acceptable. And, in fact, in the process of the questioning by my colleagues on the

committee, you have defined a mission here that each of you feels is appropriate, though it may not be suitably defined yet by the administration.

The second thing that I infer from what you have said, and it really goes to the fact that you have served so many presidents cumulatively yourselves, is that there is another point at work here. Which is that you know we elect presidents to make foreign policy. It is true that Congress funds those decisions, but, Lord knows, 535 of us cannot carry out foreign policy and make the kinds of commitments that have been made. And so I see, implicit and in some ways explicit in your testimony as you go to the question of international credibility, the reliability of the United States, is this recognition that we entrust presidents with the responsibility to make foreign policy.

I do want to say in that regard, I personally believe though, as Dr. Wolfowitz knows since he strongly worked with some of my colleagues on this committee, that the administration's position on the arms embargo was wrong, that we should have lifted it long ago. But I feel that President Clinton has acted with real strength here and not come to this, current policy without a lot of thought, and he comes to it also as a result of consultation with our allies in NATO. Again, the three of you seem to agree that our relationship with our allies is important.

One of my colleagues here on the committee made reference to the fact that the troops will be out of there in a year because there is an election in a year. It is my strong conclusion that if there is one thing the President is not thinking about in asking us to support this policy it is the next election. He is not going to win any popularity contests with this policy. I think he is doing this because he thinks it is right for the country, and I personally admire him for doing that.

I do want to come back to something Dr. Wolfowitz said in response to Senator Kempthorne's holding up the magazine. And it is a very important point. You are absolutely right. It was my honor to support President Bush in the Gulf War. If somebody had asked then, "Is Kuwait worth dying for?", you are right, a lot of Americans would have said "Hell no." But there were larger principles at work there: aggression by one nation of a smaller nation, human rights violations, and the economic interests that we had in the oil supply in the Middle East, not to mention the strength of the moderate Arab countries which would be jeopardized there. And the same I think is true here.

I want to ask this question about the clarification of the mission. It does seem to me that the administration, in the agreement, is trying to draw a line between the work that the NATO implementation forces will do in implementing the military aspects of the agreement, which is basically the separation of forces. At the same time, we have committed ourselves to a non-military role with our European allies, which involves resettlement of refugees, reconstruction of Bosnia, carrying out elections, and the like.

Does not that separation of military goals and the broader stabilization goals give you some confidence that the military mission is clear and achievable?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Well, it is clearer. As I said earlier, whether or not it is achievable is something we cannot tell at this moment. The other goals are probably less achievable. And I think that we should focus on those things that can constitute a relative foreign policy success.

Senator LIEBERMAN. My time is up. Again, I thank the three of you for your very thoughtful and helpful testimony.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank all of the witnesses. I know you are not in policymaking roles now in the government and you were not consulted, and you still came here to express your views, and we appreciate it.

Mr. Wolfowitz, have you changed your position? Were you, not too long ago, opposed to this policy and now support it?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I had serious question, Senator, from the beginning about the commitment of peacekeepers to this negotiation. And I am not saying that I support it now. This, Senator Hutchison, is also partly in answer to your question. It is not simply a matter of deferring to the President's prerogatives. It is a matter that we have a different situation today than we had a month ago. We have very serious consequences if we do not go ahead with what the President has negotiated.

There are also serious consequences if we go ahead and we fail. And I think the Congress has a serious responsibility to weigh which of those are the more dangerous to the interests of the United States. But I think the most constructive thing to do is what Senator Coats has talked about, which is to try to define what we are doing in a way that increases the chances that if we go ahead, as I think we are likely to, that we can do it successfully.

Senator SMITH. Let me go to the issue of credibility, and, Secretary Schlesinger, let me ask you, because you mentioned more than anyone else. I am having trouble understanding why it causes credibility problems in the United States of America or in the world for the United States of America in the world.

What would be wrong with a policy of the President saying to the European allies that we shed a lot of blood in World War I; we shed a lot of blood in World War II; we spent a lot of money in the Marshall Plan to rebuild; you have got a problem over there in Bosnia; it is a European problem; we are willing to help you as much as we can, perhaps financially, perhaps with air support, but we are not going to put ground troops in; we think it is your turn; we are going to take a by on this one; what is wrong with that?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Nothing if we had made that clear some time ago. We have wavered. That was our initial policy, and I think defensible. And, added to that was that the Europeans had said, "We can handle this, we do not need your assistance." That was three years ago. They have changed their minds, too, on that.

But now we are engaged. We have engaged in putting together the peace conference. We have encouraged the Croats to move against Serbia. We have bombed the Serbs. A whole host of things that, along with our commitment to provide 20,000 peacekeepers, have changed the situation. I would have supported the policies that you outlined, but I think circumstances have changed.

Senator SMITH. I would agree with you that it has changed. It certainly changed the circumstances. I do not know that it changes it enough to warrant the action. But a lot of comment has been made here today and also in the President's speech yesterday about NATO. I have the NATO Charter here before me. And if you look at Articles 3, 4, 5, and 6, they all talk about collective action against an aggressor—one of them. None of these parties are members of NATO. I do not see any attack against anyone in NATO.

So I have trouble understanding why this is somehow going to result in the destruction of NATO because the United States of America does not participate with other NATO allies in this operation or indeed whether it needs to be a NATO operation. I have trouble understanding that logic as well.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. It is a legitimate question.

Senator SMITH. I mean there is nothing in NATO's Charter, is there?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. We have gone well beyond the original NATO Charter.

Senator SMITH. Is there anything in NATO's Charter that talks about peacekeeping in non-NATO countries?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. No, there is nothing. The only question is our relationship with our allies, which, through the North Atlantic Treaty, rises above the specific wording of that agreement.

Senator SMITH. Let me just end on this point. If we go back through talking about the dynamics and the changes that have been made—and anyone of you could respond to this—if we start as we are policy people, we are involved in this decision. We look at the facts. The facts are the war has been going on—wars have been going on in that region for centuries. The President made a commitment, unfortunately, as Senator Hutchison indicated, outside the parameters of Congress to send troops there or to participate in some process. The overwhelming majority of Americans today—it could change tomorrow—say no, we should not be there.

Let us assume that Congress, at some point in the process—it may not be, but let us say—they vote no, that we should not send troops, but the President sends them anyway, which he has the constitutional authority to do. Then Congress has a decision to make whether we pull the rug out from under our troops, which no one wants to do. So, most likely, we will support the President, probably, after it happens, because we will not have any choice. Otherwise, we put Americans in harm's way.

But let us say that the peace does not hold. That we are there for a year. And I do not agree—just an editorial point on that one—I do not agree that we have got a clear policy here at all. I am not convinced that we are going to be there a year. Whether we are saying we are going to be there 10 years, 30 years—I hear a former General in NATO said 30 years, 32 years.

My point is that what do you say to the family if, as Senator Kempthorne referred to, someone were to die there, God forbid? What was the reason that he died or she died? And, second, what is the credibility issue if we withdraw after a year and let it go back to where it was before? As we are beginning to see now happen in that great democratic Republic of Somalia and Haiti, where we are now seeing democracy going by the boards and loss of life.

I will tell you, as a parent—and I put myself in that position, ahead of myself as a Senator—I would have some trouble explaining it. I do not think the policy is clear. We are not saying we are going to be there a year or 10 years or 30 years. And so what I think I am hearing is, if we cannot get it done in a year, we are probably going to pull out. And, if so, that we go right back to where we started from.

I mean, what is the policy here, in your opinion? Last question. General Scowcroft, since you like to be on the spot, I will let you answer it.

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Well, all of your points are very cogent ones. I think the basic issue here—you raised the NATO Charter—the basic issue is—I cannot remember which article it is now, the collective defense article—suppose in the future there is some kind of an attack on NATO and we say, “Well, we do not think we are interested in that.” That would be the kind of signal we would be sending. The President has said, I will send troops if there is a peace agreement.

It is taking over the management of the war. It is setting up the negotiations. It is driving them to a conclusion. It is the wholesale involvement of the United States in the leadership position. That is what we would be repudiating. And that is why it is more than just the President saying something. This is a wholesale commitment of the United States itself whether you like it or not. There are a lot of questions about how we got to where we are.

Senator SMITH. Well, you would say to the parents you died for the leadership of America, but not too much leadership. If we do not get it done in time, we are going to get out. We are not committed to getting it done. I might not agree with that policy, but at least that is a policy that you could explain. We are going to stay there until we get it done, until we bring peace. That is not what we are saying.

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Well, let me say, Senator Smith, that we have marvelous armed forces now. It is a professional force. It is perhaps the best force we have ever had in our history. These people know why they are there. They know what their job is. And they are prepared to do it. And, if necessary, they are prepared to die for it. They understand that. Their parents probably do not, but the troops do. And they are very good at it.

Senator SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Could I respond to the Senator by dealing with the question that Senator Hutchison raised earlier? No, Congress should never be a rubber stamp. Perhaps from the time of Pearl Harbor to Tet, it tended to defer excessively to the President, or perhaps not excessively. But those days are gone.

In ambiguous circumstances, probably the Congress should give the President the benefit of the doubt. But if the Congress believes a policy to be wrong, it should act accordingly.

However, it should do so recognizing the full consequences of its action. The United States is not just another nation. The United States is the leading world power. If we back away from commitments that we may have unwisely made, but which many of our allies and others are counting on, our ability to stabilize the world will be substantially reduced.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, I congratulate our panelists on what I think have been very responsible and thoughtful answers to very thoughtful questions. And I find it helpful to have listened to these three panelists. I have tremendous respect for them.

After listening to the three, I am reminded of Socrates, who, when asked what his advice concerning marriage would be, answered, "Well, you will be sorry if you do not and you will come to regret it if you do." [Laughter.]

Senator BYRD. Having said that, nevertheless, I think that the responses have been right on point.

Dr. Schlesinger, could you speak to the reliability of the intelligence capabilities of the United States and its NATO allies specifically in situations such as we think we are going to be in, in which there will be probably rogue elements wandering around and causing trouble, and in view of the December weather to which you have already alluded? How do you view those capabilities in this situation?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. They are very modest. Normally, we will have sources on which one can place some reliance. But the principal sources on which we will draw, other than overhead surveillance, will be the observations of parties in the conflict, all of whom will have their own axes to grind. And, as a consequence, we will have great difficulty sorting out the truth from fiction.

Senator BYRD. Well, I think that you have all answered most of the questions that I already had in mind. I would like to come at you in this way. You have all had great experience in the executive branch. You are experts in the field. You are, at the same time, citizens of the United States. We like to think of ourselves as average citizens, as one of the common people. You have children, grandchildren, as do most Americans—or a great many at least.

If you were in our shoes, sitting on this side of the table, what limitations or restrictions would you attempt to outline or to place upon the administration in going forward with this very serious and dangerous venture?

One can glibly say that the commander-in-chief has this or that authority. The commander-in-chief is commander of the armies and navies which are raised and supported and provided and maintained by the Congress of the United States, through its power of the purse. We have a responsibility here. We cannot just say, "Well, this is the commander-in-chief, and he has this authority or he has that authority." We also have a responsibility. And our responsibility is equal to that of his, in my judgment. We have a responsibility to the people who sent us here.

So I should think that we ought to attempt to help to shape the circumstances and conditions which will guide us in our efforts, and which will guide us in the event that we seek to extricate ourselves.

What, if any, limitations or restrictions would you be in a position to advise us in our attempts to help to shape the circumstances and situations which will determine what we do and how successful we may be?

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Senator Byrd, that is a very hard question to answer in view of the fact that many of the fundamental issues are

not at this point clear. It seems to me the first responsibility of the Congress is to clarify the positions of the administration on many of these fundamental issues, and then come to the conclusion, which we three have all come to on the same side, as to the merits of the adventure and what kinds of limitations would facilitate the achievement of the objectives and mission once they are decided.

For example, a resolution of support could have some time limit on it in which the administration should come back for further consultations and extension to avoid a 30-year sort of syndrome that we have been discussing. But I think it is very hard for us to say specifically what limitations at this point—at least it is for me, Senator.

Senator BYRD. Dr. Schlesinger.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Senator, I think that the administration has had some tendency to engage in grandiose objectives. This was enshrined in the original PDD-13, as you will recall, and the suggestion early on that U.S. policies should be one of assertive multilateralism, whatever that may be.

I think one objective for the Congress is to see that this does not drift off into the achievement of unattainable goals. Mention has been made of the return of the refugees. We should not expect much success in that area.

Subsequent to the aborted PDD-13, there was PDD-25. I would think that the Congress would be interested in seeing how the mission statement relates to that overall definition of U.S. policy.

And, in addition to the changes, in addition to avoiding the grandiose objectives, any change in the mission should be reported to the Congress by those who are assigned with the execution of the mission, meaning the military.

Senator BYRD. So as to avoid mission creep?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Mission creep without any explanation—mission drift is more the problem.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. I would like the final panelist to respond.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Yes, if I might, Senator.

I think there is one thing worse than undercutting the commitment the President has made, and that is to carry through and see it through to a disaster. And I think the Congress has a major responsibility here to try to shape what we do in a way that we can come out at the end and be successful and not come out at the end saying that whatever effort we expended was in vain. Because there was a very, very real cost to the United States from going into Lebanon and then leaving Lebanon. And that is an example that is worth keeping in mind.

And I think I agree strongly with what Secretary Schlesinger said about the more grandiose goals of this agreement. I think we need to be very clear and very realistic about what we are going to say we accomplished when we left, and that is what we are going to say our military accomplished when they left. And we have to be very careful about a creep or a drift in the definition of the mission.

But I also believe—and here I guess I disagree with my colleagues—I think the essential thing to changing this situation when we leave is to have established enough of an equilibrium on

the ground so that we can get out of this cycle of our being responsible or the international community, of which we are the leading member, being responsible for the security of the parties in Bosnia. We took on that responsibility when we put an embargo on the Bosnians. We now have, in part because of the way this agreement is changed, a chance to finally do what the Congress has been pushing the administration to do up until now.

And I think the administration needs to be much clearer that that is something we are going to get done and that we are going to accomplish, if necessary, or rather, if possible, by having other people do it, but that we are going to get it done. It is critical to our getting out. And that we ought to get it done as rapidly as possible, not deferring to some European notions about arms control negotiations, which, as General Scowcroft can tell you, have a way of going on for a decade or longer, but to get it done expeditiously.

Senator BYRD. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Bryan.

Senator BRYAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General, I would like to join my colleagues in expressing my appreciation for the public service that each of you have rendered in the past and that each of you continue to render today, in terms of your very sobering testimony.

Having crossed this diplomatic Rubicon that we face today, I have a couple of fairly narrow questions. One is the President has talked about a commitment of about a year. What circumstances should we look to that might indicate a contingency that may or may not arise in which we should withdraw prior to that period of time?

Mr. Scowcroft?

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I believe if the parties indicate, for example, that they are eschewing rebuilding their military forces, that they are beginning contacts with each other with a view to how they are going to behave after the withdrawal of the NATO forces—there are a number of signs we could see that would give us encouragement and maybe the possibility of leaving sooner. They would be likely to be cumulative rather than one dramatic event, however.

Senator BRYAN. In a less optimistic scenario, suppose armed conflicts in a rather wide scale break out. Would that be circumstances in which, as you understand the terms of our engagement, we should withdraw from?

Mr. SCOWCROFT. As I understand the terms of engagement, I think the President has said we are not going in there to end the war. We are going in there to preserve a peace. If the situation breaks down into a resumption of that kind of violent conflict, it seems to me we would have a valid rationale for saying, Look, we tried. If you people insist, you know, this is not ours to solve. Although it might be difficult to get out easily in that kind of circumstance.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. I do not expect the circumstances to develop because, as General Scowcroft indicated, it is very hard to trust any of the leaders. But if we do detect what I would say are unexpected signs of trustworthiness on their part, then I think that we



could contemplate an earlier withdrawal than one year. It would have to be a far more peaceful situation than I now anticipate.

When we get out, how we get out—we ought not to stay if the conflict develops in ways that we have speculated on. We are not there for the purposes of preventing war in the Balkans in general. We are there to prevent conflict in Bosnia. And if there is a change in those circumstances, we ought to review that and probably get out.

I do not think that we ought to have an automatic date of withdrawal of one year, however.

Senator BRYAN. Dr. Wolfowitz.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think, unfortunately, one of the risks is that if, in your pessimistic scenario, fighting breaks out, it may not be possible to simply get out. And I do not think we should go in with the proposition that we only stay as long as it is peaceful.

I think, unfortunately, although the situation, I agree with Secretary Schlesinger, is gray, it is not black and white, but the shade of gray is reasonably clear. I do not think the Bosnians are likely to start a wholesale war. For one thing, we can prevent them from doing it. The much greater danger is that the Bosnian Serbs would resume the fighting because they want Sarajevo back or they want the Brcko corridor widened or you could name a long list of whys.

And if that happens, I do not think we can leave. And that is why I think it is a mistake to go in saying we are just neutral. We are basically there to protect Bosnia for some period of time, and we should make that period of time as short as possible. But it is not something that we can just go when it gets difficult.

I suppose you could think of a real gray area where there is a lot of uncontrollable killing going on both ways, both sides, and we just say this is not something we can police. But I think much more likely, if your pessimistic scenario happens, we are going to have to stick it out, and there is no question this is not a course that is free of risk.

Senator BRYAN. Dr. Schlesinger, you have commented in reluctantly coming to the conclusion that we have gone so far that indeed the credibility of the United States, for all of the reasons that you and the other panelists have indicated, indicates we need to support the President, at least at this stage. The question that I have is we try to define here with the Congress, interacting with the executive, precisely what the role, the mission is, what the exit strategy is, what we seek to accomplish.

If indeed the credibility of the NATO alliance and with our NATO allies is a paramount consideration, and I concede that it certainly is a very valid one, what kind of understanding do we have with our allies, first, in terms of what the mission is and under what circumstances the United States would withdraw its troops?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Well, I do not know what our understanding is with our allies and, indeed, whether or not we have an understanding with our allies. I see substantial divergences amongst our European allies as it is. The French take a different posture from the British, and the Germans have stood aside. The other nations have been involved to a greater or lesser extent—the Dutch and the Canadians have provided troops.

But part of the problem here is that there is no common position amongst our allies. That is the reason, in part, that we are being drawn in.

Senator BRYAN. I note that my time is up. It would just seem, parenthetically, that if credibility is an important consideration here, if we do not have that understanding, even if we go in, if we withdraw under circumstances that apparently there is not a consensus among our allies, that loss of credibility may nevertheless exist, notwithstanding our commitment to follow through initially.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Well, a prior understanding with our allies is not necessarily something that is written in concrete with some of our allies. [Laughter.]

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you all for being here this morning. It has been very illuminating.

U.S. leadership has been alluded to several times here. And we are certainly not new to worldwide commitments. They go back a long time. And they have not all been as vital maybe as others have been, as far as the future of the U.S. goes. But we go back—World War I, II, the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine. We have stood for peace and freedom around the world.

And that has been exhibited through our commitment to Korea, the Mideast, Japan, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, South America, Haiti, Northern Ireland, MPT, NATO, even in a different context, Grenada, Panama, and on and on, and AID programs, and Peace Corps programs, and things like that that we have not retreated within our own borders and said, We are going to be part of the world community and try and do some good. I think it is our Judeo-Christian heritage partly. We do not want to see fighting and things going on if we can help prevent it.

Now, this particular situation here, I was a bit dubious going in as to what our options were on this or what our opportunities were. And I think maybe this is an opportunity.

But what happened?

The people over there are tired of war; 250,000 killed, 2 million refugees. They indicated, separately, through diplomatic channels, that they wanted peace. They are tired of the fighting basically.

And then what happened?

Well, we invited them to Dayton and, lo and behold, they came. Darned if they did not come. I was surprised at that. I really was. Not because it was Ohio, but because they came. [Laughter.]

Senator GLENN. And, lo and behold, we went through all these things out there, and they initially new borders on a 1-to-50,000 scale map, down to within 50 meters. All signed that and all agreed to it. Now, I think that is rather amazing.

Now the agreement has been hammered out. We have copies of it here we got yesterday. And I will not try and go into details of that in the limited time. But the agreement had to be in real detail. And I did not think they would get it to that detail.

Another thing has to happen. There has to be a cease-fire or we do not go in. No shooting going on. We are not going to shoot our way in period. That is it. The firing must stop or we do not go in.

General Joulwan told us that. Everybody was briefed in Europe a few weeks ago over there in Sarajevo. Every place we went, we are not going in fighting.

We are going in to help enhance something that they agreed to themselves or we do not go in.

Now, why do not they just do it themselves, then?

Well, where most of the cease-fires prior to now have broken down—30-some of them as a matter of fact—have been largely with the irregulars, those who do not answer to an army command someplace. The farmer who goes up and mans a rifle for a few days, hands it to somebody else, and goes back to his farm again. Most of the cease-fires have come from that.

Now, why the United States?

We are the only ones that they trust over there. The mission, to me, is not all as dubious as seems to be indicated by my colleagues here this morning and some of you, I guess, also. Because I think it is very clear. We go in after there is a cease-fire and the agreement that they have initialed, and that it has to be signed now and agreed to formally in Paris before anything happens. And then we go in with a very simple mission. It is to man this zone that keeps them apart where the cease-fires have broken down before and give peace a chance.

Now, I do not want to oversimplify this, but, to me, that is the basic mission there. If it is something else than that, then I do not know what it is. We are going in with NATO rules of engagement. Which means, as General Joulwan told us, we obliterate anything that shoots at us. We do not reply in kind. We take it out heavy duty, big time, so that it does not happen again.

If any of the parties decide they want out of the agreement and they try to alter the borders that were agreed upon, we are out of there. We are not there to enforce one side or the other. We are there to monitor these peace zones. But if somebody decides they want to back out of their agreement, we are out of there. And that should not be looked at as a black mark or a lack of guts. It is just common sense. We are in there trying to enhance something.

Now, the importance of the Russians. That was mentioned earlier. I think it is important. We do not want them lining up on the side of the Serbs and us on the other side. That is an absolute recipe for disaster, as I see it, or a potential for that. So I think it is important that we have them in. Now, I think we have to try this.

How do we judge success or failure?

Well, let us not over-complicate that either, because I think if they decide they do not want peace, we are not there to enforce it for them. It is their agreement that we helped implement. It is their country that we are helping them try and get control over. It is their decision. It is their failure, not ours. We provided a structure and an implementing means of what they said they wanted and they agreed to, as I see it.

Now, is there some risk?

Yes, there is some. But I would also note that through the years we have lost—and this is a different context of course—we lost some 224 people in the Peace Corps. Now, that is a long-time commitment of course. But to make it in a little different way, back

in my flying days, they used to say the only way you have complete flight safety is you keep all the airplanes in the hangar, too.

And my view would be that some risk now may well enhance our long-term leadership toward peace and freedom around the world and, in the long run, maybe save lives. I think we go in at minimum risk on this. And I am very much concerned about the risk that we have. But we go in as one-third of this international force.

I will not personally judge success or failure on just—even if we fail in this, and if they go back to fighting again, we should not stay there. We should get out of there, not become involved long-term. We will have tried. We will have tried an implementing structure. We will have done our best to help them to our everlasting credit, as I see it.

But we have to have this agreement agreed to, signed, formally agreed to. We have to have the cease-fire in place. We are not going in if there is still fighting going on, even rifle fire. We just are not going to do that. What we do are man the separation zones in there that are very, very clearly defined, and give peace a chance.

Now, if this can all be brought off—and I would think that the best judgment even at this point would be 50-50 as to whether this whole thing occurs, through the signing and the cease-fire and all the things—I would not say it is any done deal yet. And I think the President still has a lot to do to sell the American people. But I hope people go back and sort of review the bidding on this, as I have done only very, very briefly here. I think this could even be looked at perhaps eventually as an opportunity for us. If we can bring peace to that area through our efforts, through the unique standing of the United States, we will have moved on to a new high in our international leadership. And I think it is that clear.

So that is a statement much more than it is a question. My time is up. But if you care to comment, why, feel free.

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Senator Glenn, I hope it turns out just the way you say. And one cannot rule it out. But you know if there was ever a simple mission, it was Somalia. In, clean it up, out. Things changed.

Senator GLENN. We did not have agreement of all people that they wanted peace when we went into Somalia. We went in quite the opposite.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. Well, that is the point that I was going to make, Senator Glenn. The Bosnian Serbs did not initial this agreement. They had given their proxy to Milosevic, and the Bosnian Serbs are quite clearly unhappy with some of the terms of the agreement. And some of those who signed the agreement may well have been disingenuous at the time they signed it. I suspect that that may indeed be the case.

It is a simple mission as you defined it. The problem—and this goes back to Senator Byrd's observation—is to see to it that the simple mission remains simple and does not expand.

Chairman THURMOND. Do you have anything to say, Mr. Wolfowitz?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. No, I do not, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Well, we have now completed round one. For round two, I was wondering, if we could just ask one question

each. If you have other questions, let them be asked for the record. Is there any objection to that? [No response.]

Chairman THURMOND. Okay, that will be adopted. I will ask one question.

General Scowcroft, do you believe that 20,000 U.S. military personnel is sufficiently large enough to defend itself and be a formidable presence within the proposed zone in Bosnia?

Mr. SCOWCROFT. Yes, Senator, I do.

Chairman THURMOND. I would like for the other witnesses to answer the same question.

Secretary Schlesinger?

Mr. SCHLESINGER. I think the American forces going in are capable of defending themselves.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think they are as long as, again, we understand the mission is kept limited in the way it has been described.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My question would be containment strategy if this breaks down or if we go in and the fighting resumes, do you believe that we need to start now to carve out with our allies some containment strategy, so that if events do go wrong there, we prevent the conflict from spreading? And I am talking about over a period of time. And if so, do you have any suggestions?

Mr. SCOWCROFT. I certainly think we should. I think we should look at all the possibilities for good and bad endings, and try to make preparations for all of them. Our fundamental interest in that area is containing the spread of this conflict to areas or situations which in fact could involve NATO members on opposite sides. And that should be uppermost in our minds.

Mr. SCHLESINGER. I sure hope, Senator, that we are looking at possible contingencies and doing what-if calculations should those contingencies develop.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think, Senator, the most—I certainly agree with the importance of contingency planning. I think the notion that if the fighting resumed it would quickly spread to other parts of the former Yugoslavia is probably exaggerated. I do not think that is the near-term danger.

In fact, we have this much of an agreement because the parties are, to some extent, exhausted. I think we do have to have some very clear contingency planning with our allies about the circumstances in which we would redeploy or even withdraw—the kinds of questions that were implied in Senator Bryan's question, about what if things go bad—and particularly, what if someone who—and there are a lot of parties to this conflict that do not feel they were represented in Dayton or even represented in Pale necessarily—how do we deal with the various efforts that may be made to make this thing unravel?

I think there is a lot of contingency planning with our allies that, my impression is, this has only just begun, and it is very important. But I think it has more to do with dealing with scenarios of breakdown of the agreement than immediate spread of the war elsewhere in Yugoslavia.

Senator NUNN. Yes, I was speaking long-term, not immediate.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Oh, long-term, it is one of the greatest dangers.

I think the other great danger, and I think it should be said, is that though it is more elusive, it is harder to describe, but I think the reason that we are concerned about this conflict in a way, let us say, we are not concerned about Rwanda is because—when it is in a place like Europe, where there are huge armies engaged, where there are nuclear weapons potentially involved—the moral dimension has a strategic dimension as well.

Secretary Schlesinger rightly warned about creating too many dominoe theories, but I think, on the other hand, that one can see if the plague of ethnic cleansing and ethnic warfare spreads in Europe, what we have seen in the Balkans could be really very, very small compared to the kinds of major problems we would have elsewhere. And I think that is the reason we want to do more than just contain this conflict if we can.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. Just a footnote. We hear a great deal said about there being 500 years of history in this region, 700 years of history. It is much longer than that. The Roman legions saw as their most fierce warriors those that came from Illyria, the area of the world that we are now talking about. And there were wholesale massacres even of the legions and destruction of lives—old men, young men, women, and children. This is not something new that is happening in that part of the world.

I would add merely this, in addition to again thanking you three gentlemen for your helpful responses to our questions, I would hope that we might be able to follow through personally and privately if possible, if we have additional questions we might wish to ask you. I have always found Dr. Schlesinger to be most helpful in that regard since the days when I was majority leader and minority leader. And I thank him for the assistance that he has rendered, not only to me, but to his country.

I would close simply, Mr. Chairman and Senator Nunn, by suggesting that we ought not to rush to a decision on this question. It seems to me that we ought to hear the administration. I do not agree that the President has done this for any political reasons. Failure could bring his administration down. He has much to lose. And I have not always agreed with him, as he has not always agreed with me. But in this instance, I think that he has acted with what he sees as the uppermost good interest of the country and in the interest of NATO and the future functioning of that alliance.

So I hope that we will all hear the case and withhold from saying no. We can always say no at the end. It seems to me that we might even, by saying no too early, assure the failure of the effort and give aid and succor and comfort to some of the warring elements in the region.

So that would only be my suggestion, that we withhold our final decision until the time to make the final decision. The parties have not yet signed the agreement. We politicians always have a proclivity to rush out and offer free advice. But in this instance, it seems to me that there is too much at stake and we might well withhold

our comments and listen carefully to what others are saying before we show down.

I thank you, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, if I could just share Senator Byrd's sentiments there, and also thank the witnesses. I think they have done a superb job. And you have been here over three hours now without leaving for any reason. I congratulate all of you on that alone.

Mr. Chairman, I know we are going to have other hearings this week, I did not know whether you wanted to outline any plans. I believe you have some other plans this week.

Chairman THURMOND. Since there are no more questions, I want to thank all the witnesses for their testimony today. I believe that you all have outlined a number of issues for which the Congress needs to find answers. I would like to mention that it is my intention to schedule a hearing with the administration witnesses for next week, possibly Wednesday or Thursday.

The record of the hearing will be kept open for seven days for further questions for the witnesses, if there are any.

Once again, I thank the witnesses for their testimony, and the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

##### VITAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES

Senator THURMOND. Do you believe that vital interests warrant the deployment of U.S. military forces on the ground in Bosnia to enforce the peace agreement?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. There is no inherent interest of the United States in Bosnia that we can describe as vital. However, the United States has become deeply engaged in the process of attempting to bring a settlement in Bosnia. By doing so, it has engaged its own prestige. As a result of our sponsorship of the peace conference at Dayton and our public pledge to provide forces, it is now in our vital interest to deploy those forces to Bosnia—even though we lack an *inherent* interest in Bosnia that is vital.

General SCOWCROFT. The intrinsic interests of the United States in Bosnia do not warrant the deployment of U.S. troops. The President, however, through his commitment to provide troops, taking over conduct of the conflict on behalf of the West, pressuring the parties to the conference at Wright-Patterson AFB, and cajoling the parties to sign a peace agreement, has, in fact, created a vital interest of the United States. That interest is in the reliability of the United States to its words and its commitments. It is in that sense that we have a vital interest warranting the deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia.

Dr. WOLFOWITZ. I agree with my colleagues that the President, by his previous actions, has created a vital interest where none existed before.

#### IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACE AGREEMENT BY PRESIDENTS OF BOSNIA, CROATIA AND SERBIA

Senator THURMOND. Do you believe that the Presidents of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia are in a position to implement the peace agreement within their republics and ensure the safety of the NATO military forces?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. So long as the three presidents continue to adhere to the terms of the agreement, there is a fair chance that the agreement may be implemented. It is only a fair chance, because they are not fully in control of events. President Milosevic, who signed the agreement, cannot necessarily speak for the Bosnian Serbs. I think that President Tudjman may have greater influence with the Bosnian Croats, but events could lead to an explosion between the Croats and the Muslims that blows away our carefully crafted federation. Of course, Bosnia is a badly divided country, so that the President of Bosnia has only modest control over events in Bosnia.

General SCOWCROFT. In general, I believe they do exercise such control. However, there are a number of rogue elements who may seek to do harm and are controllable only in the broad sense through their need for supplies and equipment they cannot acquire by themselves.

Dr. WOLFOWITZ. I believe that they are at present in a position to ensure the safety of NATO forces, even though they may be unwilling or unable to implement some aspects of the peace agreement.

#### THE NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES

Senator THURMOND. Do you believe that the President should seek congressional approval prior to deploying U.S. military forces to Bosnia?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. I believe that it is politically prudent for the President to seek such approval prior to deployment.

Dr. WOLFOWITZ. Yes, he should.

General SCOWCROFT. I do not regard the President as being Constitutionally required to seek congressional approval before the deployment of troops, but I believe it to be important for the country and for the troops themselves for him to do so.

#### VITAL INTERESTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Schlesinger, do you believe that the European Community has vital interests that are greater than that of the United States in securing and ensuring the peace in Europe?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The vital interests of the European Community in securing and assuring peace in Europe vastly exceeds that of the United States. Nonetheless, the European Community lacks cohesion and cannot at this time formulate a common foreign policy. Consequently, the European Community has floundered in the matter of Bosnia even though its interest in ensuring a peace in Europe is greater than is ours. That is why we felt obliged to step in.

#### U.S. VITAL INTERESTS

Senator THURMOND. Last week, Secretary Perry told U.S. commanders in Europe that the U.S. had vital political, economic and security interests in Europe, which continued fighting in Bosnia threatened. Last night the President stated that it was in the United States vital interests to participate in the NATO-led Implementation Force. Do you believe that U.S. vital interests warrant the deployment of U.S. military forces to Bosnia and why, or why not?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. In my answer to Question 2. I indicated that there is no inherent interest of the United States in Bosnia that is vital. Secretary Perry may have overstated things in suggesting to our military commanders that continued *fighting* in Bosnia threatens our vital interests. However, the President is closer to the mark to say that the United States *after Dayton* has a vital interest in participating in the Implementation Force. We are the sponsor of the Dayton accord, and we cannot be seen to waver on it. Therefore, with our credibility at stake, we have now acquired a vital interest in deploying forces to Bosnia.

Dr. WOLFOWITZ. I agree with Dr. Schlesinger.

#### NATO CONTRIBUTION

Senator THURMOND. The President stated last night that military forces from over 25 NATO nations would be contributed to the operation. The last time I checked there were only 16 nations in NATO. I assume the President meant that a total of 25 nations; including NATO nations, would be participating in the implementation Force. Can you describe or discuss, to the best of your knowledge, how Russia, and the other non-NATO countries will contribute to the overall operation?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The bulk of the forces in Bosnia will be provided by NATO. Non-NATO nations will be providing fewer than 10,000 troops. The Russians will be providing a brigade, deployed in the U.S. zone, and tied into NATO with a somewhat jerry-built command structure. I fear that the Russian forces may, to some extent, march to their own drummer. Sweden, a non-NATO nation, will have some troops in the U.S. zone as part of the Scandinavian deployment. The contribution of these non-NATO nations will be less in terms of the forces provided than in terms of the diplomatic support that they symbolize.

General SCOWCROFT. While NATO has been given responsibility for the military mission in Bosnia, the association of the armed forces of countries outside NATO such as the Russian Federation, in the operation lends the weight of a larger com-



munity of nations to the support of the goals of the mission. They are not militarily essential to the success of the NATO mission.

#### SECURING PEACE IN EUROPE

Senator THURMOND. The President said in his address last night that NATO is the only organization capable of securing peace in Europe and that if the United States does not participate in this operation, that its commitment and leadership in the world would be questioned. Do you believe that deploying U.S. military ground forces to Bosnia is the only way to show Americas leadership in the world? Is it not a sufficient show of leadership to provide the majority of the air and sea power in the region, provide intelligence, and broker a peace agreement among the warring factions?

Dr. SCHLESINGER. The President is probably correct that, as of now, NATO is the only organization capable of securing peace in Europe. He is also correct that, if the United States failed to participate, *given our sponsorship of the Dayton agreement*, its commitment and its leadership would be questioned.

However, deploying ground forces in Bosnia was not initially the only way to demonstrate American leadership. It might have been sufficient to provide air and sea power and to provide intelligence. That question, however, can never be resolved, because the United States brokered the Dayton agreement on the premise that the United States would provide 20,000 troops on the ground to implement the agreement. Given that commitment, our failure to provide those forces would be a serious blow to U.S. leadership.

General SCOWCROFT. America is able to show its leadership in the world in a variety of ways. In the specific case of Bosnia, however, the President has thoroughly committed the prestige and leadership of the United States to this enterprise. He has promised U.S. troops if the parties agreed to make peace, taken over the conduct of hostilities in Bosnia on behalf of the West pressured the parties to a cease fire and a peace conference in Ohio, cajoled and pressured the parties to complete a peace agreement. He has committed U.S. leadership to the achievement of this agreement and, in these circumstances it would indeed be a dereliction of U.S. leadership at point to fail to follow through. In other words, at this juncture, there is no way other than the deployment of U.S. ground troops for the United States to demonstrate its leadership.

#### QUESTION ABOUT THE SIZE IMPLEMENTATION FORCE

Senator THURMOND. General Scowcroft, do you believe that 20,000 U.S. military forces is sufficiently large enough to defend itself and be a formidable presence within the proposed zone in Bosnia?

General SCOWCROFT. I do.

#### TIME LIMIT FOR MISSION

Senator THURMOND. General Scowcroft, the President has stated that there will be a one year timeframe for U.S. military forces participating in the Implementation Force to complete its mission. The experience of the United States in setting time limits for military missions has proven to be unwise, undermining the credibility and deterrent effect of the U.S. military presence. Do you believe that setting a one year timeframe as a goal for completing this mission is wise?

General SCOWCROFT. The timeframe for accomplishing any military mission is integrally associated with the mission to be performed. Some general estimate of the time required to accomplish a given mission is not imprudent, so long as it is a flexible time and geared to successful accomplishment of the mission. In the case of Bosnia, the mission itself has not been set forth in clear and unmistakable terms, and the timeframe has been described in very concrete terms. That is unwise.

#### RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATO AND THE U.N.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Wolfowitz, there have been concerns about NATO "mission creep". The United Nations will end its military peacekeeping role but is to remain active in civil matters such as refugee resettlement and reconstruction. NATO's role is to create a secure environment for the critical functions of securing peace in the region by creating and enforcing a zone of separation between the military forces and enforcing the ceasefire. According to the press reports, however, the peace agreement appears to place more responsibility for civil affairs activities on NATO commanders. Is there a way for NATO to avoid being overloaded with tasks that are not specifically military in nature?

Do you believe the United Nations and NATO will be able to operate together and cooperate without causing friction between the military and the civil responsibilities of the two diverse organizations?

Dr. WOLFOWITZ. I believe that there will be strong pressure for NATO to become involved in implementing those aspects of the peace agreement that the United Nations or others cannot enforce.

#### TIME LIMIT FOR MISSION

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Wolfowitz, once U.S. military forces are deployed to Bosnia, do you believe it will be possible for U.S. military forces to be withdrawn, or pull out of Bosnia, if fighting breaks out and the mission becomes untenable to continue?

Dr. WOLFOWITZ. I believe that it will not be possible for U.S. forces to withdraw in the circumstances you describe without serious damage to U.S. interests.

**THE BOSNIAN PEACE AGREEMENT, THE  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MILITARY PLAN  
AND THE PROPOSED MISSION FOR U.S.  
MILITARY FORCES DEPLOYED WITH THE  
IMPLEMENTATION FORCE (IFOR)**

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**WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1995**

**U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC.***

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:14 a.m., in room SD-G-50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Thurmond, Warner, Cohen, McCain, Lott, Coats, Kempthorne, Hutchison, Inhofe, Nunn, Exon, Levin, Glenn, Byrd, Robb, Lieberman, and Bryan.

Committee staff members present: Richard L. Reynard, staff director; George W. Lauffer, deputy staff director.

Professional staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, Lucia M. Chavez, Lawrence J. Lanzillotta, Cord A. Sterling, Eric H. Thoemmes, Bert Masurawa.

Minority staff members present: Andrew S. Effron, minority counsel; Richard D. BeBobes, counsel; Creighton Greene, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Patricia L. Banks, Pamela L. Farrell, Deasy Wagner, Jennifer Wallace.

Committee members' assistants present: Judith A. Ansley, assistant to Senator Warner; Ann E. Sauer, assistant to Senator McCain; Richard F. Schwab, assistant to Senator Coats; David J. Gribbin, assistant to Senator Coats; Thomas L. Lankford, assistant to Senator Smith; Glen E. Tait, assistant to Senator Kempthorne; David W. Davis, assistant to Senator Hutchison; John F. Luddy, II, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Patricia L. Stolnacker, assistant to Senator Santorum; Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; David A. Lewis, assistant to Senator Levin; Steven A. Wolfe, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Patricia J. Buckheit, assistant to Senator Glenn; Leonard Weiss, assistant to Senator Glenn; C. Richard D'Amato, assistant to Senator Byrd; Lisa W. Tuite, assistant to Senator Byrd; William Owens, assistant to Senator Robb; John F. Lilley, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Mary Weaver Bennett, assistant to Senator Bryan.

## OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND, CHAIRMAN

Chairman THURMOND. The committee will come to order.

I welcome our witnesses today, Secretary of Defense Perry, assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili.

The witnesses have been asked to provide testimony on the military annex of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the NATO implementation plan agreed to yesterday by NATO foreign ministers, the deployment of U.S. military forces as an advanced element of the main body of the IFOR authorized by the President, and the time frame for the deployment of the main body of U.S. military forces after the formal signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Paris.

I would also like the witnesses to comment on the proposed United Nations Security Council resolution to authorize the deployment, the ability of the republics to implement and enforce the peace agreement and ensure the safety of the NATO forces; the use of non-NATO military forces in the Implementation Force; and the goals and objectives and exit strategy for the NATO-led operation.

You are no doubt aware that I continue to have grave concerns about the vital national interest of the President's commitment and questions about the clarity of the mission and whether the goals and objectives of the mission can be achieved within the limited deployment time frame.

The President has stated that the mission of the Implementation Force would be precisely defined, with clear and realistic goals that could be achieved in a defined time. However, the President did not describe or define the mission for the American public. He did not describe the clear and realistic goals, nor did he clearly describe the time frame or the exit strategy.

As I understand it, the mission of IFOR is to monitor and enforce compliance with the military annex of the Dayton peace agreement.

Specifically, the IFOR is to ensure the following: continued compliance with the cease-fire; establishment of zones of separation; withdrawal of the military forces behind the cease-fire lines and re-deployment of military forces to their particular zones of separation; establishment of military and civilian liaisons; and the creation of joint military commission to resolve disputes between the parties.

Despite the President's address to the Nation last week and his follow-up discussions with the U.S. military forces in Germany, who will make up the U.S. contribution to the NATO Implementation Force and their families, I believe that the American public has yet to be convinced that vital national interests or vital national security interests are threatened or at stake.

I want to reemphasize that I believe that the United States has an interest in ensuring stability in Europe. I will keep an open mind until such time as the committee has concluded its hearings, at which time I will make my final decision. However, I remain unconvinced at this point that vital interests are strong enough to warrant the deployment of U.S. military ground forces.

I understand from press reports that U.S. military forces are ready to deploy within 96 hours of the formal signing of the peace agreement in Paris.

However, I understand from remarks made by Secretary of Defense Perry a couple of weeks ago, that U.S. military forces would not be deployed to Bosnia until it was clear that the three republics were committed to implementing and enforcing the peace agreement and that there had been an interval of time where the republics had exercised their compliance with the agreement.

As I stated last week at our hearing with Dr. Schlesinger, General Scowcroft and Ambassador Wolfowitz, I believe that it is imperative that President Clinton follow through and not deploy U.S. military forces to Bosnia until such time as it is clear to all that Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia will enforce and implement the agreement and until such time as they have shown their commitment to the peace agreement through compliance with it.

I would like more information about the mission, the objectives of the mission, the time frame for achieving the objectives, as well as the exit strategy.

Additionally, I am concerned with how the Implementation Forces will separate the military forces into their various zones of separation and how U.S. military forces will avoid mission creep when the IFOR mission statement says that IFOR will provide assistance to the others responsible for implementing the other provisions of the Dayton agreement, such as coordinating and assisting the international humanitarian missions in their efforts; monitoring and clearing mine fields and booby traps; and assisting the movement of the civilian population and refugees.

I am also gravely concerned about efforts to have the IFOR ensure the military strategic balance between the parties through arms control efforts and to provide equipment and training to the Bosnian Muslims.

I have supported the idea of lifting the arms embargo and providing training and equipment to the Bosnian Muslims so that they could defend themselves.

However, I have concerns about providing that support in an environment where the peace is extremely fragile, and the U.S. military forces could end up as targets as a result of these efforts.

Senator Nunn is not here yet?

Senator Levin, would you care to make an opening statement?

Senator LEVIN. I think when Senator Nunn arrives, perhaps you could call on him for his opening statement. That would be fine, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you very much.

Dr. Perry, we will proceed with your remarks and comments and follow with Ambassador Holbrooke and General Shalikashvili.

#### STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. PERRY, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary PERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

This past month I have traveled extensively in Europe and the United States to prepare our plans for U.S. military participation in the NATO Peace Implementation Force.

At the invitation of Secretary Christopher and Secretary Holbrooke, I have met with the heads of the warring parties in Dayton while the negotiations were underway.

I met several times with the defense ministers and the chiefs of the defense staffs of all NATO countries and virtually every non-NATO nation that plans to participate in IFOR. I met several times with our NATO commanders, General Joulwan, Admiral Smith, General Walker and the others.

I have gone to our training ranges where every battalion which is going into Bosnia has gone through extensive training for the last few months, including very realistic exercises and training based on a simulated operation in Bosnia.

Now, on that basis, I went last week, right after the signing of the Dayton agreement, to Bad Kreuznach in Germany to meet with the soldiers of the First Armored Division. This Division will be the backbone of our forces in Bosnia.

I spoke to 700 of the commanders of the First Armored Division, division commander, all of the brigade commanders, all the battalion and company commanders, all of the sergeant majors, all of the first sergeants—in short, the leadership of this First Armored Division.

I spoke with them to deal with the questions which were foremost in their minds. Why was the U.S. going in? What will our mission be? Who is going in with us? When are we going in? And when will we be coming out?

To the best of my ability, I answered these questions fully and frankly, and I believe that they were satisfied with the answers that I gave.

Today, I would like to give this committee the same answers I gave to our soldiers last week. To do this, I have prepared some charts, and I would like to move over and make this presentation from those charts.

Mr. Chairman, can you hear me all right from this mike?

Chairman THURMOND. Yes. We can hear you.

Secretary PERRY. This first chart simply summarizes the questions which I tried to answer for the soldiers and which I plan to answer for you this morning.

Why we are going in, of course, is the most fundamental question. We will be prepared to discuss this in much more detail with the committee, but I want to summarize in this chart two very important points.

The first of these is that there really is only one real alternative to going in, and that is the restart of the war. From my discussions with the public and with Congress, I hear many other alternatives, theoretical alternatives, proposed.

I would like to leave very clearly with this committee that we either go in and participate in this operation, or we will see the war restart.

With that, the resumption of the killings and the atrocities, and, I emphasize of great concern to me, the very real risk of this war spreading, spreading north into Croatia and thereby threatening Slavonia and Hungary and spreading south to Macedonia and Kosovo, threatening Greece and Turkey. I need not tell this committee the threat to U.S. vital interests if the war would spread and involve those countries.

The second point I want to make to this committee is recognizing fully that there are risks to this participation. Both General Shali

and I will talk about those risks in more detail. We want the Congress and the American public to know that we fully understand these risks.

But if this war restarts, make no mistake about it, the risks to the United States' national security will be even greater. These are the two fundamental points I want to make for the reasons of why we are going in.

Now, I also talked to our troops about what our mission is. And when General Shalikashvili follows me, he will be describing in some detail the missions spelled out in the military annex of the Dayton agreement and, in particular, the task that is spelled in the NATO operation plan, which was just approved by NATO the other day.

The point I want to make about this mission is that first of all and foremost, we are not going to Bosnia to fight a war. For two and a half years this administration has said, and we say again, that we are not going to send ground troops to become combatants in the war.

We are going in to implement a peace, a very different situation. The tasks which General Shali will lay out for you, we believe, are limited, clear and achievable.

I want to also emphasize that our tasks, the U.S. military and the NATO Implementation Force, which we call IFOR, do not include nation building. We will talk more about what civil functions are going to be going on in parallel with the IFOR, but the mission of IFOR does not include nation building.

And finally, we recognize that there are going to be risks involved with this operation, and we will take very important steps to minimize those risks. We have, first of all, a large and a well-armed force. And second, this force is very well trained.

Let me just show you a few of the pictures from the training ranges that were taken when I was there a few weeks ago. Would you put the first one up, please?

Secretary PERRY. This is a scene in a mine familiarization and a mine awareness course that is going on at Grobenzell in Germany. Every unit and every individual going into Bosnia will have a refresher course in mine awareness. We believe that is one of the primary risks to our troops there.

There are hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of mines in the area. It is going to be very important that we deal with these properly.

This is not, I should tell you, the first time the U.S. Army has had to deal with mines. In fact, General Shali will talk to you later about the rather extensive experience we had with them in Northern Iraq under rather similar circumstances. The key is discipline and training. The training is going on at full scale.

Secretary PERRY. The next picture, also taken at Grobenzell, symbolizes one aspect of the training before our troops went down there: The training to refresh their combat skills.

First and foremost, we want our soldiers to be proficient in the skills in which they were originally trained.

For example, every tank crew going into Bosnia, before they go, will have gone through a live firing training, live firing exercise, to update their proficiencies in those basic skills.

Finally, every battalion that goes in there is sent for about a week at Hohenfels, Germany. In Hohenfels, we have set up a mini-Bosnia with simulated villages, the roads with potholes, the cold weather, and snow. The snow is free of charge. We did not have to provide that.

The Bosnian-Serb Army is simulated, which was provided by the Germans, a simulated Federation army, paramilitary forces, villagers, and CNN (all of the factors which our troops are going to have to deal with were included in this simulation.)

General Joulwan, who set this up, has a philosophy, and his philosophy, as he stated is, "The scrimmage should be harder than the game."

Therefore, he set this up in such a way that if a battalion did well on their exercise the first day, then he ratcheted it up and made it more difficult the second day.

The purpose of the exercise was to cause the soldiers to flunk; that is, the theory is that you learn by mistakes. He made it harder and harder. It was a very rigorous set of training exercises.

I do not believe any force has ever gone in for any military operation, certainly any peacekeeping operation, with the training that this force has received. The U.S. Army believes, and I strongly believe, training counts.

Let me go now to the one specific aspect of the mission they are going to have to perform. Again, General Shali will describe this in more detail.

The annex to the agreement calls for enforcement of military zones of separation. The separation line between Bosnian Federation forces and Bosnian-Serb forces will have a two kilometer line on either side of it, or a four kilometer deep zone, which is about two and a half miles wide.

In that area, no troops or weapons are permitted, except for our forces. One of our tasks will be to mark and enforce this zone of separation. The warring parties will have 30 days to remove themselves from this area, and we will ensure that that is maintained.

We believe that the breathing space that is needed, both in time and in space, is very critical in allowing the hatreds and the passions time to cool down.

In addition, they are required by the agreement to withdraw their heavy weapons and their forces to the cantonments and barracks areas within 120 days. That is another area of the agreement which we will have to enforce. Again, General Shali will talk about these in more detail.

The next point is who will be going with us on this operation. It is a remarkable list of companies. For openers, every NATO nation, except Iceland, who does not have an armed force, is committing forces to this operation. All are committing substantial forces proportional to the size of their country.

The United Kingdom, for example, is committing 13,000, France about 8,000, Germany 4,000, Italy and Spain about 2,000 each, and all of the other NATO countries—about 1,000 each.

Denmark, for example, with something over 1,000 troops, is making a very substantial contribution relative to the size of the country.



In addition to these NATO forces, more than a dozen non-NATO nations have indicated that they want to join the force. Let me just pick out a few. Sweden and Finland are going to join with the NATO countries of Norway and Denmark to form a Nordic brigade. This brigade will have 4,500 troops and will probably include forces from Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

The brigade will be built up from what is now the Nordic battalion, located in Tuzla. One of the great advantages to the United States is that this brigade, which will be located in the American division, brings with it a knowledge of the terrain, experience which will be very useful to our commander.

Incidentally, the Turkish battalion, which is also in the Tuzla area, will be reinforcing that battalion for the purposes of this operation.

I also want to call your attention to Russia. At the Williamsburg defense meeting, which took place two months ago, the NATO defense ministers asked me to meet with the Russian minister of defense to see if I could negotiate an agreement with him.

They gave me two guidances. First, they stated—and I might say unanimously stated—it was very desirable for Russia to participate in this peacekeeping operation, not just because of the benefits to Bosnia itself, but because they saw, and I think correctly so, that the involvement of Russia in this most critical security issue in Europe would set the stage for working together with Russia on security issues in Europe, instead of confronting them. They thought it was very important to have Russian participation.

But they gave me a very important restraint, which was that there could not be a separate Russian force. There could not be two different peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. There could not be two separate lines of command.

Russia, on the other hand, when I met with Minister of Defense Grachev, was very anxious to participate but did not want to participate under NATO. It took four meetings over the last month and a half to finally get that question resolved. It was resolved at the Brussels meeting, which I attended yesterday.

We have now an agreement, both among NATO and Russia. It still has to be formalized in writing, but the agreement is that there will be a Russian brigade. It will be under the tactical control of the American division commander. It will be under the operational control of General Joulwan.

The operational tasks and missions will be sent from General Joulwan to the brigade commander through a Russian general, who, incidentally, has been working with General Joulwan for the last month at NATO Headquarters.

I believe, our military commanders believe—particularly General Joulwan and General Nash, the division commander—and all of the NATO defense ministers believe, that this is a satisfactory arrangement. This is how we are proceeding.

This will cast a long shadow on European security for years to come if we can successfully carry out this plan. I do not minimize the difficulties of implementing it. It was difficult enough, I can assure you, to arrange it.

Let me get to the next chart.

Secretary PERRY. This is perhaps hard to see from where you are sitting. This is a layout of the three sectors which are planned

under the NATO operation. The British division will be in the vicinity of Bihac, the French division in Sarajevo, and the American division will be headquartered at Tuzla. The sector for the American division is indicated by this green line.

The U.S. division will consist of 20,000 troops of the First Armored Division, which will come from Germany. The First Armored Division will have an armored brigade, a mechanized brigade, an assault helicopter brigade, and artillery brigade. This will be a very well-armed and very competent division.

In addition, it will have the 4,500 personnel from the Nordic brigade. It will have perhaps 1,500 personnel from the Turkish reinforced battalion, and it will have the Russian brigade, which will be perhaps 2,000 to 3,000 personnel.

Let me point out one other thing. There are three trouble spots in this whole area, three areas where we are particularly concerned about security. One of them is the Bihac area where, besides the combatants that have been fighting all through the war, four forces actually exist.

Besides the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian government forces, there is also a separatist Bosnian force working there. So there is a particular security issue in Bihac.

There is a particular security issue in Sarajevo, because the agreement called for Sarajevo, which has been split and divided ever since the war began, to become a unified, multi-ethnic city again.

There will be a particular problem at Brcko, because Brcko has a narrow corridor which separates, or which connects, the two different Serb forces. The United States is responsible for the Brcko area, the French for Sarajevo and for Gorazde, and the British for Bihac.

When I talked to the troops, they wanted to know when they were going in, and I told them they would be going in within a few days after the signing of the peace agreement in Paris. We now know that that peace agreement signing is scheduled for December 14.

Our plan is to deploy rather rapidly, and by land primarily. We will be taking forces, which are now located at several different sites in Germany, and going by rail to a staging area in southern Hungary. Two staging areas will exist. One is a rail head and one is an air head.

From those two staging areas, we will assemble by unit, and each unit will go by road into Bosnia and on to Tuzla. Units will travel on their own power and with ammunition in their guns. That is, they will go in as combat units prepared to defend themselves, if necessary.

We expect the entire force to be in country, fully deployed, in fewer than eight weeks. More than half of the force will be there in the first three or four weeks. It is going to be a very rapid and a very effective entry.

General Shali will tell you more about the enabling force, which is already on its way into the country, which will prepare the way for this larger force.

Oh, I am sorry. Leave that chart on a little longer.

The last question which I answered for the troops is: When will we be coming out? I gave them a simple answer, but I have to give you a more complicated one.

They will be coming out in about a year. The NATO commitment for the Implementation Force is a one-year, twelve-month commitment. Now, the question is then: What will be the end state in Bosnia at that time? This is a question that I want to try to answer for you this morning.

Three categories exist: military tasks, civil tasks and military balance. These three criteria were examined. They determined for us what the size of the force should be and how long the force needed to be committed.

In terms of military tasks, I have already described them to you in simplified form, and General Shalikashvili will describe them to you in more detailed form. We are confident that we can complete these tasks in less than a year, and with some margin.

I indicated a few of the tasks that would be done in the first few months or by the first four to five months. But in general, the military tasks will be completed early in this one-year period.

The cycle of violence will be broken, and we will remain with that break in the cycle of violence for a year's period of time. I might also say a year plus two months, because the cease-fire, which was established on October 11, has been holding reasonably well since that time.

The second factor is the civil tasks. I emphasize to you what I have already stated, that IFOR is not there to perform civil tasks. But I cannot overemphasize the importance of these tasks are for the ultimate success of the peace in Bosnia.

The tasks of rebuilding the infrastructure, rebuilding the economy, creating elections, resettling the refugees, and providing humanitarian assistance are going to be assumed by other organizations, most of them under the sponsorship and the direction of the European Union.

These are very important functions. But none of them has the organization and the resources dedicated to it that NATO has already dedicated to the military tasks. Thus, it is reasonable to predict that they will be slower getting started.

We believe that they will be underway by the sixth-month mark, thus giving them six months to establish themselves by the time we leave. But we cannot link the departure of the Implementation Force to the completion of those tasks.

Some of those tasks will be going on for years. Our task is to provide the secure environment which allows them to get started.

Finally, the issue of military balance. Again, we can talk about this in much more detail.

We believe that a primary causative factor of this war was the force imbalance that existed between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian government, created when the Bosnians split off from the former Yugoslavia, thus giving the Bosnian Serbs most of the military equipment.

Therefore, when we leave in 12 months, we want that imbalance to be corrected. Fortunately, an arms control process has been set up in the Dayton agreement.

This arms control process is modeled on CFE, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. It applies—and calls for a build down of forces according to certain formula.

It includes not only the three warring parties, but regional actors such as Serbia and Croatia.

According to the agreement, we have six months to get this process successfully launched. And I have confidence that it will be successfully launched, particularly since it is not being imposed on the parties but rather they agreed to it.

Nobody wants an arms race to start in this area. This would be counterproductive to everybody. So we are counting on that arms control process working.

It has six months to work, and to accommodate the embargo. The embargo is extended for the first three months of the period. An embargo on heavy equipment is extended for six months.

We believe that this will be the key to achieving a military balance. But we also understand that it will not be sufficient. Therefore, we have undertaken to assure the Bosnian Federation that this military balance will be achieved by the time we leave.

We are prepared to do that by working through other countries and with other countries to provide any additional equipment and training that the Federation needs. That process, I might say, has already started in the sense that we have sent survey and assessment teams to Bosnia. The first team has already returned, and General Shali and I will be getting a report from them on Monday.

I wanted to give you some indication of cost. I have this organized in terms of the number of troops that will be involved and the cost that will be involved.

The troops, as we have testified many times before, number 20,000 in Bosnia and 5,000 in Croatia. Those 25,000 troops consist of the U.S. contribution to IFOR, the Implementation Force.

The cost of those 25,000 over a one-year period with some time to build up at the beginning and some time to build down at the end comes to about \$1.2 billion.

In addition, we plan to continue the airborne operation out of Italy at the same rate as the last year and a half, at a cost of \$300 million.

Finally, logistics support for this operation will be located primarily in Hungary and Italy, and will involve another 7,000 troops. We estimate that cost at a half a billion dollars.

So all told, the cost of this operation will be \$1.5 billion for IFOR the ongoing air operation, and another half billion for logistics support, for a total of \$2 billion.

I want to emphasize to you—I am sure this committee understands this point—that these are incremental costs. They do not include the salary of the troops, whose salary would be paid whether or not they were in Bosnia. These are the incremental costs associated with this operation.

All other costs associated with this, such as the salary of the troops, such as naval forces, which I do not mention here because we will have naval forces in the Mediterranean and the Adriatic whether or not we are in Bosnia, are included in the normal defense appropriation bill and are already accommodated by the funding we have.

I wanted to end with one final point before I turn it over to General Shali. I have been, in the last two months, to three different NATO meetings: one here in the United States at Williamsburg in October, the second one last week in Brussels among defense ministers, and again yesterday at an unprecedented joint meeting of foreign ministers and defense ministers, where final approval was given to the NATO operational plan.

I have never in my history in connection with NATO—and I have been attending NATO meetings in an official capacity since 1977—I have never seen a series of meetings at which such significant results were obtained.

Three things occurred at these meetings. First of all, the agreement on the commitment to IFOR. This was done unanimously, with all members present and not a single dissent, not a single major point raised.

General Shali will talk to you later about the issues, for example, on rules of engagement, which have been problems in the past. It is simply not an issue at this time.

Secondly, there is complete and unanimous agreement, not only on the value of Russia participation but on the particular agreement, which we have been able to negotiate with the Russians.

And finally, at the meeting last week, for the first time in 30 years, a French defense minister attended a meeting of defense ministers at NATO Headquarters.

Yesterday at the meeting, the French foreign minister announced that the French were now prepared to participate in the military structure in NATO. For those of you who have followed NATO for years, you understand what a landmark event this was.

My bottom conclusion on this is that NATO, which a few years ago people were predicting would become moribund and would pass out of existence as it lost its reason for being with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, produced the most resolute set of actions that I have ever seen. We saw an unprecedented unity—I want to emphasize that, unprecedented unity in NATO—rally around American leadership. It was unprecedented unity and speaks of a remarkable vitality.

My final comment is that one of the defense ministers remarked at the meeting yesterday, to a round of applause by the others, that the way he saw this mission is that they, meaning the other NATO nations, would go in with the Americans, they would act with unity, and then they would go out with the Americans.

And this was the unity I am talking about, and it also is an indication of the significance and importance of American leadership in NATO.

I would like to now ask General Shali to follow up my testimony. And then I will call Ambassador Holbrooke, and then we will all three be prepared to deal with questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Perry follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. WILLIAM J. PERRY, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Thank you Mr. Chairman. The Bosnia peace agreement that was initialed in Dayton was achieved through tireless efforts of Secretary Christopher and his lead negotiator, Dick Holbrooke. Dick's team included Lt. Gen. Wes Clark from the Joint Staff and Jim Pardew from my staff. As a result of their efforts we have a real oppor-

tunity to achieve peace in Bosnia and protect and advance America's security interests in Europe.

I recently spoke to 700 leaders from the First Armored Division—every leader from the Division commander down to the company NCO's. I can tell you they understand the mission we are giving them, they are trained and ready and enthusiastic. The First Armored Division will be the core of the U.S. ground component in the Bosnia Peace Implementation Force (IFOR). They had five questions they wanted me to answer and I want to tell you and the American people what I told our soldiers.

The questions were, "Why should we commit U.S. forces to IFOR in Bosnia? Who else is sending troops? What is our mission? When will we deploy? And what is our exit strategy?"

After I answer these questions, General Shalikashvili will talk more about the specific mission tasks of our forces, their capabilities and the command structure.

*Why should we send ground forces to Bosnia-Herzegovina?*

I believe there is a set of propositions that create an "iron logic" as to why we should commit ground forces to Bosnia as part of the NATO implementation force:

The United States has vital political, economic and security interests in Europe.

The war in Bosnia threatens these interests.

We now have an opportunity—the first real opportunity in 4 years—to end this war.

To seize this opportunity, a NATO force is required to implement the peace.

The United States is the only nation that can lead that force to success.

Finally, although there will be risks associated with this operation, the risks to the United States of allowing this war to continue and perhaps spread are even greater.

It is this "iron logic" that drives the decision that we should, at this time, commit ground troops to the NATO IFOR. Let me expand on each of those points very briefly.

The United States has vital political, economic and security interests in Europe. I regard this as an indisputable fact. For the past 50 years we pledged our lives and treasure to preserve the security of Europe against the threat of the Warsaw Pact. We understood that keeping Europe stable and secure ensured our own security. The threat from the Warsaw Pact has passed from the scene, but the collapse of the Soviet empire unleashed ethnic rivalries that continue to threaten stability in Europe and Central Asia. We are in the process of creating new structures to deal with these problems—the Partnership for Peace, an expanded NATO, and a pragmatic partnership with Russia—but the war in Bosnia threatens those positive developments.

When I say the war threatens our interests, I am not referring to the actual war itself and the direct consequences of the war, as appalling as those are. Many of you will support this commitment in part on the grounds that we have a moral obligation to seize this opportunity to end the killing and the atrocities. I am deeply sympathetic to that view, but as the Secretary of Defense I base my recommendations on colder analysis as well.

I'm talking about the danger of this war expanding to a wider part of Europe. This is not an academic concern. Only 2 months ago, I would have given you even odds that the Croat offensive in Bosnia would provoke a renewed, all-out war between Serbia and Croatia. And all during the last 3½ years, the danger has been palpable that this war would spread south into Kosovo and Macedonia, involving Albania, and perhaps Greece and Turkey. Given that we have the opportunity, there is certainly a moral imperative to stop the bloodshed and violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it is that danger of a wider war that is the most significant threat to U.S. interests. The best way of avoiding the spread of the war is to stop it.

We now have such an opportunity. It is the first time in 4 years that we have been able to get all of the parties to step forward to sign an agreement. I talked with each of the presidents involved and their delegations in Dayton. I believe there were two factors that brought them reluctantly to this agreement. First of all, a war weariness—4 years of fighting, a quarter of a million people killed, 2 million refugees. They are just sick of the war. Previous diplomatic efforts had been thwarted by the belief of one or more of the parties that they had more to gain by continuing to fight.

The second factor was that the warring parties were impressed and awed at the military capability of the United States and NATO. They got a sample of that during the bombing raids. They witnessed our military power, but they also came to believe that, in the context of an agreement, that power would be used constructively, not to harm them, but to enforce the peace. That was the solid foundation

which allowed them to step forward and make the necessary compromises to reach this peace agreement. Compromises, by the way, for which the three Presidents will be criticized in their own countries.

Therefore, in order to seize this opportunity for peace, we must make an American commitment to participate. None of the parties, certainly not the Bosnian Federation, and also surprisingly, neither the Croats or Serbians, would have been willing to sign the peace agreement without an American commitment to participation in the IFOR. And one of the parties has already publicly stated that they would withdraw from the agreement if that commitment to participate is not met.

So the real alternative to implementing this peace agreement, to passing on this chance for peace, is to allow the war to start up again. Failure to meet the American commitment could lead to another 6 months, another year, another 2 years of war—resulting in humanitarian tragedies in Bosnia and risking the danger of the war spreading—and thus endangering America's interests in European security.

This is not a blind plunge into a conflict. For 4 years and two administrations, we have, in the face of great pressure, refused to enter this war as a combatant on the ground. And we will not send U.S. troops into a war in Bosnia. We have said we will engage only to implement a peace agreement—with the consent of the three parties. We now have that agreement and that consent. If the parties don't sign or if they otherwise renege on the consent, we won't go forward.

And we will be taking every possible action to minimize the risks necessarily entailed in the IFOR. NATO is going in with a large force—60,000 total on the ground in Bosnia. Sixty thousand is the number of troops that General Joulwan, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, has determined he needs to accomplish the mission. Additional support troops will be located in neighboring countries. The air strike component will also be located out of country—the commanders will have access to as much NATO air power as they require. Some have argued that we could get by with a smaller force on the ground. A large force has advantages both from the point of view of deterrence and for planning our deployment. In any event, if we err, I prefer it to be on the side of sending in too many. If it turns out we don't need that many, we can pull some of them out. That is a lot better than not sending enough and scrambling to put more in later.

The American component of this force will include 20,000 ground troops in Bosnia. There are sound military reasons to organize our military presence around a full American division which has the advantage of self-sufficiency and organic support elements. The American force will be able to protect itself under any circumstances. This large a force also is indicative of our size and our leadership position in NATO.

We are going in with a well-armed and well-trained force and with robust rules of engagement. The U.S. ground contingent is built around the 1st Armored Division. Nobody should doubt that the 1st Armored Division is capable of taking care of itself. The 1st AD's Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, artillery, and Apache helicopters will be sufficient to take on any opposition in the region.

In addition, about 5,000 U.S. troops will deploy to Croatia, and 7,000 will be stationed in countries around the rim of the former Yugoslavia in support of the operation. We also plan an initial call-up of some 3,800 reservists for a 270 day period, both to fulfill some key tasks within IFOR and to backfill in Europe for active duty units deploying to Bosnia. These reserve call-ups are a result of the implementation of the Total Force concept.

#### *Who else is going?*

Two thirds of the IFOR will be non-United States. While there will be 20,000 Americans in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as of today, more than 25 nations have stated an intent to join this force. Every NATO nation except Iceland plans to send troops. The British 12,000 to 14,000; the French 7,000 to 9,000; the Germans 4,000; Italians and Spanish about 2,000 each; and nine other nations about 1,000 each. In addition, there are more than a dozen non-NATO nations that have offered forces.

The 1st AD commander, Maj. Gen. Bill Nash, will have under his command his own division plus some other U.S. units, but he will also command soldiers from 7 to 10 other countries.

He will have a Nordic brigade of 4,500 troops, who are well-trained and well disciplined, and know the terrain. This brigade will consist of Norwegians, Finns, Danes, Swedes, and perhaps a Polish battalion. A very positive aspect is that many of their personnel have served a year or more on the ground in the Tuzla area where our troops will be centered. We can learn from them; in fact, our survey teams already are benefiting from the experience of the Nordic forces.

Major General Nash will also have a Turkish task force of one or two battalions. And he will have a Russian brigade. This poses some challenges to Major General Nash, but it's also a historic opportunity. I've spent most of my life as a "Cold War-

rior," and as recently as a few years ago I could not have imagined the prospect of a Russian brigade serving under an American division commander.

I have met with General Grachev four times in the last 2 months, trying to hammer out the agreement for Russian participation. We agreed on an arrangement putting the Russian brigade under General Joulwan's operational control, but giving him a Russian deputy who will transmit Joulwan's orders to that brigade. General Grachev agreed that Major General Nash will have tactical control of that brigade.

In addition to the military arrangement, General Grachev and I discussed the issue of political control. We reached agreement "in principle" on an arrangement that gives Russia the opportunity to consult, to be fully informed and to have input on matters involving Russian forces. This will be done through a formal consultative committee. But the final decisions of political control will be left to the North Atlantic Council, preserving unity of command. NATO and Russia would take each other's views into account, but if any disagreement cannot be resolved through this committee, the decisions would stand. Russia, of course, would have the option to withdraw from the operation, but we do not expect that contingency to develop. In any event, inability to agree would not prevent NATO from proceeding.

I have invested so much time on this issue because of the impact that Russian participation will have on the future security in Europe. Last month, I met with all the NATO defense ministers in Williamsburg, Virginia. There was unanimous agreement that we wanted Russian participation—providing it could be arranged without jeopardizing unity of command. In the Europe of the future, we do not want to isolate or exclude Russia. We want to find a way to include them inside the circle working with us, rather than outside the circle in a posture of confrontation.

The wide participation in the IFOR is a symbol of the new Europe. The effort will define how security in Europe is going to be handled for decades to come. In effect, we will be defining what post-Cold War Europe is all about and how its security will be assured. We will be creating new relationships with these military leaders of other countries, not just NATO countries, that will have a positive effect on the security of the United States for decades to come. But the entire effort depends on U.S. leadership. That is the lesson of Dayton, where U.S. leadership made the difference in diplomacy. That is the lesson of the NATO bombing campaign, where U.S. leadership stiffened the resolve of NATO. And that is the lesson that European leaders repeat to me at every meeting—if the U.S. leads, the military job will be done right and we will succeed.

#### *What is the mission for IFOR?*

The mission of IFOR is to implement the military aspects of the peace agreement: enforce cessation of hostilities, withdrawal to agreed lines, creation of a zone of separation, and oversee return of troops and weapons to cantonments. And, of course, IFOR will be responsible for its own self-defense and freedom of movement. The forces, their training, their equipment and their Rules of Engagement (ROE) are geared to these missions. I recently completed my second trip to the units getting ready for the operation: I have talked with every commander in the U.S. chain: from SACEUR, General Joulwan, who will be in overall command; to Admiral Smith, who will be the theater commander; to Lieutenant General Walker, the ground forces commander; to Major General Nash; to the brigade, battalion and company commanders and the senior NCO's. They understand the mission; they have the training and equipment they need; they are ready to go if the order comes.

This mission will be even-handed. If they get any provocations, either by the Bosnian Serbs or the Bosnian Federation forces, they will respond. They will have the authority to move anywhere in Bosnia. They will be based primarily in the Federation, but will be enforcing a zone of separation which goes several kilometers into Bosnian Serb territory and will have to maintain lines of communication that pass through Bosnian Serb territory. Therefore in the peace agreement, we insisted on and got the authority to go anywhere in Bosnia to carry out our mission.

Our troops have all trained extensively for their mission. They will have robust Rules of Engagement and have been trained and disciplined in how to apply the ROEs. If our forces are attacked, or if hostile intent is demonstrated by opposing forces, our rules of engagement will permit the immediate and effective use of deadly force. Our troops are well-disciplined, and well-trained. They know how to react across the full spectrum of situations they might encounter. They will use force as required and have been trained to control the level of violence, but make no mistake, they will have full authority to use deadly force if they believe they need to.

It is important to be prepared for the mission, and we are. But the commanders also understand what they are not going to do. The IFOR will be operating under NATO military and political control, not under U.N. control. We expect the U.N. to give a mandate to a whole set of military and civil operations in Bosnia. IFOR will



be the military side of that mandate. The civilian programs will include rebuilding the infrastructure, revitalizing the economy, bringing refugees back for resettlement, and providing for free elections. Those tasks will not be IFOR's job, but none of them can be done without IFOR successfully accomplishing its mission. IFOR must help provide the security environment that allows all those other things to be done.

Our troops are not going to equip and train military forces. However, in order to achieve a lasting peace in the Balkans, it will be essential to achieve stable and balanced force levels within Bosnia-Herzegovina and among the states of the former Yugoslavia. That military stabilization should be achieved, to the extent possible, through arms limitations and reductions, rather than by the introduction of large quantities of new arms into the region. All of the parties agreed to an arms control process modeled after the CFE agreement which would result in stability through a build down of arms. As significant as the arms control measures in the Dayton agreement are, they may not be sufficient to achieve military stabilization. In that case, the United States will work with other countries to ensure that Federation armed forces obtain the necessary equipment and training by the time the NATO-led implementation force withdraws from Bosnia Herzegovina. But we hope and expect that arms control will succeed because of the interest of the parties and their neighbors in Europe. One week after the Paris signing there will be a conference in Bonn to structure the arms control process.

We have recognized that there will be risks in this operation. But because the governments have consented, the risks do not come from entering into a war as a combatant and fighting organized units. We do expect that there may be individuals or gangs who challenge the authority of IFOR or try to harass the forces. We also expect problems from harsh weather, poor infrastructure and mines—there may be as many as 6 million mines in the country.

Our forces have trained against these risks. Last month, I visited our training areas at Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, Germany. At Grafenwoehr all the units of the 1st AD went back through refresher training in their combat skills, such as tank gunnery practice. They then transitioned to Hohenfels where EUROM has created a mini-Bosnia—complete with villages, villagers, Serb and Federation armies, paramilitary units, black marketeers, smugglers, U.N. and NGO officials, bad roads, snipers, mines, mud and even CNN. The units are run through every conceivable scenario we could think up, and we had the help of British, French, Dutch and Canadian peacekeepers who have served in Bosnia and seen it all. If they succeeded in solving the problems, the trainers just made it harder. The objective, as stated by General Joulwan, was "to make the scrimmage harder than the game."

#### *When will the troops deploy?*

The timing of the operational deployments is dependent on the signing of the peace agreement, the U.N. Security Council resolution, and a North Atlantic Council decision to deploy the IFOR. The NAC recently approved the deployment of enabling forces to go to Bosnia and Croatia to prepare for the arrival of the main body of IFOR troops. This enabling force, about half of which are American, is now deploying to various locations in Bosnia and Croatia. This preparatory step is needed if the main body of U.S. and NATO troops are to be able to enter swiftly and safely, if the order to go is given. This step does not preempt Congress' consideration of our plans because the combat units of the 1st AD will not begin to flow until after the agreement is signed.

After the signing, the force would build up rapidly, moving from Germany to Bosnia by rail and road. By the end of the second month, we will have our entire force in and we'll maintain that and build down in the last few months. General Shalikashvili will lay out the schedule in more detail.

#### *What is the exit strategy?*

We believe the mission can be accomplished in 1 year, so we have built our plan based on that timeline. This schedule is realistic because the specific military tasks in the agreement can be completed in the first 6 months, and thereafter IFOR's role will be to maintain the climate of stability that will permit civil work to go forward. We expect that these civil functions will be successfully initiated in 1 year. But, even if some of them are not, we must not be drawn into a posture of indefinite garrison.

By the end of the first year, we expect that we will have achieved perhaps several months of a stable security environment, will have broken the cycle of violence and will have the civil program efforts starting to take hold. That is why I believe that the London Conference to get reconstruction and economic efforts off to a quick start is very important.

In the final analysis, it is up to the parties to achieve peace. Our effort will give them that opportunity.

In conclusion, I want to emphasize my belief that this is both a commitment that is important to our national interests and an achievable mission. History has demonstrated the consequences of instability in Europe. Two generations of Americans paid the price. The conditions for peace in the Balkans now exist. But they require American commitment and leadership. If we do not fulfill that commitment we will rue the consequences for the long term security of Europe and for our own security.

#### **STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

General SHALIKASHVILI. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you very much for this opportunity.

I would like to take a few moments, if I may, to brief you on NATO's plan for the Implementation Force and the part that U.S. forces will be playing in this implementation.

Before I begin, let me assure you that throughout the negotiating process in Dayton, my staff and I have been in constant contact with our negotiators to ensure that the military tasks that we would have to implement would be in fact appropriate for the Implementation Force and would be executable. I am convinced that the military tasks, as outlined in the peace plan, are appropriate and are executable.

That said, let me turn to the current situation in Bosnia and the major threats that the IFOR will face. The situation of the cease-fire agreement on the ground has remained stable since October 12.

Ground offenses by factions have ceased. Our attentions in Sarajevo are heightened over future Muslim control of Serb neighborhoods, as we have heard.

In Tuzla, where the United States division will be deployed, all is quiet at this time. Nevertheless, our soldiers have to be prepared to deal with the threats shown on the bottom of this chart.



— Current situation

- Ceasefire holding; minor violations continue
- No changes to confrontation line since 11 Oct

— Major threats to IFOR

- Indirect fire against unprotected forces
- Landmines, civil disorder, snipers, non-combat losses
- Extremist elements
- Hostage taking for political goals
- Undisciplined local factions

General SHALIKASHVILI. Let me point out some of them—first being land mines. While land mines will require us to be extraordinarily careful, we have trained very hard to operate in this mine environment in such things as mine awareness and mine clearing.

We have experience from the past in this area. Certainly we operated in a very heavy mine environment when we were called upon to help in a humanitarian operation with the Kurds in Northern Iraq and Eastern Turkey, where literally probably millions of mines as well were located in this area.

We learned not only how to be aware of mines and how to operate in this environment, but we also learned the importance of discipline, small unit discipline, understanding how you clear, understanding how you mark lanes through whatever areas where mines might be located, and how to operate day and night in this environment.

As a result of the extraordinary care that we took in Northern Iraq, we had very few incidents with mines affecting U.S. soldiers. I think we can take those lessons and have done so for this upcoming operation.

Second, we have included in the agreement the requirement for the Federation forces and the Bosnian-Serb forces to mark mines and other booby traps and other obstacles where they know that they are, to provide us with all their maps and other information on the location of such obstacles and mines, and then finally for them to clear those, not for us.

The only mine clearing that we envision happening is to assist us with our specific mission when we happen to come upon mines. It is important that we clear those mines and not wait for the Bosnian-Serb or the Federation forces to do so.

Finally, we have now for some time been keeping track of the best information available on mine locations. In Heidelberg, at 5th Corps Headquarters, we have been collecting such information, ei-

ther from the Bosnian Federation forces or from UNPROFOR forces or those operating in the area, have been cataloging it, and updating it weekly.

So while we do not pretend to know all the locations of the mines, because probably no one knows them all, we have quite a bit of information on the location of mines that will obviously assist our forces as we move in.

The other issue that I want to highlight is on the second line towards the end, and that is the noncombat losses. It is useful to remember that the largest cause of casualties that UNPROFOR suffered at the time the conflict was ongoing was due to noncombat losses, traffic accidents, other accidents, deaths to illnesses.

We, therefore, trained very hard on that as well. How to operate vehicles and equipment on the kind of roads that we could encounter there, how to have accident awareness in handling heavy equipment and whatnot, because it has shown us, experience there in Bosnia has shown us, that that was and will mostly likely remain the largest cause of casualties.

We have trained, as Secretary Perry said, on all of these threats. So in addition to training on doing the task, this has been a major emphasis of ours, to learn how to deal with these. I am confident that that training has been extraordinarily good and productive.



## Overall Concept

### IFOR Mission

*In an even-handed manner, monitor and enforce compliance with the military aspects of the Dayton peace agreement*

- Unity of Command under SACEUR
- CINCSOUTH operational commander for NATO and non-NATO forces
- NATO Rules of Engagement

General SHALIKASHVILI. On the next chart you see the IFOR mission. The mission is clear and limited in scope. The chain of command is straightforward, and the rules of engagement will properly protect our troops and allow them to get the job done. I will say a little bit more in a second on that.

Now, with the help of the next two charts, let me show you the specific military tasks outlined in the agreement.



## *Military Tasks of the Dayton Agreement*

- Supervise selective marking of cease-fire line, inter-entity boundary line and zones of separation
- Monitor, and if necessary enforce, withdrawal of forces to their respective territories within agreed period
  - Ensure withdrawal of forces behind zone of separation within 30 days of transfer of authority
  - Ensure redeployment of forces from areas to be transferred from one entity to the other within 45 days of transfer of authority
  - Ensure no introduction of forces into transferred areas for an additional 45 days

General SHALIKASHVILI. First of all, as rapidly as possible, we will supervise—and I emphasize supervise—the marking of the cease-fire line and the inter-entity boundary and the zones of separation.

We will then monitor the implementation of very specific, time-phased requirements outlined in the bottom half of the chart. If there is some noncompliance by some local elements or rogue units, we will then enforce these particular steps.



## *Military Tasks of the Dayton Agreement (cont)*

- Establish and man 4km zone of separation (2km on either side of cease-fire / inter-entity boundary line)
- Establish liaison with local military and civilian authorities
- Create Joint Military Commissions to resolve disputes between the Parties

General SHALIKASHVILI. The next chart shows you the remaining three specific military tasks.

But just as important as it is to understand the tasks, the military tasks that the IFOR must be prepared to perform, it is equally important to understand what tasks will not be the responsibility of the IFOR.

The IFOR will not be responsible for the conduct of humanitarian operations. It will not be a police force. It will not conduct nation building. It will not have the mission of disarming, and it will not move refugees.


These are the military tasks that the IFOR will have to perform and the tasks that it very specifically will not perform.

In addition to these responsibilities, the IFOR has been given certain authorities, such as assisting with interference of humanitarian efforts or relocation of refugees, providing that this does not interfere with the conduct of the primary missions and that it is within the capability of the IFOR.

I must emphasize that these are not responsibilities of the IFOR, but these are authorities that we asked for because in each instance, we could envision circumstances that if we did not try to assist with interference, for instance, of humanitarian efforts, the situation might get out of hand and endanger our own forces or endanger the whole peace process.

The same as, for instance, with the relocation of refugees. I emphasize again that this is not a responsibility of the IFOR.

### Command and Control




General SHALIKASHVILI. The next chart shows the command and control. As you can see, the NATO command and control, the chain of command, is very straightforward. It will run from General Joulwan through Admiral Smith to British Lieutenant General Walker, who will command all the ground forces, and onto Major General Nash, shown in the lower left-hand corner, who will be in command of the American division.

- All IFOR units (NATO and non-NATO) under NATO ROE
- These ROE permit the right to use force up to and including deadly force:
  - In self defense to protect against a hostile act or hostile intent
  - To accomplish the mission

General SHALIKASHVILI. Let me next turn to the rules of engagement. Under NATO's rules of engagement, our soldiers have the right to use force, to include deadly force, to protect themselves against hostile acts or hostile intent.

It was very important to us to ensure that we include the ability to protect ourselves against hostile intent, as well as hostile acts. The same kind of rules of engagement and the same set of authorities to use force apply to our ability to get the job done.

### *Personnel Requirements*




In order to get the job done properly and safely, the plan calls for a total IFOR force of approximately 60,000 troops in Bosnia. Of this, as you are well aware, the U.S. contribution will be 20,000 in Bosnia with another 5,000 stationed in Croatia, for a total of 25,000 in the former Yugoslavia in support of the IFOR.

An additional 7,000 troops will provide needed support functions from outside of the former Yugoslavia, from such countries as Hungary and Italy.

Further, this operation will require a selected reserve call-up of approximately 3,800 in specialties such as civil affairs, psychological operations and military police.

Congress and the specific units have been notified in order to be able to get started on area and mission training. And we are looking for the presidential selected reserve call-up by the end of this week.

## *Phasing*




General SHALIKASHVILI. The operation itself will consist of five phases. We are now, of course, in the preparation phase. Phase two, the entry phase, will begin immediately following the signing of the peace agreement in Paris, the passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution and the issuance of an activation order by NATO. Only then will deployment of the main forces begin.





## IFOR Enabling Forces



10

As you are well aware, a small number of military personnel had to be moved into the area early, ahead of the signing of the peace agreement they were to establish an essential communications command and support structure to enable rapid arrival of the 60,000 main forces that will start deploying after the conditions that I mentioned to you.


The U.S. portion of these enabling forces include 735 personnel to Bosnia. These began deploying on Monday, and we expect all of them to be in Bosnia by the 14th of December.

An additional 730 U.S. personnel will deploy into Croatia. These forces are also in the process of deploying, and the majority of them, numbering some 421, will be in Zagreb and to place our airport where the hospital is now located.

Aside from these enabling forces, a further 3,000 support forces will be deploying this week to Hungary and some of them to Italy, to establish forward staging bases to support our main forces once they themselves start deploying.



## IFOR Initial Entry Operations




Once the peace agreement goes into effect and NATO activates the deployment, French and British division headquarters will move in from the south through Split and Ploče, while the U.S. division headquarters and appropriate security forces will enter from Hungary through Croatia from the north.

At the same time, the IFOR headquarters and the rapid reaction corps, which are the headquarters for the ground force commander, will move to Sarajevo and Kiseljak, respectively.



## *IFOR Follow-On Force Deployment Ops*



As soon as these headquarters are established, IFOR will assume control of all UNPROFOR forces in the theater. The establishment of headquarters will be quickly followed by the arrival of the lead brigades. And most forces should be in place by the middle of February.

Once the forces are in place, the division areas will look as you saw on the previous chart that Secretary Perry showed and that I want to show you one more time.

A map of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its surrounding regions. The map shows the following details:

- Neighboring Countries:** CROATIA to the north, SERBIA to the east, MONTENEGRO to the south, and ALBANIA to the south.
- Internal Divisions:** The map is divided into three main administrative regions: BOSNIA (north), HERZEGOVINA (south), and a central area labeled "AND".
- Military Divisions:**
  - US DIVISION:** Located in the northern part of Bosnia, indicated by a box with the US flag.
  - UP DIVISION:** Located in the western part of Bosnia, indicated by a box with a flag.
  - FRENCH DIVISION:** Located in the southern part of Bosnia, indicated by a box with the French flag.
- Cities and Towns:**
  - Zagreb (in Croatia)
  - Bijac
  - Panja Luka
  - Gornja Vakuf
  - Split
  - Pljeo
  - Brcko
  - Tuzla
  - Lornica
  - Sarajevo (the capital, marked with a star)
  - Gorazde
  - Mostar
  - binje
  - Podgorica
- Other Features:**
  - Dashed lines represent international borders.
  - Shaded areas represent the territories of the military divisions.

A map of the Tuzla Island area in the Black Sea. The map shows the coastline of Ukraine to the north and east, and Turkey to the south. Key locations include BAKI, TURKBAI, and TUZLA. Military units are indicated by symbols and text: 04 (SU) 1, 04 (SU) 2, 04 (SU) 3, 04 (SU) 4, 04 (SU) 5, 04 (SU) 6, 04 (SU) 7, 04 (SU) 8, 04 (SU) 9, 04 (SU) 10, 04 (SU) 11, 04 (SU) 12, 04 (SU) 13, 04 (SU) 14, 04 (SU) 15, 04 (SU) 16, 04 (SU) 17, 04 (SU) 18, 04 (SU) 19, 04 (SU) 20, 04 (SU) 21, 04 (SU) 22, 04 (SU) 23, 04 (SU) 24, 04 (SU) 25, 04 (SU) 26, 04 (SU) 27, 04 (SU) 28, 04 (SU) 29, 04 (SU) 30, 04 (SU) 31, 04 (SU) 32, 04 (SU) 33, 04 (SU) 34, 04 (SU) 35, 04 (SU) 36, 04 (SU) 37, 04 (SU) 38, 04 (SU) 39, 04 (SU) 40, 04 (SU) 41, 04 (SU) 42, 04 (SU) 43, 04 (SU) 44, 04 (SU) 45, 04 (SU) 46, 04 (SU) 47, 04 (SU) 48, 04 (SU) 49, 04 (SU) 50, 04 (SU) 51, 04 (SU) 52, 04 (SU) 53, 04 (SU) 54, 04 (SU) 55, 04 (SU) 56, 04 (SU) 57, 04 (SU) 58, 04 (SU) 59, 04 (SU) 60, 04 (SU) 61, 04 (SU) 62, 04 (SU) 63, 04 (SU) 64, 04 (SU) 65, 04 (SU) 66, 04 (SU) 67, 04 (SU) 68, 04 (SU) 69, 04 (SU) 70, 04 (SU) 71, 04 (SU) 72, 04 (SU) 73, 04 (SU) 74, 04 (SU) 75, 04 (SU) 76, 04 (SU) 77, 04 (SU) 78, 04 (SU) 79, 04 (SU) 80, 04 (SU) 81, 04 (SU) 82, 04 (SU) 83, 04 (SU) 84, 04 (SU) 85, 04 (SU) 86, 04 (SU) 87, 04 (SU) 88, 04 (SU) 89, 04 (SU) 90, 04 (SU) 91, 04 (SU) 92, 04 (SU) 93, 04 (SU) 94, 04 (SU) 95, 04 (SU) 96, 04 (SU) 97, 04 (SU) 98, 04 (SU) 99, 04 (SU) 100. The map also shows the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov, and the Crimean Peninsula. A legend in the bottom right corner identifies the symbols for Assault Command Post, Security Force, and the US flag.


I must tell you that both of them have been extraordinarily helpful to us in providing needed information on the area, on the condi-

tions, on the information that they have about such things as mine fields and any other potential threats to us. They have been very helpful in assisting our commanders with the necessary reconnaissance that had to be conducted.

As you know, our initial intent is that assault command post and the security forces will go into Tuzla where the Nordic battalion is now located.



## *US Force Deployments*



Once all forces are deployed, our division headquarters will be in Tuzla, as I just said, together with an aviation brigade. Distributed throughout the area will be two U.S. brigades, the Russian brigade, a Nordic brigade, and a Turkish battalion task force.

So you can see that the force will be very extensive. The U.S. will be essentially 20,000 and several more thousand contained in the other brigades and units that I have just mentioned to you.




## Joint Military Commissions

### Who...

- IFOR Commander -- Chair
- Senior military commander of each entity
- Comparable participants at subordinate levels

### Why...

- Resolve military implementation issues




Now, the plan calls also for the establishment of joint military commissions composed of IFOR commanders at each level and the appropriate senior military commanders of the Federation and of the Bosnian Serbs.

The main purpose of these commissions is to resolve military implementation issues. So as issues arise, whether this or that had to be done by a certain time, these are the commissions that will exist at IFOR headquarters all the way down to battalion headquarters that will deal with these implementation issues.

It is important to recall that the responsibility for the implementation of the tasks rests with the Bosnian-Serb forces and with the Federation forces. It is only when they fail to comply or rogue elements fail to comply that IFOR then will enforce that compliance.

It is important that we are in contact with them day in and day out to ensure that we can resolve any disagreements on implementation issues.

## Parallel Structures in B-H



It is also important to understand that the success of the total effort in Bosnia will depend not only on the IFOR tasks that I just described today and the IFOR effort as shown there in blue, but that it will depend just as much on the civilian effort shown in green.



## Closing Thoughts

- Plan is sound, carefully crafted to send strong, able force
  - Mission is clear
  - Command and control is right
  - Rules of Engagement allow for force protection and mission accomplishment
- Operation tough ...must be prepared for casualties
- Soldiers have trained hard ...ready
- Mission is doable

Let me just close with some final thoughts. The Joint Chiefs and I, as well as all of my NATO counterparts, agree that the plan is sound, that the mission is clear, and that the rules of engagement are appropriate to the task. Also, NATO approved the plan pending

the signing of the peace agreement in Paris, as Secretary Perry just mentioned.

Now, while the mission will be demanding, and we have to be prepared for casualties, our soldiers have trained very hard. I am firmly convinced that they are ready to the task, and I believe that the task that we have been asked to do is in fact doable.

With that, Mr. Chairman, allow me to turn it over to assistant Secretary Holbrooke.

Secretary PERRY. Mr. Chairman, let me interrupt just for a moment to introduce Ambassador Holbrooke with a personal introduction.

For the past several months, he has undertaken the task which the President has assigned him of trying to succeed in a peace agreement in Bosnia that for four years many others have tried and failed. He did succeed, and it was a brilliant performance.

And I want to acknowledge, first of all, my great personal admiration for his achievement and his efforts and say that I believe our country, and indeed the world, owes him a vote of gratitude.

Dick?

#### **STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS**

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Bill.

I am very moved, and I am very proud to be here today on behalf of the Secretary of State, who is on his way back from the important meetings in Brussels, which Secretary Perry already described.

I have spent a great deal over the last week in meetings with your colleagues and some of you, but this is the first time I have testified publicly since Dayton. So I would like to begin by asking you to introduce into the record the statement of the Secretary of State.

And then at his request, Warren Christopher has asked me to add a few personal observations to amplify what Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili have just mentioned.

Chairman THURMOND. Without objection, that will be admitted.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. As I said, I am very grateful to appear before this distinguished committee today. I would simply like to make a few general observations about where we are in this extraordinary process.

In eight days, the Dayton agreements, which were initialed in Dayton, will be signed in Paris. There will be no change between Dayton and Paris. President Clinton will be at that event.

As General Shalikashvili and Secretary Perry have said, the full life for deployments will then begin in earnest.

We come to you today, as we have before so many of your colleagues, to ask for an expression of support for the troops and for the policy and for American leadership, not only in Bosnia but in the world.

What was achieved in Dayton was more—Bill Perry is very kind in his comments about me, but this was a team effort, and the team began with President Clinton in a decision to engage the leadership of the United States diplomatically, politically and militarily.



It could not have been without the NATO air strikes, without the full leadership of the United States, and particularly with the full support of the Pentagon, which had a senior three star general, Wesley Clark, as part of our team, and the full backing of General Shalikashvili and Secretary Perry.

But it took American leadership to get the Dayton agreements. Those agreements far exceeded our expectations, and I will return to them in a minute.

That leadership has changed America's perception in Europe and has regained for us the kind of leadership we need for our national security, including our economic well-being. It will also take American leadership to make the piece of paper initialed in Dayton a success on the ground.

Implementation will be just as difficult as the negotiations, and that leadership requires some American resources in both the military and nonmilitary field.

In all cases, we are a small percentage of the overall effort, a minority of the forces in IFOR, in NATO, but the glue that holds it together and the command and control structure; a small percentage of the economic reconstruction funds, but without an American commitment, nobody else will be there.

So we ask you this morning to support the decision to send NATO troops and American troops to the region and to show the troops that they will have the backing of the American people as expressed through the Congress.

For our part, the negotiating team will return to Belgrade, Zagreb And Sarajevo tomorrow at the instructions of the President, the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, to follow up on Dayton, to look forward to implementation, and to bring directly to the attention of President Izetbegovic, President Milosevic and President Tudjman any concerns you may express to us this morning. So I would announce here that we will be returning to the region tomorrow.

In regard to the Dayton agreements, let me make two or three quick points. First, a comment about Dayton and Ohio itself. The support given to us by the people of Ohio and the people of Dayton was extraordinary.

And although Dayton and Ohio were not picked for this reason—they were picked for logistical support at Wright Patterson Air Force Base—the fact that Ohio has a diverse, multi-ethnic population, including people from all the countries and cultures of Southeastern Europe, including many Serb Americans and Croatian Americans, was an extraordinary plus.

We were picketed by the Albanian American community of Dayton, which got the message through the high wire fence. We were delighted to be there, and I want to express our full appreciation to the U.S. military personnel at Wright Patterson and to the people of Ohio, and especially to Dayton.

Secondly, the agreements themselves, as embodied in this massive document, 11 annexes plus the map, far exceeded what we expected. We had hoped to get four or five of these annexes. We never expected to get all 11.

What this document contains is the framework for a unified, single country. I want to stress that, because everyone here, under-

standably, is operating with their mind set on the picture of Bosnia as it has been, as we have seen it on television, an area torn by war and driven by ethnic hatreds.

But in Dayton, at the request of the parties themselves, the United States led an international diplomatic effort that produced a constitutional framework, an agreement on elections to be run by an international organization, not by the local people, who could not do it on their own.

The right of return for refugees, full protection for human rights, and compliance with the war crimes tribunal parts of the process now going on in the Hague, and many other issues.

There is a central government. There are free elections. The central government has specified authorities. There is a central bank, a central issuing authority for money.

Now, you may say those are just paper agreements, and the history of the region does not give one optimism about whether or not they will be carried out. But let me be clear, the parties asked us to negotiate it, initialed it and will sign it in eight days.

As General Shalikashvili's charts made clear, the chart which in some ways is as important as any other was the chart in which he showed the interface between IFOR and the civilian implementation. These will be separate chains of command.

The civilians will have no authority over IFOR, and the rules of engagement will be absolutely as General Shalikashvili described them. To the full satisfaction of the United States and NATO, simultaneously a massive civilian implementation will take place and on its success or failure will rest the ultimate verdict on the Dayton agreements. I stress this because in the eyes of so many people here, this is merely a one-year pause before they start fighting again. That is not what the parties want. That is not what they asked us to negotiate, and that is not what we are going out there to do.

We think a year is sufficient. If a year does not work, two, three or five years will not do either. And we do not think that either you or the American public would want an open-ended commitment in terms of duration. But I want to stress the people of the region want peace, and they have asked the United States and the European Community to join us in getting it.

We believe that in the long, dreadful history of this war, which is the greatest threat to stability in Europe, a stability which is integral to our national security interests and which is also the worst humanitarian crisis in Europe since 1945, in the long history of this war, the Dayton agreements provide us our first real chance of success.

Now those of us at this table and the large backup team, which stretched from Wright Patterson to the Pentagon and the State Department and to President Clinton, are all proud of having been part of an effort in which American leadership did this. We hope that you will join us in making the implementation phase as successful.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Christopher follows:]

## PREPARED STATEMENT BY WARREN CHRISTOPHER, SECRETARY OF STATE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On Monday night, President Clinton addressed the Nation to explain why American troops should join our NATO allies to help peace take hold in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Secretary Perry, General Shalikashvili, and I are here to further explain our purpose and our plans, to answer your questions, and to seek your support.

We have a fundamental choice. As the President made clear, if the United States does not participate, there will be no NATO force. If there is no NATO force, there will be no peace in Bosnia, and the war *will* reignite.

We do not have to imagine the consequences. We know what would happen. There would be more massacres, more concentration camps, more hunger, a real threat of a wider war, and immense damage to our leadership in NATO, in Europe, and the world. That is the alternative we can and must avoid. We must continue to secure the peace.

The war in the former Yugoslavia has been a threat to our Nation's interests and an affront to our Nation's values. We have been witness to horrors and cruelties that my generation—the generation that fought World War II—once thought we consigned to a dark and distant past. We have faced the constant threat of a wider, even more terrible war in an unstable part of Europe. We have had to contemplate the possibility that our troops would be called upon to rescue our allies from Bosnia under fire.

This summer, the conflict in Bosnia reached a crisis point. The President launched a carefully conceived initiative that took us step by step from the most horrifying events of the war—the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa—to this hopeful point.

At the July London Conference, we persuaded our allies to take decisive measures to protect Bosnia's remaining safe areas. We led a NATO bombing campaign to convince the Bosnian Serbs that nothing more could be gained by continuing the war. Our diplomacy produced a cease-fire and a set of constitutional principles for a single Bosnian state. And last week, we led the parties to a comprehensive settlement in Dayton. That settlement will be formally signed in Paris on December 14.

As a result of the President's initiative, the fighting has stopped. We now have an opportunity to secure an enduring peace because of American strength and American diplomacy. There can be no doubt that we will achieve our goal only if America continues to lead. The parties have taken risks for peace and we must continue to support them.

Our interest in implementing the Dayton settlement is clear.

We have a strong interest in ending the worst atrocities in Europe since World War II—atrocities that are all the more pernicious because they have been directed at specific groups of people because of their faith. By helping peace take hold, we can make sure that the people of Bosnia see no more days of dodging bullets, no more winters of freshly dug graves, no more years of isolation from the outside world.

We have a strong interest in making sure this war does not spread. Bosnia lies on a faultline in a volatile region of Europe. To the south are Kosovo, Albania, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the likeliest flashpoints of a wider war, as well as Greece and Turkey, two NATO allies. To the north and east lie Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, fragile new democracies deeply threatened by the prospect of ethnic conflict in the Balkans. To the north also lies the Eastern Slavonia region of Croatia, which could yet spark a regional war if the Dayton accords are not implemented.

Peace in this part of Europe matters to the United States because Europe matters to the United States. Twice this century, we have sent millions of American soldiers to war across the Atlantic. The first of this century's great wars began with violence in Sarajevo. The second began with aggression in Central Europe and with horrors that the world ignored until it was too late. Ever since, our leaders, Republican and Democrat alike, have acted to protect our vital interest in European stability. If we do not take this opportunity for peace, we could be faced with the prospect of action far costlier and more dangerous than anything being contemplated now.

The United States also has a vital interest in maintaining our leadership in the world. Acting in Bosnia now is an acid test of American leadership. After creating this opportunity for peace, we cannot afford to walk away. I can tell you from my personal experience as Secretary of State that if we are seen as a country that does not follow through on the work it begins, no nation will follow us—not in Europe, not in the Middle East, not in Asia, not anywhere.

Mr. Chairman, the agreement we initiated in Dayton advances our national interests and gives us every reason to believe that peace can take hold in Bosnia. The settlement was negotiated in 21 long days against the backdrop of 4 bloody years

of war. It includes many hard-fought compromises. But on every important issue, it meets the principled and practical standards on which my negotiating team and I insisted. It is an agreement not just of goals, but of means.

- It preserves Bosnia as a single state with federal institutions that represent its Croat, Muslim, and Serb communities alike.

- It reunifies Sarajevo within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and connects Gorazde to the Federation by a secure land corridor.

- It gives the people of Bosnia the right to move freely throughout the country. It gives refugees the right to return to their homes. And it creates a mechanism for settling claims to property.

- It makes it possible for democratic, internationally-run elections to be held next year. I spent hours in Dayton convincing the parties that refugees should have a choice between voting where they currently live or in their original homes.

- The agreement excludes war criminals from office. And it explicitly obligates all the parties to cooperate with the investigation and prosecution of war crimes.

- It protects human rights and creates new institutions to investigate and punish violations.

- Most immediately, it ends the war, and retires the parties to move their armed forces behind agreed lines.

Sometimes in a negotiation like this, there is a temptation to take short cuts, to deal with the hardest issues in an ambiguous way. But in Dayton, we insisted on and received concrete and detailed commitments on the most fundamental issues that divided the parties. Because the agreement is comprehensive, it is far more likely to endure.

In the long run, restoring the fabric of Bosnia's society will still require an immense effort. But at least that effort can now begin. After all, only with peace does Bosnia have a chance to exist as a single state. Only with peace does it have a chance to build a multi-ethnic democracy. Only with peace will we have a chance to bring war criminals to justice, and to ensure that no more war crimes are committed.

The Dayton accord does require the parties to take extremely difficult steps on the road to peace. I believe that each is prepared to carry out its commitments, but only if it is confident that the other parties will carry out theirs. That is why each party made it clear that they would reach settlement if NATO agreed to lead a peace implementation force.

Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili will speak in greater detail about our participation in IFOR. But let me address some of the questions I know are on your mind.

I know many Americans have wondered why Europe cannot provide all of the ground troops in this NATO force. We created NATO's integrated military structure to ensure NATO's effectiveness through the sharing of effort and risk. We are NATO's largest member, the source of its strength and resolve. The Alliance cannot undertake what will be the largest mission in its history if we decline to do our share. At the same time, we should remember that other nations, including nearly all our NATO allies, Russia, and many of our new partners in Central Europe, will contribute 2/3 of the troops in IFOR.

Others have asked whether, after 4 years of bloodshed, the parties are willing to carry through with this agreement. We constructed the agreement with that concern in mind. We secured the agreement because peace is the key to all the parties want: from reconstruction, to justice, to rejoining the international community. We have made certain that sanctions against Serbia, our main source of leverage with that country, will be reimposed if the agreement is not implemented. Sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs will remain in place until their forces withdraw within the agreed boundary of the Serb Republic. Moreover, our troops will have the strength and authority to enforce key military provisions of the agreement.

In addition, let me emphasize that it was not enough for me that President Milosevic was specifically authorized to negotiate the accord on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs. I insisted that the Bosnian Serbs initial it as well. In Dayton, President Milosevic promised to obtain their agreement within 10 days; as it turned out, he did so in just 2 days. This kind of response increases my confidence that this accord will be carried out.

Mr. Chairman, as we negotiated in Dayton, we constantly insisted on an agreement that our military could implement and enforce. Each part of the agreement was carefully constructed to take into account the needs of our Armed Forces and the advice of the military members of our team. As a result, the military annex to the agreement contains the kind of detailed provisions our military considered essential to their task.

As someone who helped to negotiate the Dayton accord, I can assure you that IFOR's mission is well-defined and limited. Our troops will enforce the military aspects of the agreement—ensuring the cease-fire, supervising the withdrawal of forces, and establishing a zone of separation between them. But it will *not* be asked to guarantee the success of democracy or reconstruction, or to act as a police force. One of the lessons we have learned in the last few years is that our military should not be a permanent guarantor of peace. It should only create opportunities that others must then seize.

Because IFOR's mission is well defined, we have a concrete exit strategy, which Secretary Perry will describe in detail. I want to stress that as one element of that strategy, we are committed to achieve a stable military balance within Bosnia and among the states of the former Yugoslavia, so that peace will endure. This should be achieved, to the extent possible, through arms limitations and reductions.

Arms control measures alone, however, will not be sufficient to achieve military stabilization. The armed forces of the Federation, which have been most severely constrained by the arms embargo, will need to obtain some equipment and training in order to establish an effective self-defense capability. For our part, the United States will ensure that Federation armed forces receive the necessary assistance. Neither IFOR nor the U.S. military will directly participate in this effort. The best approach—and the one we will pursue—is for the United States to coordinate an international effort to provide the necessary assistance.

Civilian agencies from around the world will carry out a separate program to help the people of Bosnia rebuild. Our European allies will pay for most of this vital civilian effort. International organizations will also play an important role. The OSCE will supervise elections. The UNHCR will coordinate the return of refugees. The World Bank and IMF will help Bosnia's economy recover, with the EU also playing a leading role. The U.N. will help monitor and train local police.

But none of these important tasks will be carried out unless the peace agreement endures. There is no middle ground between peace and war in Bosnia. And in the choice between peace and war, as the President so plainly put it Monday night, "America must choose peace."

Many years from now, I have no doubt that people will look back on this month in history as a critical turning point for the United States and Europe. Let us be certain that it will be remembered as the moment when our country grasped the chance we ourselves created for peace, not as the moment when we hesitated to act.

The President has made his choice. The United States must act as the great Nation that we are. We must act to protect our interests. We must act to uphold our ideals. We must keep our commitments. And we must lead.

In the coming days, Mr. Chairman, the administration will continue to consult fully with you and with the Congress. We will continue to work hard to gain the bipartisan support of the Congress, just as we work to gain the support and understanding of the American people. We are confident that the case for moving forward is clear and strong. We are prepared to answer your questions and to hear your concerns today. Thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you.

Senator Nunn, you did not have a chance to make an opening statement. Would you care to make some remarks now?

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I will just reserve mine for questions. Thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. I will start with Ambassador Holbrooke.

The Dayton peace agreement creates a single state, Bosnia-Herzegovina, to be governed by the Muslim Croat Federation and the Serb Republic. In essence, the peace agreement does not address the issues that caused the parties to go to war.

The peace agreement, at best, will act as a cease-fire agreement that will only be successful so long as the NATO Implementation Force remains in the region.

The question is: How can an imposed peace that does not reflect political realities or the basic concerns of the warring factions hope to survive without the continued enforcement of thousands of NATO forces?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, with the greatest respect, Mr. Chairman, I would have to question the premise and stress again,

as Secretary Perry did, that this is not an imposed peace. It is a requested peace. We did not force this document down people's throats. They asked us to negotiate it, and then they let us negotiate with them a far more comprehensive agreement than any of us really expected going in.

I would say—you would agree, Mr. Secretary, that this succeeded our going in expectations, therefore, Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that it should be regarded as an imposed peace.

The military forces have the authority to enforce the military portions of this agreement. If the parties decide they do not want to respect the civilian parts, then your question will prove to be correct. But we are going into this on a positive note, because the parties are themselves positive.

I know the press has been filled with comments about the rejectionists. Well, there were rejectionists on the West Bank. There were rejectionists in Belfast. There were rejectionists in Cyprus. But the leaders of the region in Bosnia and in its neighbors want this to happen, and they want American leadership to help make it happen.

Chairman THURMOND. In order to give every senator a chance, I am just going to allow five minutes to ask questions.

Dr. Perry or General Shali, President Clinton provided conditional approval of the NATO plan over the weekend prior to authorizing the deployment of U.S. military forces to Bosnia and Croatia in an advance element. I understand that NATO gave its provisional approval to the SACEUR plan and that details are to be worked out prior to the formal signing of the agreement next week.

What are the details that remain to be addressed? Either one of you can answer that.

General SHALIKASHVILI. Mr. Chairman, the provisional aspect of the approval by the North Atlantic Council and by NATO in general refers to two aspects; one, provisional to the signing of the peace agreement in Paris, and second, provisional to the review of Admiral Smith's subordinate plan. This is to ensure that the plan Admiral Smith had developed in support of the overall plan developed by General Joulwan—that there are no disconnects on key annexes of that plan.

That is the provisional aspect of it. So it is not that there are issues still to be worked, but that NATO reserved final approval pending the signing of the peace agreement and pending assuring themselves that the two plans matched totally.

Chairman THURMOND. Ambassador Holbrooke, the conflict in Eastern Slavonia appears to be on the backburner. This situation remains volatile and could endanger the overall peace in the region.

Evidently, promises were made by the United States that the area would be returned to Croatia within a one-to-two-year time frame, and that Croatians who were displaced from this area would be able to return to their homes.

What is the United States' position on Eastern Slavonia?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, we were in Dayton 21 days. There were really 3 phases to the negotiations. In the first phase, the first 8 days, we focused on strengthening Bosnian-Cro-

atia ties; In the last 10 days, we focused on the territorial issue and the political issues.

In the intervening three days, we focused on Eastern Slavonia. And in a very intense negotiation between President Milosevic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and President Tudjman of Croatia, we made a breakthrough. We could not announce it in Dayton because for various political reasons, it had to be done in the region.

This breakthrough, which is now codified in a series of agreements which have been signed, not initialed, has resulted in the averting of a war which otherwise would have started five days ago. President Tudjman had said he would start a military action in Eastern Slavonia when the U.N. mandate ran out on November 30.

So I think that Eastern Slavonia is on the backburner. I believe that to be a correct statement precisely because it was settled in Dayton. We could not have addressed Bosnia until Eastern Slavonia was finished.

Now, the nature of the agreement in Eastern Slavonia is that Belgian and Russian troops will remain in the region for a year in a transitional phase.

Both parties have asked that the United States show a degree of involvement in this, and we are probably, therefore, going to ask that the head of the transitional authority, at the mutual request of Belgrade and Zagreb, be a civilian American, preferably at the request of the two sides, a civilian American who is a former senior general in the military services.

Secretary Perry may wish to add something on that latter point, because we have not yet discussed it in greater detail. But I believe that you will be very comfortable with the fact that a war was averted in Eastern Slavonia in the last month.

Secretary PERRY. I would add to that. I have described several—every time I discuss the Implementation Force in Bosnia, I refer to the danger of the war spreading as being one of the principal reasons why we wanted to stop the war.

Some people think that is an academic consideration, that it is rhetoric. In my judgment, this is a very serious issue. As recently as a month ago, I would have given a 50/50 shot of there being a real war breaking out between Serbia and Croatia, endangering all of the countries to the north of that.

This is not academic. The Dayton agreement, as Dick has said, has headed off that problem. There are still difficult implementation problems ahead. I do not want to minimize those.

We are not planning to send peacekeeping forces into Slavonia, but we do expect to work very closely with the Croatians to try to find a way of assisting in that implementation. There is no issue that is more important than heading off this potential war between Serbia and Croatia.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Nunn, I believe you are next.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Holbrooke, we are glad to have you before the committee, and we congratulate you on a job that was as difficult as any I have witnessed and a job well done.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you.

Senator NUNN. Secretary Perry, I know with all the other news going on that it has not been as much attention as would have otherwise been given to the French decision to participate in the NATO military committee.

And I am sure you played a role in that. So I wanted to just make note of that. Not dwell on it this morning, but I hope for other committee meetings we will be able to gather in the full significance of that, because it is a very important development.

Secretary Holbrooke, there are certain assurances that I believe the United States has given to the Bosnian government relating to a balance of forces when we leave. Secretary Perry had that as one of the bullets on his chart.

Could you tell us what those assurances are? Are they in writing or are they oral? Do we have any memo of them?

Could you give us your interpretation of what we have agreed to and the time frame in which this commitment will be carried out?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Senator Nunn, both for your personal comments and for your comment on the French.

Before I answer your question, let me say that the French decision yesterday is of historic importance. It undoes a 29-year problem we had with the French and is directly related to Bosnia. It simply would not have happened without the President's initiative and leadership on Bosnia.

In regard to the question you have just asked, let me begin by saying that there are no secret agreements from Dayton or any other part of the negotiation in this or any other field.

There are no documents classified and there are no side letters or understandings in writing that you are not aware of and that have not been made available to you and to the American public, none whatsoever.

In regard to the issue you specifically raised—oral commitments and assurances on the part of the Executive Branch were made not only by the negotiating team but by Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry, Tony Lake, General Shalikashvili, General Joulwan and Strobe Talbott, all of whom came to Dayton and participated in the talks and all of whom this was discussed with the Bosnian government.

Secretary Perry has already outlined our position. Let me outline it once more in slightly greater detail, because we all know at this table that this is the issue that has perhaps generated the most cross currents within the Congress and, I would note, not on a partisan basis but because it is a genuinely complicated issue.

We are trying to balance two equally important things. Number one, to do nothing which would increase the danger to the American and other NATO troops in IFOR. Number two, to undo the injustice of the arms embargo insofar as it pertained to the government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This goes back to Senator Thurmond's earlier question—if the agreements are not implemented and at some future date combat were to resume, something we do not think will happen and we will work to avoid but we recognize is not impossible, then that the Federation forces would be in a position of better balance.



Therefore, we believe that establishing a stable military balance within Bosnia by the time IFOR leaves is important in order to prevent the war from presuming and facilitating IFOR's departure.

The Dayton agreement had strong arms control provisions, which provided for build down of the forces, very much in accordance with one of the most influential letters I have ever seen sent from this body to the Executive Branch, the letter that you and Senator Lugar sent Secretary Perry last year, which was very much one of our guiding principles in Annex 1-B in the agreement. I would urge all of you who are interested in this issue to read Annex 1-B.

We intend to pursue this very vigorously. An arms restraint regime is obviously necessary to contribute to a stable balance.

However, even with arms control, we anticipate that there will be a deficiency on the part of the Federation. Accordingly, we have made commitments to the Bosnian government—and I repeat again: These are not in writing, but we made them orally and we repeat them here publicly—that we will lead an international effort to ensure that the Bosnians have what they need to defend themselves adequately when IFOR leaves, if the necessity arises.

Because we want to assure——

Senator NUNN. When you say "the Bosnians," are you speaking of the Federation there?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. The assumption is that it is the Federation that will have a balance, is that right?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. That is right. And when I finish these comments, perhaps the Secretary and General Shali and I can go back into the details of Annex 1-B, if you wish to pursue it.

We wish to assure the evenhandedness of IFOR—that is essential. Therefore, arms and training the Federation forces will not be, repeat not, be done by either IFOR or U.S. military forces.

We intend to pursue an approach of coordinating these efforts, primarily through third countries. In fact, our efforts in this have already begun. An assessment team has come out to Dayton and then went on to the region to make an assessment.

They returned yesterday from the region, and their report is in the process of being evaluated. I will let my colleagues address them specifically, because the assessment team is working directly for the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman.

We will proceed with our efforts in a manner that is completely consistent with the U.N. Security Council resolution passed the day after Dayton lifting the arms embargo in a phased manner. This allows planning and training to proceed immediately, which is now the phase we are discussing, but prohibits the transfer of heavy weapons for six months.

I might ask, with your permission, if Secretary Perry would like to add to my comment.

Senator NUNN. Could I just ask one clarification point? You are saying training under the oral commitment can proceed immediately. Is there an obligation for training to proceed immediately?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. An obligation, you mean, by the United States?

Senator NUNN. Yes.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I would say that there is a commitment on behalf of the Executive Branch that we will proceed with efforts in the area of giving them training roughly—and I want to stress the word “roughly”—along the lines of what has already been happening in Croatia.

But it would be a little premature to go into detail, Senator Nunn, for several reasons. One is simply legal. This has to be done in a way that is consistent with American law. It will not be done by American uniformed and active personnel, as it is not being done in Croatia. And therefore, it has to be done in accordance with the rules governing that sort of thing.

And secondly, we are still in the assessment phase. Until the assessments are finished, I think it would be very difficult for us to tell you exactly what we think the requirement is.

But if your question is to the point of whether we feel we have made a commitment to assist them in this area in one way or another, the answer is yes. But an excessive precision right now is not only premature, but I also think would be very unwise in terms of our larger objectives of protecting the American forces.

Secretary PERRY. Senator Nunn, I will add briefly to that. I have discussed this issue with President Izetbegovic at Dayton. I have discussed it most recently a few days ago with Prime Minister Silajdzic.

I have offered him precisely the same assurances that I have testified to this morning and that Secretary Holbrooke has testified to; nothing more, nothing less.

I have also emphasized that our commitment is not to any particular way of affecting this, any particular month-by-month schedule, but to the end result. And the end result is when we leave in a year, the military balance will be adequate.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired. I would like to see if General Shali could tell us if he is comfortable, he and the Joint Chiefs are comfortable, with the commitment that has been made and outlined here this morning on arming and training.

General SHALIKASHVILI. Thank you very much, Senator Nunn. I have testified before, this is an issue that we among the chiefs have discussed very often.

We felt it very important from the beginning that for the safety of American troops, this not be a task that is given to American soldiers and that it not be included as an IFOR task.

With these provisions in place, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are well satisfied with the way this program is now outlined.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will divide my time between an opening statement and questions.

Ever since the President in 1993 indicated that he would make a commitment to insert a third element of U.S. force, we are there in the air, we are there at sea, and that third element being a substantial ground force, I have expressed by deep and sincere reservations.

We are there, and this thought that we have not, the United States, borne our share of responsibility to end this tragic civil war

I think is wrong, because we have been 66-some percent of the air missions, a very substantial number of the naval missions in the embargo, the Marines in rescue, intelligence, and many other ways, including over \$1 billion from the American taxpayer towards humanitarian relief.

So do not let anyone say that the United States has not pulled its weight in this conflict. My question goes to this further commitment.

I have studied this situation as carefully, I think, as anyone here in the Congress, and I have made five trips to this region over the past two and a half years, the most recently in September.

Mr. Secretary, as you state in your opening statement, your fear is that this conflict could restart. I remember the chart; I just saw it up there.

If it is a conflict that could restart, then our forces do not go in as peace forces; they go in as an army of occupation, as that term has been used throughout the years since World War II and indeed before.

I think I want the American people to fully understand that this is not a peace agreement until such time there is a clear manifestation and willingness of the indigenous fighting forces and indeed the civilians to make it a peace agreement, and that is going to take a long time.

In an earlier appearance before the Congress, you stated that very clearly, Mr. Secretary, in words that went as follows: Secretary Perry, "My greatest fear in this operation is the hatred among the people in this region."

And I share that, Mr. Secretary.

I have studied the history, as I am sure you have done. The hatreds, these ethnics differences, go back hundreds of years into history. This region has been subjected to forces trying to stop the civil war since the time of the Romans and Frederick the Great.

So where are we today? We are faced with a presidential decision now, pursuant to the role of the Commander-in-Chief in the Constitution to put the troops in. I do not question that constitutional authority, and I have supported that many times in the years I have been here in the Senate with many presidents.

But what I do challenge is the wisdom of this third element of U.S. forces, namely the ground troops. I do not see a vital national security interest to put at risk those ground troops.

Do we have an interest? Yes. Is there a question of U.S. credibility? To some degree. I think that has been over-exaggerated, but to some degree. And NATO. But is there—I have not heard the word "vital" used in the context here this morning to really justify this mission.

Therefore, the focus of our responsibility in Congress is to turn to what we can do to make this mission as safe as possible for our troops and those of our allies. And therefore, my question goes to the concept of the exit strategy.

Now, Mr. Secretary, I have heard you say as early as a very pleasant breakfast you had this morning with members of this committee, "Twelve months"—and I repeat, twelve months—"and we are out." Very clear and understandable statement.

And I have heard you, General Shalikashvili say—and I specifically remember this Sunday on a 5:00 o'clock show on CNN. Here it is. I copied it down—"We will stay until our mission is completed."

Now, I have said the same thing in public appearances, because I agree with you. We would go in here against the historical background of coming out of Lebanon and coming out of Somalia with the indigenous people, the very people we went in to help, shooting at us as we brought out our troops.

And we cannot have a repeat. That, to me, is where we would have a very serious problem with U.S. credibility a third time, a third experience.

So, therefore, I find the statements of the secretary, "12 months," and yours, General Shali, as being in conflict. If we moved ahead 12 months, and none of us can predict, the Secretary could say, "Twelve months and it is time to get out, General."

And you, being the able professional you are, would have to say, "Mr. Secretary, our mission is not yet completed," because of things we did not anticipate and primarily this rearming issue and establish an equilibrium through a third party, which I find difficult to accept, given the Serbs will clearly see behind that facade.

So you might be faced with a situation of saying that we cannot meet that timetable. And therein, General, is my concern, for the proud U.S. military. Are we being set up as the fall guy to say at some point in the future: We cannot meet this timetable?

A timetable that concerns me, particularly, Mr. Secretary, as it overlays the timetable of our domestic political elections in this country.

I hope you will dispel any thought in that venue.

General.

General SHALIKASHVILI. When I made that statement, to the best of my recollection, I was referring to the completion of our military tasks. Those are the tasks for the IFOR, not the larger things that need to be accomplished under the peace agreement, such as the civilian tasks.

It is inconceivable for me to think that the tasks that I showed you here will not be completed in one year. And so for me there is no doubt that by the time we leave in 12 months, our mission will be completed.

That is not a play on words on my part. I feel very strongly. I was one who early on recommended to the Secretary of Defense, when we talked about how long this mission should last, that one year was not only sufficient to accomplish the specific military tasks, but also gave us more than enough time for creating a secure environment because of our presence there, for the start, and just the start, of the essential civilian tasks, whether they are tasks such as the start of the reconstruction effort, the start of the return of the refugees, the start of the humanitarian support.

Further, I was very confident, after conferring with our experts, that 12 months would give us enough time to achieve that military balance that we have been talking about here earlier.

So I feel very comfortable at this stage as I sit before you, and I have been from the beginning, that 12 months is the right time to set to bring the force home, because I feel confident that the

military tasks will be done and the other aspects that I have just referred to.

Secretary PERRY. Senator Warner, I want to assure you that the 12-month figure did not come from the top down. It came from the bottom up. General Shali recommended it to me based on his best assessment of the tasks. I evaluated that, thought it was reasonable, and I was the one that recommended to the President that this be a 12-month mission.

If the election has been a factor in this, the time limit should have been nine or twelve months, because by twelve months the elections are going to be long since over.

The nine to ten months would have been a time at which one could have been quite suspicious about. But let me assure you that the question never came to me. It was never raised to me by the President of lowering this time from 12 down to 9 or 10 months.

The issue of the timing of this operation with the election was never a matter of discussion between me and the President or between General Shali and the President. The issue was always around: What does it take to do the mission?

Now, the other point I wanted to make is on this question of the war restarting, which you point out was in my chart there. The chart was meant in the context—I want to be sure that it was understood.

My statement about the war restarting was if we walk away from this peace agreement, the war is restarting. I feel with high confidence that that will happen. We do not expect a war to restart while we are in Bosnia executing the peace mission. I have high confidence on that judgment.

We do expect, as I have testified, individuals in gangs who will not be satisfied with this peace agreement, who may try to harass us. We have seen examples in Israel, for example, where a small group, who did not agree with the President's move toward the peace agreement, moved to do an assassination.

We even see in Oklahoma City where there can be actions taken by people who do not agree that can cause serious problems.

But we do not expect the war to restart while our troops are in there. We would not have recommended this operation if we thought there was going to be a war while we are over there.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, may I just add one quick word? I think your question and the responses underlie a very key point, which is: What is the role of the military? It is to enforce the military provisions of this agreement, Annex 1, particularly Annex 1-A.

This can be done in a year, separating the forces, which by the way we deliberated the line so that as much of it as possible follows the current cease-fire line, separating the forces, enforcing some of the military provisions.

But we did not require the military to take the most obvious and critical example, be responsible for returning to the country the two million refugees, to sort them out, to figure out who owns which houses and so on. All of this is ensured in the agreement, but it is not the responsibility of NATO or IFOR.

And if it was, this force would have to be sized at least ten times as big, and we still could not do the job in any definable amount of time.

The tasks laid out for the military can be done in 12 months. And then you come to the key question, which is the other provisions, elections and so on.

It is not going to be the military's job to conduct those elections, but their presence there will create the environment under which, I believe, the elections can and must go forward.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, gentlemen.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Levin?

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First let me add my thanks to those that others have expressed to Dick Holbrooke for the extraordinary work that he engaged in.

Secretary Perry, you have also engaged in some extraordinary work, not just in getting the French involved, helping in that process for the first time in 30 years in NATO, but also in terms of the Russians.

I think the effect of this agreement or the falling apart of this agreement on the role of Russia in Europe and our relationship with the Russians is a very, very significant factor.

Your being able to work with them to include them in this chain of command and to move them closer towards part of a European security arrangement is historic work indeed. I want commend you on that. It is a big factor in this thinking.

General Shalikashvili, I know that you and your counterparts have been very, very active in that process, too. I want to add my commendation to you as well.

That is one of the factors here in weighing the risks, on the one hand the risks of casualties against the risk of this peace agreement falling apart.

Included in the falling apart side is certainly what happens in terms of the future of Russia, in European security and indeed the future of Russia and its elections next year, because the falling apart of this agreement could have a very significant impact, a negative impact from our perspective, on those internal elections inside of Russia next year. So there is a lot at stake here.

And I want to simply say that as I have weighed the risks here, I have also focused on the clarity of the mission, because the clear and more limited it is, the more reduced the risks of casualties are. I want to spend my few minutes on that mission, particularly the rearming issue.

Now, in your chart, you list military tasks. I think they are clear, and you indicated—more important than what I feel is that you and the Joint Chiefs feel strongly that we have a clear mission, a sound plan, and that we have rules of engagement that are appropriate to the task. You are fully supportive of what the President is proposing, both professionally and personally.

Is that correct, General?

General SHALIKASHVILI. That is correct.

Senator LEVIN. Now I want to get to that bottom part of the chart, which is neither part of the military tasks, your first bullet, or the civilian tasks, which are the second bullet. Then we get

down to this goal, which is that there be a military force balance when we leave.

It is not part of the military tasks because we are not doing it. This is going to be done with our leadership but through third parties. So it is not a military task.

On the other hand, Mr. Secretary, you and others have said that we are committed to ensure that there be a military balance at the end of the year. I would think that that statement should carry an awful lot of weight and that anybody would take that seriously and not feel that they could win an arms race with us, should they seek to do that.

On the other hand, I do not think the parties that are not happy about that military being created are going to stand still during that year.

And so the question arises: If there is no military equilibrium at the end of the year, will you then believe we should stay longer until it is achieved, or would you then stick to the one-year position, which you have taken? Which of the two would govern in the event the year comes without a military equilibrium?

I know that is a hypothetical question, and that your intent is to ensure that that equilibrium is a very important piece here. Many of us have been very much opposed to the arms embargo and wanted to see it lifted. We very much want to see that equilibrium as a way of ensuring that after we leave peace will be retained.

But if there is no military equilibrium at the end of the year, do we still leave?

Secretary PERRY. Let me make a point, first of all, that we and no party in the region wants an arms race to start in the former Yugoslavia. We do not believe this commitment we have made is going to stimulate an arms race. Quite the opposite.

It should provide a strong incentive for this arms control process to work, because in the absence of some remedy to the problem, the other forces might be motivated to try to build up and to gain some kind of an advantage.

So we believe the best way of preventing the arms race is being prepared to make that commitment.

Now, specifically on your question, Senator Levin, I think the issue is not whether we would have to stay longer to ensure the balance, but whether we might have to work harder and do more than we expect to have to do during the period up to that 12-month period.

We will be working this process for a full year. In fact, we have already started working the process. We have already sent assessment teams into Bosnia to get a measure of the degree of the equipment and training that would be necessary.

So if we are lucky, if the process works well, then this will be a relatively small effort and will be done relatively quickly. But we are prepared for it to be a larger effort, and we are prepared to accelerate it if necessary.

So if we saw this getting off the track and if we were unsuccessful in bringing it back on the track, the answer to the question, I think, is acceleration, not taking a longer time. And we can move very quickly in these fields, if we need to.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you.

Secretary PERRY. One other thing I might say, Senator Levin, the estimate of how long it would take to do this was one of the factors in determining the 12-month period. We wanted to be sure that among the various things that needed to be done is adequate time to perform this function.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank our witnesses, especially Secretary Holbrooke, for their efforts on behalf of peace in this very difficult and daunting challenge that we are faced.

There is great skepticism here in the Congress and amongst the people that I represent about this enterprise. And I have to tell the witnesses that one of the major reasons for that skepticism is a lack of a coherent exit strategy.

Secretary Holbrooke, I find it interesting that you were able to negotiate 11 annexes, hundreds of pages of documents, but yet the key and vital aspect in the view of many of us of an exit strategy is a stable military equivalent on the battlefield, and that issue was taken care of by oral commitments.

It is disturbing to place our belief in a build-down strategy in which one party is vastly inferior with that of one that is dramatically superior.

The process could not even move forward significantly no matter what, because it is going to be six months before our heavy weapons are—the embargo against heavy weapons is lifted to allow the Bosnians to acquire what we know is one of the most vitally—one of their greatest shortcomings.

I am deeply disturbed when you, Secretary Holbrooke, read a statement that says, "If the necessity arises," when Secretary Perry says, "I do not care about a particular way." We are very detailed and very specific about our mission. We are very detailed and specific about all other aspects of this plan, but the most vital and key element, the exit strategy, is a nebulous oral commitment that frankly I and most of my colleagues are not satisfied with.

I want to tell you right now, I do not believe you are going to get any expression of approval from this Senate with this kind amorphous, non-specific, if the necessity arises, Secretary Perry does not care what the particular way is, and no specific way that we can be absolutely assured that there is an equivalency on the battlefield when we leave. That does not mean having them provided with rusting Rumanian tanks.

I understand your reluctance and the difficulties involved with using United States troops in this effort. We will have to be convinced that there are other troops and other countries and other ways of supplying these much-needed materials so that when we leave, that there will not be a re-ignition of the conflict.

And may I say I believe that there will be a relatively peaceful situation during the time that we are there. But without an equivalence on the battlefield and a specific plan for it, not just "an oral commitment," then I believe that this enterprise over time may be doomed to failure.

I deeply regret, that only oral commitments were obtained as far as this key factor in assuring a lasting peace in the region.



I am deeply concerned about the fact that we are going through this exercise of a "build-down" when it took us 14 years to get Mr. Brezhnev to agree to a mutual balance of forces reduction agreement.

We are going to get the Serbs to agree to some kind of build-down, which would mean a reduction in their forces. It could mean further reduction in Bosnian forces.

So I suggest, and I look forward to a response, but I suggest very strongly to you that if you expect to get, not just the approval of the Senate, but of the American people, we better have a coherent exit strategy.

A vital part of that is a stable battlefield situation, so in case these age-old animosities erupt in a conflict again, that there is some chance of the Bosnians being able to defend themselves.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Well, Senator, with great respect I am a little puzzled by your comment, because you have articulated our policy and then said we did not articulate it. I did not say "if the need arises." I did not say that.

On the contrary——

Senator MCCAIN. Well, you——

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. No.

Senator MCCAIN. I am sorry. I thought you said "if the necessity arises."

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. No, sir. I did not. This one part of our response was written up in advance. We knew it would come. It is written, and there is no ambiguity in it. What I said, and Secretary Perry said it slightly differently but with——

Senator MCCAIN. Why could you not get it in writing that we would be committed?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Let me address your question at three levels. Why did we not give it in writing in Dayton? Very simple. Congressional prerogative.

Second, we did not feel that it was appropriate to give a memorandum of understanding to one side during the peace negotiations when an oral commitment on behalf of the administration, by the secretaries of State and Defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs should be quite appropriate, and the Bosnian government accepted it, Senator.

They did not insist on a written document. They said it would be nice to have one, but—I was in the room for all seven of these conversations, and the most important was the one with Secretary Perry. He made the commitment, and he has already addressed that.

And second, as for build-down, I wish you would look carefully at Annex 1-B. It is a build-down annex which provides room for strengthening the Federation forces while putting maximum pressure on the reduction of the armaments of the Federation adversaries.

It is very much in the Bosnian interest, and they like it. The ratio is five to two. And if you look at the two, if you look at the thirty percent for the Bosnians, you will see that it is two-thirds/one-third for the Federation, which means that the amount of weaponry allowed to the Bosnian Serbs under this agreement is

very small. And we are going to insist on compliance, and we will use all means.

But again, I want to stress, none of the three of us said "if." And I want to repeat, since this seems to be a miscommunication here, and you have expressed our policy, I simply want to repeat one sentence that I said, which is consistent with what Secretary Perry said.

Even with arms control, that is Annex 1-B, we anticipate a deficiency on the part of the Federation. Accordingly, we have made a commitment to the Bosnians that we will lead an international effort to ensure that the Bosnians have what they need to defend themselves adequately when IFOR leaves.

Now, that is our position. It is consistent with what you have called for, and it is also consistent with build-down.

I really believe that this is a sophisticated approach to an incredibly complicated problem, where you build down—and they all agreed on this—and you have room to strengthen the weakest group, the ones that were the victims of this horrendous tragedy.

Secretary PERRY. Senator McCain, I would like to start off by agreeing with your concern, because I shared that concern a month ago. I was very apprehensive that we were going to be able to effect a reasonable way of dealing with this problem.

I was surprised and delighted with Annex 1-B, which Dick was able to negotiate, to get all of the parties to agree to this build-down and build down to very appropriate ratios, I think.

A final comment I wanted to make, and having agreed with you, now let me separate from you. I do not understand why you place so little value on the public statements and the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, that we are going to do this.

We are sitting here in front of the Congress and testifying that we are going to do this. I certainly do not consider that a light commitment. That is a solemn commitment, that we are going to do it.

And a final point I want to make is that, as Secretary Holbrooke has suggested, we met with President Izetbegovic, the prime minister, the foreign minister, and told them what we were going to do.

But we told them nothing beyond what we are telling you. That is, we are making a public testimony to the U.S. Congress of what this commitment is, and we will stand behind it.

Senator MCCAIN. And you would have no objection to us writing that into a resolution that would be proposed for the Congress's approval.

Secretary PERRY. I would want to see the language of the resolution before I answered the question. Words count. But yes—

Senator MCCAIN. Yes. They have no written words.

I have no more—my time is expired, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary PERRY. I have certainly no objection to having in any resolution what we have testified to today.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I would ask only one thing in regard to the wording, Senator McCain, that you would work with the administration to create wording which encompasses what you have described and which is our policy, but which does not create what

in the eyes of General Shalikashvili and his colleagues might be additional hazards to the American and NATO forces. That is doable.

But I would ask you, please work with us on this, because it is a delicate equation, and parts of it are best dealt with in closed session. But on the basic proposition you have stated, you have stated our policy.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My compliments, Secretary Holbrooke. Dick, this was, by all reports, both public and private, on what happened at Dayton and what preceded Dayton, what even got them to, was a diplomatic tour de force, almost a solo tour de force, and you certainly deserve a lot of credit for it.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I was not solo.

Senator GLENN. I know you had a team backing you up and all that, but you stuck with it when things looked pretty thin over there, as I understand it.

I will also be glad to pass along your compliments about the people of Ohio and of Dayton and that particular area, obviously.

I would point out something else, though. You were just off I-70 there. I-70 pretty much splits Ohio. And when people ask: Do we think these people are sincere in wanting peace, if you split Ohio, it is about—the half of Ohio is equal to the Bosnia-Herzegovina area. In that area in the past four years, they have had 250,000 people killed and 2 million refugees.

So when we ask whether they are sincere or not, I cannot help but think that they are sincere, no matter what their past animosities have been. Whether it will hold or not, well, we will find that out in the future.

But I think one thing we keep forgetting is they asked to negotiate. And they came to Dayton. And they stayed 21 days. I would not have given you a chance of keeping heads of states in Dayton for 21 days, great though Dayton is, no problem with Dayton. But they stayed 21 days.

You worked this out to where they initialed it, they did. It was not up to us. We are not at war with anybody. They are the ones that initialed it. They will sign this in Paris. It is their peace. And now we are trying to help them implement what they agreed to and what we brokered.

Now, if they back out, then it is simple. We no longer implement it, if they back out and start fighting again on a major scale. And they will have failed, not us. They will have failed in what they wanted us to broker and what they have signed.

If they do not back out, then this genocide, this horror of war, this terror of the Balkans will have come to peace, we hope it holds and hope it lasts.

I do think it is very important that all these other good things that are going to happen, supposedly by other international organizations, I think it is extremely important that those happen on just as fast a basis as possible so that they see the benefits of peace and security and elections and things like that.

If those do not happen, if those are still hanging fire out there at the end of a year, then I do not know quite happens at that particular point.

So we can set the framework and we can help them on this, but I think this is a rather unique situation where the combatants have asked somebody else to help them establish peace, because of the irregulars that have broken cease-fires in the past and things like that.

A couple of questions, though, directly on how this will be implemented, General Shalikashvili. The rules of engagement, I am not quite sure.

I have never heard it described as to whether our activities are going to be limited just to these separation areas, these four-kilometer-wide areas, or—you have on the map there approximately a little larger than one-third portion of Bosnia.

Are we free to roam throughout that whole area now and try and ferret out where there may be problems?

Are we going to send patrols out all over our one-third area in addition to just making sure that we have those sanitized areas kept clear? And how do we plan to do that?

General SHALIKASHVILI. Senator Glenn, the agreement is very clear that the IFOR has freedom of movement throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is our intent, and we really have to exercise that, if for no other reason than we need to resupply ourselves. But we also want to do it to ensure that that freedom of movement exists.

Initially, we intend to have the preponderance of forces garrisoned in a Federation area. And as soon as the situation settles down, and we have established the various separations lists or so, we will evaluate it depending on what the situation in fact is.

But without a doubt, we have the right, which has been recognized by all parties. The rules of engagement to protect us in doing so are there, regardless of where we are.

Senator GLENN. We have some elements here that do not agree with the peace, with what was signed and how their proxy was given, how it was represented at the meetings in Dayton.

The Mujahdin are particularly of major concern. There are several hundred, maybe even up to 1,000, I guess, or more of these people who are literally committed, even at the expense of their own lives, to creating as many problems as possible.

What can you tell us today about them being moved out? Will they be moved out before we go into areas where we know they are? Because they do not mind sacrificing their own lives, and they could be a real problem.

General SHALIKASHVILI. Again, that was recognized early on as an issue. It is firmly imbedded in the agreement that all of these foreign forces and groups must be gone within 30 days of the signing of the agreement.

We have structured our force in such a way that if, prior to their departure, they were to interfere with us, that we can protect ourselves and deal with them adequately. And we have assurances, and we fully expect that the Bosnian government will ensure that these people will be gone in accordance with the agreement.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, may I just read the key sentence, because this is quite critical?

Senator GLENN. Sure.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Article 3, Section 2, there is a lengthy discussion of the withdrawal of all forces not of local origin.

And then concludes, "In particular, all foreign forces, including individual advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers, and personnel from neighboring and other states"—this would also include Serbs—"shall be withdrawn from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

This is a critical assurance, and we all understand its importance.

Senator GLENN. Do we have the capability, though, of monitoring whether it has actually happened or not, or are we going to have to just take somebody's word that we have gotten them out? Will we monitor that?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. We have the capability.

Senator GLENN. Okay. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Coats [presiding]: The gavel has been passed this far down the roster. I happened to note the Committee's early bird order of recognition, and I am the next person in line. I am going to recognize myself and try to hold to five minutes.

Secretary Holbrooke, I would like to pick up on the line of questioning that Senator Levin and Senator McCain were talking about, because I do believe it is critical and potentially could be the Achilles heel of this entire arrangement. Let me just ask some preliminary questions.

Do you agree with Secretary Perry's statement that 12 months is an absolute outside limit for U.S. involvement?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I agree with Secretary Perry's statement that about 12 months is the limit. We are not saying 365 days to the day and to the minute, but about a year is correct. And I totally agree with that. That is also embodied in the Dayton agreements.

Senator COATS. Does it say "about" in the agreement?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. It says exactly this on Article 1, Annex 1-A, "The parties welcome"—and this goes back to Senator Glenn's point that were asked. "The parties welcome the willingness of the international community to send to the region for a period of approximately one year a force to insist on implementation of the territorial and other militarily related provisions"—I want to stress that—"of the agreement as described."

Senator COATS. That would involve U.S. troops on the ground, is that correct? So the correct word is "approximately." And that is plus or minus what? Weeks? Months?

Secretary PERRY. Not months.

Senator COATS. Second, to clarify something, I think it is now evident that there is no written, signed agreement relative to specifically arming and training the Bosnian Muslims. But, Secretary Holbrooke, I thought I heard you say, and I wrote a note down, that the oral agreement that we had was with the Bosnian government.

Did that oral agreement extend to the other two parties?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Do you mean the Serbs and the Croats?

Senator COATS. Yes.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. That is two very important and different questions. In regard to the Croatian government in Zagreb, they are fully supportive and understand this. They want it just as much as the Bosnians because of the Federation issue, which Senator Levin mentioned earlier.

Senator COATS. So they have orally agreed.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Oh, yes. They are very——

Senator COATS. And in regard to the Serbs?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The Serbs are in a bit of a more difficult position here, but they understand our position on this. And with all due respect, I would like to reserve the rest of the answer on that for a different venue.

But let me answer it in these terms: They understand exactly what our policy is. And if they ever had any doubt about it, it will be resolved after this hearing.

Senator COATS. If I understand it correctly, long-term stability for the region, which is our stated goal, can only be achieved by achieving a rough military balance, which can only be achieved by arming and training the Muslims, unless the parties successfully comply with the build-down agreement.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. No. I think that is the linchpin.

Senator COATS. That is what I have been hearing all morning.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. That is the linchpin of this colloquy we just had with Senator McCain, where I think there is a——

Senator COATS. And Senator Levin.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. But I think it was Senator McCain who misunderstood the point. There are two policies which——

Senator COATS. I understand that, and you explained it very clearly.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. They are not one—one does not depend on the other. Equip and train is not something that we decide to do or not to do based on build-down. Build-down makes equip and train more effective. But Senator McCain thought he heard us say “if.” None of us used the word “if.”

Senator COATS. So the commitment is to build up as well as build down.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The commitment, as Secretary Perry has said repeatedly, is “to ensure that the Bosnians have”—excuse me for reading, but I really want to keep to the same language—“to ensure that Bosnians have what they need to adequately defend themselves when IFOR leaves.”

Senator COATS. And that involves arming and training.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. That is correct. Right.

Senator COATS. So that oral commitment is made regardless of what happens to the build-down equation. But that oral agreement is not made with the Serbians.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I am not sure I follow your question.

Senator COATS. You just said earlier there was full understanding and agreement, in answer to——

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The Serbs do not have to agree to this. It has nothing to do with them. They have to respect the build-down.

Senator COATS. Oh, I think it might have something to do with the success or failure of achieving military balance, because if the

Serbs do not agree, you will not necessarily be able to achieve military balance in a 12-month period of time.

If I was a Serb and I had not agreed to achieving balance through a buildup of the Bosnian Muslims, why would I not conduct my own buildup?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, with great respect again, I would request that we continue this discussion in another forum, because to continue it at this forum will not serve the purposes that you and the three of us fully share. And I know I speak for General Shali and Secretary Perry when I say that we would be happy to continue this, with your permission.

Senator COATS. I will accept that.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you.

Senator COATS. Just one very quick last question, General Shali. In the Persian Gulf effort, when we called up reserves, there was, I believe, a very commendable volunteer effort on the part of the reserves, with more requests for service than slots available.

What is the situation in regard to the Bosnia call-up? How many reserves are we calling up, and what has been the response?

General SHALIKASHVILI. We have not called up any yet, and we are going to ask that this be done by the end of this week or this weekend. And the reason for it principally is that we need to start training them, because we want to make sure that they are fully trained before they go.

We have identified the units. There are a total of 3,800 that we wish authority to call up. The units and the congressional delegations involved have been notified. So the units now know, but it is a little too early for me to know what the response is across the board, although in some instances, we know that we are filling some of those already by volunteers.

For instance, in the Air Force, some particular skills that they need, while their numbers are included in the 3,800, we already have some who have volunteered. So that the actual number we will call up we now already know will be less than 3,800. But how far that will go down, I do not know yet. It is too early.

Senator COATS. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I will not ask a question, but I could just have a ten second observation.

Chairman Thurmond [presiding]: Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. I do not understand how we know what arm and train means in terms of a mission until we get a military balance assessment, number one, and until we make an effort to build down, number two, whether that succeeds or not.

So I do not understand how we undertake an arm and train mission without getting that information first. So I am puzzled by a couple of answers.

Secretary PERRY. Well, Senator Nunn, I think you are exactly right in that. What will be going on, what is already going on, is the assessment. That has already started. And General Shali and I will get the first briefing on that this Monday.

But the planning for it can go on and is going on in parallel. But we are not going to be able to put numbers in terms of how many weapons, what kind of weapons, until we finish the assessment,

until we see what the success of the arms control build-down is going to be.

We do not have those details, not because we are trying to be evasive and not because we have not done our homework. They just will not be available for some months yet.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, may I just add, let us separate arm and train. Train is now the arms embargo is lifted, a training mission can be worked out, but we need to look at it and see what the need is. I would, of course, defer to my colleagues on that.

On the equip side, on the arm side, Annex 1-B, oft commented on here, is very clear. And I want to stress that this was annex signed by all the parties, including the Bosnians. This also goes to Senator Coats's point.

"The parties agree to initiate steps towards a regional agreement on confidence and security building measures. The parties agree a, not to import any arms for 90 days after this annex enters in force"—that will be on December 14—"b, not to import for 180 days after this annex enters into force or until the arms control agreement referred to below takes effect, whichever is earlier, heavy weapons, ammunition, mines, military aircraft, helicopters," et cetera, and then it defines heavy weapons.

There is then an extremely detailed sub-regional arms control regime. The Bosnians want this. Within it and within its ratios, there is room for the arm side of equip and train. Let us keep training aside.

This will allow us to do both things at once in a phased manner and with maximum protection for the American troops. This is also embodied in the U.N. Security Council resolution, which lifted the arms embargo two weeks ago today.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman. I do not want to belabor this, and this is not a question, but I do not know how you know what training people need until you know what equipment they are going to need and what equipment they are going to be trained on, which requires the assessment first. And it requires an assessment of the build-down first.

I just do not understand it, unless it is small unit training that has nothing to do with equipment.

General SHALIKASHVILI. That is correct, Senator Nunn, that some training will probably be necessary, and the assessment team will report back on that have nothing to do with a specific piece of equipment.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Robb.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentleman, I join our colleagues in thanking you for the efforts to date and for significant consultation. I have the privilege of sitting on three different committees that have national security implications, so I have had perhaps more opportunities than others.

But I know that each of you individually and collectively, and others working with you, have made numerous trips here to Capitol Hill to consult and to respond to a number of questions that we have had an opportunity to explore—virtually every imaginable question at this stage that most people might be able to think of.



I think it underscores, perhaps, the wisdom in granting to the Commander-in-Chief the responsibility for taking certain actions which only a singular executive can take and granting the advice and consent responsibility to the Congress, where are 535 of us, each of whom might make different decisions about one particular aspect or another, but eventually must close ranks behind decisions that are made in the national interest by our Commander-in-Chief.

Let me just suggest that in one of the only parts of Senator McCain's statement that Ambassador Holbrooke did not specifically question, I believe he used the term "approval" rather than support, and I think it is an important distinction.

We have discussed it before, but you are here seeking support, not necessarily approval. I think if it were approval in the strict sense, that there would be more reservations by some who have expressed those in open and closed forum on a number of occasions.

But I want to personally commend colleagues who have discussed some of their reservations, discussed some of their differences, but have nonetheless believed it was in our national interest to provide some expression of support at this particular time.

Ambassador Holbrooke, I wonder if you could go back to the basic question that does so often provide difficulty for many of our colleagues and a substantial majority of the American people with respect to risks of involvement of U.S. forces in this type of an operation.

We sometimes look upon it as a question simply of should we do this or should we fail to do this at this particular time, and we do not look at it in the context of the alternative and the risks of not acting.

Could elaborate very briefly on the risks of not acting in this particular case with respect to our commitments in international treaties and other encumbrances and complications that might develop in the international community.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. President Clinton actually made the same comment this morning in his public remarks before the group of influential supporters at the White House.

If we fail to act here in support of the implementation effort, we run the risk, a significantly greater risk, that the peace agreement, which all three parties want, will fail. Therefore, as you said, we look forward to the support of the Congress for the decision to deploy Americans as part of the NATO IFOR force.

We will also be asking your support for a modest but important component of economic reconstruction assistance, because we have to rebuild that place. And we have to show the leadership, even though the lion's share of the assistance will come from Europe, Moslem countries and Japan.

If we do not move forward, if we fail, the American leadership in Europe will be severely eroded. Senator Nunn earlier referred to the important events concerning the French yesterday. Those would not have happened without Bosnia.

Someone else mentioned the historic negotiations involving the Russians that Secretary Perry has undertaken. Let us pause on that for a minute. The Russians are about to put military units under an American commander. That has not happened since 1945,

or arguably did not even happen then. It is an extraordinary move forward.

Worst cases always create policy. It was thus true in Vietnam with tragic results. And it was true elsewhere in Desert Storm, and now it is true in Bosnia. What happens in Bosnia will determine America's role in Europe and half the globe for the next cycle of history until the next great defining event.

We have shown the diplomatic and political leadership. We showed the military leadership with NATO. Now we have to show the leadership in implementation.

The consequences of failure are intangible, as well as tangible. I think they are clear to all members of this committee, because this committee has long stood for a strong American international position.

We cannot desegregate or separate military, strategic, political and economic factors when you talk about our leadership.

Senator ROBB. Mr. Secretary or Mr. Ambassador, I thank you.

I was going to allude again, as other colleagues have, to the two events agree with your characterization in this case of extraordinary—the Russian participation with U.S. forces in the context that they have been agreed upon, and the announcement yesterday by the French with respect to their reintegration into the whole of NATO are truly very important events in terms of our evolution of international relationships. And I thank you and commend you for them.

I was going to ask some questions about outlaws and mines and what have you, but I can pursue those later. My time has expired.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. One last point, Senator Robb, we have not talked about NATO enlargement here today, but it is part of the policy. And it is directly related to these things. And to the extent that it has been discussed in the past, I would just note that it, too, is involved in this.

What we are looking for is an integrated Europe composed of three overlapping areas, what we used to call Western Europe, old Western Europe, what we used to call Eastern Europe and now call Central Europe, and which tragically includes the Balkans, and the former Soviet Union.

The events of the last month in Dayton, in Brussels, and the extraordinary negotiation that Bill Perry conducted with Grachev have really made a dramatic and, I believe, historic step forward. But we have to finish the job.

Senator ROBB. One question, if I may. Has there been any explicit or implicit agreement with respect to the Russian participation in this exercise as I have seen raised publicly that relates directly to the expansion of NATO that you just referred to?

Secretary PERRY. No.

Senator ROBB. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Hutchison.

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to add—to what has been said here—my high regard for Ambassador Holbrooke's efforts at the peace table. I think you did an incredible thing. And I give the President credit for being the catalyst to bring the parties together and hold them there.

I also want to say to General Shalikashvili and Secretary Perry that I think the training you are giving our troops is commendable. I think from what I know of your plans with regard to securing our troops, it seems that they are on the right track. I do not know everything, but I applaud that.

I am so against the basic decision that we are dealing with here, which is not that we are committed to peace in the Balkans—we are—but that the President has allowed U.S. troops on the ground to be the sole criteria of whether this peace agreement will hold and whether our commitment is there to peace in the Balkans.

Secretary Perry said the only alternative to troops on the ground is restarting the war. I think that is not true, and I think that it is only because the President raised the expectations of our allies and the parties that we would do this.

I believe that any kind of peace that is going to last should not have as its sole criteria the nationality, even if it is the leading country in the world, of the peacekeepers.

The second point with which I disagree Ambassador Holbrooke, is what you said about NATO. I believe that we have extended far beyond our commitments to NATO—a new element that has actually expanded our treaty obligations without a renegotiation, without the approval of Congress. NATO is a mutual defense pact. You and I both know exactly what the NATO treaty says.

This is not a NATO country. It is a civil war outside of a NATO country. And I believe that the indications that it would spill over and damage the stabilization of Europe have not been shown.

The third point I would like to make is that I believe the American people—as you do—support our helping the people in Bosnia. They have suffered untold atrocities, and we do want to help them. I think that is a United States interest. But when we are talking about putting troops in harm's way, there is a higher standard we must pass and that is a United States security threat. I do not think the case has been made that there is a United States security threat or that there are American lives at stake that would cause us to put our troops in harm's way.

I am going to be very firm that we set—at least I would like to try, to set a precedent. I think it is too late in reality here, but I believe we should have as a principle from which we do not veer that American troops on the ground should never be an option unless there is a security threat to the United States or American lives are at stake.

I am very concerned about these points. My question relates to something that has not been brought up, because so many questioners before have talked about these points, and that is the monetary value that you are putting on the operation. You have said, Secretary Perry, that you believe this will cost \$2 billion.

Let me repeat what you are saying this mission requires—34,000 total troops, well-armed, which I certainly agree with. I will never quibble with you on the number of troops or the arms, because I want the troops to be protected. But when we are planning for this and we are looking at our defense budget, and we are looking at the readiness issues, I can only compare it to Haiti, where we put 20,000 troops in early.

We are now down 2,000 troops in Haiti. It is approximately the same time frame that you are talking about. And we have spent almost \$1 billion there, depending upon how much extraneous money you would add to it.

So I would just ask you how you come to the \$2 billion figure and how we can expect that to remain intact for that amount with a much more robust force—many more people over the full year period? I am just concerned about how we are going to fund it and not hurt readiness in other areas for our own national defense.

Secretary PERRY. Thank you very much, Senator Hutchison. You have referred quite appropriately to the problems, the costs and the risks for our participation in this Implementation Force. We understand these very well, and I can assure you that General Shali and I think about them, worry about them, and work on them every day.

I would like to also, though, have you think about the problems and the costs and risks of letting this war continue, because I truly think that is what our real alternative is. This is not simply a decision of the President, but that is what our alternative is. That is just, in my judgment, an existential reality.

If we do not send forces and if we do not participate in that, then the war will restart. The killings, the atrocities—we can avert our gaze from those, but they will continue, they will resume.

And the danger, to get to your very important question of vital interest, I say again that I believe there is a very real probability of this war spreading north, including threatening Hungary and Slavonia, not only to Croatia, and south not only to Macedonia and to Kosovo and Albania, but threatening Greece and Turkey. These are threatening allies of ours, allies that we have a solemn commitment to defend if they are in a war.

So it is the spreading of the war that involves the vital American interests. The killing and atrocities affect American values in very real ways, but the vital national security interests stem from the probability of this spreading.

We do not live in a risk-free world. We have to choose between the risks with which we are confronted. And in my judgment, if I weigh these two risks, the risks, the costs, the problems of going into IFOR versus the risks, the costs and the problems of letting that war continue, I make the judgment, and I try to present to the Congress the basis for making the judgment, that the risks are greater by letting the war continue.

On the costs, we did the cost estimating on precisely the same basis we did for our Haiti cost estimate. And indeed, the costs per soldier per month is almost identical to what we used there. That was the basis on which I arrived at the cost figures that I have shown you.

Senator HUTCHISON. Excuse me. Did you just say that you were using the cost figures for Haiti per soldier?

Secretary PERRY. We are using the same basis for determining costs per soldier per month. The actual numbers of soldiers are different. The time periods are somewhat different. But it was on that basis we made that judgment.

We are, I believe, Senator Hutchison—

Senator HUTCHISON. Is not the weaponry different, also?

Secretary PERRY. Pardon me?

Senator HUTCHISON. Is not the weaponry necessary and the peripheral support much greater in Bosnia than Haiti?

Secretary PERRY. Yes, and all of that was calculated. What I am trying to say, perhaps poorly, is that we have a methodology for determining costs, and an identical methodology was used in Haiti and proved to be correct, accurate, to the methodology we are now using in Bosnia.

I have high confidence in our methodology. Where we get improper estimates sometimes is where we are sometimes wrong on the assumptions, the assumptions of how many troops are going to go in or how long they are going to stay.

But to the extent we can give our cost estimators accurate assumptions, how many troops, how long, we are very good at making the estimate of costs. I have high confidence in these cost figures based on the assumptions which I have stated for you here, which is how many troops and how long they would be in.

Senator HUTCHISON. Mr. Secretary, my time is up, but I do not understand how you could apply exactly the same standard to two very different missions to produce an accurate reflection of the costs per soldier.

For instance, the intelligence resources are so different. The amount of arms, the number of soldiers, obviously, is different. Surely that cannot be standard.

Secretary PERRY. I am sorry, Senator Hutchison. I am not explaining myself very well. It is the methodology—

Chairman THURMOND. Dr. Perry, if you will excuse me just a minute.

Secretary PERRY. Yes.

Chairman THURMOND. I have another engagement. I have to leave. The distinguished Senator from Maine, Senator Cohen, will take over. And the next witness is Senator Lieberman.

Secretary PERRY. It is the cost methodology we are using which is the same for both cases. The input assumptions are very different.

The number of troops, the number of support troops, the kind of armament they are using, the kind of support bases, all of those are different, but the methodology is broad enough to accommodate those differences, and it does.

So I am expressing to you, and maybe General Shali would like to also comment, a high confidence in our ability to equate costs to the assumptions which I have stated. So if we are in error, it is an error in our assumptions, not an error in our application of the cost methodology.

General Shali?

General SHALIKASHVILI. We have used this methodology. And again, it is not going back to what it costs us in Haiti and applying it somehow to Bosnia, but it is the formula for how one does that.

We applied that to Rwanda, and we came out with a number. And we came in, I believe, under cost slightly.

We did the same thing for Haiti, the Haiti operation, and I believe we are very close to what we had estimated. And we have great confidence in the methodology we are using that it will prove out again to be correct for the operation in Bosnia.

By the way, if I may, we have done it also for Deny Flight, and we have done it for the operation in the Adriatic, again this same methodology. In each case, we are fairly accurate in predicting the costs.

Secretary PERRY. Let me conclude to say to Senator Hutchison that I would be very happy to ask our comptroller, John Hamre, to come over and give you a detailed analysis of what we are doing here. I am very confident of what we are doing, and I would like you to share that confidence.

I do not think I can convey that confidence to you in a few minutes' testimony, but I am quite prepared to lay out the data in some detail for you.

Senator HUTCHISON. Mr. Chairman, if I could just respond and say thank you.

Senator Cohen [presiding]: I think we have to conclude.

Senator HUTCHISON. I do think we have to plan for this, and I do think we need to have that confidence. Thank you.

Senator COHEN. Senator Bryan. Excuse me.

Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator COHEN. I would be happy to take your place, Senator.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Senator Cohen and I have a running joke.

Let me join in the universal praise for the work that the three of you have done, also to thank you in the more immediate time frame for your very strong and sensible testimony today.

Ambassador Holbrooke, this is the first time we have had the opportunity to see each other since your work here. And I would say as a United States Senator, I am extremely grateful to you for the service that you have rendered to your country. And as a friend, I am very proud, may I say, for what you have done.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you.

Senator LIEBERMAN. It is very important, I think, as we consider where we are now and as we follow the understandable line of questioning that has occurred here about the Dayton agreement and its implementation, to remember what each of you has said and what Secretary Perry answered in response to the last question—though we may have different feelings about where we are now, what has clearly affected all of us over the last three or four years; which is the frustration, the disappointment, the disgust, the anger that we felt as we watched the aggression and genocide occur.

The NATO-led air strikes led by the United States—the diplomacy under your leadership, Ambassador Holbrooke, and the achievements on the ground by the Croatian and Bosnian forces as a result of being better armed, have all brought us to the point where the aggression has stopped and the genocide has stopped, and where NATO, as Secretary Perry testified at the outset quite movingly, I thought, is not only revived but is probably as robust as it has been certainly since the end of the Cold War and maybe even than it was during the Cold War because of the unique challenges that we are facing now. And on top of all that, American leadership is strong and restored.

For many of us here, as we watched the events that passed in Bosnia over the last three or four years, our response was an effort

to end the arms embargo as a way to create a balance of force on the ground. And because we agree, in the excellent term that Secretary Perry has used, that the imbalance of force was a causative factor in the war. One side had confidence it could take advantage of the other side.

I must say, though, that throughout this, I always felt that asking for the arms embargo to be lifted was not the end of our policy as we desired it. What we thought that would bring about is a balance of force on the ground which held the prospect of bringing the parties to the peace table; then perhaps the chance of a peace treaty; but always the understanding, at least by this Senator, that there would be a requirement for the presence of United States forces as part of a peacekeeping effort.

Thanks to the factors that I have described earlier, you have brought us to that point now. And I congratulate you for it.

The focus of so much of the questioning has been, nonetheless and understandably, on the question of the balance of force on the ground and the lifting of the arms embargo and the role we will play in arming and equipping.

And this is particularly important, I know, to Senator Dole and Senator McCain, and it is thanks to their leadership, which I greatly admire, that I believe we will have a bipartisan resolution of support. So I appreciate the responses that you gave to Senator McCain.

I want to ask you a few questions that go to the arming and equipping question. The first addresses the concern that if we armed and equipped the Bosnians, this would deprive us of neutrality, which is to say, I presume, that the Serbs would be angry, and they would take action against us or we would lose our credibility with them.

I think General Shali's responses to the conclusion of the Joint Chiefs, Secretary of Defense, about this question that the ability to arm and equip and train outside of IFOR and the U.S. military has satisfied—I just want to ask Secretary Holbrooke: At Dayton, I presume that the Serbs, and in fact the Croats, understood and accepted the fact that the United States, as part of the Dayton agreement, would be arming and equipping, or would at least—let me rephrase this: the United States would be ensuring that the Bosnians were going to be armed, equipped and trained.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. That is correct, Senator. May I just make one small editorial comment about the use of the word "neutrality"? We never used "neutrality." We are not neutral.

We are going to be evenhanded. We are pro-peace and pro-peace requires an evenhanded implementation. There were earlier questions about Iranians or Mujahdin. If they are the source of sniper fire, it will be returned.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. If the Bosnian Serbs are the source of sniper fire, it will be returned. That is not neutrality; that is evenhandedness.

And within evenhandedness, I think once one switches from the word "neutral" to the word "evenhanded," it becomes easier to see, because I know you appreciate because you have been a leader in this field, why equip and train fits into the policy.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate the answer. A final question to Secretary Perry. Throughout the debate about the arms embargo, the attitude of our allies in NATO was a central factor, which is that they did not support the lifting of the arms embargo. We are now past that point. The U.N. has lifted the embargo, which is a significant step to what we wanted.

We are committed to ensuring that the Bosnians are armed and equipped. Is it my understanding, Secretary Perry, coming from NATO meetings, that our allies at NATO now accept, at least, if not support, the fact that we will ensure a balance of force on the ground?

Secretary PERRY. I have both at the defense ministers' meeting last week and both Secretary Christopher and I at the foreign ministers' and defense ministers' meeting this week described to the NATO defense and foreign ministers just exactly what we have described at this committee and why we are doing it.

I do not know how many will be joining us in that process, but they fully understood what we are doing. And the only comments that were heard there was that they hoped that we would do this in such a way as to not stimulate an arms race. We do not need that advice. The last thing we want to do is stimulate an arms race.

And indeed, I believe, by being clear in the beginning that we are committed to that balance, we may head off an arms race.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator COHEN. Once again, Senator Lieberman, you have exceeded your time.

Senator LIEBERMAN. But I am not alone in that today, I would say.

Senator COHEN. Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to, because we are operating on a very close time frame, ask that the witnesses respond more directly and a little less editorializing for the sake of time.

Secretary Perry, you had made the comment during your remarks that the participation of our allies in Europe are proportional to our participation. And you commented that the Germans are prepared to send 4,000 troops. Germany has about one-third the population that we have. The President has committed 25,000 troops. How is that proportional?

Secretary PERRY. Country by country, it is not an exact formulation. And if you take all of the NATO countries and all of their contribution, it turns out to be somewhat more than proportional.

The British, for example, with 13,000 troops, if you go through the same calculation, you will see that they have proportionally more. I do not make that really to say that we were trying to effect a formulation determination, but only to indicate that they have a strong interest, as they should, in this.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much, but I would also throw into this factor that the Balkans are the backyard of Germany. There is a proximity question here.

General Shalikashvili, I appreciate the fact that you have remained consistent when you say it is going to be 12 months.



And if you remember on October 17, I was very specific in my question of you and of the two secretaries who were at that hearing. And they said yes, it will be 12 months.

My concern right now is, after the 12-month period and we are out of there and then the civilian portion takes effect, and if the deputy sector commander in Sarajevo is correct when he said that the largest concern is that the population in these areas will revolt or the mayor of the city that is not far from Sarajevo—in fact, I was very close to that city—said, “We will still fight. And if the multi-national force tries to drive us from our homes or take away our right to defend ourselves, there will be no authority on earth, including the Serbian authorities, that can stop us. We will not leave. We will not withdraw, and we will not live under Muslim rule.”

Now, in the event that this takes place, do we go back?

General SHALIKASHVILI. We take these threats seriously. We also recognize that most probably a good part of that is posturing. We are also very well aware that the Bosnian Serbs authorized President Milosevic to negotiate the agreement with them. The Bosnian Serbs were represented at Dayton.

President Milosevic agreed to these provisions, and he has assured us that the Bosnian Serbs will abide by—and he himself has publicly stated that Americans will be safe in Bosnia.

We do not take him by his word. We are watching the situation very carefully on the ground, and we will continue watching it. But I do not believe this will come about.

Senator INHOFE. General Shalikashvili, you said in your remarks that in the training—and by the way, I have met General Nash and met General Yates in the First Armored Division, and I hold them to the very highest regard. I think they are great soldiers, and they did a wonderful job in training for the Persian Gulf as well.

You mentioned that the training environment there was very similar to that that is found in that northeast sector of Bosnia. When was the last time you were in the northeast sector, specifically Tuzla?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I have never been to Tuzla. I have been to Sarajevo just very recently.

Senator INHOFE. You have not been to that area south and surrounding Tuzla?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I have not been to Tuzla, no.

Senator INHOFE. Well, let me just suggest to you I have been to Tuzla, and there is no similarity between the roads in the 12 by 6 box that they are trained in and the roads that I saw in Tuzla.

Secretary Perry, you commented in your statement that the cease-fire was holding. In other words, as the President said, there is peace today because of the cease-firing. When was the last time you were up in Tuzla?

Secretary PERRY. Senator, I think you well know I have not been to Tuzla, but I—

Senator INHOFE. No, I did not know that.

Secretary PERRY. But I should point out that we have soldiers, leaders from the First Armored Division that have been to Tuzla.

They have discussed at great length with the thousand or so Nordic soldiers who have been there. We have a pretty good—we, institutionally, the U.S. Army, have a pretty good familiarity with the situation in—

Senator INHOFE. Secretary Perry, I am asking this in a very serious way, because I was in Tuzla. We could hear the fire power at that time. That was during the cease-fire.

And this is why it concerns me, when we make a statement that the cease-fire is holding, there is peace up there, when I know there is not, and you have not been there.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. May I just ask, Senator, when you were there?

Senator INHOFE. I was there November 3 through about the 6th. When was the last time you were there, Mr. Secretary?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Earlier this year I was up there.

Senator INHOFE. Let me go on to one other thing. In terms of the—and you have stated about the Mujahdin, about the Iranians. Of course we have other factions such as the Black Swans, the Arch End Tigers and all of this. Now, when you talk about arms control and all these people around the table, none of those factions was around that table. Is that correct?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. That is correct.

Senator INHOFE. How are you going to resolve the problem if these factions in fact are continuing to fire upon us? Would this constitute in the interpretation of a corporal in the field as a systemic violation?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. It certainly would. The Annex 1-A gives the IFOR American NATO troops the authority to respond as necessary to deal with it. This is not U.N. This is not UNPROFOR. This is not Dual Key.

If they are challenged, the people challenge them, whoever they are, we will be very sorry.

Senator INHOFE. Is one of the results of a systematic violation that we withdraw?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. We are not going—

Senator INHOFE. Okay. One last question then, because they have already told me my time has expired. Mr. Secretary, you commented that you are going to be seeking support from Congress for the troops and seeking support from Congress for the policy.

You are not suggesting that if we reject the support for the policy, that we are rejecting support for our troops, are you?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Are you addressing this to me, Senator?

Senator INHOFE. Yes, sir.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I am suggesting, Senator, that American forces are going to Bosnia after the signing in Paris. And I think that they will be watching this vote because they believe, as we all do, that the Congress expresses the views, the voice, of the people, and it will have an effect on them.

They will go and do their job. They are brilliantly trained, and they are totally ready. But of course, of course it will affect them, particularly the ones who follow it carefully.

They have television. They watch these hearings. It is all available to them through CNN and AFM. And to suggest that they are

sealed off from what is happening in this room today, I think, would be to demean the quality of the modern American army. Of course it will affect them.

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired. I would only say that I really have not seen anything or heard anything today that has changed my opinion as to the ill-conceived notion of sending a mass deployment of troops into Bosnia.

I am very much concerned about it. I am concerned about the policy that we have adopted in this administration of getting into these humanitarian involvements and then coming to us as Congress and saying: We must have emergency supplementals for this, on something that we have no voice in. I think it is wrong, and I am hoping that we cannot continue this policy.

Lastly, Mr. Chairman, I had a conversation yesterday with an American hero named Captain Jim Smith. Jim Smith lost his leg in Vietnam, and he lost his son in Mogadishu. The last letter that his son wrote in he said, "Dad, I can't tell the good guys from the bad guys over here."

It is his opinion and an opinion that I share that our rules of engagement and our situation and environment are so similar that I do not want to see the corpse of Americans dragged through another city like they did in the war in Mogadishu.

Senator COHEN. Senator Byrd, the Chair has exercised great flexibility on the time constraints, and you will be recognized for five minutes plus a few seconds beyond that.

Senator BYRD. Thank you. I hope you will tell me when my five minutes are up, and I will stop.

I thank the panelists. I want to say to Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili that I can appreciate the mental and the physical distress that you have gone through in these many hearings, most of which I have tried to attend myself.

I congratulate Secretary Holbrooke in his work and on his testimony.

General Shalikashvili, on December 3 on CNN, you said, "I am absolutely convinced that the best policy for the United States public and private is that when we go in, and we have really thought this through, when we go in to do a mission, then we stay until the mission is done. Period."

Now today we have heard Secretary Holbrooke refer to the words—he used the words, I believe, "approximately one year." And I believe Secretary Perry echoed his understanding as to the time period that we expect will be required.

Now, how do we square the words "approximately one year" with the words "then we stay until the mission is done. Period"? Suppose the mission is not done in approximately one year? Suppose it is not done in 15 months? Suppose it is not done in 18 months?

What is the Congress to understand as being the time frame on which we are all in agreement when we all enter into this effort? Is it going to be approximately one year, period, or is it going to be until the mission is done, period?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I believe that in approximately 12 years, the mission will be done. It is not—[Laughter.]

General SHALIKASHVILI. My apologies. That in approximately 12 months, the mission will be done that has been given to us. I can-

not conceive how the military tasks that have been given to us could possibly take longer than 12 months without one party or another having walked away from the agreement.

And so speaking to the IFOR tasks that have been given us, I believe firmly that in approximately 12 months, this force can withdraw, and the tasks, the military tasks, will be done.

Senator BYRD. Suppose it is not done?

General SHALIKASHVILI. The time lines in which they must be done are outlined in the agreement.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. May I have the permission to join General Shali, because this question has come up now repeatedly, and it is based on a semantic confusion, Senator Byrd.

The military tasks are doable within 12 months. There is not any question. Separate the forces. Read Annex 1-A. What your question underlies is the deeper question as to whether the non-military functions can be done in 12 months.

That is a real question, but it not the NATO or U.S. force responsibility to do that. It is us on the civilian side working with the Europeans. It is going to be very tough.

Should the military stick around until every refugee has gone home, until everything else in the civilian annexes has been done? No. That is not their mission.

And so I want to stress that what you felt was a contradiction between General Shalikashvili on one hand and Secretary Perry and I on the other is not at all a contradiction. We were talking within a very clear framework.

Senator BYRD. But General Shalikashvili, I take it, was talking about the military mission.

General SHALIKASHVILI. It is correct.

Senator BYRD. He did not leave any ifs, ands or buts. He said, "Then we stay until the mission is done."

I think Congress ought to have an understanding, a clear understanding, because the American people ought to have that clear understanding. Congress is made up of the elected representatives of the people.

I think we ought to write that kind of understanding into the resolution, because we are getting all kinds of conflicts in words which may come back to haunt us. It seems to me that we ought to try and nail something down that will be more definitive by way of a resolution.

My second question is with regard to the unilateral or U.S.-dominated efforts to arm and train the Bosnian Muslim forces. We have heard that American military forces will not be used. We have heard that this would be done by international entities, but not by our own military.

I have seen a draft text—excuse me. I have had a terrible bout with the flu over this past weekend, and I am having a little difficulty in making myself heard. But I have seen a draft text of a resolution that uses the following language. This question can be answered almost with a yes or no, Mr. Chairman.

This is the language that I have seen floating in this draft text. "The United States will lead an immediate effort separate and apart from the NATO Implementation Force to provide equipment, arms, training and related logistics assistance of the highest pos-

sible quality to enable Bosnia and Herzegovina to provide for its own defense, including using existing military drawn-down authorities and requesting such additional authority as may be necessary."

Does that comport with your intentions? Does that comport with the intentions of the administration, with the plans of the administration, that kind of language?

Secretary PERRY. The simple answer, one-word answer, is no. It was a draft of one person's attempt to arrive at a policy. It is not agreed policy, and it will undergo some changes before it becomes agreed policy. When we get such a policy, Senator Byrd, we will share it with you and this committee.

What Secretary Holbrooke was reading from this morning is the most authoritative statement of U.S. policy on this question as of today.

Senator BYRD. Well, this does not seem to comport with the statement that we have heard from the panelists.

Secretary PERRY. That was the draft which we could not agree at this time.

Senator BYRD. I thank the panelists.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Senator Byrd.

Senator Kempthorne.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. All right. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

May I say that on my recent trip to Croatia and Bosnia, I was able to see firsthand the tireless and dedicated efforts of Secretary Holbrooke. You you are indeed to be commended for your efforts.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. In this hearing and other hearings, we have identified what apparently are the vital national interests of the U.S. with regard to this conflict. One is American leadership and two is European stability to prevent the spread of this conflict.

With regard to American leadership, Secretary Christopher recently stated, "Whether we take action now in Bosnia is the acid test of American leadership."

How does that square with the fact that Americans have been enforcing the no-fly zone and economic sanctions in the Balkans? As Senator Warner pointed out, about two-thirds of the bombing missions, NATO bombing missions, were carried out by the U.S.

The U.S. convened the Dayton meeting. Americans are enforcing the no-fly zone and economic sanctions against Saddam Hussein. American troops are helping to restore democracy in Haiti.

Forty thousand American troops are on the Korean peninsula. One hundred thousand American military personnel are in Europe fulfilling our commitments to NATO.

We are the world's only military power. We are the world's largest economy. So why is it that the question of the placement of ground troops in Bosnia is the acid test of American leadership?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, all of the things you mentioned are illustrations of American commitments to leadership around the world, many of them legacies of the Cold War.

Many of them culminate in the Dayton agreements and in the IFOR deployment. I would submit to you, for example, that Deny Flight, Provide Promise and the other things we have done, plus

the negotiations, all are leading inexorably towards where we are now.

You have correctly listed the things, but all of it will be pulled together by a success in Bosnia. I really believe—and I know this may sound quite strong, but I would submit to you that if we succeed in Bosnia in the next year—and by success, I would define ending this war, not necessarily getting every word of these peace agreements implemented, because they are very ambitious. If we leave Bosnia, leaving behind a country, a single country, ready to work within its ethnic communities, and if you combine that with the historic developments on the Russian front, the Perry-Grachev talks and the French events of yesterday, I think history may well look back at this period we are in now as a seminal period in the recreation of America's post-Cold War foreign policy in Europe, perhaps comparable to what happened in 1947/49.

Now, your question is why do we need to send those troops. The answer is it is the culmination of all the other things you listed, except for Korea. Korea is a separate issue, but all the other things you listed, I would submit this is the cap stone to.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. And I appreciate what you have said, Mr. Secretary, but I believe that we have said that argument. We have said to the world that the acid test will be whether or not we put troops into Bosnia. I think that was wrong for us to have established that we have now put that mark up there, based on everything else that we have been doing.

Now, the second area dealing with European stability, Secretary Holbrooke, you said earlier the conflict has been "the greatest threat to European stability."

Secretary Perry, you said "no issue is more important than heading off war between these factions."

So we are sending in "an overwhelming force" into Bosnia so that we will prevent this conflict from spreading to Europe. We have put in this overwhelming force.

You have also assured us that they are there for peacekeeping and that if conflict were to break out again, we are under no obligations to stay. They would be withdrawn.

But if in fact the way to fulfill this vital national interest is to keep that conflict from spreading, if conflict breaks out again, do you feel that there may be a temptation on the part of the administration to then say that to pull out versus snuffing out this conflict from erupting again would be the more conducive thing to the stability of Europe?

Secretary PERRY. I think, Senator Kempthorne, I would be the first to say that nowhere in the world, and particularly in the Balkans, is there any guarantee about what is going to happen in the years ahead.

But I will say that this peace agreement, which Ambassador Holbrooke negotiated to brilliantly, gives us the best chance, the best chance we have ever had, of not only stopping the killing and the atrocities that have been going on for four years now, but it is also the best chance of reconstructing stability in that area.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. But, Mr. Secretary—

Secretary PERRY. There is no guarantee.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. I know there is no guarantee, but do you feel there would be a temptation with that overwhelming force that you may come to the conclusion that rather than withdrawing, instead you would try to eliminate that conflict from gathering further steam?

Secretary PERRY. We are only there to implement the peace agreement. First of all, we not only required the parties to sign the peace agreement, we have to believe they really wanted the peace agreement, and I fully believe that they do. Certainly Secretary Christopher and Secretary Holbrooke, who have spoken with the leaders much more than I have, share that belief.

So we believe that they want peace and that therefore there is a high probability of success of this mission. If we thought the war was going to break out again, if we thought that this desire for peace was not sincere, we would not go in in the first place.

We have for two and a half years avoided going into Bosnia, sending ground troops in Bosnia, to try to impose a peace settlement. That is just too big a task, and that task we are not willing to undertake.

But now that we have the opportunity to implement a peace agreement that the parties have come to, this opportunity it seems to me to be too good to pass up.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Mr. Chairman, may I just have a clarification then?

Senator COHEN. Just a clarification.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Secretary Holbrooke, you said that "the American troops are going to Bosnia after the signing in Paris." They are going regardless of any action taken by Congress?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The President has asked for the congressional support, but I think, as has been expressed many times, he is moving ahead. This is our commitment. And I think Senator Robb addressed that point quite accurately.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. All right. I thank the panel very much.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Senator COHEN. Senator Bryan.

Senator BRYAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me join with my colleagues in congratulating you on your personal diplomatic triumph, in this administration. I would compliment each of our witnesses this morning for their excellent testimony.

Our undertaking in Bosnia has been a very difficult sell with the American public, as each of you are well aware. The calls into my offices in Nevada and here in Washington continue to be overwhelming against it, and I think that there are two concerns that we have.

One is the mission and the other is the exit strategy. I think your testimony this morning has been very helpful in illuminating and clarifying the mission, defining it as you have between the military mission and the civilian mission. I certainly have a greater understanding, and I think that has been very helpful.

I do have some concerns and some uncertainties about the exit strategy. Let me ask something that all of you have testified to that you think is a highly unlikely strategy or outcome, but nevertheless it could occur.

Let us suppose that within this approximately 12 months, for reasons that are totally unforeseen, that fighting does flare out again, and indeed, armed conflict erupts.

Who makes the decision to withdraw under those circumstances? And I ask that in the context that we have all of our NATO allies, except Iceland, which does not have a military force. We have a number of other nations as well. We have all gone in there with a unified presence.

Is it a majority vote? Is there a proportional vote? Is it our decision, the United States of America, as to whether to withdraw?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. May I just clarify? Secretary Perry must answer your question for the administration, but I want to begin by saying that your question, while absolutely reasonable, presupposes a Bosnia which is not going to take place. The——

Senator BRYAN. Well, I am hoping that it will not either, Ambassador, but——

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. It really will not happen. You are going to have the line of separation. It is going to be demilitarized. The IFOR forces will have the authority, and they are going to use it, to hit anyone who fools around. There may be a few skirmishes and some local vendettas and blood letting.

But the kind of things you envision is exactly what all the parties are now trying to avoid and pledge to avoid. So none of us believe that, although we are ready for this, that will happen.

Senator BRYAN. Well, I understand that, but it would not be the first time in the course of human events that unexpected events occur.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Fair enough.

Senator BRYAN. And I just simply think it is a fair question and one that we have a right to an answer.

Secretary PERRY. Senator Bryan, let me answer the question directly.

Senator BRYAN. Sure.

Secretary PERRY. The United States has the authority to pull out its own forces any time it wants to. NATO nations have said we go in with America, we go out with America.

Senator BRYAN. So in effect, Mr. Secretary, it is our decision, the United States.

Secretary PERRY. We have unilateral authority. Any of the nations in NATO has the authority to do that.

Senator BRYAN. And I appreciate that. That is a direct answer, and I appreciate that.

Now, with respect to this difficult concept of the equilibrium, the military equilibrium, whether it is accomplished through a build-down or a buildup with respect to the Bosnian-Croat Federation, my question is: Assuming that that equilibrium is not achieved within the period that you have all characterized as approximately a year—I think that is the language of the annex, or about a year, which is the testimony.

I view those as synonymous. I do not see any great distinction between the use of those words. Will we leave if that equilibrium, that military equilibrium, has not been achieved within that approximate year?



Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I do not think these issues are directly related. We are committed to both. And the one year, as I think all of us have made clear repeatedly, is not contingent upon completing these tasks, other than enforcing and implementing Annex 1-A, which we are absolutely confident will be done.

Senator BRYAN. And the 1-A is the military portion, is it, Mr. Ambassador? So again, let me just ask: So in other words, if after a year, notwithstanding the best efforts of our diplomatic efforts, our allies, the military effort, we are not able to achieve this military equilibrium, which I agree is highly desirable, that would not preclude us from withdrawing at that time.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. That is correct, Senator Bryan. I might add to that that if we saw that problem developing at the ninth or tenth month, I think we would undoubtedly accelerate our efforts along that line.

Senator BRYAN. And I appreciate your answer.

As a follow-on to the equilibrium issue, who is going to monitor? Suppose we have some general agreement among the parties that there will be this build-down.

Who is monitor, what kind of regime or protocol do we contemplate that will make sure that in point of fact what the parties are telling us is in fact what is occurring on the ground with respect to their military capabilities?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, that is covered in Article 4 in Annex 1-B, which lays out a fairly specific way of monitoring this. The primary organization that is supposed to negotiate and verify this is the OSCE. But the OSCE, quite frankly, has never had a task this important or this difficult.

Therefore, it is going to be up to the United States, as the driving engine of the OSCE, to make this happen. And again, I would urge you to introduce all of Annex 1-B in the hearing's record, because it is relevant to so many of the questions today.

Senator BRYAN. Would that contemplate—because of the lack of experience of this group, would that contemplate that Americans would actually have arms control experts in Belgrade, in Zagreb?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. We cannot say to you whether there will be Americans or not, but you will notice on General Shalikashvili's briefing chart, where he had the blue IFOR on the left and the green civilians on the right, you had, if I recall correctly, John, an arms control person right in there. Is that correct?

General SHALIKASHVILI. There is an arms control representative in the middle of the upper line. So that is specifically one of the tasks under the higher representative in theater.

Senator BRYAN. Thank you very much, General.

Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank the witnesses.

Senator COHEN. First let me say that the concept of build-down is completely out of context. It has no meaning whatsoever in the context of what you are trying to achieve in Bosnia.

Build-down was a concept that was developed during the nuclear freeze era, when we were trying to modernize our nuclear forces while building the numbers down, a two-for-one exchange. I do not see that at all being applicable here. We are talking about an arms reduction, not a so-called build-down. Just for the record, so that is clear.

Secretary Perry, when you responded to Senator Warner about the potential political perception of this deployment, I think I should state for the record that I do not believe for a moment that President Clinton has any political motivation behind his decision to deploy troops.

There is very little upside for President Clinton; there is a whole lot of downside. So I think that ought to be very clear from the beginning. This is not something that he has calculated to bring him a victory in 1996.

Which is not to say, however, that next fall there will not be pressure upon the President to say: Let us see at least some initiation of your commitment to get the troops out within a year's time.

You indicated before that if the time frame had been nine months, you would be suspect as far as the motivation is concerned.

We are now talking in terms of twelve months. Does that mean for the record that we do not expect to start pulling troops out in, let us say, October on a 2,500 tranche at a time, to say the troops are coming home, the mission has succeeded, and the boys and women will be home by Christmas?

Secretary PERRY. In our planning and also in the costing figures which we have used based on that planning, we assume a two-month buildup. Out of this twelve-month period, the first two months is a buildup of the force.

The last three months is the phasing out of the force, and they will come down gradually over those last three months.

Senator COHEN. Starting in October?

Secretary PERRY. Yes.

Senator COHEN. So there will be some political implication, I would assume, to be drawn from that, that the troops are coming home, the mission has been completed. It is not a year, but it really is a nine-month contemplation on the part of the administration.

Secretary PERRY. I want to emphasize, Senator Cohen, those are planning for costing figures only. There is no decision as to when they would come out. They will come out based on the circumstances at the time.

But prudence says we are not going to pull them out on the last day of the twelfth month. We will be phasing them out for the last several months.

Senator COHEN. So basically we can expect October will not be an October surprise, as such. We can anticipate that some of the troops will be coming home beginning in October.

Secretary PERRY. There should be no surprises, because we will lay out all of these data, as we are doing today, lay this planning out to you right now, as we understand it. But the actual phasing down of those forces, it is premature for me to try to be more precise than that at this time.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Secretary, we have had testimony before, Secretary Holbrooke and yourself, but the President has indicated he intends to go forward whether or not Congress lends its support to the deployment or not. That is your understanding. I assume there is no misunderstanding about that from anybody at the table.

The question I have for you is: Assuming that to be the case, that the President intends to move forward with or without congressional support, if Congress drafts a resolution, the language of which you feel to be too narrow or too provocative or counter-productive, I assume that the administration would feel no obligation to abide by the terms of any sense of the Senate or joint resolution on the part of the Congress pertaining to a refinement or narrowing of the mission.

In other words, if you found that to be unacceptable and inconsistent with what you believed to be the agreement that was reached in Dayton, you and the President would have no obligation to be bound by its terms.

Secretary PERRY. Senator Cohen, that is a little too hypothetical for me to respond to, but let me say that I am familiar with the discussions that are going on now towards specific narrowing provisions that are being considered.

Senator COHEN. This is a very logical conclusion. If in fact the President is committed to going forward with or without congressional consent and if Congress therefore passes a resolution which the administration thinks is inconsistent with what it wishes to do, I assume—and it is not hypothetical—that it follows very logically that the administration is not going to be bound by anything that it feels is inconsistent with the agreement, as it understands the agreement, reached in Dayton.

Secretary PERRY. The administration very much wants the support of Congress, and therefore is going to work very closely to try to get language which we can accept. And as I understand it, that language is coming in that direction.

Senator COHEN. And if you cannot get language that you can accept, then I assume you will not feel bound by any resolution.

Secretary PERRY. My recommendation to the President on this would probably be limited to language which I thought might endanger the safety of our troops. And if there were such language, I would recommend to the President not to accept it.

Senator COHEN. That he ignore it. Let me go on.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, in furtherance of that point, we will obviously take very seriously whatever comes out of this Congress. We are not going to ignore it.

Senator COHEN. You would not feel bound by it. In the event that Congress fails—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. If it is not legislation—

Senator COHEN. Excuse me. Wait. In the event that Congress fails to go on record in support of the policy or the deployment, you are not going to be bound by that. You have indicated very clearly that the administration is not going to be bound by that.

Therefore, it would seem to me to follow logically that if Congress passes a resolution which you feel is inconsistent with the understanding that was reached in Dayton, you are not going to be bound by that. I think that is pretty clear. Right? I think the record should indicate that Secretary Holbrooke is nodding in the affirmative.

Now, Mr. Secretary, as we pull out in one year, our NATO allies, I take it, are going to pull out at the same time and in the same

proportion. In other words, I think you indicated that if we pull out, they pull out.

Secretary PERRY. I think that is their stated intention, and that is the way the NATO operational plan is being drawn up.

Senator COHEN. So if we start to pull some of the forces down in October, we can see a corresponding reduction in commitment on the part of the NATO allies to match our own.

Secretary PERRY. They will have the same problem we have, which is the logistics problem and the transportation problem, which is you cannot pull out all the troops instantaneously. So I would imagine they would have the same sort of scheduling issues.

Senator COHEN. All right. A final question on this round, at least, General, are any of the forces or any of the equipment that will be used for deployment in Bosnia, are they committed to any other region?

For example, should there be any kind of a conflict in another major contentious area, such as Korea by way of example, would there be any equipment that is now headed for Bosnia that would be also assigned to go into Korea?

General SHALIKASHVILI. We have worked very carefully to de-conflict this deployment from our forces that are needed for other contingencies, just like we have done so when we went into Haiti. The Joint Chiefs and I are comfortable that we have the forces to respond to those contingencies.

Senator BRYAN. So there is no overlap here. We would not have one set of equipment being designated to be deployed to other major regional conflicts, should they occur.

General SHALIKASHVILI. In the case where a specific unit might have been, it has been replaced with another unit in the plan.

Senator COHEN. All right.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator, may I just go back to the previous colloquy lest there be no misunderstanding? You used the word "resolution." I want to be clear that the President—and he has stated this repeatedly himself—will obviously act in accordance with the laws within the Constitution.

I took your question very specifically to refer to the word "resolution." And I do not wish to leave any impression that the President would ignore any laws coming out of the Congress, nor would he ignore the sentiments of the Congress. But those are two different things.

Senator COHEN. I think I was pretty clear. A joint resolution in the sense of the Senate and the Congress is not binding. The question is whether or not it would be ignored.

Secretary PERRY. I understand. I just do not want to leave the impression that the President would ignore the Congress.

Senator COHEN. Well, if Congress passed a resolution not supporting the deployment, you have already indicated that the President is going to ignore it.

Secretary PERRY. He would not ignore it. He would continue with the deployment. Maybe this is a semantic issue.

Senator COHEN. I think it is more than a semantic issue.

Senator EXON.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Gentlemen, I have grave concerns about all of this. I apologize for not being here at the start of the meeting. I was in conference with the House on another matter. But I have been here now for an hour and a half, and you have been very forthcoming.

With all my grave concerns, I simply want to say, when I see people like the three of you here, it gives me—it alleviates some of my concerns, because I have the utmost respect for each of you.

You have been just magnificent in your duties, and I appreciate your forthright response to the questions that have been aimed at you this morning.

Senator COHEN. The Senator's time has expired. [Laughter.]

Senator EXON. I certainly want to say that out of this, if the historic development that was announced today, where both the French and the Russians are coming in to this proposition, if this is successful, that is historic. It bodes well for the future.

Certainly, I want to compliment you for the excellent job that you have done, Mr. Ambassador. You have done a yeoman's service, and I would point out I do not think that others have.

In the process, we lost three of your very close friends and associates, the first casualties that we have had in the Bosnian situation. So my thanks goes to them for their sacrifices and what you have tried to do to bring a measure of peace.

General, I am somewhat reassured, if not totally reassured, by the fact that you will be in charge of the military activities that are going to take place over there. And you know of my long support and admiration for you and your talents.

Let me get right into something that has been asked time and time again. I will start with you, General, if I might. It has been estimated and talked about a great deal, the land mines will pose a hidden and a deadly threat to the peacekeepers in Bosnia.

I have read reports that military officials estimate six million possible active mines scattered about Bosnia, but maybe only about a million of them have been located and identified now.

What is the magnitude of the problem that land mines represent to the safety and the operation of the peacekeeping forces in Bosnia?

General SHALIKASHVILI. We do not know the exact numbers. Some commentators have talked of three millions. Some commentators have talked of nine million. Others have prophesied how many we know about.

If you were to ask my professional judgment, it is that the number is probably towards the lower, the three million number.

Senator EXON. Regardless of the numbers—

General SHALIKASHVILI. We know only a proportion of them from reports that we have received from marked mine fields that we know about. Therefore, this in fact is something of considerable concern to us.

That is why we have undertaken such an extensive training in mine awareness, mine clearing, mine avoidance, that we in fact have trained upon and will continue training upon.

We have also put great emphasis on small unit leadership to ensure that the sergeants know how to supervise and the soldiers take care of themselves, walk only in marked lanes and so on.

And finally, the agreement has in fact included in it that the parties themselves are responsible for marking mine fields that they know about, for identifying and giving us maps of where they are located, and finally doing the clearing of the mines.

So it is not the IFOR that is responsible for clearing; it is the warring factions. That in itself will greatly minimize the threat to our forces from these mines.

Senator EXON. Thank you, General.

If I might go to you, Mr. Secretary. During the questioning at one time, General Shalikashvili alluded to the fact that—I think his quote was “unless warring parties resume fighting.”

We talk about all kinds of exit strategy. The exit strategy that I would like to have you comment on briefly is that supposing in the first week or the second month or the third month or whenever, the war starts all over again. Do we have in place now a plan for pulling out our troops as a part of an exit strategy, not at the end of twelve months but between the first month and the twelfth month? Do we have a plan in place to get people out in a hurry if the war starts all over again?

Secretary PERRY. I will try to answer your question directly, but let me preface by saying that if we thought there was any real possibility of that happening, we would not be going in. That is why we have not gone in in the last two and a half years.

Senator EXON. Okay. But if it does—

Secretary PERRY. I am going to ask General Shali to talk specifically about the plan here. But the second point I would make about it is that one of the principal reasons, not the only, but one of the principal reasons, we insisted on having such a large and a well-armed and a well-trained force, 60,000 NATO, 20,000 U.S. and very well armed, is so this force would not only be capable of defending itself, but if we had to withdraw, it could withdraw under its own power.

We have enough strength and enough capability that we would not have to call for a rescue operation in order to be withdrawn.

General Shali?

General SHALIKASHVILI. The plan for withdrawing cannot obviously be drawn with great specificity, because you do not know where the trouble develops and so on. But the provision to be able to get out is part of any plan that brings forces in.

So I am satisfied that we can get the forces out and that we have the contingency forces in the area to assist in that. So I am well satisfied that we would be able to get out if we had to.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, my five minutes is up, and I have been very restrained.

Senator COHEN. You get another question.

Thank you very much, Senator Exon.

Senator Levin?

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, first on the line of questions that the Chairman was engaging in, Senator Kempthorne phrased it this way.

He said to you, Ambassador Holbrooke—in other words, you are saying that the administration is going in regardless of any action of the Congress. That is the way Senator Holbrooke phrased it.

Senator COHEN. No, it is secretary.

Senator LEVIN. I am sorry. Senator Kempthorne phrased it. That is not what I heard from you in your last response to Senator Cohen.

But your last response to Senator Cohen was that if Congress passes a law, for instance, prohibiting troops from going to Bosnia, using the power of the purse, if that law becomes law, that obviously the administration will comply with the law. Is that correct?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes. I am a little out of my pay grade here, Senator Levin, but the President is not going to violate the law. I was addressing the distinction between resolutions and laws here.

Senator LEVIN. Except resolutions can become laws.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Understood.

Senator LEVIN. And that is the problem, I am afraid. A joint resolution does go to the President for signature. If he vetoes and it becomes law over his signature, it is a law. So I do not think we should make the distinction between a resolution and a law.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Okay.

Senator LEVIN. Okay? Now, having said that, assuming I have stated it correctly, we have our constitutional authority. We can pass a law. It could be a bill. It could be a joint resolution. We could use the power of the purse, should Congress so choose, to prevent 20,000 troops from going to Bosnia.

That is a decision which the majority in Congress can decide. The President could then decide to veto it. Two-thirds could decide to override. But that is the constitutional authority of the Congress, and I assume the President would honor that if that constitutional authority were exercised. Is that correct?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Again, Senator Levin, this is an area—when you get into the constitutional law and the prerogatives of the Commander-in-Chief, I feel way beyond my confidence.

Senator LEVIN. Well, let me state it. It seems to me very clear that if we pass a law using the power of the purse saying that none of the funds of the United States may be used to send 20,000 troops to Bosnia, and if that becomes law—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. As happened in Cambodia and Vietnam, as we all remember. We understand that.

Senator LEVIN. Okay. That is the law, and the President, presumably, would abide by law. The question is short of that, if Congress expresses an opinion, for instance, short of exercising its constitutional right to use the power of the purse, would then the President be bound by that opinion and not exercise his authority as Commander-in-Chief?

What the President has said is no, he would continue to exercise his authority as Commander-in-Chief in that circumstance. It seems to me that is perfectly understandable, may I say.

So we both have constitutional authorities. The President has his and has told us very forthrightly he will exercise it unless the Congress exercises its authority to restrict his rights by the power of the purse, and if that exercise by the Congress becomes law.

Now that seems to me to be the normal constitutional approach. I do not see anything unusual here. But that does not mean, may I say to you, Secretary Holbrooke, that it is correct, as Senator

Kempthorne said, that the troops are going regardless of any action by the Congress.

What I think is correct is that if Congress expresses its opinion short of a law that the troops should not go, that the President would then utilize his constitutional authority to send the troops. Is that a fair statement of where we are at?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. Okay.

General SHALIKASHVILI. May I just make a comment on that? But I think it is important to understand how important in turn it is to the troops that are deploying to know, to have an expression of support for them as they are going into this mission, as to go into any mission.

Senator LEVIN. I thank you for that, and I think it is important to note that. Now, from the congressional point of view, I think it is also useful, may I say, that if we do not exercise the restrictions of the power of the purse, which are allowed to us, but instead we have an expression of opinion, that we then hopefully will shape that opinion in a way which will be useful to the Executive Branch and give our advice in a way which will be helpful to our troops.

That is exactly what we are struggling to do in shaping this resolution. Some of us have concerns about how the mission is defined. Is the arm and training part of the mission? It is clear here today it is not part of the mission. It is a goal separate and apart from the military mission of the United States.

But there are things which I hope we can contribute in a resolution which will be positive, which will help secure for our troops a positive outcome. That is what I hope our goal will be on a bipartisan basis in a resolution.

That again is very different, though, from a use of either a joint resolution or a bill to restrict funding for troops, which, if it becomes law, is then binding on the Executive Branch.

Okay. Having no heard no disagreement to that, I will just go on to my—

Secretary PERRY. Senator Levin, may I comment on that—

Senator LEVIN. Please.

Secretary PERRY.—because I think you made a very important case here and a very important distinction? But in summary, I have no doubt that the President will obey any law dealing with this issue. I think there should be no question on that point.

Secondly, he is seeking an expression of support, understanding that if he does not get one, he is prepared to move ahead anyway. But seeking it is not academic. It is very important to our troops to get this expression of support.

That is why and General Shali and Secretary Holbrooke are here testifying on this. It is very important to get that support.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. My time is up.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, it is to get congressional support. But Congress, if it is going to exercise its constitutional obligations as well, or even non-constitutional powers by expressing an opinion, get the support of Congress as Congress sees that mission defined.

It is not only to come and get Congress to support. Congress has a right and a responsibility to define it in a way in which it feels



best helps our troops that may be contrary to what the administration wants.

I think this entire debate is very important, because I do not think Secretary Holbrooke or you, Secretary Perry, have indicated that the President tends to violate any law.

But rather, I think it is pretty clear that if the Senate were, for example, to pass a sense of the Senate resolution indicating it did not favor deployment of troops in the Balkans, that the President would not be bound by that particular sense of the Senate resolution.

And if it were a joint resolution that went to the President, it is unlikely that he would sign such a resolution; he would ignore it for all practical purposes. We do not have to play with words on this—it is pretty clear.

So the next question is: What happens if Congress then formulates a sense of the Senate, which is not to the President's liking, which you and other advisers feel is contrary to the understanding and the best interests of our troops?

It seems to me very logical to say that we are not going to be bound by that type of resolution. That is not to say that Congress is not going to cut off funds. That is an entirely different approach to it. But I think that is all very clear, and I think it is important that we discuss that because there are negotiations going on as we speak.

Secretary PERRY. Yes.

Senator COHEN. So we should be under no illusions in terms of what the consequences would be.

Secretary PERRY. Senator Cohen, I do want to emphasize that we are not in any way indifferent or contemptuous of that resolution, and we want very much—

Senator COHEN. I understand.

Secretary PERRY.—to get a resolution. I think this is the Constitution operating at its best. The dynamic tension between the two branches is coming together and trying to arrive at a solution which is best for the country.

Senator COHEN. I agree. I think also, Mr. Secretary, that we do a great disservice if we pretend that we are neutral peace enforcers when in fact we are not neutral peace enforcers. Secretary Holbrooke used the term "evenhanded," which is a distinction between neutral.

We pursued policies in the past which have succeeded in handicapping the Bosnian Muslims. We now intend to pursue policies to rectify this imbalance. So it is very clear that we are not neutral.

I remember Aretha Franklin, a great soul singer, had a song out a few years ago called *Who's Zooming Who?* And the question we would have is who are we zooming in terms of trying to pretend that whether we do it directly or whether we get the Turks or the Malaysians or the Thais or someone else to provide the weapons and the training indirectly what we do not do directly, I mean, who is in fact fooled by such an arrangement?

This is not the hand of the United States operating to achieve that balance, which is not there at this time. So I think that is one of the reasons why you are seeing such a strong statement coming out of this side of the table at least and I suspect on the Senate

floor as well, in terms of trying to define exactly what the mission is to rectify the imbalance.

Hopefully, it can be done by arms reduction. But in the meantime, I think you will find many members insisting that the process of preparing for the buildup of the Bosnian Muslims takes place in the forefront rather than at the end of the 180 days.

So that by June, for example, the Bosnian Muslims, should the arms reductions not take place on the part of the Serbs, that they would be in a position to receive the arms and have the training underway. They would then be on a relatively level playing field at that time, so when the troops start coming out in October, they will be in a better position to be able to defend themselves. I think that is one of the reasons why this debate is taking place as far as the shaping of the resolution.

I would like to turn to you, General Shalikashvili, about the mode of deployment. As I understand it, and I missed some of your testimony, I assume we are going to have certain fixed positions in the region of Tuzla, and we will have mobile patrols along the DMZ, so to speak.

General SHALIKASHVILI. We will have brigade zones. The brigades will be garrisoned and have areas of responsibility that cover essentially the area of the Federation right now and specific sectors of the separation line between the two factions.

Senator COHEN. But they are going to be mobile. They are not going to be just in fixed positions.

General SHALIKASHVILI. That is correct.

Senator COHEN. They are going to be traversing back and forth, daytime, night patrols, I assume. We will not simply be in a fixed position.

General SHALIKASHVILI. We will not be simply in fixed positions, and there obviously will be patrols to ensure that the separation lines are adhered to.

Senator COHEN. Explain to me again the rules of engagement. Assuming you have, let us say, a Bosnian Serb rifle company out on a night mission, and their goal appears to be to attack a Muslim village, as such, across that separation line, and they appear to be operating in a hostile manner. We pick them up by infrared capability.

What is the responsibility of that—or the understanding, I should say—of that young second lieutenant or captain who is out there on that patrol? Does he contact the group and say stop?

If they bear no hostile intent toward the U.S. forces, does that not mean—does it mean that he cannot respond aggressively or preemptively with fire, if necessary, to prevent them from going across? What is his understanding, or her understanding if it happens to be a woman in charge?

General SHALIKASHVILI. His rules of engagement allow him to use force to include deadly force if he sees that element that you say violating a portion of the military task of the peace agreement, which in this particular example of yours is the separation and not entering into that four kilometer zone.

If he feels that he cannot prevent them from doing it any other way, he may use up to deadly force. Or if he in any way feels that they intend this to do him harm or in fact are attempting to do him

harm, he again may use force to include deadly force to prevent that.

Senator COHEN. If they are attempting to circumvent the agreement by going around without posing a threat to the U.S. or NATO forces—

General SHALIKASHVILI. In order to get the job done, he also may use force to include deadly force.

Senator COHEN. In a preemptive manner, if necessary.

General SHALIKASHVILI. In a preemptive manner, if necessary.

Secretary PERRY. Senator Cohen, may I add to that? What General Shali has said is exactly right, but I do want to emphasize that these troops are well trained and well disciplined, and they will not use force promiscuously. They are not going to be cowboys out there.

I have testified to that before. I want to reemphasize the point. We are not seeking a fight, but we are prepared. And we are prepared either if we are attacked, or if we see people flagrantly violating the peace agreement, we are prepared to use it.

Senator COHEN. I think it has to be very clear, because I recall seeing some of the scenes with our troops deployed to Haiti and they were keeping the peace.

On one side of the fence we were seeing the populace being beaten by a group of thugs, and we stood idly by because the rules of engagement in our mission were rather unclear.

I think if you are talking about sending some of our young men and women out on night patrols in an area as dangerous as that of the Balkans, those rules have to be very clearly understood in terms of exactly what the responsibility of the U.S. forces are going to be and—

Secretary PERRY. Senator Cohen, that incident you referred to in Haiti was the first time that happened. It did not—it was not the second time that happened.

Senator COHEN. I understand.

Secretary PERRY. The rules of engagement were carefully explained to the troops, so that did not happen again.

Senator COHEN. My understanding is, Secretary Perry and I think Secretary Holbrooke as well, you have to depart at 2:00 o'clock.

Senator Levin, do you have another round of questions?

I am sorry, Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I am going to be brief once again. I just want to start out by asking this question that I believe probably should be directed at you, Mr. Ambassador.

As I understand it, about 25 nations have now pledged two-thirds of the Bosnian peacekeeping forces, is that correct? Is there any nation that has been asked to contribute troops who have not done so?

General SHALIKASHVILI. I do not know if—do you mean non-NATO forces or NATO forces?

Senator EXON. Any nation that we have requested or hoped would contribute troops. Have any refused?

Secretary PERRY. We have not asked nations—

Senator EXON. None.

Secretary PERRY.—to contribution troops. These are all volunteers. All NATO nations, except Iceland, have volunteered troops. They have already proposed to put in troops. And more than a dozen non-NATO nations have volunteered.

Of the ones which we specifically discussed this with, which were the Nordic nations, because they already have a battalion in the area we are going to be in, two of them were NATO, two non-NATO, all four have agreed to participate.

Senator EXON. In other words, everybody has come forth.

Secretary PERRY. Everybody that we have discussed it with have come forth, yes.

Senator EXON. Then let me follow on with this question, and whoever you feel comfortable in answering it: What do you believe—and I suspect it would be your turf, Mr. Ambassador.

What do you believe would happen to the resolve of these nations to place their troops, two-thirds of the total force, in potential harm's way if the United States was to renege on its commitment? Do you believe that the other nations would step up and fill the shortfall?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. No, sir.

Senator EXON. Or under that eventuality, what do you think would happen?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Not a chance. The other nations are there because we are the spine of this operation, the leadership. We are the world's leader. They want to be there because we are there.

In amplification to your earlier question, many nations came forward that we did not expect to come forward, like Hungary, which wants to be there, the Czech Republic, which wants to be there because we are there. The major British and French and Italian NATO allies cannot go without us because we are an integrated command.

So the answer to your question is without the U.S., no NATO, no IFOR, no peace implementation.

Senator EXON. A logical follow-on question to that, Mr. Secretary, would be if such an eventuality, if after the commitment of 25 nations, some of them not even NATO who have committed forces there, as a senior diplomat who understands obligations and the commitments and what other nations expect of us, would it not be terribly complicated for you to continue with your diplomatic efforts if the United States of America would renege on its commitment?

It would place the United States of America in a most difficult position worldwide, would it not?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes, sir.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Secretary PERRY. To that I would add, Senator Exon, I think this would be the end of NATO as an effective security organization. It certainly would be the end of American leadership in NATO, but I think more than that, it would be the end of NATO as an effective security organization.

Senator EXON. And let me point out—I think that is an excellent point. I would hope that point would be made. I hope all understand that from its very beginning we have had an American com-

mander in NATO and have an American commander there leading now.

It would seem to me that if, for example, we would renege, the first thing we would have to do is to recall or have our military leader there, the general that is there now, removed from NATO, because this is essentially a NATO operation. Is that an accurate statement?

Secretary PERRY. It is not only that the NATO—the American general is the supreme commander of the allied forces in Europe, but we also have American four star Admiral Smith, who is specifically the commander of the IFOR operation. And yes, your statement is correct.

Senator EXON. Thank you.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator COHEN. Senator Levin, did you have one?

Senator LEVIN. Two questions quickly on exit strategy. We all hope that some of those civilian goals and missions take root, I think, here, to use General Shalikashvili's word, during the year.

But even if none of them took root, if the military missions were accomplished, we are out of there in a year, is that correct?

Secretary PERRY. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Secondly, I want to see if the State Department agrees with what I believe was Secretary Perry's response to Senator Bryan, that while it is our intention, determination, to ensure that there is equilibrium at the end of that year, that if we were not successful, that that would not preclude the removal of NATO troops. Does the State Department agree with that?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I agree with it, but I would stress what Secretary Perry added, which is that as we approach the end of the year, if we saw that coming, we could take measures to avoid it.

So I think it is a self-denying problem. It will not happen. If we carry out—

Senator LEVIN. Would you agree with his answer to Senator Bryan?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Oh, sure. Of course.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I agree with everything Secretary Perry says.

Senator LEVIN. Well, in particular, do you agree with that one, though?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Oh, absolutely.

Senator LEVIN. I think that is a very important question I was trying to get at earlier in terms of I know it is our goal. I share that goal. I never wanted this embargo there to begin with.

So this is coming from someone who deeply believes we should work to achieve that equilibrium. And we should do it in a way which does not in any way jeopardize our troops. I just want to know what the answer is on that.

By the way, the other side of that coin, if I may say, the other side of that coin is that for those who disagree with that answer is that we ought to keep our troops there even longer until an equilibrium were achieved.

I am not so sure that there are many of us that want to take that position particularly. I think your position, your answer to Senator Bryan's question, is the better of the two positions.

There is no great answer to any of these questions. There are just better or worse answers. And I think your position is the better one, that we can do this without jeopardizing our troops if it is done through a third party.

Our goal should be genuinely to do it in a year. We are confident we can do it in a year. But that is not one of the military missions.

If it is not achieved, for whatever reason, in a year, that does not preclude the removal of those NATO forces. That is now both Defense Department and State Department statements of policy, is that correct?

Secretary PERRY. Correct. You stated my position better than I stated it. Thank you, Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. No. I think you stated it very well. Thank you.

Senator COHEN. Let me close, Mr. Secretary and Secretary Holbrooke and General, to point out there are two heads to that particular coin on NATO as well. One is that if the United States fails to participate at this point, it is the end of NATO.

The other side of that particular coin is that in the event that we do participate and things go awry militarily, we suffer heavy casualties, and public opinion demands a pullout, as we did in Somalia, that, too, will spell the end of NATO.

So it is not just if we do not go in, we lose NATO; if we do go in and circumstances do not go according to our plan, it could well spell the end of NATO as well, because public opinion has not been persuaded at this point.

The public has not been persuaded that it is the wise thing to do. The President does not have broad-based support for it.

And when body bags come home, as they are likely to do, hopefully in very limited numbers, you can expect that that opinion is going to solidify and put tremendous pressure upon a reluctant Congress and an administration to bring the troops home well before the nine months that currently they are planning on. That, too, could spell the end of NATO, if that situation occurs.

Thank all of you for testifying. It has been very helpful. Hopefully, we will continue to work the issue. The committee will stand adjourned.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

##### NATO IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

Senator THURMOND. President Clinton provided conditional approval of the NATO plan over the weekend, prior to authorizing the deployment of U.S. military forces to Bosnia and Croatia in an advance element. I understand that NATO gave its provisional approval to the SACEUR plan, and that details are to be worked out prior to the formal signing of the agreement next week. What are the details that remain to be addressed?

General SHALIMASHVILI. This answer was provided on page 51 of the testimony, beginning on line 7.

Secretary PERRY. The North Atlantic Council formally approved Operation Joint Endeavor, also known as OPLAN 10405, on December 16, 1995.

## MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT

Senator THURMOND. Both you, General Shalikashvili and the President have stated that the mission of the implementation forces is clear, that its goals and objectives are achievable and that the United States forces will leave after a year. How will the United States know that it has accomplished its mission and is ready to leave—and if the U.S. achieved its objectives and goals in a shorter time frame, would U.S. forces depart earlier?

Secretary PERRY. We believe the mission can be accomplished in one year, so we have built our plan based on that timeline. The mission is simple and straightforward: (1) to ensure compliance with the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement, including in particular the withdrawal of forces of the Formerly Warring Factions to their respective territories within the timeline specified in the agreement and establishing agreed lines of separation between those forces; (2) within the limits imposed by the military mission, to ensure that a secure environment is created for implementation of the civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement. The key military tasks of the agreement are also clear: to establish IFOR rapidly; to control the withdrawal of non-transferred UN forces; to ensure IFOR's self-defense and freedom of movement; to monitor and enforce compliance by all parties with the military annex of the Dayton Agreement; to supervise the marking of boundaries and zones of separation between the Parties; to establish Joint Military Commissions at appropriate levels; and other supporting tasks. We believe the timetable established is realistic because most of the specific military tasks in the agreement can be completed in the first six months. Thereafter, IFOR's role will be to maintain a stable and secure environment that will permit other civilian aspects of implementation, such as elections. We expect that a majority of these civil functions will be successfully initiated in one year.

General SHALIKASHVILI. IFOR has six (6) measurable military implementation tasks: (1) Monitor, and if necessary enforce, the withdrawal and redeployment of forces to their respective territories within agreed periods and the establishment of a Zone of Separation. (2) Authorize and supervise the selective marking of the Agreed Cease-Fire Line, the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, and Zones of Separation. (3) Establish and man the four kilometer Zone of Separation. (4) Establish liaison arrangements with local civilian and military authorities and other international organizations as necessary. (5) Create Joint Military Commissions to resolve disputes between the Parties. (6) Assist in the withdrawal of UN forces not transferred to the IFOR.

In addition to these military tasks, IFOR will provide a secure environment in which civilian implementation tasks can begin and conditions for reduced and stable regional military balance can be achieved.

Overall, we believe these end state conditions will require about 12 months.

## MISSION CREEP

Senator THURMOND. Many of the international humanitarian organizations will be unable to begin operations until at least six months into the deployment of IFOR. How will U.S. military forces and NATO forces avoid mission creep?

Secretary PERRY. I disagree with the assumption of the question. The fact is that many international humanitarian organizations were carrying out their work under very difficult circumstances before the IFOR deployment. IFOR, which will be established very quickly, will allow such organizations to expand their efforts almost immediately. The U.S. government will continue to work with our allies in the Bosnia peace effort to ensure that the non-military aspects of the peace, allotted to the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and to other non-military organizations, go forward as planned. U.S. other forces committed to IFOR will avoid "mission creep" by having a detailed operational plan, approved by U.S. and NATO political authorities, that clearly lays out their mission and the tasks associated with completing that mission. Our military commanders understand their mission quite well and will work diligently to complete it successfully and on schedule.

## MILITARY STRATEGIC BALANCE

Senator THURMOND. How will the U.S. enforce the peace, supervise and enforce an arms build-down and ensure military strategic balance, as well as support plans to train and arm the Bosnian Muslims?

Secretary PERRY. The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR), versus solely the United States, is responsible for enforcing the military provisions of the Dayton Agreement. IFOR will carry out its peace enforcement mission under the auspices

of NATO's North Atlantic Council and with the cooperation of the Formerly Warring Factions (FWF). IFOR will carry out its duties in an even-handed manner for the duration of its mission in Bosnia.

Neither the United States nor IFOR are responsible for supervising or enforcing an arms build-down in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As set forth in the Dayton Agreement, arms control negotiations between the Parties will take place under the supervision of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Enforcement of agreed-upon arms control measures, to include inspections or other verification mechanisms, will be addressed by these negotiations. The U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) will provide some technical assistance on educating the Parties about how to conduct arms control-related inspections. Under Annex IB of the Dayton Agreement, it is the responsibility of the Parties themselves to agree upon arms control measures. Annex IB sets certain limits for arms which take effect automatically if the Parties are unable to reach agreement on further reductions.

As a complement to arms control measures, the United States and other nations will be involved in efforts to provide the Bosnian Federation with the means to defend itself in the future against potential regional aggression. We believe that the Train and Equip program will act as a stabilizing force for the entire Balkan region by creating a level playing field among specific countries. While the United States will provide some defense equipment and arms in support of the Train and Equip program, we expect the bulk of support to come from other contributing nations.

General SHALIHASHIVILI. The role of the U.S., as part of IFOR, is limited to assisting the Parties in implementing the military aspects of the Peace Agreement. The U.S. is not tasked with monitoring the implementation of the arms control regime or forcibly disarming any Parties if they fail to comply with arms control limits. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the lead organization responsible for the implementation and verification of arms control agreements. The "equip and train" program is for the Bosnian Federation, not just the Bosnian Muslims. The U.S. has made a commitment to the Federation that it will lead an international effort to give the Federation the capability to adequately defend itself when IFOR leaves. Providing arms and training to the Federation forces will not be done by either IFOR or U.S. military forces; instead, the U.S. will coordinate the efforts of third countries and contractor personnel. The U.S. believes that this civilianization and coordination methodology will assure the impartiality of the U.S. and IFOR vis-a-vis the Bosnian Serbs.

#### UNITED NATIONS AND NATO COOPERATION

Senator THURMOND. There have been concerns about NATO "mission creep." The United Nations will end its military peacekeeping role but is to remain active in civil matters such as refugee resettlement and reconstruction. NATO's role is to create a secure environment for the critical functions of securing peace in the region by creating and enforcing a zone of separation between the military forces and enforcing the cease-fire. According to the press reports, however, the peace agreement appears to place more responsibility for civil affairs activities on NATO commanders. Is there a way for NATO to avoid being overloaded with tasks that are not specifically military in nature?

Do you believe the United Nations and NATO will be able to operate together and cooperate without causing friction between the military and the civil responsibilities of the two diverse organizations?

Secretary PERRY. The mission of the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) is to enforce the military aspects, specifically Annex IA, of the Dayton Agreement. IFOR will avoid "mission creep" by having a detailed operational plan, approved by the U.S. and NATO political authorities, that clearly lays out the military mission and the specific tasks associated with the successful completion of that mission. IFOR military commanders clearly understand the boundaries of their mission. They will work to create the type of secure environment that will allow important civil work to go forward. The civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement will be coordinated and implemented by the UN appointed High Representative, Carl Bildt. A variety of international organizations, such as the OSCE, the UNHCR, and the ICRC, will assist the efforts of the High Representative.

General SHALIHASHIVILI. The Peace Agreement clearly delineates responsibility for military and civilian implementation tasks. It also established the office of the High Representative to oversee and facilitate civilian aspects of GFAP implementation, but gave him no authority over the IFOR commander. The Joint Civilian Commission provides the forum for the IFOR Commander to formally interact with all civilian and political leaders. The establishment of these precise responsibilities, leadership roles and authorities, as well as an appropriate forum for leadership inter-



action, bode well for the prevention of NATO mission creep and for smooth UN-NATO cooperation.

Senator THURMOND. The U.S. military forces, as well as other participants in the Implementation Forces could wind up being taken captive by local resistance groups, for a number of reasons, such as the groups feeling that the forces are partial to a particular group. Will U.S. forces be treated as prisoners of war or political detainees?

Secretary PERRY. The Defense Department believes that with the signing of the Dayton Agreement, all of the formerly warring factions in Bosnia have expressed a true commitment to peace. The significant amount of cooperation afforded IFOR by the various local parties over the last three months is not only indicative of this commitment, but has also resulted in a significant lowering of the possibility that U.S. IFOR personnel will be detained against their will.

Shortly after the Dayton Agreement was signed, Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) were concluded among all parties to the peace accords. Under these SOFAs, IFOR personnel are accorded the status of "experts on mission," and as such are immune from arrest and detention. Rest assured that if any U.S. personnel are detained, DoD will immediately seek their release and take all necessary steps to secure their release. Additionally, IFOR will have the authority to take all necessary steps to rescue any of its personnel who are unlawfully detained. DoD will also work to ensure that detained U.S. personnel are accorded specific international protections afforded to them under the Geneva Convention.

Although the Defense Department does not believe that U.S. personnel are at serious risk of being detained by the formerly warring factions, prudence dictates that our forces are prepared for this contingency. First and foremost, this involves providing them with the necessary training, equipment, and firepower to deal with any situation that may arise. Secondly, before being sent to Bosnia, U.S. military personnel were instructed by the Joint Services Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Agency. During the training given to troops as part of this instruction, they were informed that, although they are technically not POWs, the Code of Conduct remains applicable to them should they be detained against their will. Also, given the unique nature of the IFOR mission, U.S. personnel are also being instructed that, should they be detained, they are not to act as combatants and not to attempt an escape under hostile conditions, but to request their immediate release and to seek an audience with a U.S. Government or NATO representative. U.S. personnel are also being instructed that, instead of being limited to basic military information, they are permitted to explain the circumstances of their situation to their captors.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. [Witness did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files.]

Senator THURMOND. Secretary Perry, I am aware that there is an agreement reached with the regard to the Russian brigade that will be sent to the Balkans. It is my understanding that there is an agreement to put Russian brigade under General Joulwan's operational control, but giving him a Russian deputy who will transmit Joulwan's orders to the brigade. What I'm unclear on is the "political control." I've seen your testimony before other Committees that say that the Russians will have the opportunity to consult, to be fully informed and to have input on matters involving Russian forces. This will be accomplished by a formal consultative committee and the final decisions of political control will be left to the North Atlantic Council, to preserve the unity of command. If Russia disagrees, then they will hear each other out, but the final decision is NATO's.

I'm concerned that if hostilities break out, whether it's patrolling the zone of separation or resettling refugees, action will need to be quick and decisive. How will this "political control" decision making process work quickly enough to respond?

Secretary PERRY. The Russian Brigade participating in Operation JOINT Endeavor will fall under the operational control of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, General Joulwan, with Russian COL-General Shevtsov, based in Brussels, acting as his deputy for Russian forces. Timely orders to Colonel Lentsov, the Russian Airborne Brigade Commander based in Bosnia, will flow from General Joulwan through COL-General Shevtsov. In addition, Major General Nash, commander of IFOR's Multinational Division North, will have tactical control over the Russian forces operating in his sector. Such command organization will work to ensure that swift and decisive instructions can be transmitted through IFOR's chain of command to the Russian Brigade. Furthermore, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), to include a special consultative mechanism, is currently being negotiated between NATO and Russia to codify the political terms of Russia's IFOR participation.

Senator THURMOND. Secretary Perry, the President has reaffirmed that the deployment of U.S. troops to Bosnia will not last more than one year. The Administra-

tion has referred to this as a "time-based exit strategy." How sound is an exit strategy that is based on an arbitrary deadline? Can you guarantee that the deployment of U.S. troops will not exceed one year? As you well know, after the United States engages in a region, it is very difficult to extract itself. I'm reminded that after Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the United States has continued to be heavily engaged in defending Kuwait, namely operation "Vigilant Warrior" in October 1994, which sent thousands of American soldiers to Kuwait on almost no notice. In addition, President Clinton has just announced an extension of the U.S. military presence in Haiti. Given this recent history, the larger amount of U.S. troops involved, and the more volatile region, do you think this is a realistic time frame?

Secretary PERRY. Yes, I do. After consulting with senior US and NATO military planners, we believe the IFOR mission can be accomplished in one year. This schedule is realistic because the specific military tasks as outlined in the Dayton Agreement can be completed in the first six months of the operation. Thereafter, IFOR's role will be to maintain a climate of stability that will permit important civil work to go forward. We expect that these civil functions initiated by the High Representative and other international organizations will be well underway within the one-year time frame. By providing a secure environment in which the civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement can take hold, the Parties will be able to break the cycle of violence and commit themselves to rebuilding Bosnia-Herzegovina, thus lessening the need for IFOR's military presence. In the final analysis, it is up to the Parties, themselves, to achieve peace. IFOR's one-year deployment will provide them with that opportunity.

Senator THURMOND. The military annex to the General Framework Agreement tasks the IFOR with helping to create "secure conditions for the conduct of others tasks associated with the peace settlement." How will we know when these "secure conditions" have been achieved? How will we judge the overall success of the IFOR mission? What measures of effectiveness are to be used in evaluating the mission's success or failure?

Secretary PERRY. IFOR's mission includes helping to ensure "secure conditions for the conduct of other tasks associated with the peace settlement." Judging if secure conditions have been achieved is largely a function of IFOR's ability to carry out its mission as outlined in the Dayton Agreement. A continuation of the previously negotiated cease-fire, an end to organized resistance against international forces, and freedom of movement within Bosnia-Herzegovina serve as three examples of such "secure conditions." To date, we believe these conditions have been achieved. Also, we expect that within the one-year IFOR deployment, political and economic reconstruction efforts by the Parties and international civilian agencies will take hold, thus lessening the need for IFOR's presence. Additionally, IFOR's ability to carry out its duties as outlined in the Peace Agreement will be the key test in determining overall mission success. The IFOR commander, Admiral Leighton Smith, has determined that the Formerly Warring Factions are generally complying with the military terms, specifically, Annex IA, of the Dayton Agreement. For example, the Parties have withdrawn their forces behind the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, have begun demobilizing their armies, and have entered into negotiations on arms control measures. They have also started to consolidate air defense assets and other large weapons into containment areas. In light of IFOR's robust force presence and rules of engagement, we expect such compliance with the Dayton Agreement to continue.

#### EASTERN SLAVONIA

Senator THURMOND. The conflict in Eastern Slavonia appears to be on the back burner. This situation remains volatile and could endanger the overall peace in the region. There were evidently promises made by the United States that the area would be returned to Croatia within a one- to two-year timeframe, and that Croats who were displaced from this area would be able to return to their homes. What is the United States position on Eastern Slavonia?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. [Witness did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files.]

#### SURVIVAL OF MUSLIM-CROAT FEDERATION

Senator THURMOND. The Dayton peace agreement creates a single state, Bosnia-Herzegovina, to be governed by the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Serb Republic. In essence the peace agreement does not address the issues that caused the parties to go to war. The peace agreement at best will act as a cease fire agreement, that will only be successful so long as the NATO implementation force remains in the region.

How can an imposed peace that does not reflect political realities or the basic concerns of the warring factions hope to survive, without the continued enforcement by thousands of NATO forces?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. [Witness did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files.]

#### U.S. FUTURE COMMITMENT TO BOSNIA

Senator THURMOND. The President has committed to the continued existence of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a nation beyond a one year timeframe. This would imply that the President has made commitments beyond that of an initial year long deployment of U.S. military ground forces. Has or will the United States incur some form of continuing security obligation to Bosnia, even alter the bulk of U.S. ground forces leave the region after twelve months?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. [Witness did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files.]

#### CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS TO WITHDRAW U.S. MILITARY FORCES

Senator THURMOND. President Clinton has stated that U.S. military forces would withdraw if there was a breakdown in the agreement and fighting in the region were to be renewed. It appears highly unlikely that the warring factions would renew its fighting since in the short run it is in the interests of all parties to take a rest, at which time they would be able to rearm themselves. The more likely scenario would be sporadic resistance and intransigence at a local level. What plans are there to deal with resistance efforts against the Implementation Force?

Secretary PERRY. In the event of such violations, including any attacks against Implementation Force personnel, IFOR will take swift and decisive action to ensure full compliance with the military provisions of the Dayton Agreement. IFOR's NATO-approved Rules of Engagement (ROE) are robust and will enable IFOR to deal effectively with any challenges to its authority.

#### CAPTURE OF WAR CRIMINALS

Senator THURMOND. You made a comment that the policy on arresting war criminals, and in particular, Radovan Karadzic and General Mladic was not precise. However, you also said that if American forces have authority to arrest the Bosnian Serb political and military officials. If the policy is not precise, is the authority clear and do the troops understand their authority?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. [Witness did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files.]

### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICK SANTORUM

#### REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT

Senator SANTORUM. Secretary Holbrooke and General Shali, after viewing the General Framework Agreement, I'm a little unclear about some of the missions our troops will carry out, particularly with regard to refugee resettlement. Will the Rules of Engagement allow U.S. forces to be used to pro-actively implement ALL aspects of the peace accord? Will U.S. forces be used to forcibly evacuate citizens from their homes in order to resettle refugees previously displaced? The movement by refugees displaced by the war in Bosnia has been a cause of fighting and was the spark that ignited the Muslim-Croat conflict in 1993. How will IFOR help create the conditions for a just resettlement of displaced refugees?

General SHALHASHVILI. IFOR's presence will provide a stable and secure environment throughout the country so that rebuilding, refugee resettlement, and other civil tasks may occur. IFOR will operate under a robust ROE and with authority to implement the military aspects of the agreement and to ensure its own security. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has been designated as lead agency for refugee matters and will coordinate a phased, orderly return of refugees. Security for this movement will be provided primarily by local police monitored by the International Police Task Force, and supplemented by protection officers from UNHCR and human rights monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. IFOR commanders have the authority to intervene in the event of an attack on international organization personnel or a gross violation of human rights. U.S. forces will not be involved in the forcible evacuation of citizens. Enforcement of decisions by the Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees is a civilian implementation matter.

## CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR MINOR INFRACTIONS OF AGREEMENT

Senator SANTORUM. General Shali, President Clinton has stated that should the peace accord break down, U.S. troops would withdraw rather than stay in the midst of a renewed civil war. What is the contingency plan for something short of a complete breakdown? In other words, if there are sporadic and local levels of resistance as military planners are predicting, would we stay there at the current mission, or will we respond by defending ourselves and perhaps inadvertently drawing the U.S. in on one side?

General SHALHASHVILI. Whenever the operational situation permits, every reasonable effort will be made to resolve a potential hostile confrontation by means other than the use of force. If necessary, commanders have the authority to use force and have the right and obligation to take all necessary and appropriate action for unit and self-defense. U.S. forces will respond in an even-handed manner and not take sides in the conflict. In the event of a major breakdown in compliance, the North Atlantic Council will assess the situation, with advice from NATO Military Authorities, and authorize appropriate changes in the mission and ROE.

## POLITICAL CONTROL

Senator SANTORUM. Secretary Perry, I am aware that there is an agreement reached with regard to the Russian brigade that will be sent to the Balkans. It is my understanding that there is an agreement to put the Russian brigade under General Joulwan's operational control, but giving him a Russian deputy who will transmit Joulwan's orders to the brigade. What I'm unclear on is the "political control." I've seen your testimony before other Committees that says that the Russian will have the opportunity to consult, to be fully informed and to have input on matters involving Russian forces. This will be accomplished by a formal consultative committee and the final decisions of political control will be left to the North Atlantic Council, to preserve the unity of command. If Russia disagrees, then they will hear each other out, but the final decision is NATO's.

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## TIME-BASED EXIT STRATEGY

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[Whereupon, at 2:10 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]



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